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
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REVELATION AND REASON  
IN  
ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

By the same Author

*In English :*

HINDUISM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT  
THE RHYTHM OF THE REAL  
EVOLUTION OF PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA  
ṢAD-DARŚANA SAMUCCAYA (TRANSLATION AND  
NOTES)

*In Telugu :*

BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ VYĀKHYĀNAMU  
ISOPANIṢAD VIVARAṆAMU  
RĀMĀNUJA DARŚANAM  
DESCARTES' DISCOURSE (TRANSLATION AND  
INTRODUCTION)



# REVELATION AND REASON IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

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*Visiting Professor, Princeton University, 1959*

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TO  
SRI VENKATESWARA

“निर्मलानन्तकल्याणनिधये विष्णवे नमः”

P#1P2

12-2-22

सुदृष्ट-पु

—मम





## PREFACE

I wrote this book some years ago, but it could not be published earlier. If I were to write a book now on this subject my treatment of it would be different, but I believe I would make almost the same criticisms and perhaps come to the same conclusions, though my emphasis on certain points and my formulation of the problems discussed would be different.

The following considerations led me to study this subject : The majority of the great world-religions claim to be in possession of a final truth, deposited in a sacred scripture. While most of them agree that such truth had been disclosed by God at a particular time, some religious philosophies (e.g. the Mīmāṃsā) aver that it is eternal. The importance of the conception of 'revelation' and its philosophical implications have been discussed by many thinkers in Europe, specially with reference to the Christian situation. Some of the Gifford lecturers, such as N. Soderblom, A. E. Taylor and Wm. Temple, have dealt with this topic. J. Maritain, E. Brunner, N. Berdyaev, E. Gilson, J. Baillie, H. H. Farmer and others have devoted entire books to the discussion of this problem. The work done in recent decades by Karl Barth, M. Buber, R. Bultmann and other German theologians, as well as the British Academy lectures of C. C. J. Webb and N. Kemp Smith in 1930 and 1931, have revolutionized the conception of the knowledge of God. In the light of my acquaintance with these developments, I restudied the Advaita Vedānta, which is a religion as well as a philosophic system to many in the Indian subcontinent; and I came to realize that the concept of scriptural authority occupies an important place not only in this system, but also in other Hindu systems, and that some of the problems which are being grappled with by modern thinkers had been anticipated, at least in a dim way, by Indian thinkers.

The following pages contain a fairly exhaustive study and criticism of the problem of scriptural authority (*śrīti prāmāṇya viçāra*) in the Advaita Vedānta, based on a study of the



Sanskrit texts; and the exposition as well as the translations of passages are mine. Though much has been written on Śankara and the Advaita, no study of the Advaita Vedānta, so far as I know, is available from this point of view; and it is hoped that this book will be a contribution towards a better understanding of a system of which P. Deussen has said: 'On the tree of wisdom there is no fairer flower than the Upaniṣads and no finer fruit than the Vedānta philosophy.' (*Outline of the Vedānta*, Prefatory Note.)

In view of the many modern works on the subject, I have given only a brief historical account of Advaita Vedānta in the Introduction. I have divided the whole work into two Books, each consisting of two Parts. Book One contains exposition, while comparisons and criticisms have been made in Book Two. In Part One of Book One, after giving a summary of the Advaita conception of God and revelation, the Advaita conception of scriptural testimony and interpretation is expounded. Part Two of Book One deals with the function of reason in the Advaita Vedānta. All the arguments and conclusions in Book One are those of the Advaita Vedāntin (unless expressly stated otherwise), and I have refrained from making any appraisal of them in it.

Part One of Book Two contains a study of the remaining five systems of Hindu philosophy, with reference to the two allied topics: (1) Knowledge of God, and (2) Nature of Scriptural Authority. In this part, immediately after stating the views of each school, I have added one or two paragraphs of criticism. Since the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas develop their own views by trenchantly criticising each other and the Vedānta, exposition of their views automatically constitutes criticism of the doctrines in Book One. I have given considerable space to the Nyāya conception of Testimony and God, because I concur with it more or less. Further, little attention has been paid to the Nyāya theology by any modern writer, in spite of the fact that it attempts to meet almost every kind of criticism of theological proofs (including those made by Hume, Kant and C. D. Broad); and an analysis of it shows how far (if at all) inferential reasoning can give us knowledge of God. In Part Two of Book Two, I have attempted to make an independent criticism of the Advaita



metaphysics, theology and 'Vedic revelation', and have also displayed the temerity to indicate in brief how more satisfactory solutions of these problems are possible. In general, my views on Revelation in this book are in agreement with those of the Nyāya writer Jayanta, while my conception of God differs very little from that of Rāmānuja. In writing this Part, my studies of European thinkers have been very helpful in suggesting critical reflections and positive comments.

The material in this book was originally submitted as a thesis for the Ph.D. Degree of Andhra University. I now come to some comments made about this book when it was read in typescript. It has been suggested that the history of the Advaita Vedānta and the chronology of the various commentators should have been more clearly indicated. While I admit that this would have been more helpful to some readers, I submit that as this book does not claim to be a contribution to historical research in Indian philosophy and as there are books dealing with the history of Indian philosophy, more historical details would have merely added to its bulk. Also, it ought to be remembered that it has not so far been possible to construct anything like an unanimously accepted complete history of Indian philosophy; and in the case of quite a good number of important commentators, we have no information about their dates and the places they lived at. I have relied for dates on well-known Indian writers such as Dr. Radhakrishnan and Sri Rahul Sankrityāyana.

It has been suggested that I could have given a detailed treatment of Bhartṛhari and Jaina and Buddhist theories in connection with my discussions of linguistic problems, and that my discussions of *lakṣaṇā* and *tātparya* could have been amplified in the light of modern developments in the West. These are all problems which are important and deserve special monographs. I limited myself only to the Advaita Vedānta and the five non-Vedāntic schools of Hindu philosophy for the sake of making comparisons. One cannot deal fully in a single volume with all the philosophical schools and *all* the issues that may emerge in the course of discussions. Every author has to select his material, and to some it may look arbitrary; but no treatment of any subject can ever be complete.

A possible criticism is whether it is necessary to have both Book One and Book Two in such detail. This, in other words, means: Is it necessary that there should be a long discussion of the proper methods of Vedic interpretation, the different theories regarding the nature of the Veda etc., to write a book on revelation and reason? On the other hand, to expound the position of the Advaita Vedānta and compare it with some other systems of Hindu thought, is it necessary to enter into all the discussion that has been carried on in Part Two of Book Two? A Western theologian may raise the former kind of objection, and a Sanskritist of the latter kind. If one wanted to expound the Advaita Vedānta with reference to its treatment of scriptural testimony, and if that system regards the *śruti* as eternal revelation, there seems to be no reason why the nature of such testimony and the methods of interpreting it should not be discussed in a book dealing with that subject. Similarly, when the principle of non-duality is taken to be the content of revelation which alone is the means of *mokṣa*, discussion of this principle, its formulation and its relationship to empirical knowledge becomes relevant. The second half of this book is intended to provide a comparative study of the material dealt with in the first half, and then the grounds for criticising it, so that something constructive might emerge in the course of such reflections on the first half. Perhaps, it was not necessary to write *all* the earlier part to make the criticisms and to draw the conclusions found in the latter part; and for a *mere* exposition of the Vedānta the second book is not needed. But I wanted to expound, compare and also criticise. One can always write a shorter book, and I agree, with Lessing, that a big book is a big evil.

Some of the above considerations show why I did not devote any space to the 'higher criticism' of the Vedas. A perusal of this book will reveal that I am not a Hindu fundamentalist. I hold that the principles and the methodology that have been evolved in the West since the time of Spinoza's *Tractatus* for interpreting the Bible ought to be applied to all religious scriptures. The various points I make in the last part of this book make it clear that Vedic studies would result in sound



## PREFACE

conclusions only when the higher criticism of the texts is not neglected.

Since all my exposition is based on original texts and commentaries and since I take the responsibility for all the interpretations given, I did not feel it necessary to append a list of modern publications dealing with some of the topics discussed in Book One. I knew that there were some workers in this field, and I read their writings and profited thereby. But, except in the case of chronology, there was no direct indebtedness to modern exponents of the Vedānta.

In transliterating Sanskrit terms and passages, I have followed the usual method, except that I have omitted the ~ sign and the dots on the top of some letters. Except the names of persons, schools and well-known books and words like 'Brahman', 'dharma' and 'Ātman', all Sanskritic words and phrases have been italicised. "The Vedānta" and "the Advaita" refer to the philosophy developed by the school of Śāṅkara, while "Vedānta" refers to the Upaniṣadic teaching as such and "Advaita" to non-duality.

In the attempt to develop my views on the problem of Reason and Revelation, I was greatly helped by discussions with Prof. I. T. Ramsey (Nolloth Professor at Oxford) in 1954. Professor H. H. Price of Oxford and Professors C. D. Broad and H. H. Farmer of Cambridge were kind enough to spend some time in discussions with me on more than one occasion. While none of these eminent thinkers should be implicated in a share of any of my heresies and confusions, I am grateful to them for the many fruitful conversations I had with them. Discussions with the late Dr. E. C. Dewick enabled me to express myself at some places more clearly than I could by myself.

I am grateful to the Spalding Trust and its Secretary, Mr. K. D. D. Henderson, for the subvention they have given to make this publication possible. I thank the authorities of Andhra University, especially its Vice-Chancellor, Dr. V. S. Krishna, for publishing this book.

I am thankful to the Columbia University Press for bringing out an American edition of this book. I am beholden to Prof. James Gutmann, Dean Jacques Barzun and Prof. Justus Buchler of Columbia, but for whom an American edition of this book



would not have come out. I have received much understanding and co-operation from Mr. Henry H. Wiggins and his assistant Mr. Gerrit Y. Lansing of the Columbia University Press.

I wish the proof-reading had been perfect.

While I do not doubt that there are many shortcomings in this book, I venture to place it before scholars with this Gītā precept in mind: 'Thy concern is with action only, never with its fruits.' (II. 47.)

K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY

*McCosh Hall,  
Princeton University,  
February 1959.*

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## INTRODUCTION

Prof. Karl Jaspers, one of the foremost living philosophers, told me in 1954 that there was no metaphysics superior to that of Śāṅkara. It is for the reader to judge whether the pages which follow confirm such a remark.

The Veda, derived from the root *vid* (to know), means that which makes us know, and is the name by which the sacred scriptures of the Hindus have been known down the centuries. The Veda is divided into four books: the *Ṛg Veda*, the *Sāma Veda*, the *Yajur Veda* and the *Atharva Veda*. Each Veda consists of these parts: *mantra samhitās* (hymns), *Brāhmaṇas* (precepts about rituals and religious duties), the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads* (philosophical and religious doctrines). On the basis of passages mentioning vernal and autumnal equinoxes in the Veda, some Indian scholars assign them to 4500 B.C. In any case Indian scholars do not assign them to a period later than 2000 B.C., but many of the major Upaniṣads cannot be earlier than 1900 B.C.,\* while some (e.g. the *Śvetāśvetara*) seem to be post-Buddhistic.

Sometime between 500 to 300 B.C., Bādarāyaṇa (in his *Brahma Sūtra*) tried to work out a coherent theory from the Upaniṣads, reconciling what he believed to be the apparent contradictions in them. About the same time was composed the Bhagavad Gītā, which while disparaging the view that the Veda is the all-sufficient source of truth, yet claims to teach a doctrine, which is as old as the world, and is at the same time the essence of the Veda. These three books—the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the Gītā—form the 'triple standard' (*prasthānatraya*) on which Vedāntic schools of philosophy are based.

In the Upaniṣads, and even in some Ṛg Vedic passages, is to be found in embryonic form the doctrine of Advaita (*q.v.* the first chapter). Bādarāyaṇa mentions a philosopher

\* Many Western orientalists put the Vedic age between 1500 and 1000 B.C., and the Upaniṣadic about 900 B.C., while the Gītā is assigned by them to about 200 B.C.



Kāśakṛtsna, who held that God himself is the individual soul; and another Bādari, who thought that the worship of 'conditioned Brahman', can only lead to the impermanent world of Brahmā (*infra* pp. 85-7). Śankara's school claims Bādarāyaṇa as the teacher *par excellence* of Advaita; but this is disputed by other interpreters of the *Brahma Sūtra*.

The Buddha is claimed by Śrī Harṣa (*q.v.*) as an Advaitin;<sup>1</sup> but though this may be doubted, some Buddhist philosophers taught that the world is neither real nor unreal,<sup>2</sup> that it is like a mirage or a dream,<sup>3</sup> and that cognitions alone are real;<sup>4</sup> while other Buddhist philosophers taught that everything is void, un-originated, and not self-existent.<sup>5</sup>

Influenced by these theories sometime before 550 A.D., Gauḍapāda developed the theory of 'non-origination' (*infra* pp. 158-9), and being a staunch believer in the authority of Vedānta (concluding portion of the Veda, i.e. the Upaniṣads), he attempted to discover his theory in the Upaniṣads. In his *Kārikā* he tried to reconcile Upaniṣadic non-dualism with Buddhist theories.

Maṇḍana, the author of *Brahma Siddhi*, was another important teacher of Advaita before (?) Śankara.

Śankara, a South Indian, who flourished between 688 A.D. and 720 A.D.,<sup>6</sup> (there is no unanimity about his date) was the disciple of Gauḍapāda's disciple, Govinda. In his commentaries (*bhāṣyas*) on the 'triple standard', he developed the doctrine of Advaita, which since then became a dominant school of thought in India.

Two direct disciples of Śankara, Sureśvara and Padmapāda have respectively expounded two of his *Upaniṣad-bhāṣyas* and his *bhāṣya* on the first four aphorisms in the *Brahma Sūtra*. Sureśvara also wrote an independent work, *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi*.

Prakāśātman (1200 A.D.) in his *Vivaraṇa* commented upon Padmapāda's *Panṇapādikā*; Vidyāraṇya (Bhāratīrtha? 1296-1386 A.D.) composed his *Vivaraṇaprameya sangraha* on this. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī summarised the views of *Vivaraṇa* in *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*.

Vācaspati (about 842 A.D.) wrote a commentary *Bhāmātī* on Śankara's *Brahma Sūtra bhāṣya*; Amalānanda (11th century)

wrote a commentary *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī*; and Appayya Dikṣita (17th century) wrote a commentary *Parimala* on the *Kalpataru*.

Padmapāda and Vācaspati gave rise to two different schools, called the Vivaraṇa school, and the Bhāmatī school.


Śri Harṣa (12th century) wrote a highly polemical and dialectical work *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhūdyā*, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16th century) a similar one called *Advaita Siddhi*. Čitsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā* (1220 A.D.) also belongs to that category.

Appayya Dikṣita's *Siddhāntaleśa Sangraha* and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Siddhānta Bindu* are compendiums of doctrinal differences in the Advaita school. Dharmarāja's *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* is a small but valuable book on the Advaita theory of knowledge.

Govindānanda's *Ratnaprabhā* is a lucid commentary on *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*.

Sāyaṇa, a follower of this school and a brother of Vidyāraṇya, commented on the Vedas.

In the writing of this book, all the above-mentioned works have been consulted, and no particular work has been exclusively relied upon. While I have not tried to sharply distinguish what Śankara himself said from what his followers said, wherever there is a clear difference, I have mentioned it. Similarly the differences between the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmatī schools have not been ignored.





## BOOK ONE

' All this exposition is carried out through interpretation of texts (*anvaya*) only ; nothing is written by me which is not found in the originals, neither is anything unnecessary said '.

—Mallinātha.

### NOTE

Part One contains an exposition of the Advaita Vedānta Conception and Interpretation of the Veda. Part Two expounds the views of the Advaita Vedānta on the relationship between the Veda and Perception, and the Function of Reason in Brahman-discussion. *The author's own views are not expressed in either of these parts*; at a few places, however, comparisons have been made to facilitate exposition, but all appraisal is reserved for Book Two.



## PART ONE

### CHAPTER I

## GOD AND REVELATION IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

### I

#### *The Advaita Vedānta Conception of Brahman and Īśvara*

Advaita Vedānta is a theory of non-dualism based on the Upaniṣads, which are the concluding portions of the Veda. The cardinal tenets of the school which upholds this theory are: (1) The Real (*Brahman*) is one and is of the nature of consciousness and bliss. (2) Due to its *māyā* the Real appears as the world of plurality. (3) There is absolutely no difference between Brahman and the individual soul (*jīva*).

Brahman is eternally endowed with *māyā* or the 'power' (*śakti*), which is made up of three elements *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*; and that is the cause of the world. This power of Brahman cannot be described either as real or unreal. It is not real, because it does not form the essence of Brahman. In itself Brahman is transcendent and independent of this power. Nor can it be said to be unreal, because its manifestations are apparent. It is most wonderful and indefinable.<sup>1</sup> Brahman, 'limited by' *māyā* (cause of the five elements), is God. Now, to be 'limited by' means 'to be associated with', as a white crystal in which a red flower is reflected is associated with the reflected redness. Brahman, limited by the effect of the subtle elements (the *pañca-kōṣas*—mind, senses etc.—called the subtle body) is the individual soul.

The difference between God and the individual soul is due to these differing limiting adjuncts. When these are absolutely negated (*nirāśa*), then there is no God and no individual, but there remains only the eternal, absolute and pure Brahman. When the identity of God and the individual is spoken of, this identity is between the two as conceived of *without* the limiting adjuncts. When associated with the limiting adjuncts, they



differ from each other as much as a servant differs from a king, or a well from the ocean, or an atom from a mountain.<sup>2</sup> The two are asserted to be non-different only when the limiting adjuncts are completely negated. A man is a king so long as he has his kingdom, and a servant is a servant so long as he is in service. When the kingdom and the service are gone, there is neither king nor servant.<sup>3</sup>

Scripture (Upaniṣads) says that the limiting adjuncts are accidental, and superimposed on Brahman; so reasoning based on scripture must negate them both.<sup>4</sup>

From the standpoint of absolute knowledge (*parāvidyā*) there is only one Reality, Brahman, and there is no difference between God and the soul.<sup>5</sup> Brahman conceived from the standpoint of worship and lower knowledge is *Īśvara*. Nevertheless this lower knowledge is not delusion (*bhrama*); nor is it final and absolute knowledge. It is a step towards the higher knowledge and is presupposed by the latter.<sup>5a</sup> Brahman and *Īśvara* (God) are not two distinct things, but the same thing conceived from two different standpoints. Brahman is therefore referred to in many places as *Paramēśvara*,<sup>6</sup> i.e., the supreme Lord. So conceived, God is transcendent over primal matter and the world generated from it.<sup>7</sup>

As *māyā* is Brahman's power and as multiplicity is due to *māyā*, Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the world. *Māyā* is that which produces the appearance of the world, but is not itself the appearance. This appearance of multiplicity, which is false (*mithyā*), is not Brahman's action, for Brahman is actionless. Though Brahman is free from all particulars and limitations (*nirguṇa*) and is *esse purum simplex* (*viśuddha sattā*) the reason for its appearance as many—i.e. *māyā*—eternally lies in itself.<sup>7a</sup> That is why Brahman may be defined *per accidens* as 'that from which the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world proceed';<sup>8</sup> while the definition *per essentiam* of Brahman is 'reality, knowledge and infinity'.<sup>9</sup>

Just as a colourless ray of light is split up by a prism into many colours, *avidyā* (man's ignorance) makes Brahman appear as God. God is the creator, sustainer and dissolver of the world. He is the end, the lord, the witness, the friend and the refuge of all individuals. God shows his grace to those who meditate on

him and endeavour to reach the goal.<sup>10</sup> God is the causative agent of all activity,<sup>11</sup> but he makes human beings will and act in accordance with their past deeds. Scriptural injunctions are intelligible only if man is a free agent.<sup>12</sup> The human individual alone has freedom to choose between the good and the bad, the eternal and the temporal;<sup>13</sup> but this freedom of will is not uncaused or spontaneous.<sup>14</sup>

As the world-cycle is beginningless, the question as to which of the two (individual's *karma* or God's action) is prior does not arise. Though the individual is subject to God's control, God can only make those act who are able to act. God's action is analogous to the role played by rain. Without rain there can be no crops; but the nature of the crop is determined by the seeds sown—wheat, rice or barley.<sup>15</sup>

By God's grace, which is obtained by discharging all his duties in a spirit of worship, man gets first wisdom and then liberation.<sup>16</sup> This liberation is not tantamount to becoming one with Brahman, but consists only in going to *Brahmaloka*.<sup>\*</sup> Till the end of the aeon, the liberated souls will abide in *Brahmaloka*; they will then become one with Brahman and will not be re-born.<sup>17</sup> But even in this state the liberated souls can never become 'creators' or 'sustainers' of the world, for the only creator is the eternally freed God.<sup>18</sup> It is only in happiness and in having supernatural knowledge and power that the freed souls are similar (*samānam*) to God.<sup>19</sup> Even in that state, the souls will not cease to be distinct from God and they will retain their personality (*lingadeha*).

But as for those who have truly become wise here and now and attained the higher knowledge by fully realising that there is only one Reality, Brahman, there is no question of going to *Brahmaloka*, nor is there for them any God, because they become Brahman forthwith.<sup>20</sup>

\* The world of Brahmā, the four-faced deity, creator of the world; but not *Īvara*.



### *The Advaita Vedānta Conception of Four-Fold Revelation*

A study of Śāṅkara's *bhāṣyas* shows that according to him there are four ways in which Brahman reveals itself.

#### General Revelation :

(a) There is a sense in which the world at large is a revelation of the Supreme Reality (Brahman). Śāṅkara says that the Supreme Reality has manifested (*vyākriyāṇa-abhivyakti*) itself as the world of name and form and as life (*Prāṇa*), and this manifestation of the one Reality, with its knowledge and power increasing gradually, rises higher and higher, from inanimate things to animate beings, then to mankind, and lastly in the most developed of human beings (*vibhūti*).<sup>1</sup> This conception of Śāṅkara implies that Brahman, whose nature is consciousness and joy, is manifesting itself in ever-ascending degrees of being, knowledge and bliss, and the highest manifestation of it is the man who knows himself to be identical with Brahman.<sup>2</sup> So Brahman discloses itself at different levels through the order of nature. In this sense though there is 'general revelation', it is not, strictly speaking, a revelation; but is more properly described as 'manifestation' or 'realization'; for though the Supreme is there present in its own light (*svaprakāśa*), we do not realize that we are in contact with it, that we are moving and living in it, that it is it that works in us, and that it is, as Śāṅkara says, in fact our true Self.

The Advaita school says that in the form of 'I am', the Self (which is identified with Brahman by the Upaniṣads) is evident to the whole world (*sarvalokapratyakṣa*), though its specific nature is not known.<sup>3</sup> That is why though everyone admits that there is Ātman, some mistake it for the body and some confuse it with the momentary cognitive states. Similarly, in all cognition Being itself is directly cognised. In every case, it is the bare reality (*nirviśeṣa sanmātram*) that is apprehended, and the activity of the senses is limited to that only. Apparent differences in cognitions like 'This is a pot', 'That is a cloth' are illusions, just as in the illusion of silver in nacre ('This is silver'), the senses have correctly apprehended the substratum,



'This', while 'silverness' is wrongly predicated of it. The Advaita Vedāntin contends that though many things are sensed, each thing need not be assumed to be a distinct reality; for those schools of Hindu philosophy (e.g. Sāṃkhya) which admit that there is only one constituent cause of the world, it would be superfluous to assume that each is real by itself. What is apprehended as real in each thing is the one real principle, which is the material cause of all things. As the material cause of the world is Brahman, it is Brahman which is apprehended as the real in each cognition.<sup>4</sup> Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says that in a cognition of the form 'The jar is real', the idea 'real' is true; but the substratum is Brahman, and not the jar.<sup>5</sup>

The Advaita position is that though we know Brahman itself in all cognition, in the world at large we do not come to know it in its essential nature as 'reality, consciousness and bliss'. Unless it is known as it is in itself, knowledge of it is neither complete, nor fully true; but at the same time we are not shut off from all knowledge of it. This knowledge, which every rational being possesses, is *sāmānya*, but not *viśeṣa*. For example, the study of a pot's structure, its form etc., may throw light on much that is connected with the pot; but if we wish to study, so to say, the 'very soul' of the pot, we must know what it is in itself—a mass of clay (*mṛtipiṇḍa*). This second type of knowledge (*viśeṣa jñāna*) is different from the first. Extending this inadequate analogy to Brahman also, it may be said that while we have underlying all knowledge the notion of a reality abiding amidst all change, we do not know its exact nature.

### Vedic Revelation :

(b) It is for giving us this second type of knowledge—that which is not got through perception and inference—that the Veda is promulgated at the beginning of each world-cycle by *Iśvara*. This is the main type of revelation accepted by Śāṅkara, and accordingly the greater part of this book will be concerned with the conception of Vedic revelation.

### Revelation through *Avatāra* :

(c) Śāṅkara opens his *Gītābhāṣya* by admitting the personal God Nārāyaṇa and also the fact of incarnation. God created

the world, and then taught the two-fold Dharma, (righteousness), *pravṛtti* and *niṣṛtti* (the *bhakti-karma mārga* and the *jñāna mārga*) to the first created sages and forefathers of all men (*prajāpatis*). But he says that in course of time, on account of man's growing sensual desires and waning moral discrimination, God's teaching was forgotten and dharma declined. To reveal again the way of salvation and to restore righteousness, Nārāyaṇa, the first Creator-God was partially (*amśena*) born as Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devaki and Vasudeva. Here Śankara's use of the word 'partially' is intriguing. As God could not have any parts, the word 'partially' can only mean that though God incarnated as Kṛṣṇa, he has not ceased to be the creator and sustainer of the universe, and omnipresent and omniscient. Though he became Kṛṣṇa, he was not exhausted in the form of Kṛṣṇa.

Śankara explains that in himself God is eternally endowed with knowledge, power, etc., and is ever free from all limitations and impurities and is immutable. But through his power, i.e. by having the primal matter under his control, he is able to appear as if embodied; as if born and as if showing compassion to the world. Though he has no end to serve, out of a desire to show his grace (*bhūtānugraha jigṛkṣayā*), he taught the two-fold dharma contained in the Veda once again to Arjuna, and through him to the whole world. Śankara says that God chose Arjuna to impart his teaching, because Arjuna was in need of it, being immersed in sorrow and delusion, and because he was a good man; and the dharma accepted and practised by good men will eventually be accepted by all.<sup>6</sup>

Śankara accepts the theory of Incarnation fully and believes Kṛṣṇa to be Īśvara himself. He says that only fools think that the son of Vasudeva is not God and not omniscient.<sup>7</sup> Kṛṣṇa is omniscient, because he is eternally free and his knowledge is not impeded by any defects and obscurations (*anāvaraṇajñāna-śakti*).<sup>8</sup> It should be remembered that in his *sūtrabhāṣya*, Śankara has said that God alone is free from *āvaraṇa doṣa* (the defect of 'obscurations' of the intellect), while individuals are not.<sup>9</sup> While every man is not different from God, nobody but Kṛṣṇa has the consciousness of this identity, because *māyā* deludes all others.<sup>10</sup> But Kṛṣṇa has *māyā* under his control,<sup>11</sup> even



as the magician's magical power is under his control.<sup>12</sup> So, though unborn and always the lord of all beings, God *becomes as if* he is embodied (*dehavāniva*) by means of *māyā*, which is under his control; but he 'does not *really* become embodied like the others' (*na paramārthato lokavat*).<sup>13</sup> Elsewhere Śāṅkara says that fools, who do not know the indestructible nature of the Supreme Self, think that Kṛṣṇa existed nowhere (*aprakāśa*) prior to his birth, and that now he has become manifest.<sup>14</sup> The truth is that he is the eternally present God, but he is not evident (*prakāśa*) to all, being veiled in his glorious power (*yoga māyā*)—the *māyā*, made up of the three principles, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So, not knowing Kṛṣṇa to be the immutable Lord, many do not worship him.<sup>15</sup> It is clear from this that Śāṅkara accepts the theory of Incarnation.

But it may be asked, inasmuch as every individual is non-different from Brahman, in what way is Kṛṣṇa superior to them? Śāṅkara has tried to answer in the following way. While every other individual does not have the consciousness of his identity with Brahman, Kṛṣṇa alone has such a consciousness; for his knowledge is unobscured.<sup>16</sup> God, through his will, can assume any form; but all these forms are illusory, for in himself he is immutable.<sup>17</sup>

One of the chief purposes of incarnation is to reveal the eternal truth, which has been forgotten, but which is contained in the Veda. The Gītā says that God will be *born* (*sambhava*) from age to age, whenever it is necessary to uphold the Law; but whenever an *avatāra* (incarnation) may come, and whatever may be the number of *avatāras*, the teaching of the *avatāra* will never be at variance with the Veda. The *avatāra* may develop, clarify and emphasize some points, but he will never teach anything that contradicts the Veda. At the same time an *avatāra* will never be able to teach all that is in the Veda; he will choose only its core, and reformulate it. In Śāṅkara's words, the teaching of an *avatāra* is '*samastavedārthasārasamgraha*', i.e., 'the essence in brief of the meaning of the entire Veda.'<sup>18</sup>

#### Revelation in *Anubhūti*:

(d) *Anubhūti* or *Sākṣātkāra*, i.e. direct experience of Brahman, which arises from meditation on Upaniṣadic texts,



is the fourth kind of revelation according to Śankara. As this is not independent and is *always* mediated through the hearing of the Upaniṣadic sentences, it is best to take it up after expounding the Advaita conception of scriptural testimony.

To sum up, in the Advaita Vedānta we have a conception of four-fold revelation :—

(a) There is a partial disclosure of Brahman through the graded forms of existence, from the clod of earth to the gods in heaven (*Ābrahmastambha paryantam*). This is Brahman's '*abhivyakti*'. But this disclosure though directly present to all, is not of much help ; 'seeing we see it not'.

(b) The Veda revealed by God at the beginning of each aeon contains the final truth about dharma and Brahman.

(c) When people forget the eternal truth in the Veda, then in order to put them back on the right path, and reproclaim the Law, God incarnates himself and teaches the quintessence of the Veda.

(d) In the *anubhūti* or integral experience of Brahman, which a knower of Brahman will have, the real nature of Brahman is disclosed.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA THEORY OF ŚABDA PRAMĀṆA

#### I

#### *The Nature of Testimony*

The testimony of words (*śabda pramāṇa*) is accepted as a distinct and independent source of knowledge by the Advaita Vedānta. *Śabda pramāṇa* is that which is the cause of knowledge through words. When the 'purport' (*tātparya*) of a sentence is uncontradicted by other means of knowledge, as well as unknown through other means of knowledge such as perception and inference, then that sentence becomes a *pramāṇa*, i.e. means of valid verbal testimony. Purport is defined by Dharmarāja as the capacity to produce a particular knowledge. If any sentence has more than one meaning, then the meaning which is not intended by the utterance of that sentence cannot be its purport. We cannot understand what a sentence means unless the words in a sentence need completion by each other and are not incompatible with the purport. Immediate apprehension of the meanings of the words in a sentence and the knowledge of its purport are also necessary to enable us to understand it.<sup>1</sup>

According to Advaita Vedānta, when words are grouped together they indicate a thing conjointly. Their capacity to do so is intrinsically inherent in them (*svarasika*). So the capacity of sentences to give knowledge is not dependent upon their being statements of reliable persons. A sentence is true not because it is a reliable person's statement, but because the knowledge it gives is uncontradicted. An unreliable person's statement is based on delusion or guess-work; so the falsity of his statement is due to his defects. It is the false knowledge of an unreliable person that prevents his testimony from being true, though the validity of testimony is intrinsic. In the case of a reliable person's statement, there are no obstacles such as false knowledge and guesswork. So in either case, the truth of a

statement is not dependent upon its maker. In other words, a statement may be based upon a person's knowledge, but the validity of the statement is its own, and is not dependent on his knowledge. So while an unreliable person's statement may be false because his notions are either false or mere guesses; if it is possible to establish that there are certain sentences which have no author, then the knowledge which they produce cannot be vitiated by their author's possible ignorance or mistaken notions.<sup>2</sup>

According to the Advaita Vedānta, all statements are of two kinds: (a) Some persons come to know about certain things either by perception, reasoning or testimony, and then, based on that knowledge, they make statements to convey this knowledge to others. For example, Manu's statements in his code are of this sort. (b) When statements of this kind are repeated by others, the assertions of these people would be merely based on the memory of what they have heard, because they themselves have not directly experienced or reasoned out the things about which they are making these assertions. For example, if we to-day tell others what Manu wrote, our statements would be of this sort. Now if it could be shown that there are some sentences which have never been stated in the first way because they are prior to the existence of all persons, then obviously they would be statements of the second kind with reference to all persons.<sup>3</sup>

### Theory of Intrinsic Validity :

The Advaita Vedānta maintains that all cognition is intrinsically valid and self-luminous. Hence the cognition arising from the hearing of a sentence is also of the same type, and it needs no verification. This theory needs some clarification. The theory of the intrinsic validity of knowledge is taken over by the Advaita school from the Mīmāṃsā school of Kumārila. The truth of a cognition need not be established by another cognition. For instance, no other cognition except that derived through the sense of taste can establish the fact that sugar is sweet. Yet on the sole testimony of that one sense, we accept it as an indubitable fact.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, though the sole means of apprehending the form (or figure) and colour of a thing is the



sense of sight and though this testimony cannot be confirmed by the senses of touch or hearing, it is not set aside.<sup>5</sup> So no cognition is in need of verification.

The Advaita Vedānta elaborates the theory further on the following lines. Material things are not revealed except by cognitions of them, while a cognition reveals its own existence as soon as it arises. In other words, with the very origination of a cognition everyone knows that he has that cognition. Nobody doubts his cognition of something, nor does anybody have the idea that he does not know when he does know something.<sup>6</sup> All objects are known through cognitions while a cognition is known only through itself. To say that a cognitive state is revealed by another is to begin an infinite regress; for it can be asked, what reveals this second cognitive state?<sup>7</sup> A cognition of which the cogniser is unaware is a myth and cannot be proved.<sup>8</sup> By the very fact that it is a cognition, a cognition is self-luminous.<sup>9</sup> Self-luminosity of a cognition means that a cognition is incapable of becoming the object of another cognition, but is nevertheless capable of immediacy,<sup>10</sup> i.e. it is self-evident. This argument may be summed up thus: whenever there is knowledge of an object, this fact is known in the very act; for nobody who has knowledge doubts whether he has it or not.

We now come to the next point. The Advaita school raises the question: whenever a man knows that he has a cognition, how does he know that it is a valid cognition? It replies that the truth of a cognition is intrinsic, and need not be established by another cognition. As soon as there is a cognition, it is either accepted as true or recognised as false. One cannot go on, without having an idea of its truth or falsity, till it is confirmed later. If a cognition lacks validity, nothing else can produce this. If the truth of a cognition is to be established by ascertaining the cause of that cognition, or its conformity to another cognition, by what is the truth of this second cognition established? This position ends in a regression. So the truth of a cognition need not wait till it is established by the ascertainment of the cause of that cognition or its accordance with another cognition.<sup>11</sup>

When no self-contradiction is found in a cognition, its truth is automatically secured without any extraneous means. So every

cognition is valid in itself, and its validity is set aside only when it is later expressly contradicted, e.g., the cognition of a rope as a snake. The validity of a cognition may also be set aside when it is later found that its cause is defective, e.g., a jaundiced person's perception of white things as yellow.

The falsity of a cognition is due to either misapprehension, doubt, or non-apprehension. In the last case there is no cause of cognition at all. As soon as the object is correctly apprehended, misapprehension is set aside; just as the snake-illusion is sublated when the rope is rightly apprehended. If one doubts the truth of a cognition, then, properly speaking, there is no cognition. But doubt may be removed by repeating the same cognition after the cause of the doubt is removed. An example will make this clear. When we are in doubt about the identity of the letters in a manuscript read in the dim light of an evening, we can make sure by switching on the light and observing them more closely. Whenever there is no awareness of any defect in the cause of a cognition, there can be no reasonable doubt about its truth. So every cognition attests itself as true.

If the truth of a cognition is dependent upon a subsequent cognition, even perception might be doubted. Sometimes a cognition may never be confirmed by a subsequent cognition; but it is not necessarily false on that account. Whenever a sentence is heard, it gives rise to some idea; and if we have no reasonable cause for doubt it must be held to be valid. It will be reasonable to doubt only if we are justified in suspecting the trustworthiness of the man who gives the testimony. But if there is any testimony which is not that of any person, then there is no justification for doubting its veracity.<sup>12</sup>

As all knowledge is intrinsically valid and self-luminous, it can be concluded that knowledge arising from the hearing of a sentence needs no confirmation, just as perceptual knowledge is not in need of confirmation by inferential knowledge.<sup>13</sup>



*Significance and Eternity of Words*

If every word is a conventional sign deliberately devised to stand for a thing, and has in course of time acquired a fixed significance so that it can be understood as referring to the same thing on each occasion of its use, then obviously the significance of words and the arrangement of them into sentences must be done by somebody or other. The Advaita Vedānta strongly denies this. According to this school, the capacity of words to denote the objects meant by them is natural, and is not dependent upon anybody's whim. Otherwise the word 'mountain' may come to denote ocean. According to the Advaita Vedānta, we cannot infer a time, even in the distant past, when there was no established usage of words ; because it can be argued that as at present there was always an unbroken tradition of the usage of words in the same sense, as the past must have been like the present.<sup>14</sup> Technical words and proper names are the only exceptions to this but they are not strictly speaking words (*abhidhāna*), i.e. their referents are not classes, nor is their significance universally known.<sup>15</sup> A boy, for instance, sees things like tables and chairs and deals with them. He infers that others also see those things and deal with them, and then from the usage by elders he knows the capacity of words such as 'tables' and 'chairs' to denote those things. Thus the relationship of a word and its referent are known through experience and such a knowledge is necessary to enable a man to use the word correctly, but the capacity of a word to signify a particular referent is intrinsic in it. This capacity to signify a particular referent was not produced even by the first man who used it to refer to a particular thing. He used it, because it was capable of signifying a particular thing and because by using that alone he could convey what he meant to others. Further, to know the significance of a word, its referent need not necessarily be previously known to us. Through the use of a word and the etymology of it we can infer its referent. For instance, we may not have seen a waterfall, but from the way in which this word is used and its etymology, we can infer its referent. The Vedānta asserts that in the case of words such as Brahman also their



meanings can be known in a similar way,<sup>16</sup> i.e. from their context and etymology.

If words are inherently related to the objects meant, sentences such as, 'There are hundreds of elephant-herds at the tip of my finger' must also give us some knowledge. But this sentence is pure nonsense. So ought we not to conclude that only statements of reliable persons give us knowledge, and that this is due to other means of knowledge, and not to the inherent capacity of words to denote things? The Advaita Vedānta replies that this conclusion does not follow. Nobody can say that the sentence cited above has no meaning. Every word used has a meaning, and so the sentence as a whole must have a meaning; for a sentence is not some thing apart from the words used in it. If we know the meanings of words, we immediately know the meaning of a sentence. If we do not know the meanings of words, we cannot know the sense of a sentence; nor can we infer that its speaker has knowledge of the things mentioned in the sentence. In the sentence which is now given as an example, its meaning is unintelligible, though we know the meanings of the words. This is because its meaning is vitiated by the untrustworthiness of the person who made that statement. The words have their natural meanings and used rightly they can give us knowledge; but if they are irresponsibly used they become senseless. This is not the fault of the words, but of the person who uses them. In describing perceptual experience also, when there are defects, the words used do not refer to things. For example, when nacre (pearlshell) is mistaken for silver, it may be said 'That is silver'. Here the word 'silver' cannot refer to nacre, because it is inappropriately used and not because it has no proper meaning of its own. When the meanings of words are known (from etymology, a dictionary, context or usage by others) the sense of a sentence can be guessed on the basis of the conjunction of words. Such a guess is valid knowledge produced by that sentence. It is not memory-knowledge, because it does not arise from past impressions. It is not doubt, because no alternatives are entertained. It is valid, because it is not contradicted. This valid knowledge, it is clear, is not caused by perception etc., and is solely generated by the testimony of that sentence. The Advaita Vedānta concludes that as the capacity of words to signify things

is natural and intrinsic, independently of every other source of knowledge, sentences give us knowledge.<sup>17</sup>

The Advaita Vedānta upholds the theory of world-cycles. At the beginning of each world-cycle God uses words in the same sense in which they were used in the past world-cycle. If the referents of words differ in each aeon, then there would be no settled order, such as 'This is good, this is bad', etc., for what was called 'good' in the past aeon may be called 'bad' in the present.<sup>18</sup> As there was never an absolute beginning of the world, the Advaita Vedānta says that even God never had the occasion to deliberately devise words as the conventional signs of things. At the beginning of each creation words have always been used by God in the same sense in which they were used in the previous world-cycle.

According to the Advaita Vedānta, words refer only to universals. That is why it is possible to regard their significations as eternal and natural, and it is also possible to conceive that words are prior to all individuals.<sup>19</sup> As there was never a time when universals were not, there could be always words signifying them. The theory that words signify universals and not individuals is common to both the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta. Numerous individual cows, for example, can never be signified by a single word 'cow', and even if that were the significance, then nobody could hope to know it in full before he uses the word.

When a man is speaking of, for example, a 'cow', the hearer does not understand by it any particular cow. A word cannot be conceived as signifying an individual, because which is the particular individual signified by it? Nor can it be said that the sum total of all individuals is signified, for nobody knows the extent of this and no quality can be predicated of all things, as no single quality is invariably found in all things, e.g., a phrase like 'white cow' would then be meaningless. If 'cow' refers to the sum total of all cows past, present and future, the use of it in sentences such as 'tie up that cow' would be nonsense. So the Advaita Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā schools conclude that the significance of a word is a universal. Through the universal a word implies or secondarily signifies an individual. For instance, in the sentence, 'sprinkle water on the corn', the primary significance of 'corn', i.e. the universal 'corn', cannot



be sprinkled with water, as that is impossible. So the word is here used to indicate by implication the particular heap of corn.<sup>20</sup> In the case of technical and proper names, however, it is accepted by the two schools that they are fixed by deliberate convention to refer to particulars. If there are some sentences which do not contain proper names and if it could be also shown that they were never constructed by somebody, there would be no impossibility in conceiving them to be eternal.

Following the doctrine of Upavaṣa, an ancient commentator on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, the Advaita school holds that the letters are the word and that they are eternal. Letters are eternal, because they are recognised as the same whenever they are pronounced. If each time a man utters, a new letter is produced, nobody would be able to recognize it. When a man says 'ga' and 'ga', we do not say that he has uttered two 'ga's'; but that he has pronounced 'ga' twice, because we have such a cognition. Differences in pronunciation and tone cannot make out that letters are different, because recognition of letters as the same is a fact. The apparent difference is due to the difference in the media which manifest the same letter. When one utters a word, what happens is the manifestation of an already existing letter. Letters, though eternal, are not always heard because air clogs the ear. When a man utters by moving his jaws and lips, air is disturbed and set in motion and the wavelets of air carry the letter to the sense of hearing, as light rays enable a thing to be seen. When air is motionless, due to lack of a suitable medium letters are not heard. The apparent difference in the 'ga' heard at one time and the 'ga' heard at another time is due to the different ways in which air is disturbed by the utterances. As ether in a well and ether in a jug differ only in their adjuncts, the apparent difference in letters is due to their adjuncts. If this is not an acceptable hypothesis, Śaṅkara says that the apparent difference may be explained as due to differences in the audible sounds (*dhvani*) made by men while pronouncing. The 'softness' or 'loudness' of the words (for words are letters) is due to the voice or the tone associated with them. It is this voice or audible sound which is the cause of the apparent difference in letters. So according to Advaita Vedānta, however much the difference in voice and tone, it is



the same letter which is uttered again and again. That is why it is possible to say, "pronounce the 'ga' in this compound word clearly". As words are the letters and as letters are eternal, words are eternally related to their referents, which are themselves eternal being universals.<sup>21</sup>

The letters in a word conjointly signify the referent. Each letter after being heard leaves a 'residual impression' (*samskāra*) in the mind, and after the last letter of a word is heard, this together with those impressions becomes a combined unit (*samudāya*) and this, which is called a 'word', produces the idea of the referent. By 'residual impression' is meant the mental modification (*bhāvanā*) capable of evoking memory. As soon as the preceding and succeeding letters, being recollected, stand unified as a word, because of its relation to the referent, the meaning becomes evident. Though made up of the same letters 'ja' and 'ra', there can be two words 'jāra' and 'rāja' depending upon the order in which they are uttered, and since they will be recollected in the same order there would be no confusion. Just as numerous trees are comprehended as a 'forest' and a number of armed men as an 'army', a number of letters can become a word and a word is nothing more than a group of letters. In experience an entity called 'word as a whole' apart from the letters that constitute it is not known. So the Advaita Vedānta concludes that since letters are recognised as the same everytime they are heard they are eternal, and as the letters are the word, words also are eternal.<sup>22</sup>

According to the school of Padmapāda, i.e. the Vivaraṇa school, letters are omnipresent and eternal. They are not, however, eternal in the sense in which Brahman is, but in the sense in which ether is, i.e. letters are generated at the time of creation and are destroyed at the time of world cessation (*pralaya*). Letters heard in a sequence constitute a word, but in fact 'the sequence' is only superimposed on the letters; for omnipresent and eternal letters cannot have any inherent sequence, nor can 'sequence' be an object of the sense of hearing. So according to the Vivaraṇa school, words and sentences which are obtained by imagining sequence in letters are false (*mithyā*). Since letters are apprehended in a definite order, 'the order' cannot be unreal, and since letters are all-pervading and eternal they

cannot really be having any such order. 'The order' or 'sequence' is present only in our cognition, but is superimposed on letters. It is indescribable as real or unreal.<sup>23</sup> The leader of the other school, Vācaspati, says that though letters are eternal, the sounds (*dhvani*) manifesting them are not so. In pronouncing, by putting the accent differently the same letter can be uttered differently, e.g. 'a' and 'ā'. This difference between a long and short vowel is due to difference in sound. But by superimposing this characteristic on the letters, we get different senses, e.g. 'naga' means a mountain and 'nāga', a snake. Thus the meanings of words are due to imagining in letters relations and characteristics, which are not there really.<sup>24</sup>

Vācaspati seems to differ from the view of Śankara and Padmapāda. The latter accept the Mīmāṃsā view that letters and words are eternal. Vācaspati, on the other hand, argues that even if letters are eternal, the non-eternality of at least words and sentences must be admitted. As letters occurring in a certain order form a word, and as words succeeding each other in a particular way become a sentence, before the utterance of letters in a certain order, words have no existence; from which it follows that sentences too cannot be eternal. It may be asked, how is it that the same word is uttered whenever a particular thing is to be denoted? Borrowing an idea from the Nyāya school,<sup>25</sup> Vācaspati answers that words are repeated in the same way in which the movements of a dance are repeated. A person learning the movements of a dance imitates the movements of his teacher, but can never go through the *very* movements of his teacher. Similarly, when a man repeats a sentence uttered by another, he does not utter the *very* same words. He merely imitates the movements of lips and jaws of the other man and thereby produces the same kind of sound (words). According to Vācaspati, as even the Mīmāṃsā school must admit that a student does not utter the *very* words of his teacher, so even in the case of the Veda all words without exception are non-eternal.<sup>26</sup>

Now, Śankara accepts the doctrine of the eternality of letters, and in his opinion the letters are the word.<sup>27</sup> But according to Vācaspati the same word can never be repeated twice, just as the *very* movement made in a dance by a teacher cannot be made by his pupil. Since words are nothing but



letters, no such thing as a 'word-entity' being acceptable to the Vedānta,<sup>28</sup> the implication of Vācaspati's view would be that letters too are non-eternal. To take an example, when two people pronounce 'ga' it is not actually the same 'ga' which is pronounced by both; the two sounds are different, but are of the same kind. Letters are, after all, uttered sounds and since it stands to reason that they are not eternal, words and sentences also are not eternal. This is exactly the Nyāya theory. It must however be mentioned that in his commentary elsewhere Vācaspati clearly accepts letters as eternal.<sup>28a</sup> The two views do not seem to have been reconciled.

### III

#### *Existential Propositions Need not Necessarily be Reiterations*

If, as the Advaita Vedānta says, the testimony of words is a *pramāṇa*, then it should be shown that (a) other *pramāṇas* do not contradict the knowledge obtained through testimony and that (b) this knowledge is not capable of being acquired in other ways. There is no difficulty about the first point, because each piece of knowledge alleged to have been got through testimony will be judged on its own merits. The Advaita school tries to prove the second point in the following way.

Two objections, which the Advaita school has to meet in this connection are: (i) It is unanimously admitted that words take on a meaning only when their referents are known, and this is known from their usage by elders. All usage is meant for initiating some activity. For instance, a child who has heard a man tell another, 'bring the cow' sees that man bringing the cow and thereby infers that 'cow' means a kind of animal having a hump, dewlap etc., and next time he himself is capable of using the word 'cow'. All use of words is either intended to bring about some action or has some connection with action. If usage is the way of knowing the significance of words, how can words signify anything not connected with action?<sup>29</sup> Even propositions such as 'he cooks with fuel', which are apparently statements of facts, indicate an accomplished fact only secondarily; their primary meaning is the act itself, e.g. 'cooking'



in this case. (ii) Any sentence which does not have its purport in action is a mere statement of what is known through other *pramāṇas*. Nobody need tell us 'this is a paper', for such knowledge can be had from perception. But, on the other hand, if the sentence is of the sort 'write on this paper', the content of this command cannot be known except through the hearing of that sentence. A fact is never stated by anybody for the sake of a fact, but with reference to something to be done. For instance, when a man says 'This is the Ganges', he means something of this sort: 'Now look; here is the Ganges which you have been so anxious to see', or 'We have now come to the Ganges; we will have a swim'. Mere statements of facts are purposeless. So the words of a sentence express their meanings as related to each other through an action.<sup>30</sup> The Mīmāṃsā therefore concludes that the purport of sentences lies in action or in something relating to action; and if there are any sentences which are statements of facts they are only reiterations of what is capable of being known otherwise, because existent things can be perceived or inferred.

The Advaita Vedānta has attempted to meet these criticisms in the following way: (i) All sentences are not command-sentences, because some are evidently propositions. Sentences like 'The Everest has been climbed,' 'That is a rope, and not a snake' are statements of facts. They have a purport as they inform us what was previously unknown to us, and also serve to remove mistaken ideas. It is therefore nonsense to say that propositions do not serve any purpose; and the fact that we meet with propositions both in everyday life and scripture is undeniable. The Advaita school emphasizes that there are statements of facts and that even if they lead to or are meant to lead to some activity, they do not cease to be factual statements thereby. An existent thing does not cease to be existent, merely because a statement is made about it for the sake of some activity. For instance the statement 'Rāma is in the house' may have been made with the intention of conveying some such sense as, 'You have to meet Rāma; now he is in, so go and meet; this is the best time.' Though this may be the purpose (*prayojana*) of the statement, it cannot be denied that it is also a statement of fact. This proves that words are capable of stating facts (*bhūte*

*arthe avadhṛta śaktayah*), and as in some places it is seen that sentences have for their content an existent thing which has no relation to any thing or activity beyond itself (*sva niṣṭabhūta*), the Advaita Vedānta concludes that the contention of the Mīmāṃsā school cannot stand. The purpose of such existential statements is to give knowledge which was not previously available or to remove erroneous notions.<sup>31</sup>

Coming to the second criticism, the Advaita Vedānta splits the problem into: (a) Is every *pramāṇa*, which has for its content an existent thing (*bhūtārtha*), in need of confirmation by another *pramāṇa*? (b) If things are known in more than one way, do these 'ways of knowing' become merely duplications? And (c) are all existent things capable of being known through perception and inference?

Now regarding (a), as every *pramāṇa* is intrinsically valid and as the testimony of words gives us uncontradicted and otherwise unknown information, it needs no confirmation, just as perception which cognises an existent thing requires no confirmation.<sup>31a</sup> (b) A pot, for example, can be cognised as a pot by the sense of touch, while through the sense of sight also it can be apprehended as a pot. To take another example, we may know the existence of a person either by sight or by sound. But yet, the two cognitions are not mere duplications; similarly even though sometimes the content of testimony is a thing capable of being cognised in other ways, there is no harm.<sup>32</sup>

(c) Most existent things are capable of being known through perception or inference. A statement made by a person such as, 'that tree by the river-side has fruits' is based on his perception of the tree and its fruits. Even if we have not heard this statement, we may have chanced to see that tree by ourselves; or after hearing that statement we may go to the place and verify for ourselves what he has said. The content of the statements of anyone must be capable of being known otherwise, because he himself first comes to know the thing (about which he speaks) through some other means of knowledge like perception or inference. And if he is capable of perceiving it or inferring it, we also must be able to do it. Notwithstanding this fact, the Vedānta urges two further considerations. (i) We cannot justifiably hope to cognize the content of all sentences in the manner



in which their author did, as all sentences do not have an author. (ii) If there are existent things which cannot be known at all through perception, inference or other *pramāṇas*, but only through testimony, then non-cognizability of those things through those *pramāṇas* cannot undermine the foundation of testimony regarding them. For example, if somebody tells us that hares have horns, but we do not perceive any hares having horns, we may conclude that there is no such thing as a hare's horn. But consider another example. If the form (or figure) and colour of a thing can be apprehended by the sense of sight, but not by the senses of touch or hearing, so that the sole means of our apprehending it is through the sense of sight, then the testimony of the sense of sight cannot be set aside. So it is urged by the Vedānta that if there is a thing which, by the very nature of it, can be known *only* through testimony, then we cannot doubt the veracity of that testimony, *merely* because the thing of which it speaks is unknown otherwise. The Vedānta says that Brahman is such a thing. Another point to be remembered is that by the very nature of such a thing, it is incapable of being the content of the statement of any person, for the statements of all persons are based on their knowledge obtained through other means. So the Vedānta asserts that the content of statements, which have no author, can be an existent thing, though it is impossible to know it in any way other than from those sentences.<sup>33</sup>

If any critic were to say that *all* testimony is always a reiteration or restatement of what is known otherwise, the Vedānta would retort that thereby the critic would imply that this is true even of scriptural command-sentences, through which alone duty, 'good' and 'bad' can be known; an implication which the Mīmāṃsā school at least would not admit. Of the other critics, the Vedānta will ask, why should testimony be regarded as the reobtainment of what is cognised in other ways? Why should not the knowledge obtained in other ways be regarded as the reduplication of testimony?<sup>34</sup>



### CHAPTER III

## THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA CONCEPTION OF THE VEDA

### I

#### *Definition of the Veda*

It is difficult to give a precise definition of the Veda. The famous commentator on the Veda, Sāyana, who belongs to the Advaita Vedānta school, has discussed this problem in the introductions to his *Vedabhāṣyas*. In the *R̥gVeda bhāṣya*, he first of all enumerates some definitions and criticizes them: (1) 'The last among the *pramāṇas* such as perception and inference is the Veda'. This definition would be applicable to the books of Manu and others, which are also sacred traditions or scriptures (*āgama*), because 'an *āgama* is the means of the correct experience of the invisible'. (2) The Veda cannot be defined as 'the *āgama* which has no author', because it has been composed by God. (3) It cannot also be said that the Veda is 'the work of a person who has no body', because God has been described in scriptures as the 'thousand-headed and the thousand-eyed'. (4) It cannot also be said that the Veda is 'the *āgama*, which has not been composed by individuals (*jīvas*), whose bodies are the results of their *Karmas*'; because *Agni*, *Vāyu* and *Āditya* are said to be the producers of the Veda, and they are *jīvas*. So Sāyana concludes that all these definitions are defective and accepts 'the mass of words (*śabdārāśi*) made up of *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas* is the Veda' as the correct definition.<sup>1</sup> This is the definition which is accepted by other authorities like Āpastambha<sup>2</sup> and the Mīmāṃsā school. Śankara too speaks of the Veda in the same way in the *Māṇḍūkya bhāṣya*.

But the difficulty about this definition is that there is no precise definition of *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas*. Usually however *mantras* are defined as the texts which indicate things connected with the performance of actions; while *Brāhmaṇas* are those which are not *mantras*.<sup>3</sup> But Sāyana, following Prabhākara,<sup>4</sup>

is of the opinion that there can be no real definition of *mantras*. Sentences which are extremely heterogeneous and of diverse kinds are *mantras*, and except that all of them have been called *mantras*, they have no common factor. So a *mantra* has to be defined as that which has been called a *mantra* by those who are well-informed. That part of the Veda which is not made up of *mantras* is the *brāhmaṇa*.<sup>5</sup>

Elsewhere in the same commentary Sāyana says that the definition of the Veda is 'that by which the means of obtaining the transcendent goal of man is known'.<sup>6</sup> In his commentary on the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, Sāyana states the same definition in a slightly different way. There he says that the Veda is 'that book (*grantha*), which makes known the transcendent means of obtaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable'.<sup>7</sup> Sāyana explains that ordinary means of getting the desired things and getting rid of undesired things are well-known to all. For example, it is well-known that women, sandalwood etc., are capable of giving pleasure, while medicine cures disease. The Veda is not the means of knowing such things. On the other hand, nobody knows what will come to him in future lives, and what he must do now to be happy in future. The Veda informs us about such things. From the Veda only we can know, for example, that the eating of red onions (*kalanja*) is sinful, and that the performance of a sacrifice called *jyotiṣṭoma* leads one to heaven.<sup>8</sup> Sāyana further amplifies this by quoting the ancient adage, 'Dharma and Brahman are known from the Veda alone'.<sup>9</sup> Dharma (virtue or merit) is generated only after performance of an action, as it does not exist prior to the act. After the accomplishment of the act also, since it has no form and colour (*rūpa*), it cannot be apprehended by the senses. It cannot be inferred, since it is unconnected with any middle term. It is futile to say that what gives happiness is dharma, for this too is known from the Veda. As Brahman also has no form or relations, it too cannot be the object of other *pramāṇas*. So, Sāyana says, the Veda enables us to know Dharma and Brahman.<sup>10</sup>

The famous Advaita scholar Madhusūdana Sarasvatī accepts this view. In fact he has defined the Veda as 'the truly authoritative and valid sentences, which have no author and which propound Dharma and Brahman'.<sup>11</sup> According to him it is



made up of *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas*. *Mantras* are those which throw light on the things and deities of the rituals. *Brāhmaṇas* are of three kinds : *vidhis*, *arthavādas* and those which are neither of these two, the *Vedānta Vākyas*. *Vidhis* are injunctions. *Arthavādas* are corroborative statements of *vidhis*, either by praising what has been enjoined or condemning what has been prohibited. Different from these two are the *vedānta* sentences, which, though informing about things unknown by other means, do not enjoin anything. They are valid by themselves and do not corroborate any other sentences. So they are not *arthavādas*. They are not auxiliary to any other sentences and have their purport in themselves. In fact injunctions are auxiliaries to them, because by acting according to the injunctions a man's mind is purified and becomes fit to understand the *Vedānta* sentences. Madhusūdana concludes that the *Vedānta Vākyas* are a distinct portion of the Veda, different from the *mantras*, the *vidhis* and the *arthavādas*.<sup>12</sup>

## II

### *Proofs for the Reliability of the Veda*

The Advaita school maintains that unless an unimpeachable source of knowledge regarding 'good' and 'bad' and 'right' and 'wrong' ways of living is admitted, relativism in morals will be inevitable, which no Hindu school of philosophy would accept. Indeed Hindu philosophy in general does not countenance either the utilitarian or the intuitionist theories of ethics.

Is there a true *Śāstra* ?

As it is supersensual and as it is *not* invariable at all times and places and in spite of all reasons, Śankara says that dharma (one's duty or the 'right' way of living) cannot be known by perception or inference. What is dharma at one time and place due to certain reasons may not be dharma at another time and place for other reasons.<sup>13</sup> Kumārila, the great Mīmāṃsā writer, has discussed this in detail. The utilitarian school argues that what gives happiness to others is right action, while that which gives unhappiness is wrong. But actions such as meditation on God, or wine drinking, cause directly neither pain nor pleasure to



others ; yet many would agree that the former is good, while the latter is bad. Seduction of the wife of one's teacher is regarded as a grave sin, though it is the cause of at least transient pleasure to the man and woman concerned. Some people say that it is a sinful act, because it pricks one's conscience. But this is an argument in a circle ; for an act is declared sinful, because it pricks one's conscience, while it pricks the conscience, because it is sinful.<sup>14</sup>

Śāṅkara says that many good men (*śiṣṭāḥ*), for instance, perform animal sacrifices and they are not condemned. An exception is thus made to the general rule, 'no being should be killed'. No empirical means can settle the rightness or wrongness of such actions.<sup>15</sup> As 'good' and 'bad', 'virtue' and 'vice' are not objects of the senses, nobody can ever see them, even if he be a *Yogin*. Reasoning can never prove an action to be right or wrong, because the premises must be either derived from intuition or accepted arbitrarily. It is notorious that what seems intuitively certain to one person seems false to another. So, Vācaspati concludes, the rightness of actions and the goodness of ends can never be demonstrated.<sup>16</sup>

Kumārila holds that it is not also safe to accept the traditions and customs followed in any particular country as the right way of living ; for ways of life differ from country to country, and the superiority of any particular way of life must be shown to be based on an unquestionable authority.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, whatever appears to be 'good' to a man cannot be deemed to be so. Just as fire cannot wet and water cannot burn something, a sin cannot be a virtue at anytime. The murder of a brāhmaṇa (a person of the highest caste), for example, can never be a virtuous act, while the performance of the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice cannot be a sin in any age or aeon.<sup>18</sup>

The Advaita Vedānta holds that those who accept relativism in morals have no occasion to defend any particular theory as the only true one. Duty (*kartavya*) depends for its existence on man, i.e., he can do it, not do it or do it otherwise. That is why injunctions and prohibitions are meaningful, as options, general rules or exceptions.<sup>19</sup> If morality is relative, moral maxims and commands become a farce. On the other hand, those who believe that moral values are absolute, but can be directly

intuited, are deluding themselves, for no two intuitions agree with each other, and in many cases they contradict each other.<sup>20</sup>

The Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta therefore conclude that as the norms of virtue and vice cannot be analysed, and are fundamental, the rightness and wrongness of an action cannot be determined either by its consequences or through intuition. As virtue and vice are absolute, knowledge of them must also be absolute and can be given only by a *śāstra* (scripture), which is not composed by anyone, and is true for all time. The Hindu schools of philosophy assert that the Veda is such a *śāstra*, because if there is no such scripture, then knowledge regarding absolute moral values would not be available.

Is the Veda the true scripture ?

Now can it be proved that the Veda is the *śāstra* ? Sāyana examines three possible proofs and discards all of them : (a) 'The Veda is named and cited as reliable in several passages of the Veda itself.' Sāyana says that this contention is worthless, because to quote the Veda itself in support of its reliability would be like attempting to ride on one's own shoulders, which is impossible even for a clever man. (b) Similarly, *smṛtis* (law-books such as those of Manu) cannot bear witness to the Veda, because they themselves are based on the Veda. (c) 'The Veda is reliable because it is universally accepted.' According to Sāyana this argument is also weak, because many false ideas, e.g., 'the sky is blue', are universally entertained.<sup>21</sup> This conclusion of Sāyana is in accordance with what Śankara himself said : 'The reliability of scripture cannot be established by inference.'<sup>22</sup>

Śankara says that the Veda is reliable in respect of its own meaning, as the sun is in respect of the objects illuminated by its light.<sup>23</sup> This idea is further elucidated by Sāyana in the following manner. A book, of course, cannot be a witness to its own reliability. But the Veda is not an ordinary book ; it has unimpeded power (*akunṭhita śakti*), and so it can establish its own reliability as well as the reliability of other things, just as, though things like pots and cloths cannot appear by themselves unless light is shed on them, the sun can appear by himself.<sup>24</sup> Another famous Advaita writer Vidyāranya says that we cannot presume



to question the authority of *śāstra*, for its greatness is inconceivable. He adds that otherwise we have no reason to believe in what the Veda says, for who among us has seen heaven and how do we know that he who performs certain sacrifices goes there?<sup>25</sup>

The above argument from the *maḥimā* (unique greatness) of the Veda to its reliability, is not however the chief argument of the Advaita Vedānta. The reliability of the Veda is sought to be established on epistemological grounds.

### The Veda Intrinsically Reliable :

The Vedānta argues that nobody—not even the materialist—can afford to deny the authority of all testimony. For instance, is not Āraka (the founder of the medical science in India) a true authority on diseases, their diagnosis and cure? If the materialist answers in the negative, then any debate with him is useless. If, however, he accepts ‘authority’ in empirical matters such as medicine, why should not he in the case of supernatural matters? The Veda is a reliable authority, because it teaches us about things which are highly useful (*phalavat*) and are not known otherwise (*anadhigata*); and this knowledge is uncontradicted (*abādhita*).<sup>26</sup> To the criticism of the Nyāya school that the concept of an authorless intrinsically reliable book is absurd, the Vedānta school replies that such a concept is not more absurd than the Nyāya concept of ‘eternal, self-conscious cognition, simultaneously apprehending all things at all places and times’, which is alleged to belong to God.<sup>27</sup>

Vācaspati admits that when we derive some knowledge, which is seen to be uncontradicted, previously not known and indubitable, then we justifiably presume (*arthāpatti*) that it is produced by a *pramāṇa*. Though the fact that a *pramāṇa* produces such knowledge is known by presumption based on the results of this *pramāṇa*, one *pramāṇa* does not depend upon another *pramāṇa* for generating knowledge. Nor do they require this presumption for generating the knowledge.<sup>28</sup> So in Vācaspati's opinion, which shows the influence of the Nyāya theory, each *pramāṇa* gives knowledge independent of every other *pramāṇa*, and from the nature of that knowledge the capacity of the concerned *pramāṇa* is judged. This theory of Vācaspati seems to be slightly different from the theory usually advanced



by the Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā. According to Vācaspati, application of this theory would result in proving the intrinsic reliability of the Veda. The Veda is, of course, independent of every other *pramāṇa* in producing knowledge, and herein lies its intrinsic reliability (*svataḥprāmāṇya*); but from the nature of this knowledge, i.e. as it is novel, uncontradicted and indubitable, the Veda is established as a *pramāṇa*.<sup>29</sup> That seems to be Vācaspati's conclusion.

The general position of the Advaita Vedānta is that as the subject with which the Veda deals is incapable of being apprehended through any of the other *pramāṇas*, and as it will be shown in the sequel that there is no author of the Veda, it is not in need of the concurrence of perception or inference; nor are any defects possible in sentences which are not those of anybody.<sup>30</sup> Sureśvara makes a neat enumeration of four reasons for which a *pramāṇa* may be discarded: (a) if it establishes only that which is established by another *pramāṇa*; (b) if it propounds something contradicted by another *pramāṇa*; (c) if it gives ambiguous knowledge; or (d) if it establishes nothing.<sup>31</sup> Sureśvara says that in the case of (a), the compliance of the Veda is secured because it treats of things beyond the scope of other *pramāṇas*. Regarding (b), the teaching of the Vedānta sentences, e.g., that 'Ātman is free from sorrow', is truth, not contradicted by any other *pramāṇa*. Thirdly, the Vedānta sentences are not ambiguous because *ahamkāra* (ego) etc., which may be mistaken to be the self, are clearly rejected. Fourthly, as intelligent people are able to understand them, the Vedānta sentences cannot be charged with establishing nothing.<sup>32</sup>

View of the Bhāmati School:

Vācaspati could not refrain from betraying the Nyāya influence in this case also, for at two places in his commentary he seems to go beyond the general contention of the Advaita Vedānta that the Veda is its own proof.

(i) Commenting on the words of Śaṅkara that the Veda is supplemented (*upabṛmḥita*) by many other branches of knowledge like the *Purāṇas*, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, etc.,<sup>33</sup> Vācaspati says that by this the doubt about the unreliability of the Veda is rejected, because it is shown that all good men (*śiṣṭāḥ*)

have accepted the Veda. Vācaspati further explains that the authors of *Purāṇas* etc., the great sages, are good men ; and since they have elucidated the Veda in their respective works and are following it with respect, it is evident that they have accepted it as a reliable authority.<sup>34</sup> Śāṅkara himself does not seem to have intended this interpretation, as he has said in the same sentence that the Veda throws light on all things like a lamp (*pradīpavat sarvārthāvyotyoti*).<sup>35</sup> The sense intended seems to be the same as that in the other place, where the analogy of the sun is given (see *supra*), namely, that the Veda is its own witness and proof, its reliability being intrinsic.

(ii) Having stated that the omniscient and omnipotent Supreme Self (*paramātmā*) composed (*virāṇita*) the Veda (but not independently), and manifested it at the beginning of each world-cycle, Vācaspati raises the following question. Is it proper to rely on or believe in a book which was solely manifested by one person ? This means that as nobody can know dharma and Brahman except through the Veda, and as *Īśvara* also is supposed to have manifested the Veda exactly as it was in the previous aeon, and as nobody else knows what the content of the Veda was in the previous aeon, we have to rely solely on *Īśvara* to accept the Veda as truly authoritative. Now, is it proper to thus rely on a single person ? Vācaspati answers that it is also not proper to rely on the knowledge of many men, if they are ignorant or if they are subject to the *āśayas* (desire, avarice, pride etc.). On the other hand, it is proper to rely on what has been brought to light (*pratibhāna*) or manifested by a single person, if he has true knowledge and if he is free from all defects. The primal ancestors (*prajāpatis*) and the divine sages who were virtuous, wise and indifferent to worldly ' goods ', and who were at the same time endowed with supernormal powers (*aiśvarya*), knew the nature of the person who revealed the Veda ; and they accepted the Veda as reliable, and their confidence in it justifies the confidence of the present day men.<sup>36</sup> This view of Vācaspati is found in his work on the Nyāya school *also*, and betrays the influence of that school.

A similar view is expressly condemned by the Vivaraṇa school. Prakāśātman says that the fact that the Veda has been accepted by many great men (*mahājana*) does not prove its



authority. In some countries the Buddhist scriptures are accepted as the final authority ; yet that fact alone does not prove that Buddhist scriptures are reliable. We see that even great and good men commit mistakes. They also usually mistake the body for the self, and think the moon to be of the size of the span of a hand. So Prakāśātman concludes that acceptance of a book as sacred scripture by even good and great men does not prove it to be so.<sup>37</sup> We have earlier seen that Sāyana criticizes an argument similar to that of Vācaspati. The only difference is that in the argument criticized by Sāyana the reliability of the Veda is based on universal belief (*lokaprasiddhiḥ sārvajanīnā*) ; while Vācaspati argues that it is reliable because good and holy persons, who have abundant wisdom and supernormal powers, have accepted it. Though Vācaspati's argument is stronger than those criticized by Sāyana and Prakāśātman, it does not square well with the Advaita theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge.

### III

#### *Eternity of the Veda*

According to the Advaita Vedānta, the Veda is eternal, but renewed at the beginning of each world-cycle. The Advaitins try to prove the eternity of the Veda with the following arguments.

Proofs for the Eternity of the Veda :

1. As dharma and Brahman are absolute, the *śāstra* which contains knowledge of them must always remain the same. Even in form it cannot change.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Advaita Vedānta infers that Vedic study was always governed by the memory of past Vedic study as it is at present, since it had no beginning at all. A similar inference about other books cannot be made, because their authors are mentioned within those books themselves. The Veda nowhere speaks of anyone as its author. The sentence in the Veda which says that 'He created all this, the *Ṛks*, the *Yajus* and the *Sāmans*', speaks only of the ancestor of all peoples (*prajāpati*) who, having come to know the Veda, uttered it in sequence. The word 'creation'



here refers only to the manifestation of the Veda in Prajāpati's intellect at the beginning of the world-cycle.<sup>2</sup>

Besides the fact that no one is mentioned as its author in the Veda, no one is remembered to have been its author,<sup>3</sup> while all other scriptures, such as those of the Buddhists, are distinctly known to have been the productions of some historical person or other.<sup>4</sup>

The Vedānta along with the Mīmāṃsā argues that there is also no need to suppose that there ever was any author of the Veda, for we can conceive of an unbroken and beginningless Vedic tradition. No man or God can be considered to be the *very first* teacher of the Veda or the first receiver of it, because the world is beginningless, and it is conceivable that just as at present, there have been *always* a number of men teaching and studying it. Some critics (the Nyāya school) have said that from the fact that nobody to-day remembers who dug a particular disused well, it cannot be argued that there never was such a person. Is not the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta argument a similar one? Does it not base its proof on present ignorance? These two schools reply that though in the case of a disused well, its author might well have been forgotten, the author of a living book such as the Veda, on which the religious life of millions depends, could never have been forgotten.<sup>4a</sup> There are indeed those who speak of the Veda as having been composed by this or that person—God, Hiraṇyagarbha, or the sages; but their lack of unanimity shows that this is an attempt of the ill-informed to ascribe Vedic authorship to somebody. This attempt is governed by the assumption that like other books, the Veda too must have been composed by somebody; but it is so unique that nobody could have composed it; and this is confirmed by the fact that no one is remembered as its author.<sup>5</sup>

3. The Veda declares itself to be eternal<sup>6</sup> and the *smṛtis* also declare that '“eternal speech”, beginningless and deathless, has been ejected (*utsṛjta*) by the self-born'.<sup>7</sup> Thus the Advaita maintains that holy scriptures themselves testify to the eternity of the Veda. The word 'ejected' means that the tradition of the Vedic study was promulgated, as any other kind of 'ejection' of an eternal thing is inconceivable.<sup>8</sup>

4 (a). The Vedānta advances another argument which is

usually little known. Vācaspati stated this succinctly and clearly. 'The world cannot be generated from the non-eternal, for then the latter also would be an effect, and this would lead to a regress. So the Veda is eternal, because it is the cause of the generation of the world, like God.'<sup>9</sup> This may be explained as follows :

Śankara says that when anyone wants to make a thing, he first recollects the word signifying it, and then makes it. He says that this is evident to us in experience, and the creation of the world was similar. The words in the Veda (as they were in the past world-cycle) manifested themselves in the mind of Prajāpati, the creator, before creation, and then he created things accordingly. Thus, for instance, from the word 'bhūr' (earth) which occurred in his mind he created the terrestrial world.<sup>10</sup> Vācaspati adds that when anything is unsignified, it cannot be vividly present in the mind.<sup>11</sup>

Śankara says that the fact that the world has been created from the Word (*śabdaprabhava*) is known from the Veda and the *smṛtis*, which are respectively called 'perception' and 'inference' by Bādarāyaṇa. The Veda is 'perception', because like the latter it is an independent *pramāṇa*; whereas a *smṛti* is dependent (upon the Veda), like inference which is dependent on perception.<sup>12</sup>

The theory that the world is generated from the word does not conflict with the doctrine that Brahman is the cause of the world, for Śankara says that what it means is that when an eternal word stands as the sign (*vācaka*) eternally related to its referent (which is *always* a universal), from that issue forth (*niṣpatti*) individuals capable of being denoted by the word.<sup>13</sup> Vācaspati explains that word is not the material cause, but an instrumental cause in the above way, i.e. from the occurrence of a word signifying a certain universal (or genus) in the mind of one, who wants to make a corresponding thing, that thing is generated.<sup>14</sup> So, the words, which occurred to the creator's mind before the world was created, are eternal; and they are Vedic words.

Śankara and Vācaspati appear as if they are struggling to express something similar to Aristotle's concept of 'final cause'. It is clear that when they say that a word must first be in the



mind so that the thing corresponding to it may be made, what they mean by 'word' is not the articulate speech, the sound-symbol, but 'the idea'. Unfortunately for Indian philosophy, there are no precise terms in Sanskrit for 'final cause' and 'idea'. So the same word 'śabda' had to serve for both 'idea' and articulate speech. Śāṅkara's sense seems to be something like this. The world is created according to the ideas, universals or forms (*jāti* or *ākṛti*) eternally present in God. The world is created to correspond to God's eternal thought or Word; and it expresses his idea, his End.

Appayya Dīkṣita, however, understands Śāṅkara in a different way, and it would be hazardous to differ from so great an authority. Appayya Dīkṣita says that experience does not show that all production is dependent on the recollection of things through words alone. For instance, if a pot is to be made, what is necessary is that its form etc., which manifest its species (potness) should be known, and this is possible through prior experience alone and the word 'pot' is not needed. A clever artisan having seen a thing being made by certain instruments, can make a thing of the same type, though he does not know the word denoting it.<sup>15</sup>

Appayya Dīkṣita having concluded from this that knowledge of the denoting term (*vācaka śabda*) is not necessary to make a thing raises the question, in what sense then is the world word-generated? He answers that in the world we see sculptors making idols after knowing the names and forms of gods from the *śāstras* on sculpture (in which is given the relevant information), and in a similar way Hiraṇyagarbha (the four-faced Brahmā, maker of the world according to Hindu cosmogony) after learning the names and forms from the Veda creates gods, men and all things. Quoting the Upaniṣad text, 'He (God) who creates Brahmā at the beginning of the aeon and promulgates (or sends=*prahinoti*) the Vedas for him',<sup>16</sup> Appayya Dīkṣita says that from this it is clear that the Veda is given to the created Brahmā, for enabling him to know the names and forms of all things, so that depending upon this knowledge, he may recreate the world.<sup>17</sup>

It is clear from this that Appayya Dīkṣita understands by 'word' only the linguistic symbol—the denoter (*vācaka*) of a



thing—and not an 'idea'. That is why he says that one can make a thing without knowing the word, which would be impossible if by 'word' is meant 'idea'. As he states explicitly, he means by word a *vācaka*—a denoting term, and taking it in that sense he shows how the world could be said to have been generated from the word.

As the world was created from the Vedic words, which signify universals, and as the world is always of a fixed pattern (*niyata ākṛti*) in spite of world-cycles, (the Advaita argues) the Veda is proved to be eternal.<sup>18</sup>

4 (b). Appayya Dīkṣita thinks that the above argument serves another purpose. In the Veda itself some *mantras* are declared to have been composed by some sage or other, e.g., it is said that 'this is the *sūkta* of Viśvāmitra'; or 'this is the *vidyā* (knowledge) of Śāṇḍilya'. Lest the conclusion that sages composed the Veda may be drawn from these, the argument, previously stated, makes it clear that even the divine sages are generated from the words of the Veda.

He further explains it in the following way. From words like 'Viśvāmitra' in the Veda, the four-faced Brahmā comes to know the extraordinary names, forms and activities of 'Viśvāmitra' etc., who flourished in the previous aeon. Now, words like 'Viśvāmitra' etc., are designations of certain ranks (*pada*), such as the words 'chief of the army' or 'Prime Minister'. They are not proper nouns; so in every aeon there will be a Viśvāmitra, an Indra and so on. For instance, an individual by his actions in the previous aeon, may have acquired merit, which entitles him to be reborn as 'Viśvāmitra' in this aeon; and so he is generated accordingly by Brahmā, who also sees to it that the individual is endowed with the same form, name and actions which a 'Viśvāmitra' has in every aeon. By virtue of that, without having studied previously, he who is born as Viśvāmitra in this aeon is able to 'see' the very *sūkta*, which is seen only by a 'Viśvāmitra' in each aeon. His authorship of the *sūkta* means only his 'seeing' it. Appayya Dīkṣita states that Brahmā sees to it that what was *Viśvāmitra sūkta* in the past aeon remains so in every succeeding aeon, by creating 'Viśvāmitra' alone as the 'author' of it.<sup>19</sup>

According to both the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta, words signify only universals (or species) and as universals, being eternal, are prior to all individuals, there was never a time when the Vedic words had no referents and there will not be also such a time. So the Veda is eternal. The Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta also maintain that there are no proper names in the Veda. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā argues that the naming of certain Vedic passages after persons, such as *Kaṭha*, means only that *Kaṭha* and others were the foremost expounders of that portion of the Veda. It is also possible that names such as '*Kāthaka śṛti*' (the *śṛti* of *Kaṭha*) are merely names arbitrarily chosen to signify that particular portion. Even if *Kaṭha* were an individual and the passage were named after him, it does not follow that it was non-existent before him; for a town named after somebody may have been flourishing for hundreds of years prior to his birth. It is also possible that '*Kaṭha*' refers not to any individual, but to a Brāhmaṇa clan of that name. Apparent proper names such as '*Pravahana*', which occur in the Veda, are in fact common names, which have to be understood etymologically; in the present instance '*Pravahana*' is that which causes something else to carry or flow (*yah pravāhayati*).<sup>20</sup>

Now the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta have to face a problem, which arises from this theory. In the Veda various gods such as Indra and Vasu are mentioned. According to their theory these words cannot denote evanescent individuals, for words, which denote individuals, cannot be eternal; since they could not have had any referents before the individuals came into existence, nor can they have after the individuals have been destroyed.

To get over this difficulty the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school says that words such as '*Vasu*' denote unique individuals like the word '*ether*'; and as these individuals are eternal, the relations between them and the words signifying them are also eternal. According to the Mīmāṃsā, gods are not embodied; they have no birth and death. Each god is a unique type and eternal. So, it concludes, that mention of these '*eternals*' in the Veda cannot prove the latter's non-eternity.

The Vedānta denies this Mīmāṃsā theory for the following reasons. (i) Gods are said to be endowed with extraordinary powers (*vibhūti*) which are only temporary. Due to merit (*puṇya*) one is born as a god and when that is exhausted, he has to be reborn as a man or an animal. We hear of a great king Nahuṣa who became Indra due to his merit, and who cursed by a sage for insulting him, had to become a huge reptile. From the Vedic *mantras*, the *purāṇas* and the *itihāsas* it is clear that gods are also embodied beings. They too are subject to passions (e.g. Indra's seduction of Ahalyā), and they too are moved by the desire to know Brahman realising the fleeting nature of their glory<sup>21</sup>. (ii) Jaimini says that if gods are embodied they cannot be simultaneously present at many sacrifices and accept the oblations offered to them. Śāṅkara says that this is not



a difficulty, because a god, due to his supernormal powers acquired by birth, can be present in many bodies, and simultaneously accept the oblations offered at many places; and yet remain invisible. If this is not so plausible, Śankara says that just as salutations may be offered simultaneously at many places to one Brāhmaṇa, many people can at many places simultaneously abandon or donate (*parityāga*) their wealth in honour of one god. After all, sacrifice consists in abandoning or donating one's wealth with the motive of pleasing a god. So, even though gods are conceived as embodied, according to Śankara, there is no difficulty.<sup>22</sup>

From this, Śankara argues that gods have forms (*ākṛti*) and species (*jāti*), and the Vedic words signify only these forms and species and not individuals, for no word can signify individuals, which are infinite. While words such as Vasu signify species, words such as Indra are titles, i.e. they signify a certain status, like the word 'chief of staff'. It is, of course, true that only those things have a species, which can be recognised as similar. For example, when we see a cow to-day, we have recognition in the form, 'That is this; like that this is also a cow; what was seen yesterday was a cow and what is seen to-day is also a cow'. Who recognises the various gods as similar and having species? This objection is met by the consideration, so the Advaitins reply, that Brahmā by God's grace is able to recollect the things of the past aeon by means of the Vedic words, and creates gods, men, and, in fact, everything, exactly after that pattern. If the world in this aeon is not created in dependence upon the world in the past aeon, if it is creation *de novo* and *ex nihilo*, the actions of individuals in the past aeon would remain without producing their due results, and there would be no basis for the differences and inequalities among individuals in this aeon.<sup>23</sup>

Is the eternity of the Veda in conformity with world-cycles?

According to Śankara, although the world is subject to periodic dissolutions, it (including the Veda) is continuous, just as our waking experience is continuous, in spite of its temporary stoppage by sleep. Even if we admit that at the great dissolution there is a cessation of all activity and usage, it is possible that due to God's grace other gods like Hiranyagarbha recollect the things of the past world-cycles, including the Veda. Śankara says that knowledge and power, which increase by degrees as we ascend from lower forms of creation to man, must surely be present in a still higher degree in gods. So gods like Hiranyagarbha, who have acquired merit by good deeds in past cycles and who are born as gods at the beginning of this cycle, are able to recollect

the Veda by God's grace. Even after the great dissolution, the world exists in a potential state; for, if there is complete annihilation, the next creation of the world would be sudden and without cause. Though years succeed each other, the seasons and their characteristic signs (*ṛtulinga*) remain the same.<sup>24</sup> Thus whenever spring comes, trees will put on new leaves and blossoms, cuckoos will coo and joy will fill all nature. The years roll away, but each year will bring spring, and it will be exactly like the past spring. The cyclic rotation of the world is similar.

Śankara says that all creation is the result of merit and demerit, because the *smṛti* tells us: 'beings attain again and again the very same *karmas* (actions), which they have performed in the previous aeon'.<sup>25</sup> As the cyclic rotation of the world is beginningless,<sup>26</sup> the flow of the congregations of beings (*prāṇi nikāya pravāha*) such as gods, animals and men, the institutions of caste and station (*varṇāśrama*) and the patterns of virtue and the fruits of actions are fixed (*niyata*) like the fixed relation between each sense and its object. Śankara concludes that as all world-cycles are similar (*tulya, samāna*), at the beginning of each creation Brahmā gives to the newly generated sages and the Veda, the same names and power which they respectively had in the previous aeon.<sup>27</sup>

#### IV

##### *In what sense is the Veda eternal?*

In Indian philosophy two kinds of eternity are distinguished, (a) *kūṭastha nityatā* and (b) *pravāharūpa nityatā*. A thing is *kūṭastha nitya* if it is unchanged for ever, while a thing has *pravāharūpa nityatā* if though incessantly changing it does not alter its pattern (*niyati*). Roughly speaking, a rock, for example, has the former kind of reality, and a river the latter kind. The nature of a river is to flow incessantly, and so long as it does not swerve from this nature of its, it may be said to be 'mutably real'; though not 'enduringly real' as a rock.

Now, Śankara seems to conceive the eternity of the Veda as *pravāha nityatā*, because he distinctly uses the word *pravāha* and says that all the three worlds and creatures are a flux, but have a pattern.<sup>28</sup> If the whole universe including gods is of that



nature, it would be but natural to think that the Veda too has only a reality of that sort. If 'Prajāpati' or 'Hiraṇyagarbha', who has to recollect the Veda and manifest it at the beginning of each aeon, is a person who comes to occupy that position and title for a definite period, then it seems absurd to ascribe immutable reality to the Veda.

But a protagonist of the Vivaraṇa school holds a different view. Vidyāraṇya says that the Veda is beginningless and is never produced in altered form as is the case with the *purāṇas*. The word 'Veda' denotes, according to him, letters, words, sentences, topics and chapters in a certain regular order. They are *only* manifested (*āvirbhāva*) and concealed (*tirobhāva*) respectively, at the beginning and the end of the aeon, and so their *kūṭastha nityatā* may be accepted. Vidyāraṇya now raises the question, if the Veda is also beginningless and immutably real just as Brahman what is the difference between the two? He replies that while Brahman is *independent*, immutably real and beginningless, the Veda is *dependent*, immutably real and beginningless; i.e. the Veda is dependent on Brahman being a superimposition, as the snake is on a rope in an illusion.<sup>29</sup>

The other leaders of the Vivaraṇa school, Prakāśātman and Rāmānanda Sarasvatī seem to differ from Vidyāraṇya, for they distinctly say that the Veda is real only as a beginningless and endless flow (*pravāha*).<sup>30</sup> This position seems to be more intelligible and in consonance with what Śaṅkara said, i.e. from one world-cycle to another the *stream* of Vedic study is kept on unbroken and without beginning.

As usual Vācaspati differs from the Vivaraṇa school. He says that because dharma and adharma can never fail to have their respective capacities (*sāmarthyā*), what are Vedas in this aeon, are Vedas in the next aeon also, and hence their meaning is also the same. Then he significantly adds, 'When similarity (*sādharmya*) with what is seen is possible, to suppose dissimilarity is to oppose both scripture and inference.' Clay can produce only a pot and not threads; i.e. in other words, the capacities of things are invariable, and there can never be any interchange between the capacities of dharma and adharma. So he concludes that the Veda which sets forth dharma and adharma, is always the same.<sup>31</sup> Though not explicitly stated, Vācaspati

seems to imply that only the truths contained in the Veda are invariable and eternal, and as the Veda is the best well-connected presentation (*ānupūreṇī raçānā*) of them, a similar presentation is made of them in every aeon. As has been already said, Vācaspati does not believe in the eternity of words and sentences, and the various examples he gives ('fire does not wet', 'water does not burn') show that in his opinion moral laws are invariable like physical laws. Unswervable laws could be stated only in a uniform (*niyata*) way. That seems to be his proof for the *sameness* of the Veda in every aeon.<sup>32</sup>

How is Brahman the cause of the eternal Veda?

There is a special *sūtra* (aphorism) in the *Brahma Sūtras* which says that Brahman is the cause of the Veda. Commenting on it, Amalānanda says that this *sūtra* was composed to remove the doubt that as the Veda is eternal, Brahman cannot be its cause. Śankara himself has not thrown any light on how Brahman is the cause of the eternal Veda. In his *bhāṣya* on I.1.3 of *Brahma Sūtras*, he simply says that Brahman is the cause of the Veda; while in his *Bhāṣya* on I.3.29, he says that it is eternal, because (a) it has no independent author and (b) because the world is produced from it. He has no doubt made the suggestion elsewhere that when the final truth of non-dualism is known, the Veda also will become non-existent.<sup>33</sup> But the point to be noticed is that Brahman's causality of the world and Veda also become non-existent then. It is only from the empirical standpoint that Brahman is the cause of the Veda and the eternity of the Veda is also true only from that standpoint. How are the two reconciled then from the empirical standpoint?

In Advaita books we find three answers to this. (1) According to Vācaspati, while the Supreme Self is the cause of the Veda, he is not its independent author; because he always *composes* in accordance with the past aeon. So in that sense the Veda is eternal.<sup>33a</sup> But is not the world also eternal in that sense, for it too is always created as it was in the past?<sup>34</sup> Amalānanda's reply to this is that the Veda is not destroyed in the intervening dissolutions.<sup>34a</sup>

(2) According to the Vivaraṇa school, as has been said al-



ready, the Veda has the same status which the 'snake' has when a rope is mistaken for a snake. As Brahman is eternal and as the cosmic illusion is also beginningless and endless, the Veda is eternal. But here too the question: What is the speciality of the Veda? remains unanswered. According to this view also it is no more eternal than the world, which too has been superimposed on Brahman.

(3) Sāyana has given a more satisfactory reply. He introduces the problem by saying that while some Vedic and Smṛti texts affirm that it is eternal, others declare that God is its cause. He tries to reconcile them in the following manner. There is no contradiction between the two kinds of scriptural texts, because the eternity of the Veda is only empirical. The time for empirical experience is after creation and until destruction (*samhāra*), and the Veda is not seen to be either generated or destroyed within that time. Just like time and ether, the Veda is also eternal. But, says Sāyana, according to scriptural tradition itself, in the first creation, like ether and time the generation of the Veda is also from Brahman.<sup>35</sup> In the *Ṛgbhāṣya*, however, he says that because it has not been composed by any man, its cause being Brahman alone, it is eternal like ether etc., in the empirical stage.<sup>36</sup>

What Sāyana has in mind here is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text where it is said 'air and ether are immortal',<sup>37</sup> and the meaning of which has been discussed in the *Brahma Sūtras*.<sup>38</sup> The conclusion reached there is that just as, though gods are spoken of as immortal, they are not really immortal (being liable to be reborn as men after their merit is exhausted), even so ether is not immortal as its generation and destruction are established by scripture itself. Similarly, when it is said that 'Brahman is omnipresent and eternal like ether', it does not prove the eternity of ether or the similarity of ether and Brahman, just as when it is said 'the sun is moving across the sky like an arrow', it only means that the sun is moving fast, but not that it is moving with the very same speed of an arrow.<sup>39</sup>

Keeping this discussion of the *Sūtrabhāṣya* in mind, Sāyana says that the dictum 'Brahman is the cause of everything' has no exception and is the cardinal tenet, and so the eternity of the Veda is to be so understood as to not contradict it. According to the cosmogony of the Advaita Vedānta, at the beginning of

creation God first conceives (*ākalayya*) the world as it was previously, then wills 'I shall do this', and then from that 'will' of God are produced the five subtle elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth in that order. Dissolution proceeds in the reverse order, the ether merging at the end.<sup>40</sup> Thus while all other things are produced and destroyed in between creation and before final dissolution, generation of ether in its subtle aspect (*tanmātra*) inaugurates creation and its dissolution completes the cessation of the world. So it is prior to all things and the last of all things, barring, Īśvara. So, compared with other things, it is eternal, but in truth it is not. To conclude, Sāyana would have us conceive that the Veda too enjoys the same status, i.e. in others words, 'the eternity of the Veda' is only a courteous appellation (*upaçāra māttram*). And this interpretation seems to be more in accordance with the intention of Śankara, as Appayya Dikṣita also obviously suggests.<sup>41</sup>

## V

*The Concept of Apauruṣeyatā*

Śankara attempts to prove that Brahman is the cause of the Veda for four reasons : (i) It is a very great book, (*mahat*), both on account of its bulk, as well as the matters it deals with. It is a mine of all knowledge (*sarvajñānākara*) and is the *sole* source of our knowledge regarding the four castes, the four *āśramas*, one's duties and Brahman. (ii) It is supplemented by innumerable subsidiary branches of knowledge (*vidyāsthāna*) like the *purāṇas*, the Nyāya, dharma *śāstra*, the Mīmāṃsā and the six *angas* such as grammar, etc. This also shows that the authors of the *purāṇas* etc. accept it as a true authority. (iii) Like a lamp, it throws light on all things. This shows that the Veda does not fail to teach us ; and that too clearly (*na anavabodhakah, na aspaṣṭabodhakah*). (iv) It is like an omniscient person, because there is nothing with which it does not deal. Śankara's contention is that a *śāstra* such as this cannot originate except from an omniscient being. The Veda itself tells us that 'the *RgVeda* is the breath of the great Being'.<sup>42</sup> With as much ease as a man exhales, the great Being produced the Veda as if in play, from which unsurpassedness, omniscience and omnipotence of its cause—which could



be nothing else than Brahman<sup>43</sup>—are to be concluded. Such in full is Śāṅkara's argument.

Now, the Vedānta does not remain content with the position that as God is the author of the Veda, it is an infallible authority. According to the Advaita Vedānta there are no proofs which can demonstrate God's existence; so Śāṅkara thinks that there is a logical alternation in the position of the other schools, which maintain that while God's existence and authority are known through the Veda, the authority of the Veda is based on God's omniscience.<sup>44</sup> Vācaspati says that there is no such defect in the Vedānta; for it holds that both scripture and God are beginningless, though God is the source of it.<sup>45</sup> Amalānanda explains it further in the following way. A lamp may have been lit by Devadatta, but its ability to give light is its own and not due to Devadatta. Similarly though God is the cause of the Veda, its validity is intrinsic.<sup>46</sup>

The Veda, caused by Brahman, but independent :

As it was said earlier, the Vedānta says that even in regard to existent things, the testimony of words can be an independent source of knowledge, *provided* that testimony is not that of any person. For, if a person has been able to derive knowledge of something and convey it to others, we can also know that thing in the same way in which he did. Now, as the Veda treats of dharma and Brahman, and neither of them can be perceived or inferred, the Veda is *apauruṣeya*.<sup>47</sup> Since there is no proof for the existence of an eternal omniscient God, scriptural authority cannot be derived from him.<sup>48</sup>

The concept of *apauruṣeya* is taken over from the Mīmāṃsā. According to the Mīmāṃsā, the Veda is impersonal, i.e. it never had any person as its author. The Advaita Vedānta tries to reconcile this view with its theory that God is the cause of the Veda. So *pauruṣeya* is defined in such a way that God can still be considered the cause of the Veda. Three views regarding *pauruṣeyatā* are expressed by Advaita writers :

(i) Vācaspati says that though letters may be eternal, words and sentences cannot be, for the words uttered by no two persons can be identical. So when words and sentences are uttered by somebody, he, of course, is their 'maker' (*kartā*). But there are

two ways in which a sentence can be uttered. It may be independently constructed by a person to express an idea of his own, or he may merely repeat the words of another. Kālidāsa, for example, wrote the *Kumārasambhava* independently, i.e. he composed it in the manner in which he liked to express his own ideas gathered from various sources. That is the *pauruṣeyatā* of *Kumārasambhava*. On the other hand, though he composed (*virāṇa*) the Veda, God did not do so independently; but only composed it as it was in the previous aeon. So according to Vācaspati, as there is no independent author of the Veda, it is *apauruṣeya*.<sup>49</sup>

Views of the Vivaraṇa School :

(ii) Prakāśātman says that if after a thing is known from perception or inference, sentences are constructed with a desire to convey that knowledge to others, such sentences are *pauruṣeya*.<sup>50</sup> Statements which are prompted by the speaker's 'opinion' are *pauruṣeya*.<sup>51</sup> 'Opinion' (*rāga*) is the capacity of a speaker's words to indicate his intention in a particular matter as, 'Here this is to be done by this'.<sup>52</sup> The knowledge of the means of obtaining what is desirable, possessed by human beings, is non-eternal; and their 'opinions' based on that will also be non-eternal. Such knowledge has to be dependent upon other *pramāṇas* and statements expressing it are *pauruṣeya*.<sup>53</sup> Prakāśātman illustrates this by means of an example. The *Mahābhārata* is *pauruṣeya*, because it has for its purport the opinions of Vyāsa;<sup>54</sup> and it was written after the knowledge contained in it was obtained through some other *pramāṇas*, e.g. perception, his own reasoning and from his teacher's lessons.<sup>55</sup> Now, he argues that God did not first get the knowledge contained in the Veda through other *pramāṇas*. Nor did he compose the Veda at some definite time as Vyāsa did his work.<sup>56</sup> At the beginning of each world-cycle God merely utters the Vedic sentences, just as to-day we might quote the sentences of the *Mahābhārata*. So the Vivaraṇa school says that the purport of the Veda is not to express an 'opinion'—*not even that of God*; its purport 'through the injunction to study consists in injunctions'.<sup>57</sup>

What is meant by this seems to be as follows. Supposing



to-day we recite and teach the *Mahābhārata*, it would not be to express an opinion of our own, but to enable others to know Vyāsa's views. But when Vyāsa composed it, he did not merely restate others' opinions, but wanted to express his own opinions. Something similar to what happened in Vyāsa's case never happened in the case of the Veda, because there *never was* a first occasion when it was *independently* composed even by God. So, according to the Vedānta, its purport is not to express an opinion. But, how can a sentence lacking purport give any knowledge? The Vedānta replies that it has the same purport which a *Mahābhārata*-sentence would have if quoted by us to-day, i.e. its purpose is merely to enable us to know what has been already said, but not to express a *new* judgment.

The writers of the Vivaraṇa school attempt to meet a number of possible criticisms of this theory. Does God repeat the Veda at the beginning of creation like an automaton, or does he repeat it after understanding the meaning of it? The Advaita replies that God, being omniscient, knows the meaning before repeating it;<sup>58</sup> yet it is not to express his opinion that he does so.

Another possible objection is that even if the Veda is not repeated to express an opinion, it must be composed after knowing its meaning, and so though the Veda's authority does not depend upon God's 'opinion', it at least depends upon his composition,<sup>59</sup> and what is not independent cannot be a true authority. To this the Advaita writers reply in the following way. It is found to-day that every moment the students of the Veda 'make' (while uttering) sentences made of letters qualified by a certain sequence (*ānupūrvīśiṣṭavarṇātmakavākya*), and like the relationship between words and meanings, continuity of sequence also can be inferred. It too is an eternal flow, i.e. from eternity generations of students were repeating the same sequence. The formal inference would be: 'The first Vedic sequence was also generated by memory of past Vedic sequence, being Vedic sequence such as the present Vedic sequence.' Even God never caused a new sequence of Vedic words and sentences.<sup>60</sup> So according to the Vivaraṇa school, God is not independent even in respect of the order in which Vedic words and sentences are arranged. This opinion differs very much from Vācaspati's.

Rāmānanda says that some people have argued that a book is

'dependent' (*sāpekṣa*) only if it is caused by the determinate knowledge (*savikalpa jñāna*) of somebody, and as the cause of the Veda is Brahman's indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpa jñāna*), the Veda is independent. According to Rāmānanda, this contention cannot stand, because if Brahman does not apprehend the meaning of the Veda, it is neither the cause of the Veda, nor omniscient; and if it apprehends, its knowledge is not indeterminate.<sup>61</sup> The result is that on no grounds can the Veda be *pauruṣeya* and *sāpekṣa*.

The Vivaraṇa school takes this trend of thought to a peculiar conclusion. It maintains that Brahman is *only* the material cause of the Veda and not its author. The Upaniṣadic passage, 'Of that great Being, the Veda is the breath', means only that Īśvara is its material cause.<sup>62</sup> If the Veda becomes a *pauruṣeya* work, because its material cause is Brahman, Vidyāraṇya says he would then accept that sort of *pauruṣeyatā*.<sup>63</sup> As was said, he conceives it as immutably real, and as an effect of Brahman in the same way in which a snake is of a rope in an illusion.<sup>64</sup>

Prakāśātman raises another point in this connection. In his *Bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara has said that if, for example, Pāṇini has much greater knowledge than what is contained in his work on grammar, need it be said that the cause of the Veda, repository of all knowledge, is unsurpassed, omniscient and omnipresent?<sup>65</sup> Now Prakāśātman asks pertinently, if to get over the difficulty of the Veda's *pauruṣeyatā*, Brahman is posited as its material cause only, then, firstly, how is Pāṇini's example relevant and secondly, how is Brahman omniscient?<sup>66</sup> The Vivaraṇa school gives the following reply: (i) Pāṇini's example has been mentioned only to prove that there is more knowledge in the cause of the Veda than in the latter; it does not seek to prove that as in the case of Pāṇini's book, the Veda is generated by the knowledge of the objects of which it treats.<sup>67</sup> (ii) There is no need to prove Brahman's omniscience from its being the cause of the Veda, for the entire world of name and form is an apparent modification (*vivarta*) of its power of knowledge (*jñānaśakti*).<sup>68</sup>

Now, Vidyāraṇya notices another possible criticism. If everything is a *vivarta* of Brahman and if it illumines all things in contact with it, why should it be the Veda's material cause? The Veda is after all needed to enlighten us on everything; and



so Brahman appears as the Veda. But if Brahman—the self-luminous consciousness—is in contact with everything, the Veda is useless. Vidyāraṇya replies that the rays of the sun are in contact with everything, including air and ether; nevertheless even in sunlight they are not seen.<sup>69</sup> Vidyāraṇya concludes that similarly, though the self-effulgent Brahman is in contact with all things, they are not illumined (known). Hence arises the necessity that they should be manifested by the Veda.

The above account fails to be intelligible if the Advaita theory of self-luminosity of knowledge, which has been mentioned before, is not remembered. The self is self-luminous and it is by contact with it that all things are cognised; while it itself never becomes an object though it is capable of, so to say, intimating its existence by its very presence. There is some similarity between this and the Platonic conception that for an act of knowledge something more than the object known and the knowing mind is necessary. A colour will remain unperceived even though the eye is there to see if there is not a light to illuminate it. 'This something' whose light makes our sight see in the fairest manner, and makes what is seen be seen',<sup>70</sup> has been later identified by St. Bonaventura with God. God is the source of all light, and for all knowledge illumination from God is necessary. This 'theory of divine illumination', which is a working out of the Psalmist's saying, 'In Thy Light shall we see light', may help us to understand the Advaita theory of self-luminosity (*svayam prakāśatā*), on which is based the above reply of Vidyāraṇya.

Sāyana's view :

(iii) We now come to the simplest interpretation of *apauruṣeyatā* given by a Vedāntin. Absence of human composition constitutes the *apauruṣeyatā* of a book, and as Brahman and not any human being is the cause of the Veda, it is *apauruṣeya*. This is the view of Sāyana.<sup>71</sup>

The popular Advaita Vedānta manual *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* neatly summarises the Vedānta position, ignoring all the elaborate discussion carried on by the masters. According to it, the Veda is not eternal, since it is produced by Brahman; and it is not *pauruṣeya*, because it 'depends on utterance of the same kind'. A sentence is *pauruṣeya*, if it is *not*, to put it simply, a repetition;

but the Veda is not so, because at the beginning of each aeon God merely repeats (recomposes) the Veda as it was in the past aeon. Between creation and dissolution the Veda remains without generation and destruction.<sup>72</sup>

Śankara quotes a *Rg-Vedic* passage which says that the sacrificers qualified themselves to receive the Veda by performing sacrifices, and later obtained the Word, which was in possession of the sages.<sup>73</sup> According to him sages and gods who excel in knowledge and action by virtue of their actions in the past aeon, are able to recollect the Veda by God's grace as it was in the past aeon, just as a man waking from sleep is able to recollect and continue his previous waking experience. He also quotes with approval a *smṛti* text which says that Śaunaka and Madhucchandras were enabled to 'see' the Vedic texts.<sup>74</sup> Such passages from Śankara would imply that according to him, God makes the Vedic propositions flash in the minds of the sages in the same linguistic form in which they are now available. Hence the sacredness of the Veda, its verbal inerrancy and the caution that change or mispronunciation of even a single letter will break one's head.<sup>75</sup>

## VI

### *The Veda is the only true Scripture*

The Advaita does not accept any composition except the Veda as infallible scripture. The various other scriptures cancel each other by their mutual contradictions. Works such as the *smṛtis* (for example the *Manusmṛti*, the *Bhagavad Gītā*, etc.) depend upon the Veda as inference depends upon perception.<sup>76</sup> All people cannot understand the Veda; so they have to rely on the *smṛtis* in order to understand the purport of the Veda; but in doing so they must rely only on those *smṛtis* which are in conformity with the Veda. *Smṛtis* which are clearly in conflict with the Veda ought to be rejected, because the authors of *smṛtis*, being but men, cannot know anything about supersensuous matters.<sup>77</sup> So the *smṛtis* are authoritative only when they are in agreement with the Veda.<sup>78</sup> If, however, a passage in the *smṛtis* does not contradict anything in the Vedas, we may infer that it is based on some Vedic text, even though we ourselves may not know that text.<sup>79</sup>



There are also mutual contradictions among the *smṛtis* themselves. The *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Manusmṛti* say that Ātman is the cause of the world ; while Kapila's Sāṃkhya *smṛti* says that matter is the cause of the world. In this case, the Vedānta rejects Kapila's *smṛti*, and accepts what the *Gītā* and the *Manusmṛti* say, because they follow the Veda.<sup>80</sup> Śāṅkara says that this does not, however, mean that the whole of Kapila's system has to be rejected. Even in the *smṛtis* which are in conflict with the Veda, if there are any doctrines which are in conformity with the Veda, the Advaita holds they should be accepted. Kapila, for example, says that the self has no attributes, and Patanjali lays down certain rules which are to be followed by the monks (*parivrajakas*). These are in conformity with what the Veda says, and Śāṅkara concedes that they may be accepted.<sup>81</sup> Other schools of Hindu thought such as Vaiśeṣika, Pāśupata, and Pāṇḍarātra also are not entirely in accordance with the Vedic revelation, and so, according to Śāṅkara, they also ought to be rejected.

The reason for this, according to the Advaita teachers, is that dharma and Brahman cannot be perceived or inferred by anyone.<sup>82</sup> There are many books that claim to be holy scriptures. The author of any particular book among these cannot be singled out and declared to be omniscient, because if the Buddha, for example, is omniscient, are not Kapila and Kaṇāda omniscient? and if the authors of all the scriptures are omniscient, why is there so much dispute about what is 'good' and 'bad'? The Vedānta concludes that while there is no proof that only one of them is omniscient, all the scriptures could not have been composed by omniscient persons, because they cancel each other.<sup>83</sup> All these books composed by human beings, however great they may be, are only based on their guesswork (*utprekṣā*), for supersensuous things can never be perceived and much less inferred.

One of the highest authorities on the Advaita Vedānta, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, asserts that among the followers of other faiths, there cannot be even the desire for salvation or its means, for the 'salvations' which they hold up to their followers are untenable. Among other schools and faiths he includes not only the atheistic materialists (*çārvākās*), Jains and Bauddhas,

but also Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiṣṇavas and Pāśupatas etc.<sup>84</sup>

In a probably later work, he is slightly more liberal towards at least the other schools of Hindu thought. There he says that the sages such as Kapila, Jaimini etc., are all omniscient and that the philosophy really accepted by all of them is the Advaita *Brahmavāda*, as set forth in Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras*, and rightly interpreted by Śankara. But, he says, these sages knew full well that the majority of men, obsessed as they are by worldly goods, cannot understand the supreme truth and so have put forward a variety of views and ways of worship, to suit different people with different temperaments. The intention of the sages in so doing was only to save people from *nāstikya* (denial of Vedic authority and the other world); but their real conviction lay in Advaita, and their real purpose was to lead men towards this. But some people, not knowing this, and imagining that these sages have even taught things contrary to the Veda, have taken these various doctrines as their guide, and are treading mistaken paths.<sup>85</sup> None of these, however, can lead to the supreme goal, liberation, directly; at most, they can do so only indirectly.<sup>86</sup> Madhusūdana holds that unless they converge in Advaita, they cannot fulfil themselves.

Regarding Buddhism and Jainism, his attitude is always uncompromising, for in this later book also he declares that the scriptures of Buddhists and Jainas are outside the Vedic faith (*vedabāhya*), and their scriptures are not even *indirectly* conducive to human good.<sup>87</sup>



## CHAPTER IV

### LANGUAGE AND BRAHMAN

#### 1

#### *Significance of the word 'Brahman'*

In view of the importance attained by linguistic philosophy at present, the following problem becomes important. It is now recognised that there are many levels of language; each level giving its own insight into the 'situation'. For example, the poet's language about a rainbow will differ very much from a physicist's language about it, though both deal with the same 'situation'. At the same time all language tries to clarify what Quine has called the 'irreducible posit'. Language at other levels refers to what is 'objective', i.e. what can be seen, heard, touched, tasted and smelt. For instance, while common-sense language has direct empirical relevance, scientific language has indirect relevance. But what empirical relevance has Brahman-language? How are we to understand the word 'Brahman' occurring in the Upaniṣads? And why would a man *desire* at all to know Brahman, which he has not come across in experience?

In the *bhāṣya* on the first *Brahma Sūtra* it has been said by Śāṅkara that he who desires to know Brahman must undertake an inquiry concerning Brahman, following the study of the Upaniṣadic texts. But Brahman is not known in any other way, except through the Veda. Why will then anyone *desire* to know Brahman? If Brahman is known from the Vedānta (Upaniṣadic) sentences, he who studies them will know it and then he will have no further desire to know it. On the other hand, if anyone has not studied the Vedānta, then Brahman remains unknown to him, and nobody can yearn after the unknown.

Study the Words and Facts will evoke Themselves :

Attempts to answer this question are made in the following manner by the Advaitins. It is true that without the

Upaniṣads nobody could know Brahman. Similarly, the Mīmāṃsā school also would have to accept that nobody knows anything about 'heaven' through empirical experience; yet when we come across the words 'heaven' or 'sacrificial post' (*yūpa*) in the Veda, we guess their meaning from the context in which they occur. In the same way, when we first come across the word 'Brahman', we assume it to have some meaning or other, as the sentences in which it occurs do not seem to be those of a lunatic. Its meaning becomes clearer when we observe the syntactical connection of this word with other familiar words in the Vedic sentences. Etymology and grammar also come to our aid. For instance, an Upaniṣadic text says, 'Reality, knowledge, and infinity are *Brahman*.' The first *Brahma Sūtra* says, 'Then, therefore, the desire to know *Brahman*'. We cannot understand the word *Brahman* here unless we take it to mean that it is a real thing, which is of the nature of consciousness, free from all limitations, and which is to be known because it is the highest End. Etymologically, *Brahman* is derived from a root which signifies 'greatness' and unsurpassed greatness, because no other words or topic limit that sense. So we further know that Brahman is free from the limitations of space, time and things.

Through the amplification of this meaning known from etymology, the Advaita says, we begin to know more and more about Brahman. We find 'greatness' predicated of persons who excel others in genius or power, and are free from the shortcomings of others. Brahman, being the greatest thing of all, cannot have any defects such as 'limited substantiality', 'inertness', etc., and is the highest End. Thus when we come across the word *Brahman*, with the help of etymology, we can attach some meaning to it, and later can amplify this meaning.

It may be that a conception so arrived at through etymology shows only that the existence of such a thing is possible (*sambhāvanāmātrabuddhi*), and does not establish that there is such a thing. But if we once know that the existence of such a thing is possible, then we can begin an investigation about it. Inquiry or discussion (*viçāra*) is possible about a conceivable thing (*pratipanna vastu*) only. A self-contradiction, such as 'the barren woman's son', is inconceivable, and no discussion can



proceed about it. As the conception of Brahman involves no self-contradiction, its possibility is shown.

To the criticism that an unknown thing could not be discussed, since no one would desire to know it, the Vedānta replies that Brahman is not an 'obscure' thing; for the Upaniṣad says that 'Brahman is this self' (*ayam ātmā Brahma*), and in the form 'I am', the self is evident to the whole world (*sarvalokapratyakṣa*). As Brahman is not entirely unknown (*atyanta aprasiddhi abhāvāt*), it can form a topic for discussion. It cannot be said that because Brahman is the Self which is universally known, it needs no discussion. Every one has a notion of 'I', but its specific nature is not generally known. The materialists say that 'I' refers to the body and its functions, there being nothing else. The nihilists say that 'I' is a void (nullity), while subjective idealists say that it is a stream of momentary cognitive states. To decide which of these several views is true and maintained by the Veda, inquiry is necessary. So, the Advaitins conclude, though the Upaniṣads tell us about Brahman, inquiry is necessary in order to refute contrary views and dispel doubts.<sup>1</sup>

The Advaitins say that he who studies the Veda and knows the meanings of words from etymology and grammar, gets an idea of eternal Brahman from texts such as 'The Real alone was in the beginning'; 'That thou art', etc. But this mere idea of Brahman is not sufficient to realise one's identity with Brahman, the blissful. This is not possible from a mere study of Vedānta; there must be discussion and enquiry following the study.<sup>2</sup>

Every sensible man is dissatisfied with the world and the things in it; for the pleasure which they can give is temporal, and permanent happiness can be given only by an eternal thing. When anyone studies the Vedānta and reads there that Brahman is spoken of as the Eternal Blissful Thing, he desires to know more about it. And though Brahman is spoken of as the self, discussion is necessary to know what precisely 'the self' is. So, the Advaitins say both the desire to know Brahman (*brahma jijñāsā*) and the inquiry about it are possible.<sup>3</sup>

*Logical oddness of the word 'Brahman'*

Having located the empirical anchorage of the word Brahman in that self-awareness, which everyone has, the Advaita Vedānta attempts to tackle another problem.

The paradox of Brahman-sentences :

How can the Vedānta sentences have as their object Brahman, which is said to be the eternal subject? The reply of Śāṅkara is that the Upaniṣads do not indicate Brahman as the 'this'—an object—to be known by us. The Vedānta is intended to remove the imagined (*kalpita*) difference due to nescience. The Upaniṣads inform us that Brahman is not an object (*aviṣaya*), since it is the inner self (*pratyagātmā*). Thus the Vedānta removes the difference between the knower, the known and the knowledge imagined by nescience.<sup>4</sup>

Vācaspati commenting on the above view of Śāṅkara says that every sentence cannot indicate the difference between any two things as the 'this'. For instance, nobody can point out the concrete difference in sweetness between sugarcane, honey and jaggery as the 'this', because that difference is verbally inexpressible. If this is the case when objective things are concerned, how much more difficult it is to find words which can indicate the transmundane inner self? Still somehow in an approximate way there can be predication even here.<sup>5</sup> When the Upaniṣad teaches 'You are Brahman', Brahman is not an object to be known as distinct from the inner self; for Brahman, which is in apposition (*samānādhikaraṇa*) with the Inner Self, has no cogniser; and when there is no cogniser, there is no cognition and cognised, just as when there is no cook, there would be also no objects, cooking, or prepared dishes.<sup>6</sup>

It may be asked: if Brahman is not capable of being known in any other way, how is it known that it is meant by the word 'Brahman'? Vācaspati replies that by negating every condition, a sentence can indicate Brahman. For example, when we have to explain what gold is, we may show an earring, a bracelet etc., and inform that gold is that which can be transformed into these various shapes, and that which remains even when these shapes



are melted down. Gold, so it would be shown, is neither an earring nor a bangle, but the substance which assumes these shapes. Similarly, Upaniṣadic sentences teaching that Brahman is not 'this' or 'that' negate all adjuncts. Words such as 'Brahman' (= the great) and 'Ātman' (= the self) etymologically indicate Brahman, because it is self-luminous and all-pervasive. When all appearances are negated, there must be an ultimate substance, and that cannot but be the self, because if the luminous self is denied, there can be no world-appearance.<sup>7</sup>

According to Vācaspati, if a man, who knows words, their corresponding meanings, and the principles of testimony, studies the Upaniṣads, he knows Brahman as the self, on account of the capacity of scriptural testimony to give such knowledge; just as, when the eye is in contact with a pot and the mind is attentive, the thing in front, i.e. the pot, will be inevitably perceived. A pot in front is cognised, because sense-object contact is capable of making it known; and Brahman is known through the Upaniṣadic sentences, because they are capable of making it known. Vācaspati says that just as a man will not be able to see even a pot in front, if his eye is defective or he is absent-minded, so one does not know Brahman, even though the Vedānta sentences are studied, if the principles of testimony and the meanings of words are not known.<sup>8</sup>

Brahman can only be *shown*, not described :

The conclusion that Brahman can never be *described*, but can only be *shown* somehow approximately (*adūraviprakarṣeṇa*),<sup>9</sup> is clearly brought out by Śaṅkara at three places. (*Vide infra.*) While no description is possible of Brahman, the task of the Vedānta is to teach about it, and so logically speaking it is an impropriety; but only in this way can the Vedānta emphasize the mystery of Brahman, which eludes all objective language; and yet it can be dealt with only in that way if Brahman has to be talked about intelligibly. While thus to talk of Brahman is a verbal impropriety, this impropriety is mitigated by means of qualifying epithets, which attempt to reduce or remove the spatio-temporal elements in experience, by either enlarging our conception or narrowing it down. Altogether it will be shown that 'these improprieties are not without a purpose: they reveal what is known but

hidden—in other words, they wouldn't reveal if they weren't wrong.<sup>10</sup>

Brahman *shown* by the method of *Adhyāropa* and *Apavāda* :

1. One passage where Śāṅkara discusses the relationship between language and Brahman occurs in the *Gītābhāṣya*. Commenting on the *Gītā* text,<sup>11</sup> 'Brahman is neither being nor non-being', he explains that as Brahman is incapable of being related to words, it is pointed out in all the *Upaniṣads* by the negation of particularities (*viśeṣa*) as 'Not this, Not this', and 'neither gross nor subtle'. Brahman cannot be described by the word 'is', nor by the words 'is not'; for, as it is supersensual it is not the object of knowledge in the form 'is' or 'is not' (*ubhaya buddhi anumata pratyaya aṁśayatoṣṭ*). He says that only things such as a pot, which can be apprehended by the senses, are capable of becoming the object of knowledge in the form 'is' or 'is not'. Brahman, which is supersensual, can be apprehended only by means of testimony.

Śāṅkara says that it is not contradictory to say that there is Brahman, which cannot be called being or non-being; because (i) *śrīti* texts assert that there is a thing which falls neither in the class of known things, nor in the class of unknown things;<sup>12</sup> and (ii) by reasoning we can maintain that Brahman cannot be dealt with by words such as being, non-being etc.

According to Śāṅkara it is possible to prove that Brahman cannot be described by words such as being or non-being, because all words, which are spoken, throw some light on a thing referred to, by enabling the hearer to cognise it by means of the apprehension of the relationship between themselves and their referents. It is possible to relate words to their referents either through species, action, quality, or connection. For example, a cow or an horse is signified by those words by means of the species 'cow' or 'horse'; the words 'reads', 'cooks' by means of action; the words 'white' or 'black' by means of quality; and the words 'possessor of money', 'possessor of cows' by means of connection.

Śāṅkara says that as Brahman has no species, words like 'being' cannot signify it; i.e. as in the case of a pot, it cannot be said of Brahman, 'It is'. Since Brahman has no qualities,



and is actionless, it cannot be qualified or spoken of as doing something. It is also unconnected with anything, because it is the sole reality without a second. Since it is never the object but is always the Self, it is but proper that no words can signify it; and the Upaniṣads also confirm this.<sup>13</sup>

Śāṅkara adds that as it has been said that Brahman cannot be described as 'being', some people may mistakenly conclude that 'it is not', and that to rebut this view, the Gītā establishes the 'existence' (*astitvam*) of Brahman by attributing to it all the organs of a living being. So the text says, 'Brahman has hands, legs, eyes, heads, faces, and ears on all sides; encompassing all, it stands.'<sup>14</sup> He says that to enable us to comprehend (*adhi-gama*) Brahman's existence, the false form (*mīthyā rūpa*) due to adjuncts is attributed to Brahman as a property, merely for the sake of supposition. In fact all difference due to adjuncts is false; but through false attribution (*adhyāropa*) and negation of it (*apavāda*), the 'extension-less' (*niṣprapañca*) Brahman is elucidated. As all bodily organs everywhere are able to discharge their functions by the existence of the power of Brahman, they are all signs whereby we can know its existence; and so it is only by way of speech (*upācāra*) that they are attributed to Brahman. Śāṅkara adds that lest anyone might go away with the impression that Brahman is endowed with many feet, hands and senses, the Gītā immediately and expressly negates what has been falsely attributed.<sup>15</sup>

The above position of Śāṅkara can be briefly summarised in the following way: Once Brahman is posited as the supreme self, the problem of its description arises, and then from the Upaniṣads and our own reasoning we learn that all human concepts, derived from man's experience of objective things in space and time, are inadequate to describe Brahman. But as long as one inquires about Brahman, words have to be used about it; but in order that the limitations of human concepts may be brought out, and the nature of Brahman revealed somehow through this odd and logically inappropriate language, an *adhyāropa*, i.e. a false attribution, is first made of Brahman, and then an *apavāda* or negation of this is made. For instance, if Brahman is first described as 'it is many-footed and many-handed',<sup>16</sup> immediately this is rejected, and if it is described as 'it moves'<sup>17</sup> in the very next sentence this is

denied. Śankara says that sentences such as 'though having no hands and feet, it moves and grasps, and though it has no eyes and ears, it sees and hears',<sup>18</sup> are to be understood in the way in which sentences such as, 'the blind man obtained a diamond',<sup>19</sup> are to be understood. As Bhartṛhari, who belongs to the Śabdādvaita school, said, in teaching children also, this method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* is adopted, for by various devices children are coaxed (*upālāna*) to grasp the truth by being led through a false path.<sup>20</sup> The conclusion is that words used for describing Brahman are not to be understood univocally, according to the usual material mode of talking, for they at best attempt to describe a mystery which exceeds them, and we use them because 'one cannot keep silent'.<sup>21</sup>

Brahman *shown* by the method of *Lakṣanā* :

2. Another place where Śankara has discussed in detail the relationship between Brahman and language is to be found in his *Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*. Commenting on the famous definition 'Brahman is reality, knowledge and infinity',<sup>22</sup> Śankara initiates a thorough discussion, which can be summarised in the following way :

He says that 'reality' etc., are words which are meant to be adjectives of Brahman, which is to be defined. All the three words, in this discussion, are in apposition. Brahman, which is qualified by 'reality' etc., is ascertained to be distinct from other things, just as the 'Nīla' is distinguished, when it is defined as a big, fragrant lotus.

Śankara says that a thing is distinctively differentiated, when other adjectives are negated ; just as by saying the *blue* lotus, a lotus is distinguished from lotuses of other colours. When many things belong to one class, and are capable of being qualified by many adjectives, then adjectives are useful. For instance, in the class 'lotus' there are many individuals, which are red, white, blue, etc. ; so when we predicate a quality *blue* of a particular individual of this class this adjective serves to distinguish it from others of different colours, or, in other words, this adjective negates the application of other adjectives. But there is no use of applying adjectives to an unique thing, because there is no possibility of its being related to other adjectives at all. So,



according to Śankara, in such a case the adjectives are principally meant for definition (*lakṣanā*), and are not principally meant as adjectives. He says that while adjectives differentiate (separate = *nivartaka*) a thing from other things of its class only, *lakṣanā* differentiates it from all things. Śankara gives 'Ether (*ākāśa*) is that which gives scope for extension (*avakāśa pradātā*)' as an example of *lakṣanā*.

According to Śankara, in the above Upaniṣadic definition, the terms 'reality' etc., are meant for the sake of another (*parārtha*), and are not mutually related. So each of them is related to the word 'Brahman' independently of the others; i.e. 'Reality is Brahman', 'knowledge is Brahman', and 'Infinity is Brahman'.

According to Śankara, 'reality' is that which does not deviate from its ascertained nature, while unreality is change (*vikāra*). As the Upaniṣads have explained, Being without change is reality.<sup>23</sup> But Being may be conceived as 'matter'; so to negate materiality, after defining Brahman as 'reality', immediately it is said that 'Knowledge is Brahman'. As the word 'knowledge' is used as an adjective along with the words 'reality' and 'infinity', it is not used in the sense of 'producer of knowledge' (*jñānakartā* = knower), for what undergoes changes in the form of a 'knower' cannot be real. Moreover, 'knower' implies the distinctions of known, knowledge and knower, which would contradict the adjective 'infinity' and other Upaniṣadic texts like 'That is *Bhūmā* (the vast, i.e. Brahman), where no other is known'.<sup>24</sup> Śankara says that it is unjustifiable to say that though there is nothing else to be known by Brahman, it can know itself, and as such it can be called a 'knower'; because if Brahman becomes the known, there remains no 'knower', as there is no internal difference in Brahman. The one Brahman cannot be both knower and known, because it has no parts or members. Further, if Ātman (the self) is also put under the category of known things, such as pots, there is no meaning in scriptural teaching about it, for all objective things can be perceived in some way or other at sometime or other. Brahman, which is pure being (*sanmātra*), can never be known. To conclude, in the definition 'Knowledge is Brahman', the word 'knowledge' negates activity etc., and materiality. To remove the supposition that as knowledge is

limited in the world, Brahman, which is knowledge, is also limited, it is immediately added that Brahman is infinity.

Śankara here raises a possible criticism and answers it. Adjectives applied to Brahman will be meaningful, only if it is an established or well-known (*prasiddha*) thing; and since it is not such a thing, any number of adjectives applied to that word are meaningless, just as the adjectives 'sky-flower-crowned and hare's horn-armed' are when applied to a 'barren woman's son'. Śankara's reply is that though the words 'reality' etc., are adjectives, they are principally meant for definition. A definition would be meaningless if there is no significant definiendum (*lakṣya*); and the word 'Brahman' (which is here the definiendum) has got its own etymological meaning (*svārthena arthavān*). The words 'reality' etc., serve to define this meaningful word 'Brahman', and distinguish it from other things. While the words 'reality' and 'knowledge' are adjectives in their own senses, the word 'infinity' is an adjective by virtue of negating finitude.

### Impropriety of Brahman-Language :

Now, Śankara brings up an important point. It has been said above that Brahman cannot be a 'knower'. Can it be 'knowledge' at least? As in the case of empirical knowledge, which is the only knowledge we know, the 'knowledge' called Brahman does not arise from sensation; it is eternal and not different from Brahman's own nature (existence, *sattā*). So, Śankara says, Brahman cannot be properly signified by the word 'knowledge' (*na jñāna śabda vācyaṃapi tad Brahma*); for 'knowledge' is a word which denotes the attributes or modifications of reason (*buddhi*), which are only a semblance (*ābhāsa*) of Brahman. The word 'knowledge' cannot signify Brahman directly, but can only imply it (*lakṣyate, na tu uccyate*).<sup>25</sup> No words can be applicable to Brahman, which has no species, genus, etc. Śankara says that even the word 'reality' cannot signify Brahman directly, but only imply it; for Brahman is devoid of all adjectives, and the word 'reality' signifies being in general.

According to Śankara, words such as 'reality' serve to define and delimit each other by being applied contiguously, i.e. one after the other immediately; and by means of their explicit sense



serve to become the *nivartakas* of Brahman, i.e. they distinguish it from all things. They also imply Brahman through their usual meaning. Śankara concludes his discussion by asserting that Brahman is unspeakable (*avācya*) and incapable of being the meaning of a sentence, because it is implied to be the substratum of the negation of all duality, while sentences indicate only relations. To justify his conclusion, he quotes the Upaniṣadic texts 'From where' words return along with mind',<sup>26</sup> and 'It is indefinable (*anirukta*)'.<sup>27</sup>

Brahman shown by *Netivāda* :

3. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* Śankara states his view in the clearest manner. Commenting on the text 'It should be meditated upon as the self' (*Ātmeti evamupāśīta*),<sup>28</sup> he discusses the significance of the word 'as'. He says that the use of the word 'as' shows that Ātman can never be properly denoted by any words including the word 'Ātman'. If 'as' had been omitted here, it would have implied that the term and the concept 'Ātman' were adequate with reference to Ātman, a view 'repugnant' to the Veda. That which could be the referent of a word can never be Ātman, for 'the objective' alone can be thought of as signified by words, whereas the *Upaniṣads* tell us that Ātman cannot be 'known' and 'spoken of'. ('*Nānyadato'sti vijnāṭy*'; '*yato vāṇonivartante*'.) Elsewhere in the same *bhāṣya*, commenting on the text: 'Now therefore the *ādeśa* of Brahman "Not this, Not this". Truly there is no other or a better *ādeśa* of Brahman than this',<sup>29</sup> Śankara says that since words can never describe Brahman, which lacks genus, qualities etc., definitions like 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss', as well as terms like 'Brahman' and 'Ātman' are all inappropriate. It is possible to apply them to Ātman only when name, form and activity are superimposed on it. According to him description of the true nature of Brahman is an impossibility. The only appropriate way of indicating Brahman, or making a definite statement (*ādeśa*) about it is to say: 'Not this, Not this.' This *ādeśa* serves to eliminate all specifications and all differences due to limiting adjuncts. According to Śankara when everything else is negated and when the desire to know other things is quelled, a man realises himself to be Brahman.

### Summary of Śankara's view :

Śankara's position may be briefly summarised thus: Brahman is so unique that no words at all are appropriate for denoting it; but since somehow it must be talked of, terms drawn from the commonsense and philosophical levels of language have to be used. 'Being' and 'knowledge' are terms drawn from language at the philosophical level, while terms such as 'cause' and 'source' are drawn from the scientific level. But as any one of these terms by itself is misleading and does not give a complete idea, they are used conjunctively, such that one term serves as an adjective of another, or, in other words, qualifies the other. They either elevate our conception of Brahman or remove from our conception all finiteness and limitation; e.g., 'infinite' is used in conjunction with 'knowledge', and 'knowledge' in conjunction with 'reality,' and 'pure' in conjunction with 'being'. The phrase 'eternal infinite knowledge' is a logical impropriety, and by this very impropriety it serves to *show* the logical uniqueness of Brahman; by its striking oddness the phrase preserves as well as reveals to some extent the great mystery of Brahman. It preserves the mystery, because we have no idea as to what 'eternal knowledge' is, though we know what 'knowledge' is; and it reveals, because the uniqueness of Brahman from all 'objects' and all empirical 'subjects' is effectively shown. So it is a *nivartaka* and fulfilment of this function' i.e. to distinguish a thing from *all* other things' is the aim of a definition. It is, however, Śankara's opinion that the best way of speaking about Brahman is the *Netivāda* (*via Negativa*), for the logic of *Netivāda* does not involve any super-imposition.

### Vidyāraṇya's Treatment of the problem :

More light on this problem is thrown by what Vidyāraṇya has said about it. He introduces the problem in this way. Many of the other schools of Hindu philosophy maintain that all sentences are relational (*samsargapratipādakāḥ*). For example, the sentence 'bring the cow' relates to an act and an agent; the sentence 'sacrifice with ghee' is based on the expectancy of some unseen result (heaven); and the sentence 'the lotus is blue' posits the difference and the non-difference of a quality and what possesses it. Even in the case of sentences, which have for their



content a single thing, gender and number are unavoidable. Then how can be there any sentence about Brahman, which has no attributes, action and relations?

Logic of Brahman-sentences :

Vidyāraṇya, while accepting that sentences are relational, maintains that Upaniṣadic sentences are able to posit the one indivisible substance either directly, or by implication, or through positing of adjuncts. Some examples will illustrate this. There is a text which says 'Brahman is pure cognition and bliss' (*vijnānam ānandam brahma*). Now cognition and bliss are mental modes, but we cannot understand Brahman to be a mental mode, because another sentence maintains its eternity. Since phases of the mind cannot be eternal, we must here understand Brahman to be of the essence of consciousness, and 'desirable'; for the text, 'Brahman is bliss' implies that Brahman is 'desirable'. Thus to some extent directly, and also by implication, these sentences indicate Brahman. Words like 'one', 'real', 'infinite', when applied to Brahman, imply the negation of internal variety, illusoriness and finitude. Brahman, together with the adjunct of the phenomenal world, which is not describable either as real or unreal, may be spoken of as 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent'. The words 'reality', 'knowledge', and 'infinity' have, no doubt, different meanings; but they refer to one indivisible thing, because their purport is unity. Each of them respectively negates unreality, materiality and multiplicity. The negation of multiplicity does not raise any problem, because multiplicity, which is not describable either as real or unreal, cannot affect the absolute reality of non-duality.

Vidyāraṇya poses another question. Why should not the text 'Brahman is consciousness and infinity' be taken to mean that Brahman has these qualities? He replies that it cannot mean that, because in Brahman there is no distinction of substance and attribute, nor has Brahman any internal variety.

Brahman-sentences Non-Relational :

Now Vidyāraṇya takes up the other problem already mentioned, namely, how are Brahman-sentences non-relational? He says that sentences such as 'Brahman is reality, knowledge

and infinity' are meaningful and refer to one indivisible thing, because they are definitions like the sentence 'the most shining (thing) is the moon'. At night, any one who does not know the denotation of the word 'moon' may ask another, pointing to the sky, 'which among these shining objects is called the moon?' The other man, desiring only to state the word's denotation may reply, 'The most shining one is the moon'. These two words—'shining' and 'most'—explicitly mean 'shining' and 'superlativity'\*; but in the present case they secondarily imply an individual thing—the moon. The general explicit meaning of both these words is excluded, and an individual shining object to which these terms are secondarily applicable is shown to be the present explicit meaning of the word 'moon'. Thus for all the three words—'most', 'shining' and 'moon'—there is an identical sense. Both the words 'shining' and 'most' are necessary; the former to exclude things such as the clouds, and the latter to exclude the stars, which shine, but not so brightly. Vidyāraṇya says that in sentences such as: 'Reality, knowledge and infinity are Brahman', the words 'reality', etc., have their own different general meanings, but as used here all of them have one impartite sense.<sup>30</sup>

### Sureśvara's Explanation :

Sureśvara has attempted to explain Śaṅkara's view with an example, and also answers the question "Why was the word 'Ātman' selected to signify *Ātman*?" Echoing Śaṅkara, he says that there is no word at all which can directly refer to Ātman, for it has no attributes, action and relations.<sup>31</sup> With the aid of some false (*mithyā*) thing superimposed on it, it is somehow signified,<sup>32</sup> and that too indirectly; just as in the sentence 'The beds are crying', the word 'beds' refers only indirectly to persons on them, but it is they that are meant, though they cannot be directly denoted by this word. The words 'I', 'Thou' and 'That' (in 'That Thou art') are used to refer to Ātman, not because they are capable of signifying it, but because there are no better words. These words directly signify the *aḥamkāra*

\*The Advaita theory that words refer not to individuals directly, but to universals should be remembered in this context.



(the sense of 'I'-ness or 'I'-awareness, which is not really 'I'; for 'I', the eternal subject, can never become the object of an awareness); but since *ahamkāra* is very much *contiguous* to Ātman, and is confused with Ātman, words denoting it inadequately imply Ātman; just as when we say 'the red-hot iron-piece burns', it is not exactly the iron-piece that is capable of burning, but the fire that is in association with it. Further, compared to the body and senses, *ahamkāra* is internal and is closely associated with Ātman, and is presupposed by all things. So, Sureśvara says, for want of better words, the words 'I' and 'Thou', whose chief sense is *ahamkāra*, are used for implying Ātman.<sup>33</sup>

Words cannot refer to Brahman : they imply it :

Sureśvara asks, how can a word which has no relation to a thing become a sign of it? He replies that though the words used to signify Ātman have no relation to it, they can signify it, as no knowledge of the relation between the sign and the signified is necessary for grasping the implied meaning of a word (*lakṣyārtha*). In the sentence 'the hamlet is on the Ganges', what is meant to be conveyed is that there is a hamlet on the *bank* of the Ganges; and this is conveyed by implication, though the word 'Ganges' does not directly signify (and so it is not related to) the bank, but the river. Sureśvara gives another example. When called by his name a sleeping person wakes up immediately. When a man is asleep, he cannot be in connection with the body and senses; so in sleep there is no possibility of his hearing and grasping the meaning of a sentence such as 'Devadatta, wake up'. If he were able to hear and understand it, he could not be sleeping; yet somehow he has heard and has awakened. Just like that, Sureśvara argues, though there is no connection of Ātman with the express sense of 'I' or 'Thou', and though there is no knowledge of any such connection, Ātman is understood as the meaning of 'I', and that is done by implication.<sup>34</sup>

## CHAPTER V

### AUTHORITY AND MEANING OF *VEDĀNTA VĀKYAS*

#### I

#### *Independent Authority of Vedānta Vākyas*

It has already been said that according to the Advaita Vedānta, the Veda can be divided into *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas*, and that the latter can be subdivided into *vidhi*, *arthavāda* and *vedānta vākya*.<sup>1</sup>

Classification of Veda :

*Arthavādas* are of three kinds : *guṇavāda*, *anuvāda*, *bhūtārthavāda*. A *guṇavāda* is a sentence that contradicts what is known from other *pramāṇas*, e.g., 'the sacrificial post is the sun'. An *anuvāda* states something already known through other *pramāṇas*, e.g., 'Fire is the antidote for cold.' A *bhūtārthavāda* states something, which is neither contradicted nor confirmed by other *pramāṇas*, e.g., 'Indra raised his weapon against Vṛtra'.

According to Śankara the Veda cannot distort truth,<sup>2</sup> nor can one *pramāṇa* be contradicted by another.<sup>3</sup> As the authority of *śāstra* lies in showing what is unperceivable, and as it has no claims to authority when it teaches about things known through perception,<sup>4</sup> a *guṇavāda* cannot be understood literally. It has to be interpreted as praising by implication a certain thing or course of action. Just as two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference, may independently give us the same knowledge, even so some scriptural passages may convey information, which it is possible to get through other *pramāṇas*. Such passages can no doubt independently give rise to knowledge; but as only well-informed men begin to study the scriptures, the knowledge conveyed through these passages may with reference to them be a mere 'tautology', *anuvāda*.<sup>5</sup>

There are Meaningful Existential Propositions in the Veda :

But there are certain other *arthavādas* which are not opposed to other *pramāṇas*; nor is the knowledge given by them obtained



through other *pramāṇas*. According to the Mīmāṃsā school, only *vidhis* or injunctions are directly authoritative, for they teach us what to do and what not to do. Sentences which merely state something are of no use, for nobody gains thereby anything; so the Mīmāṃsā school says that all *arthavādas* are authoritative only in so far as they form a unitary passage with command-sentences. For example, the *arthavāda* 'Vāyu is a swift deity' forms a unitary passage with the injunction, 'One who wants prosperity *should* touch a goat relating to Vāyu',<sup>6</sup> because taken independently the *arthavāda* has no use, while taken as a corroborative statement of the injunction, it praises the god Vāyu and suggests that a rite in connection with that god is highly praiseworthy. For the Mīmāṃsā school *arthavādas*, even when they are not contradicted by other *pramāṇas*, are not authoritative in themselves as their sense is not complete in themselves, but lies in serving as auxiliaries to injunctions.<sup>7</sup>

The Advaita school does not accept this view of the Mīmāṃsā. Śāṅkara first gives a possible criticism of the Mīmāṃsā view and shows his disagreement with it. The Mīmāṃsā has declared *arthavādas* to be meaningless in themselves, because their purpose lies elsewhere. A critic can say that it may be so; but words cannot fail to reveal their meanings, for whatsoever purpose they may have been used. A man might be going somewhere on an errand, yet he cannot fail to see the leaves and grass on the way, similarly an *arthavāda* may be for the sake of corroborating an injunction, but it does not fail to convey some meaning by itself, and so cannot be meaningless.

Śāṅkara and Vācaspati reject this view, because they think that while the *pramāṇa* of perception can apprehend anything whatsoever that becomes its object, testimony has to be subordinated to purport (*tātparya*).<sup>8</sup> A sentence can be authoritative only with reference to its purport, not according to the literal meaning of the words in themselves.

Here another possible view is that when an *arthavāda* forms an unitary passage with an injunction, and has its meaning in praising the act enjoined by the injunction, it cannot have a separate meaning referring to some fact. As the main sentence in a context is that which finally lays down what is sought to be said, an intermediary sentence cannot convey a different sense.

For example, the sentence 'do not drink wine', through the four words as a whole, conveys a unitary meaning; but the last two words in it cannot be taken independently to enjoin wine drinking. The fact that the last two words taken independently convey some sense cannot justify their being so taken. Similarly, according to this view, a subordinate sentence cannot have any meaning independent of the meaning expressed by the main sentence; and *arthavādas* are subordinate sentences.

This view is also not acceptable to the Advaita Vedānta. It is true that words are not used for conveying their own meanings individually, but to convey the meaning of a sentence as a whole; and this cannot be done if words lose their own meanings. So words convey their meanings individually and through that the meaning of a sentence as a whole. If words were merely to convey their individual meanings, a sentence would be useless; on the other hand, if words have no individual meanings of their own, a sentence made up of them cannot have any meaning. Vācaspati quotes an example to illustrate this. Just as fuel is for the purpose of producing fire, which will cook food, so words are intended to produce cognition of their own meanings and through them cognition of the meaning of the sentence as a whole. So, according to Śāṅkara, while conveying purport, words cannot but indicate their own meanings. In the sentence given as an example above, i.e., 'Do not drink wine', as the syntax lies in taking the connection of the four words as a whole, it cannot be split up into two sentences.

Now, any sentence by giving its own established meaning fulfils its function of conveying some particular knowledge about some existent thing (*bhūtārtha*); and then for some reason a question may be raised about it: what for is this knowledge given (*kaimarthyā*)? In answer to that question, it may be found that this sentence is meant for lauding or condemning a course of action enjoined in another sentence; but nevertheless it cannot fail to have its own meaning. For instance, the word 'Vāyu' in the sentence 'Vāyu is a swift god' cannot be syntactically related to the words 'should touch' in the other sentence, 'One who wants prosperity should touch a goat relating to Vāyu'. So when a word, which is a complete verb (*paripūrṇa kriyā*), i.e. a verb which is not of the sort of 'having done', 'having



beat', but of the sort of 'did', 'is doing', or 'will do', along with its *kāraṇas* (i.e. subject, object, reason for it, etc.) constitutes a sentence and is giving a meaning of its own, this fact cannot be denied. To take once more the same example, the sentence 'Vāyu is a swift god' gives us knowledge regarding the nature of a particular god. But, since study of the Veda has been enjoined in the text: 'one's Veda should be studied' (*svādhyāyo adhyetavyah*), for the sake of obtaining the End of man (*puruṣārtha*), the question arises: In what way is the information that Vāyu is a swift god useful to us for obtaining our End? In answer to this we are told that it is meant to praise the god Vāyu, a rite in connection with whom brings prosperity and has been enjoined.

Vācaspati asserts that *arthavādas*, which do not contradict another *pramāṇa* and which do not give the knowledge obtained by other *pramāṇas*, are statements of facts (*bhūtārthavāda*), though they may *imply* praise of some injunction or other; and they are able to imply this, because they do not forego their own meaning, just as in the sentence 'The hamlet is on the Ganges', the word 'Ganges' implies the bank of the Ganges and not the sea-shore, for a word or sentence cannot *imply* anything, if they abandon their own meaning. According to the Vedānta, *bhūtārthavādas* give valid knowledge and are independently authoritative. For example, from the *bhūtārthavāda* sentences 'Indra became a wolf and killed Medhātithi, the son of Kaṇva', we learn that gods such as Indra are embodied persons, who are able to assume whatever form they like by virtue of their wondrous powers.<sup>9</sup>

*Vedānta Vākyas* are existential and purposeful:

The Advaita Vedānta view is that the validity of a *pramāṇa* consists in its being uncontradicted and in its ability to produce knowledge, not produced by other *pramāṇas*.<sup>10</sup> *Anuvādas* and *guṇavādas* are therefore not *pramāṇas*, but *bhūtārthavādas* are. So are *mantras* according to Śaṅkara.<sup>11</sup> Now the status of the Vedānta sentences (i.e. sentences about Brahman in the *Upaniṣads*) is a point of dispute between Śaṅkara's school and the Mīmāṃsā. The Mīmāṃsā says that they are *arthavādas* subsidiary to injunctions, because in themselves they are mean-

ingless as they teach nothing regarding dharma; and sentences which do not inculcate dharma have no use in obtaining the End. Śankara replies that the Vedānta sentences are purposeful, because from them is to be realised the identity of Brahman and the jīva, which, by destroying all hindrances (*kleśa*), results in the attainment of the supreme End. As the Vedānta sentences are clearly seen to be referring to the nature of Brahman, it is not proper to interpret them to mean something else, for that would be to reject the direct meaning and assume what is not stated. They cannot be subsidiaries to any ritualistic action (*kriyāvidhi*), because Upaniṣadic texts such as "Then by what and whom could one see?"<sup>12</sup> maintain that once the meaning of the Vedānta sentences is realised, there is nothing else to be done, as all duality is at an end. Brahman-sentences are not for the sake of inculcating meditation (*upāsanā*) of Brahman, because when the non-dual nature of Brahman is known, the 'knowledge' of duality is quashed; and one who has realised his identity with Brahman cannot meditate on Brahman. Though Brahman is a real thing (*pariniṣṭhita vastu*), Śankara says that since it cannot be the object of perception or inference, Vedānta sentences give knowledge which is unobtainable otherwise; so they are independently authoritative.<sup>13</sup>

Śankara formulates a possible criticism of this view thus: There are Upaniṣadic texts such as 'Verily the self should be seen',<sup>14</sup> and 'The self should be sought after and desired to be known';<sup>15</sup> which command us to know the self. Naturally these command-sentences (*vidhivākyas*) give rise to the question 'what is this self?' and the entire Vedānta portion of the *Veda* provides an answer to that question. After knowing the nature of Ātman, one should meditate on it in accordance with injunctions such as 'Meditate as the self alone'.<sup>16</sup> It cannot be said that like the sentence 'this is a rope, not a snake', which removes the snake-illusion and the fear caused by it as soon as it is heard, the Vedānta sentences remove the world-illusion as soon as they are heard, because even after hearing the Vedānta sentences, men are found to be having happiness and unhappiness, which are attributes of a transmigrating soul and not of Brahman.

To this criticism Śankara gives the following reply. Dharma and adharma are respectively the causes of man's happiness



and unhappiness; and dharma is that which is commanded to be done by the Veda, while adharma is that which is prohibited by the Veda. The Veda tells us that as long as man is embodied, he cannot be free from happiness and unhappiness, caused by dharma and adharma. On the contrary, the Veda itself informs us that in the unembodied state called 'liberation' (*mokṣa*), there is no happiness or unhappiness;<sup>17</sup> from which it follows that *mokṣa* is not the product of dharma and adharma, for only happy or unhappy states are produced by them. 'Unembodiedness' (*aśarīratva*) itself is not the effect of *dharma*, for the Veda says it is natural; e.g. the texts: 'He is without breath and mind'.<sup>18</sup> *Mokṣa* is eternal, immutably real and all-pervading, and, as the Upaniṣad says, 'it is other than dharma and adharma, other than what is done and not done'.<sup>19</sup> If *mokṣa* is *now* to be achieved by virtue of accomplishing one's duty (*kartavya*), it could not have been already existent; but all who uphold the doctrine of *mokṣa* acknowledge it to be eternal. So, Śāṅkara concludes, *mokṣa* cannot be the result of following an injunction; and this, he says, is supported by texts such as, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman',<sup>20</sup> which exclude the very idea of the necessity of any intervening action between Brahman-knowledge and *Mokṣa*-attainment. *Mokṣa* is eternally realized; Brahman-knowledge merely removes the illusion that there is as yet no *mokṣa*.

According to Śāṅkara, Brahman cannot also be the object of the injunctions to meditate and know, for the Upaniṣads say that 'Brahman is different from the known as well as the unknown',<sup>21</sup> and 'Know that alone to be Brahman, not this which is meditated'.<sup>22</sup> Brahman can never be the 'object'; even *śāstra* can never describe it as the 'this', but by propounding it as the inner self, it can remove the differences of knower, known and knowledge, falsely posited by nescience.

Distinguishing knowledge from 'meditation', etc., Śāṅkara says that knowledge is not a mental activity (*mānaṣī kriyā*). Activity is that which does not depend upon the nature of a thing; but is undertaken or not undertaken according to a man's whim. Knowledge, according to Śāṅkara, is generated by evidence, such as it is, and cannot be coerced.<sup>23</sup> What one perceives, one perceives; what one infers, one infers; and there

can be no coercion there, because 'knowing for certain' is not a voluntary action. Nobody can reject or accept as he likes what he knows for certain; and it is absurd to say that a man can be ordered to know.<sup>24</sup> When we see fire, for example, we know for certain that it is fire; and whether we look at it or avoid looking at it, what we know for certain when we look at it is not something that depends upon our will or somebody's command. Śankara concludes that the knowledge of Brahman as it really is cannot be produced by command; and the apparent injunctions such as 'The self should be seen' are meant to turn away men, who in quest of happiness mistakenly pursue worldly 'goods'.<sup>25</sup>


To sum up, in opposition to the Mimāṃsā, the Advaita school maintains that among the *brāhmaṇas* and the *mantras* there are some sentences which are authoritative by themselves, in spite of the fact that their purpose is to subserve the injunctions. As for the sentences about Brahman, besides being authoritative they subserve no other sentences, for the knowledge which they give leads *immediately* to the supreme goal of man; and in fact all Vedic injunctions subserve them by enjoining a pious and pure life, which results in the purification of mind, conducive to their understanding.<sup>26</sup>

### Classification of *Vedānta Vākyas*:

Śankara has further divided the Vedānta sentences into two kinds—(i) those which are concerned with the ascertainment of the nature of the Supreme Self and (ii) those which are concerned with teaching the identity of the Supreme Self and the self, which is of the nature of consciousness.<sup>27</sup> The Vedānta school divides the first kind of sentences into (a) essential (*svarūpa*) non-relational definitions of Brahman, e.g., 'Brahman is reality, knowledge and infinity'; and (b) accidental (*taṭastha*) definitions of Brahman based on some false attribution (*adhyāropa-upalakṣaṇa*), e.g., 'Brahman is that from which beings are generated'. The latter is a *taṭastha* definition, because it does not matter whether creatorship is attributed to Brahman or not; for in spite of all such attributions Brahman remains pure and indifferent (*taṭastha*). The second kind of sentences are divided into four types: (i) that declaring the 'Thou' to be identical with Brahman, e.g., 'That Thou art'



(*tattvamasī*); (ii) that declaring the 'I' to be Brahman, e.g., 'I am Brahman' (*aham brahmāsmi*); (iii) that which proclaims the identity of 'He' and Brahman, e.g., 'This Self is Brahman' (*ayamātmā brahma*); and lastly (iv) that which identifies the 'all' with Brahman, e.g., 'all this verily is Brahman' (*sarvam khalu idam brahma*). Another classification of the *Mahāvākyas* is possible: The sentence 'Knowledge is Brahman' (*prajñānam Brahma*) is a definition (*lakṣaṇā vākya*); 'That Thou art' is the sentence which teaches (*upadeśa vākya*); 'I am Brahman' is the sentence of practice (*anusandhāna vākya*), i.e. one should constantly try to realise the Supreme Truth by repeating this sentence over and over again so that the truth of it sinks in; 'this Self is Brahman' is the sentence which embodies the acme of experience (*anubhava vākya*).



## II

### *The Concept of Purport*

After controverting the *Mimāṃsā* exegetical principle that only injunctions are independently authoritative, and establishing that *Vedānta Vākyas* (sentences) constitute the primarily authoritative and decisive portion of the Veda, the Advaita school had one more task: to prove that the *Upaniṣads* deal with Brahman.

### Method of *Samanvaya* :

Śankara says that by *Samanvaya* it is known that *Vedānta Vākyas* are concerned with Brahman. He elucidates *samanvaya* thus : ' In all the Vedāntas, sentences follow one another by having for their *purport* the teaching of Brahman '.<sup>28</sup>

The word *samanvaya* is made up of *samyak anvaya*,<sup>29</sup> and means right correlation. According to Amalānanda, to correlate all passages *purportfully* is to correlate rightly.<sup>30</sup>

Vācaspati says that the content (*viśaya*) of words is two-fold : through themselves and through *tātparya*. In a sentence the meanings of words are the content of words *through* themselves, and the meaning of the sentence as a whole is the content of words through *tātparya*. Similarly where two sentences form a unitary passage, each sentence has its own meaning *through* itself, while through *tātparya* they have for their content the meaning of the unitary passage as a whole. Vācaspati gives an example : ' This cow of Devadatta should be bought '—this is one sentence ; ' it gives much milk '—this is another sentence. The cow's capacity to give much milk is only a ' means ' for conveying the *purport* ' it should be bought ', which is the meaning of the other sentence. In other words, a factual description of Devadatta's cow and its attributes is not important in this connection ; it only occurs as a subsidiary statement to lead up to the meaning sought to be emphasized. Vācaspati says that when the meanings of words in themselves are in conflict with another *pramāṇa*, then it has to be interpreted otherwise, i.e., the *purport* of the sentence as a whole has to be taken, and not the literal meaning. He gives the following example. Supposing a man is going to eat with people between whom and his family there is a feud, his father may say to him, ' Go ; eat poison '. Here the meaning of this sentence ought to be really that which is conveyed by the sentence, ' Do not eat in his house '.

Vācaspati says that when the *purport* of a sentence itself is contradicted by another *pramāṇa*, then if the sentence is *pauruṣeya*, it becomes invalid. Scriptural sentences such as ' the sun is the sacrificial post ' are not invalid because though their literal meaning is contradicted by perception, their *purport* is



not. In a unitary passage made up of two or more sentences, if the literal meaning of the subsidiary sentence is not contradicted by other *pramāṇas*, it is valid; e.g., 'Vāyu is a swift god', 'he who wants prosperity should touch a goat consecrated to Vāyu'—in this unitary passage, the earlier sentence, which is subsidiary, is not invalid. Its evident literal meaning should not be abandoned, because it is uncontradicted by other *pramāṇas*. In Vācaspati's opinion, its *purport* may not be to give that information; still it does not fail to yield its literal meaning, just as though the *purport* of a sentence may be the 'substantive', the adjectives are not invalid.

Though the *purport* of two or more sentences is the same, according to Vācaspati, the sentences are different but constitute a unitary passage; because each sentence-sense is complete in itself, but for some reason they are interrelated. In a group of words, a sentence extends only to the extent where the meanings of the words end in a conclusion (*parāvāsāna*). For instance, in the sentence 'Having eaten, he goes to the village', the words 'Having eaten' cannot be taken as a separate sentence, because the knowledge obtained therefrom begs for completion, and is not completed without the meaning of the verb 'goes' being supplied. Vācaspati says that a long sentence, made up of many adjectives or qualifying phrases, cannot be mistaken for a number of different sentences; because the one substantive qualified by these many adjectives is the *important* (*pradhāna-bhūta*) word, and they are fulfilled only when applied to it as qualities.<sup>31</sup>

#### Elucidation of the Conception of *Purport* :

The Advaita Vedānta concept of *purport* may be further elucidated by noticing what the Vivaraṇa school has said about it. Vidyāranya says that the *purport* of a word is not relative to a person, because *purport* is not the speaker's intention. A speaker's intention to speak about something precedes his use of words to signify it, whereas *purport* arises after the use of words. Mere use of words does not have any *purport*, e.g., a lunatic's words. *Purport* is 'the meaning of words subsidiary to valid knowledge' (*tadarthapramitiśeṣatva*); and it is a property of words. Even when there is no intention to convey a particular

sense, there will be *purport* if there is subsidiariness to valid knowledge. The *purport* of a sentence need not be activity only, for sentences such as 'A son has been born to you' have *purport*. Vidyāraṇya says that sentences like 'eat poison' do not lack *purport*, because it is *purport* which removes the obstacles (e.g. the attempt to take the sentence literally and incongruity with the character of the speaker) in obtaining valid knowledge from that sentence.<sup>32</sup>

Vidyāraṇya says that as soon as a sentence is heard, though we may know its literal meaning, its *purport* may not be known.<sup>33</sup> Prakāśātman gives an example here. A man who wishes to occupy a seat occupied by another may make the latter get up by saying, 'your father is calling you'. Now while that man gets up 'to obey his father's call', the other occupies his seat. Seeing this, he comes to know that it was for occupying the seat that the above sentence was addressed to him. This man has been obviously in ignorance of the *purport* of the sentence, but he knew its literal meaning; otherwise he would not have risen from his seat. In spite of his knowing the literal meaning of the sentence, he did not grasp its *purport*; because he was not quick-witted, not because there was some fault in the sentence.<sup>34</sup> So whenever we do not grasp the *purport*, Vidyāraṇya says that we do not have right knowledge; and though we may know the literal meaning of a sentence as soon as we hear it and *not misunderstand* it, lack of knowledge of *purport* is a hindrance in comprehending it.<sup>35</sup>

*Purport*, the key to the Interpretation of *Vedānta Vākyas* :

In Prakāśātman's opinion misunderstanding of a sentence is due to one's intellectual defect, which can be removed by inquiry. Usually this defect is due to the following reason: Words used with a particular *purport* in one context, may be used with a different *purport* in another context; and if this is ignored, it will result in error.<sup>36</sup> Vidyāraṇya gives an example: In the sentence 'In this village Devadatta is the lord without a second', the *purport* is that there is no other lord in that village except Devadatta, and that he is the sole master of all the others in the village. It does not mean that 'he is a lord' and 'without a second', in the sense that besides him there is no other inhabitant in the



village, he being the sole occupant ; for that would be nonsense. Now let us take the *Vedānta* sentence, ' There is One only—the Brahman—without a second '. Here the *purport* is that there is *absolutely* nothing at all besides Brahman ; it is the *sole* reality. Vidyāranya says that to ignore its *purport* and interpret it on the lines followed in the case of the above sentence, will be to misunderstand it.<sup>37</sup> For similar reasons, i.e. for grasping their *purport*, Vidyāranya urges that *Vedānta Vākyas* should be interpreted in a unique way. In fact, according to him, when it is said that from the *samanvaya* of *Vedānta Vākyas* Brahman is known to be their subject-matter, the word *samanvaya* means ' establishment of meaning in a unique manner '.<sup>38</sup> For, while all sentences are usually relational, *Vedānta Vākyas* are not so ; and while all things are signified directly by words, Brahman cannot be taken to be directly signified. The *purport* of *Vedānta Vākyas* cannot be obtained in the way in which the *purport* of empirical sentences is obtained. *Vedānta Vākyas* have an unique context and an unique language structure.

*Purport* of a sentence is its basic meaning :

Madhusūdana says that the basic meaning (*mukhya artha*) of a sentence is its *purport* ; and if a sentence does not directly express its basic meaning, then it should be obtained from noting the implied meaning of the sentence. For example, in the sentence ' the Reds are advancing to the front ', the literal meaning that portions of red colour are moving to the front has to be abandoned, because it does not give the *purport* of the sentence ; and the implied meaning ' soldiers in red uniforms are marching to the front ' should be taken, because that is its *purport*. According to Madhusūdana, whenever indirect interpretation of a sentence is resorted to, it is to grasp the true *purport* of it ; and since the meaning so obtained is not something which is not at all expressed by the sentence, and since the direct significance of the words is not *entirely* abandoned even then (e.g. ' Reds ', while referring to soldiers, does not exclude the idea expressed by its primary meaning i.e. red colour, because they are Reds as they don *red* uniforms), in such cases the implied meaning is itself the basic meaning.<sup>39</sup> This has a bearing upon the interpretation of *Vedānta Vākyas*, for if the *purport* of any *Vedānta*

*Vākya* is found to be not obtainable by means of direct primary interpretation, it should be obtained by indirect secondary signification, i.e. by implication (*lakṣaṇā*)<sup>40</sup> and still that meaning will be basic.

A summary of the Advaita View :

The Advaita Vedānta concept of *purport* can be briefly expounded thus: Brahman is to be known from the *Vedānta śāstra*; but how? (*Brahma . . . . Vedāntaśāstrādavagamyate; katham?*) *Śāstra* is made up of a vast array of sentences, and unless a coherent coördination (*samanvaya*) of them is achieved, one cannot develop a perspective regarding its teaching. Selective judgment has to be exercised to achieve this by picking out some sentences which are significant from out of countless other sentences. The selection has to be based on a conception of the importance of the meaning (*tātparyabhūta mukhyārtha—pradhānabhūta artha*) of the sentences. Sentences have to be juxtaposed and correlated, and from out of them the recurrent dominant (*abhyāsa*) theme has to be discovered; and with reference to it, a coherent order has to be introduced into the welter of scriptural sentences. Irrelevant sentences (i.e., those which have nothing to do with *puruṣārtha*) have to be ignored; useless sentences (those which merely give empirical information) have to be passed by, for a *śāstra* is for informing that which cannot be known otherwise (*ajñāta jñāpanam śāstram*); apparent meanings have to be rejected; and the inner core of truth has to be grasped. All this can be done only if the recurrent dominant theme, in other words *purport*, is discovered; for once this is discovered, in terms of it all scriptural statements can be interrelated (*samanvaya*) and a consistent doctrine developed out of them. *Purport*, therefore, provides the clue, the aperçu, of scripture.

Purport known by Context :

The Advaita Vedānta says that the *purport* of scripture should not be determined on the basis of our presuppositions and empirical experience. Conformity with perceptual experience cannot be a guide to the interpretation of any scriptural text. Since scripture is ascertained to be having its own unique lang-



uage structure ; and since it deals with things which are unseen, and even of a nature which go against perceptible experience (*dṛṣṭaviparīta*), the *purport* of scripture should not be taken as that only which is in agreement with perception.<sup>41</sup> The Advaita school maintains that in certain cases it is possible for scriptural *purport* to be determined even in opposition to other *pramāṇas* ; for the *pramāṇas* which apprehend *purport* are the *śadlinga* and not ' non-opposition to other *pramāṇas* '.<sup>42</sup>

Six-fold Criteria for finding the *Purport* :

The Pūrva Mimāṃsā system has set forth the principles whereby the *purport* of scripture can be determined. These are known as the six-fold criteria or *śadlinga* : (1) unity of the initial and concluding passages (*upakramopasamhāraikyā*) ; (2) the recurrence of theme (*abhyāsa*) ; (3) the new conclusion sought to be brought out (*apūrva*) ; (4) the fruitfulness of such a conclusion (*phala*) ; (5) the commendation or criticism of it throughout (*arthavāda*) ; (6) the argument throughout (*upapatti*). The Advaita Vedānta also accepts these criteria as the *pramāṇas* for finding *purport*.

First Criterion : *Ekavākyatā* :

Among these criteria the first one is the most important. It was with the aid of this principle that the Mimāṃsā school was able to work out a system from the ritualistic portion of the Veda. Vācaspati mentions the Mimāṃsā principle : ' that with which a sentence begins and that with which it ends—that alone is considered to be its meaning '.<sup>43</sup> He also refers to an instance where this exegetical principle has been applied. This requires some elaboration so that the exact way in which the principle has been applied may be clearly noted :

Illustration of the application of *Ekavākyatā* :

In the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, a particular sacrifice called *Upāṃśu* (so called because in it the priest has to offer the oblations chanting the *mantras* in a very low voice) is mentioned. The subject concerning it has been introduced thus : ' Performing for us both the *Upāṃśu* with ghee alone, on a full-moon day '. This shows that *Upāṃśu* is a sacrifice to be performed on a full moon day (*pūrṇamāsa*) ; hence it is a *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice among other *Pūrṇamāsa*

sacrifices, i.e. sacrifices to be performed on a full moon day, e.g. *Āgneya* and *Agnisomiya*. Now before the performance of a *Soma* sacrifice, a *Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice is performed in which one *Purodāśa* cake is offered as oblation; and after the completion of a *Soma* sacrifice also, a *Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice is to be performed, but this time two *Purodāśa* cakes have to be offered as oblation. Referring to this there are the following texts: "By this offering of two similar cakes one after another in a sacrifice, the 'defect of similarity' (*jāmi*)\* is committed. One performs the *Upāmsu* in the interval between the offering of the two cakes."<sup>44</sup> *Viṣṇu-Upāmsu* should be performed for removing *jāmi*; *Prajāpati-Upāmsu* should be performed for removing *jāmi*; *Agni-Soma-Upāmsu* should be performed for removing *jāmi*.

Now this topic of *Upāmsu* raises the following questions: (a) Every sacrifice should have its accessories; to wit, (i) a material to be offered as oblation such as *soma* juice, curd or ghee; and (ii) a deity, with reference to whom the sacrifice is to be performed. A critic can say that no such things have been mentioned for the *Upāmsu*, and without them there can be no sacrifice. Jaimini replies that regarding (i), there is a general rule that for all purposes of sacrifice the ghee kept in a special vessel called *dhruvā* should be used; so such ghee would be the material in the *Upāmsu*. He says that though no deity has been specially mentioned as connected with *Upāmsu*, in the *prakaraṇa* (context) *Viṣṇu*, *Prajāpati*, and *Agni Soma* are mentioned; and by taking the injunction to perform *Upāmsu* along with the sentences mentioning these deities as a single unitary passage (*ekavākya*), *Upāmsu* will have its relevant deities.<sup>45</sup>

(b) This raises the most important question: Where is the injunction regarding *Upāmsu*? The first time when *Upāmsu* is mentioned, it is not used along with the imperative mood of the verb 'to sacrifice', followed by the optative suffix '*lin*'; and it is in fact used with a verb in the present tense. Amalānanda, following the *Mīmāṃsā*, answers that where for the first time *Upāmsu* is mentioned there is novelty (*apūrvatā*), and so the verb in that sentence is to be taken as being in the imperative mood. The evident unity of theme forces us to do so; for if it is not taken as an injunction, we have to take the next three sentences, '*Viṣṇu-Upāmsu* should be performed', etc., as injunctions. Then there would be three injunctions to three deities, which would be in conflict with the manifest theme of the whole passage; for there would be no syntactical unity if they are interpreted as injunctions enjoining different sacrifices. Even if they are taken as injunctions, they cannot be complete (*prayoga vidhi*), because they do not mention the material with which the sacrifice is to be performed. So according to Amalānanda to secure unity of theme, the first sentence is to be taken as an injunction.<sup>46</sup>

\* *Jāmi* is the similarity (*sādṛśya*) of two ritualistic actions, and as performance of the same ritual over and over leads to apathy (*tandrā*), *jāmi* leads to a defect; and as such is itself a defect.



(c) A critic may object thus : *Upāmsu* is not a principal rite, because it is only for removing *jāmi* that it has been enjoined in the interval between the offering of the two cakes ; and even if *Upāmsu* is a principal rite and the interval only an accessory, when there is no such accessory, there can be no *Upāmsu*. In other words, whenever there is no occasion for offering two cakes, *Upāmsu* cannot be performed. Jaimini's reply to this is that the original sentence 'Performing for us both the *Upāmsu* with ghee alone, on a full-moon day' is the injunction concerning *Upāmsu*. Since that is all that has been said, whenever a *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice is performed, the *Upāmsu* also should be performed. The interval mentioned in 'He performs *Upāmsu* in the interval', is not an accessory ; for this only indicates the time when *Upāmsu* should be performed. Supposing a man tells another 'Come by lunch time and meet me', it does not mean that the other man is to come only if and when the first man is eating lunch, for he might not have any lunch at all that day because of heavy and late breakfast. 'Lunch time' signifies only a particular time of the day. Similarly, the proper time for performing *Upāmsu* is in between the offerings of the two cakes ; but even if there are to be no two offerings, it should be performed after the first offering. Lastly, Jaimini says that *Upāmsu* is not for the sake of avoiding *jāmi*, because it is nowhere laid down that 'Non-*jāmi*' is the fruit to be obtained by *Upāmsu*. Śābara says that there is nothing desirable called 'Non-*jāmi*', and 'Non-*jāmi*' cannot be taken as a fruit ; because only after a ritual has been enjoined will its fruit be mentioned. Now the sentence mentioning *Upāmsu* cannot be taken as enjoining both the ritual as well as its fruit, for that would cause a sentence-split (*arthadvaya vidhānam*). According to Śābara, the sentence which says that *Upāmsu* is for avoiding *jāmi* is only an *arthavāda* praising *Upāmsu* in a peculiar way (*viçitra*).<sup>47</sup> The Mīmāṃsā concludes that here syntactical unity as well as the purport force us to take *Upāmsu* as a principal act enjoined in the very first sentence itself, which must be taken as an injunction, while the other sentences are its *arthavādas*.

From a study of the method used by the Mīmāṃsā in arriving at this conclusion, Vācaspati says that it is evident that the guiding principle is unity of theme. The topic begins with a mention of the defect found in offering two similar oblations one after another ; *Upāmsu* sacrifice is then enjoined apparently to remove this defect ; this is then explained, and a conclusion reached. All this is interpreted as a unitary passage (*ekavākya*) with reference to the injunction of the performance of *Upāmsu*, which is a novel sacrifice, merely on the strength of syntactical unity.<sup>48</sup>

An application of the First Criterion shows that Brahman is the *Purport* of Veda :

Vācaspati says that the same principle when applied to the

Upaniṣads shows that they are 'unitary passages' with a single theme: identity of Jīva and Brahman. For example, in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* of the *Sāma Veda*, having begun with the sentence 'The Real alone, my dear, was in the beginning', it is concluded 'That Thou art'.<sup>49</sup> The *Itareya Upaniṣad* of the *Rgveda*, having begun with the text 'In the beginning this was Ātman only', concludes 'He thus saw this person himself as the Integral Brahman;' and having introduced the subject with the text 'Him only the Ātman, who is Brahman', it culminates in the text 'Consciousness is Brahman.'<sup>50</sup> In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* of the *Yajur Veda*, the beginning is made with: 'I am Brahman', and the conclusion reached is: 'This Ātman is Brahman.'<sup>51</sup> The *Mundaka Upaniṣad* of the *Atharva Veda* begins thus: 'My lord, by knowing what, is all this known?'<sup>52</sup> and its conclusion is, 'This Immortal Brahman is in front.' The Advaita Vedānta maintains that all these sentences have a single theme, form a 'unitary passage', and by correlating all other sentences also with due deliberation of the *pros* and *cons* (*paurvāparyāloṇā*), their *purport* is seen to be Brahman. The Advaitins assert that from this it is clear that all the four Vedas have as their purport Non-Dualism, and this is proved by applying the very same exegetical principle which the Mīmāṃsā has evolved.

### *Upakrama Parākrama :*

Other principles of interpretation are also emphasized by the Advaita Vedānta. (1) In all books or passages the earlier and the latter portions have to be harmonized, so that unity of theme is secured; but if anywhere it is found that the preliminary and the subsequent portions are opposed to each other and do not establish a clear and consistent conclusion, then the initial portion is more important than the latter, and the subsequent portion is to be interpreted in conformity with the initial portion. This principle is known as *Upakrama Parākrama*.<sup>53</sup> If, however, such a unity is not possible and if it appears that both the portions together do not form a single topic (*prakaraṇa*), then the subsequent portion should be regarded as forming an altogether new topic, having its own importance.<sup>54</sup>

The Advaita school applies this principle to the *Brahma Sūtras*.



As the whole of that work is ascertained to be maintaining the theory of Advaita, as proved by the way it begins and by the repeated emphasis on this theme; the concluding portion and the preliminary portion should conform to each other. Now it is found that the last chapter of the *Brahma Sūtras* deals in general with the successive stages by which a man who has worshipped the *Saguṇa Brahman* reaches the world of *Brahmā* (the four-faced deity). Such a state is, according to the Advaita theory, not a lasting one, since it is the result of worship. But after describing the state of one who reaches the world of *Brahmā* and how he has come to reach it, the very last *sūtra* says : ' There is no return for those who have gone to *Brahmaloka*, for scripture says so.' While this *sūtra* apparently asserts that the souls who have reached the world of *Brahmā* through worship have attained final liberation ; Śankara interprets it to mean that this state also is *not* the lasting one ; but that it is called ' lasting ', because the souls who have gone to the world of *Brahmā* can there undertake an inquiry (*viçāra*) about Brahman, obtain Brahman-knowledge and thereby attain final liberation. This is justified thus : While in the earlier chapters and the earlier portion of the very last section, *jñāna* alone is said to be the means of attaining liberation, the very last *sūtra* says that *Upāsana* leads to liberation. Applying the principle of *Upakrama parākrama*, this apparent meaning should be rejected, and a meaning in conformity with preliminary chapters taken. By doing that alone the *purport* is obtained.

To give another instance, in the fourth chapter of the *Brahma Sūtras*, the following question is raised : ' Do the worshippers of *Saguṇa Brahman*, who go by the " path of gods " (*devayāna*) after death, reach the world of *Brahmā* only or do they attain once for all the pure Brahman ? ' In reply, two views, that of Bādari and Jaimini, have been mentioned one after another in that order. According to Śankara, though mentioned first, Bādari's view is the conclusion acceptable to the author of the *Brahma Sūtras*; and Jaimini's view though mentioned later and though it contradicts the first is not the conclusion. Bādari's view is the Advaita view which (Śankara says) is in consonance with the ascertained meaning of Vedic texts ; while Jaimini's is not so. Now, since Bādarāyaṇa starts with the avowed intention of

correlating scriptural texts and finding their *purport*, he can never reject Bādari's view, which voices scriptural *purport*. So Śankara says that though this is mentioned first, and the contradictory view of another is stated subsequently, the latter cannot be the conclusion of Bādarāyaṇa. In most cases the unacceptable view is mentioned first, is criticised, and the view acceptable to the author is then stated. This is acknowledged by Śankara himself; but according to him, there is no justification to think that such a procedure is followed here. But after stating the conclusion (*siddhānta*), why has been a contradictory view mentioned at all? Śankara replies that it is 'to enlarge the intellectual horizon that the possibility of a different view also has been exhibited'.<sup>55</sup> This again shows that *upasamhāra* need not be the deciding factor.

*Upakrama parākrama* however has one exception. If the earlier and subsequent portions of a chapter or book are opposed to each other, but are found to be dealing with the same topic, and if the subsequent portion has an obvious and independent sense of its own, then it should be taken as an alternative view or way of doing things. In such a case the earlier portion has no superiority over the latter.<sup>56</sup>

*Apaccheda Nyāya* :

(ii) The second principle of interpretation known as the *Apaccheda Nyāya*, has also been laid down by Jaimini,<sup>57</sup> and accepted by the Advaita school. According to this principle, if what is said subsequently contradicts what is said earlier, and if its sense is not intelligible unless what is said previously is sublated, then this should be done. The principle, it is said, is followed in empirical experience also. The cognition of a rope as it is cannot arise unless the cognition of it as a snake is sublated. Here both the cognitions are not of equal validity; that which comes later by sublating the earlier is the stronger, and is true.<sup>58</sup>

Applying this principle to the Veda as a whole, it is found that the Upaniṣads are the end portions of it, and according to Śankara's school the purport of the Upaniṣads is Advaita. Since the cognition of Advaita cannot arise without sublating the notion of 'difference'—sacrifice and sacrificer, worshipper



and worshipped—on which the whole of the earlier portion of the Veda is based, the Advaita teachers conclude that the Upaniṣadic doctrine is much stronger than what is sublated, and that it is the supreme *purport* of the Veda. For the very same reason, according to them, in the Upaniṣads themselves, the texts in which Brahman is established as devoid of all attributes sublate the texts in which Brahman is described as having attributes such as creatorship. As both the kinds of texts could not be valid and true with regard to absolute reality, and as knowledge of Brahman as it is arises subsequent to knowledge of Brahman *per accidens*, texts speaking about *nirguṇa* (attributeless) Brahman sublate the others.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī notices a possible criticism in this connection. A cognition which arises sublating an earlier cognition is said to be the true and valid one; but is it not possible that a right cognition is followed by a false cognition? Does the mere order in which cognitions occur prove or disprove their validity? Madhusūdana replies that what is meant by the Advaitins is that if a cognition sublates another and is not itself sublated by another that follows it, then it is valid. In those cases where a false cognition follows a right cognition, sooner or later the false cognition itself is bound to be sublated by another right cognition. In the case of the knowledge of *nirguṇa Brahman* derived from the Upaniṣads, there cannot be any sublating cognition. Madhusūdana also says that even if we find in some authoritative book the right view being stated first to rebut a wrong view that is stated later (as is done by Pāṇini at one place), we should thereby understand that as a matter of fact the statement of the erroneous view is meant to precede that of the right view; for then only there will be meaningful sequence.<sup>59</sup> This reply has also a bearing on the Bādari-Jaimini controversy mentioned earlier.

## CHAPTER VI

### INTERPRETATION OF *MAHĀVĀKYAS*

*Mahāvākyas* are authoritative :

According to Śankara the authority of a scriptural passage is established if it is able to generate certain and fruitful knowledge. The Upaniṣadic texts are able to give such knowledge, which, Śankara says, is seen to result in the removal of evils such as ignorance, grief, delusion and fear which are at the root of transmigration. Further, the Upaniṣads themselves say that 'for him, who sees unity there can be no delusion and grief'.<sup>1</sup> Some passages in the Veda such as 'He (the god Fire) cried; so he was called Rudra (the crier)' may not give any certain and fruitful knowledge; and they have consequently no authority.<sup>2</sup> Also, texts like 'the sun is the sacrificial post' have to be understood figuratively, because their literal meaning is contradicted by perception; and their purport does not lie in their literal meaning. But there are certain texts in the Upaniṣads, which, by the application of the six-fold criteria mentioned in the previous chapter, are found to be their central theme. Since these texts give us fruitful knowledge not obtained by any other source and since they are found to be 'important' as they have an independent meaning of their own, the Advaita school maintains that their purport must be accepted at all costs.<sup>3</sup>

'That Thou art' is the Purport of the Upaniṣads :

One of the most important Upaniṣadic texts, which the Advaita Vedānta regards as its very foundation, occurs in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. It occurs in a dialogue between the sage Uddālaka and his son. The Advaita school applies to it the six-fold criteria in the following way. The theme of this dialogue is discovered by studying how it begins and how it ends. Uddālaka begins by saying that the Real alone was in the beginning and ends by concluding that 'all this is of the nature of Self'.<sup>4</sup> The unity of purpose revealed by *correlating the beginning and end* seems to be the establishment of the doctrine of the



non-dual Reality. During the discourse, Uddālaka *repeats* the precept 'That Thou art' nine times; so, evidently that is the main point he wishes to bring home. The conclusion is a *novel* one, because except through the Veda it cannot be known through perception or inference. This teaching is highly *commended* in the passage just preceding it, where it is said that by knowing this truth all that is worth knowing is known. The high benefit to be secured by this knowledge is said to be nothing less than complete liberation, to wit, such passages as 'the only delay in his becoming Brahman is until his death.' (*Tasya tāvadeva cīram* etc.) Thus the *fruitfulness* of this teaching is immense. The arguments employed, such as that by knowing clay all products of clay are known, show that Ātman is taught to be the material cause of the world. The Advaita school says that all this will lead us to conclude that the purport of the discourse is the truth of non-duality.

Meaning of 'That Thou art':

It would be useful to see in detail how Śankara interprets this 'great text' (*mahāvākyā*). He says that 'Thou' denotes the individual Śvetaketu, who knows himself to be the son of Uddālaka, the hearer and investigator of this truth. Just as a man may be reflected in a mirror, or the sun in a lake of water, so the Supreme Deity (*parādevatā*), which has entered (*praviṣṭa*) into the material body in order to manifest name and form, *is* the individual soul. 'That' denotes the ground of the whole world which is unborn, immortal, real and eternal. Before he is told so, the individual does not know himself to be the Self of all which is of the nature of Reality. But when, with the help of examples and reasoning, he is told that he *is* the Reality, he realises that when this is known, the individual will not think of himself any longer as 'agent' or 'enjoyer'. The knowledge given by this Upaniṣadic sentence is thus *opposed* to his previous knowledge, and removes it. When one knows himself to *be* the one sole Reality which is the ground of the whole world, he cannot any more have notions based on 'difference', such as 'I will do this', 'this is my duty'; 'I will obtain this', or 'this is good'. Śankara concludes that the knowledge of the one

true and real Self removes the false idea that one is a limited individual 'soul'.

Śankara says that this teaching of the identity of Brahman and the soul is not like the conception of Viṣṇu in an idol. The idol is looked upon and worshipped only *as if* it were Viṣṇu, for how can a lifeless stone actually be Viṣṇu? He maintains that here we are not asked to think of the individual soul *as if* it is Brahman. It is categorically stated in the Upaniṣad that the real Self, the world-ground (*jagato mūlam*) itself, *is* the individual soul. Nor is this statement to be understood in a metaphorical way, like the saying, 'You are a lion', because the text emphatically says that as clay is the one thing to be found in all the products of clay, the one thing 'Being' alone is real. Further, it is said that liberation is delayed only so long as there is no true knowledge of this, for as soon as there is such a knowledge, bondage comes to an end. Hence the knowledge that each of us is Brahman cannot be merely metaphorical. It cannot be also taken as mere praise, for it is no compliment for the All-Self (*sarvātmaka*) Brahman to be praised as Śvetaketu; nor is anyone interested in praising Śvetaketu, to whom 'That Thou art' is addressed. To teach this cardinal truth—the identity of the soul and Brahman—is the aim of all the Upaniṣads. So when the Upaniṣads affirm 'That Thou art!', the idea 'I am the Real Being' cannot but arise in one's mind and since the Upaniṣads are a *pramāṇa*, this idea can never afterwards be destroyed. A critic may ask: if every man is the Real Being, why does he not *know* himself to be so? Śankara replies that this is not a real difficulty, because usually a man does not have even the idea that he is an agent or an enjoyer, apart *from* the consciousness of his material body and senses. Since he has the idea that his body is himself, it is no wonder if he does not realise himself as the Real Being. The sentence 'That Thou art' removes this false idea.<sup>5</sup>

From the above account of Śankara, it is quite clear that he does not think there is any difficulty about the interpretation of 'That Thou art'.

### *Lakṣaṇā Vṛtti :*

Later Advaita writers have devoted much attention to the interpretation of 'That Thou art'. Sureśvara distinguishes



between *mukhya vṛtti* and *lakṣaṇā vṛtti*. The *mukhya vṛtti* (chief function) of a sentence is that which enables us to understand the sentence through the well-known meanings of the words constituting it; while the *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* (secondary or implicative function) of a sentence is that which enables us to understand the sentence through meanings which are related to the well-known meanings of the words constituting it.

*Lakṣaṇā* is said to be of four kinds: (a) *jahallakṣaṇā*; (b) *ajahallakṣaṇā*; (c) *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*; (d) *gauṇa vṛtti*. In (a), the usual well known (*prasiddha*) meaning is put aside and a meaning related to it is taken, e.g., in 'There is a hamlet on the Ganges', the word 'Ganges' does not signify its usual referent, the river Ganges, but a bank of it. In (b), the usual meaning as well as a meaning related to it are taken, e.g., in 'The lances are coming', the word 'lances' without foregoing its usual meaning signifies the 'lance-bearers'. In (c), a part of the usual meaning is left out, and a part of it is retained, e.g., in 'This is that Devadatta', differences in the accidental qualities of Devadatta are ignored, and Devadatta in himself is taken as the referent. In (d), the meaning intended is apprehended through its relation to the quality of a thing, e.g. in 'Devadatta is a lion', the intended meaning, grasped through the quality of 'courage' is found in both of them.

*Lakṣaṇā*-Interpretation of 'That Thou art':

Sureśvara says that the usual well-known meaning of 'That' is the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman, the cause of the world; while the usual well-known meaning of 'Thou' is the body, for in sentences such as 'I am a man', 'You are walking', etc., 'I' and 'You' refer to the body. In interpreting 'That Thou art', 'That' and 'Thou' cannot be taken in their well-known express sense (*vāc्यārtha*), but in their implied sense (*lakṣyārtha*).<sup>6</sup>

The Advaita school maintains that we have to understand this sentence in the same way in which we understand a sentence such as 'This is that Devadatta'. Suppose two persons have seen one Devadatta at some place and time and that later the same two people have come across the same Devadatta at another place and time. Of the two, one may recognize him to be

Devadatta, while the other may not. Then the first would tell the second, 'This is that Devadatta'. Here the informer does not mean that the two places and times are the same, nor does he mean that the *two* Devadattas under those two conditions are not in some respects different. Devadatta when previously seen may have been very stout and wearing a striped shirt, while Devadatta as seen later might be lean and wearing a white shirt. The statement does not mean that the stout Devadatta wearing the striped shirt is in all respects the same as the lean Devadatta wearing the white shirt; but what is recognised as the same is the person Devadatta, who is accidentally characterised by stoutness or leanness, white shirt or striped shirt. So when it is said 'This is that Devadatta', no identity is posited between the leanness of Devadatta and the stoutness of Devadatta. Omitting these accidental qualities (leanness, stoutness, etc.), what is qualified by them is asserted to be the same. Similarly, the Advaita school says, when the individual self is asserted to be identical with Brahman, the individual self as characterised by agency, suffering and ignorance is not asserted to be identical with Brahman. In 'the individual self', the *ego*, to which agency and enjoyment belongs, is distinguished from pure being, and the latter alone is asserted to be identical with Brahman. Thus part of the usual meaning of 'individual self' or 'Thou' is abandoned and part of it is retained, while by 'That' also is not meant as usual the pure consciousness, which is remote (*parokṣa*). By 'That' Pure Consciousness *alone* is meant, and by 'Thou', the Pure Self, free from agency etc., is meant. So, the Advaita school concludes, the sentence expresses apposition (*samānādhikaraṇa*) between the two, Brahman and individual soul.

'That Thou art' not tautologous :

The Advaita school says that there is no tautology in this sentence; otherwise 'recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) would also involve tautology'. As in recognition, from this statement also no new knowledge is obtained; but it removes the mistaken notion of difference. One may know the nature of Brahman and also the nature of the individual self, and yet one may think the two to be different, just as we may have seen a man



previously and see him again now and yet fail to cognise his identity. But when we are reminded of our having met that person previously, then we shed the mistaken idea that the person whom we met then and the person whom we meet now are two different persons ; and in the same way, the Upaniṣadic sentence removes the delusion of difference between Brahman and the individual soul, even though their identity is known as soon as the true nature of both is known. For, Brahman is the self of all, and the *Self* is not really the body or the ego, but Being.

The Advaita school says that this sentence should be understood like the sentence 'This is that Devadatta' and not like sentences such as, 'The pot *is* earthen', 'The lotus *is* blue', etc. In these cases identity is posited between different things, such as cause and effect, substance and attribute. 'That Thou art' cannot possibly be taken to mean, for example, 'Thou art of That', i.e., you belong to Brahman ; because Brahman has no attributes and relations, and is indivisible. The Advaita school argues that as agency and enjoyment (*bhokṛtva*) are accidental characteristics (*upalakṣaṇā*) of the individual self, like the shirt which a man puts on, there is no absurdity at all in identifying it with Brahman.<sup>7</sup>

'That Thou art' not a *Dṛṣṭi Vidhi* :

Sureśvara brings up a possible criticism and refutes it in the following way. If any scriptural sentence is opposed to perception, then exegetical principles lay it down that it should be taken as *dṛṣṭi vidhi*, i.e. an injunction to see (imagine) something as other than it is actually. In a chapter called the 'Knowledge of the Five Fires' (*Pañcāgnividyā*), which occurs in one of the Upaniṣads, it is enjoined that heaven, cloud, earth, man and woman should be looked upon as fire and meditated upon, to obtain certain benefits. Why should not we take it that in 'That Thou art' also we are enjoined to look upon 'Thou' as 'That', though in fact 'Thou' is not 'That' ? Sureśvara replies that a careful application of the six-fold criteria proves that such an interpretation is unjustifiable ; because the sentence does not enjoin anything, and has no reference to any action. It is an existential statement which does not entail meditation (*prasankhyāna*).<sup>8</sup> Further, the knowledge which it gives is said

to end bondage. If, to avoid conflict with perception, this sentence is taken as *dṛṣṭi vidhi* enjoining *prasankhyāna*, how can it destroy the transmigratory world cycle (*samsāra*)? For even continued well performed meditation cannot end *samsāra*, if it is real. *Prasankhyāna* can only produce concentration and cannot change the nature of things. So if the reality of *samsāra* is well established by a *pramāṇa*, interpretation of 'That Thou art' as a *dṛṣṭi vidhi* and meditation on it cannot surely destroy *samsāra*. Imagination (*bhāvanā*), if often indulged in, may make *samsāra* 'disappear', but only temporarily. Lastly, eternal *mokṣa* cannot be produced by our meditation (*dhyāna* or *upāsana*).<sup>9</sup> So, Sureśvara concludes, since 'That Thou art' gives us knowledge, unobtainable from other sources, which directly leads to liberation, and as it is a declaration of the infallible Veda, the words 'That' and 'Thou', without abandoning their own sense, through their implied sense (*jahadajahallakṣaṇā*) sublimate all contrary ideas.<sup>10</sup> In his opinion, this sentence is like the sentence, 'The snake is a rope' addressed to a man, who mistakes a rope for a snake; and the word *snake* in the sentence does not have for its referent a real snake, as is usually the case, but that thing in front—a rope. Similarly, according to Sureśvara, 'Thou' does not signify the thing, which is usually called the self, but the Self as it is really.

*Lakṣyārtha* of 'That Thou art' is the basic meaning :

A possible criticism is that as the Advaita interpretation of 'That Thou art' does not take the sentence literally, but in its secondary or implied sense (*lakṣyārtha*), this meaning can only be metaphorical and not basic (*amukhya artha*). If the Advaita school thinks that scripture can override empirical perception, it can as well take the sentence literally and maintain that 'Thou' in its *vācya artha* itself is identical with 'That' in its *vācya artha*. To this Madhusūdana Sarasvatī replies in the following way : By the application of the six-fold criteria, it is found that the purport of 'That Thou art' lies in referring to an indivisible thing (*akhaṇḍārtha*) ; and the *lakṣyārtha* of the sentence alone gives us its purport. Madhusūdana says that as we understand by the word 'God' ('That') an Omniscient Person and by the word *jīva* ('Thou') a person limited in knowledge, to speak



of the two as identical taking the words in their usual senses would be absurd. So, he says, the true purport is to be had by taking the *lakṣyārtha*. 'That Thou art' is taken in its *lakṣyārtha*, not because the *vācya artha* is in conflict with perception, but for getting the purport. This is so in all cases where the *lakṣyārtha* of sentences is taken.

Madhusūdana gives three examples to show this. In 'Devadatta's cow gives much milk ; it should be bought ', the first sentence is subordinate to the second, and so its purport is not to give us the knowledge of a fact, but to indirectly indicate the cow's excellence. In the scriptural passage, 'He wept and his tears became silver ; silver should not be given as a sacrificial gift ', the first sentence is not intended to give factual information about the origin and nature of the metal 'silver' ; its purport is only to serve as subsidiary to the injunction in the second sentence, by condemning the particular metal as unfit. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* there is the passage : 'All this is verily Brahman ; the world is generated from it, will merge in it and abides in it—thus one should calmly meditate'.<sup>11</sup> Madhusūdana says that, in this case, the sentence 'All this is verily Brahman' is subordinate to the injunction 'thus one should calmly meditate', and indirectly indicates the excellence of meditation. In all these three cases we have to take the *lakṣyārtha* of the concerned sentences, not because the *vācyaārtha* is in conflict with perception, but because the purport can be grasped only in that way. According to him, in the case of 'That Thou art' it is found that it is not subordinate to any other sentence, so even though its *lakṣyārtha* is taken to bring out its purport, the *lakṣyārtha* is itself the basic meaning ; for the basic meaning of a sentence is its purport, which stands on its own legs without being subordinate to any other sentence.<sup>12</sup> This cannot be metaphorical knowledge, because scripture declares it to be 'saving knowledge' directly leading to liberation.

A contrary view is also held by some Advaita exponents, e.g., the author of a book called the *Vivaraṇa Vārtika*. This view, mentioned by Appayya Dikṣita, is as follows. The purport of 'That Thou art' is opposed to perception if the accepted and express meanings of 'That' and 'Thou' are taken ; and to avoid this and assign perceptual experience some basis, the words

are to be taken in their secondary sense. In other texts such as 'There is no multiplicity here', there is no need to resort to *lakṣyārtha*, because they are speaking of Absolute Reality, without denying empirical validity to perception.<sup>13</sup>

Dharmarāja's View: No *Lakṣaṇā vṛtti* in 'That Thou art':

An yet altogether different view is voiced by Dharmarāja. He maintains that there is *no* implication in 'This is that Devadatta' or 'That Thou art', because there is no contradiction in syntactically connecting two substantives to posit their identity, when they are *also* signified by the express sense of the words. For example, the word 'pot' signifies both the universal 'pot' and individual pots. In sentences such as 'This pot is breakable', and 'Bring the pot', by 'pot' is meant an individual pot; universal 'potness', which is an attribute of the thing 'pot', is not meant thereby, as that would lead to an absurdity. In short, since words directly signify substantives, whenever they refer to the identity of substantives there is no implication. Now the word 'Thou' signifies consciousness with the attributes of parviscience, and happiness or sorrow; whereas 'That' signifies consciousness, with the attributes of omniscience and bliss. So when 'That' is said to be 'Thou', only the identity of the substantives is posited, ignoring the attributes, just as when we say 'bring the pot', we mean only the thing—the substantive—*pot* and not its attribute 'potness'. Just as the latter sentence does not involve any implication, 'That Thou art' also does not involve any implication. This theory is based on the presupposition that words directly refer to substantives and not to the attributes of substantives, and that when words have to refer to attributes they do so by implication. Dharmarāja, therefore, asserts that as 'That' and 'Thou' are referring only to the substantives and not their attributes, it is not a *lakṣaṇā vākya*. If, however, the assertion of 'identity' had not been between the bare substantives 'That' and 'Thou', but between the substantives qualified by their respective attributes, then it would have been absurd. *Lakṣaṇā* would have been involved only if attributes alone had been meant, ignoring the substantives,<sup>14</sup> e.g., in 'The pot is eternal', the word 'pot' implies potness, an attribute of pots.



According to Dharmarāja, the right example for *jahada-jahallakṣaṇā* is a sentence of the sort, 'See that crows do not eat this curd'. Here the word 'crow' abandons its usual express sense and takes on an implied meaning, for it refers to all animals and birds, which are likely to snatch the curd, e.g., parrots, cats, dogs, etc. The purport of the sentence is that the curd should be kept safely without allowing any animals and birds to touch it, and not that crows *alone* should not be allowed to touch it. Thus, as Dharmarāja says, here the word 'crow' implies any 'spoiler of curd' (*dadhyupaghātaka*), crow as well as not-crow. In 'That Thou art' and 'This is that Devadatta', Dharmarāja does not find any such implication, and so they are not proper examples of *lakṣaṇā vākya*. He says that the statement of earlier teachers (*sāmpradāyikāh*, *ācāryāh*) that 'That Thou art' is a *lakṣaṇā vākya* is only a tentative admission in the course of argument (*abhyupagamavāda*), and not the final conclusion.<sup>15</sup>

It is to be noted that Śāṅkara himself does not say that there is a *lakṣaṇā* in his *Chāndogya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* while expounding this text. In fact he expressly says that it is not a sentence to be interpreted as 'You are a lion'; and he does not mention there the example of 'This is that Devadatta' of which later Advaitins make so much. As in his opinion there is no word which can appropriately refer to Ātman, and as any word can only imply it and not signify it directly, there is no reason why any special difficulty should be felt about this single text. But Śāṅkara himself in his minor works says that 'That Thou art' is a *lakṣaṇā vākya* like 'This is that Devadatta'; and as to why he has said so has been explained away by Dharmarāja.<sup>16</sup>

A recent commentator of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* has explained why 'That Thou art' should not be taken as a *lakṣaṇā vākya*. According to him, in 'The hamlet is on the Ganges', we take 'Ganges' to imply the bank of Ganges, because we already know that there cannot be hamlets on rivers, but only on their banks. Since we do not know the identity of Brahman and jīva before hearing 'That Thou art', why should we reject the express sense? On the contrary, if one already knows this identity, he is in fact a *mukta* (liberated soul), and for him the sentence is useless. So this commentator argues that through its express sense itself the sentence is able to convey us the great truth.<sup>17</sup>

A critic may ask, 'If it is said that here the identity of the substantives only—Brahman and jīva—is asserted, how have been they distinguished from their attributes?' An Advaitin may answer that other Hindu schools (e.g. that of Rāmānuja) also accept omniscience etc., as attributes of Brahman and ignorance etc., as attributes of jīva. Further, as will be shown later, prior to the hearing of 'That Thou art' the meanings of 'Thou' and 'That' should be 'clarified' (*tattvam-padārtha śodhanā*). When a man, who has 'clarified' for himself the meanings of those words, hears the sentence 'That Thou art', he will obviously understand that the asserted identity is only between the substantives and not between the attributes; just as when somebody tells him 'bring the jar', he understands by 'jar' not 'jarhood', but a particular thing. If, then, the question occurs to him, 'what happens to the attributes?' scriptural texts, supplemented by reasoning, will demonstrate to him that they are products of *māyā*.<sup>18</sup> Thus an Advaitin can try to rebut this criticism.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE CONCEPTION OF *VEDAJNĀNA* AND ITS RELATION TO *ANUBHAVA*

#### I

#### *Mithyātva of the Veda*

*Vedajñāna* is also delusion :

Śankara unhesitatingly states that when the final truth of non-dualism is realised, there will be no perception ; for the Veda also becomes non-existent then.<sup>1</sup> As *śāstra* is intended only for the unenlightened, it is meaningful only in the state of bondage ; and not in the liberated state.<sup>2</sup>

Vidyāranya says that like everything else the Veda is an effect of Brahman in the sense that it is an appearance of Brahman. Though not real, it is practically efficient, i.e. it can give us knowledge. For example, the idea that the body *is* the soul is a delusion, but it is still efficient in evoking activity. According to Vidyāranya, the Veda has the same status. It is like the world *mithyā*, and the knowledge of it (*vedajñāna*) is delusion (*bhramā*).<sup>3</sup>

In short, according to the Advaita Vedānta, the immutable, the independent and the eternal alone is the Real ; and Brahman alone answers to that description. The entirely unreal is incapable of evoking any activity, e.g., nobody is afraid of the hare's horn or the barren woman's son. On the other hand, the appearance of a snake in a rope can frighten people ; so the 'rope-snake' is not utterly false. The world and the Veda have the same status ; i.e. they are capable of being experienced, but they are not real. They are *mithyā*.

The Advaitin maintains that the Veda is also indescribable because it cannot be described as mere letters or letters in a definite order ; for while mere letters without any order whatsoever cannot constitute any book, letters which are eternal and omnipresent cannot have in themselves any 'order'.<sup>4</sup>

How can the *mithyā* Veda produce valid knowledge ?

Teachers of Advaita have given various answers to the question, 'How can the valid and real experience of non-duality result from Vedānta sentences, which are themselves false ?' Śāṅkara replies that the Veda, though not absolutely real, can nevertheless make the absolutely real known to us ; just as a woman or a cobra seen in a dream, though false, has physical as well as psychical effects which extend into waking experience. For example, a man who dreams that he has been bitten by a cobra may die of shock ; and dreams can also be portents of future ' bad ' and ' good ' in waking life.<sup>5</sup>

Sureśvara says that just as though a pot is *mithyā*, it is useful in bringing water, even so the sentence ' That Thou art ' is *mithyā*, but can cause Brahman-knowledge.<sup>6</sup> He also says that for a man who desires *mokṣa*, right and ascertained knowledge is generated by the sentences of the Veda, just as sleep can be removed by a dream.<sup>7</sup> Elsewhere Sureśvara says that as one who is awakened from sleep by the dream of a thief does not see any thief after waking up, even so an ignorant man well taught by the Veda does not any more see any teacher, *śāstra*, or ignorant person, apart from himself.<sup>8</sup>

Śāṅkara gives another example. The written symbol ' A ' is read as ' A ', whenever it occurs ; but in fact it is only a *false* representation of the letter ' A ', which is eternal and all-pervasive.<sup>9</sup> Vācaspati gives the same example in a slightly different way by saying that by placing accents on letters, which are themselves neither short nor long, difference in meaning is caused.<sup>10</sup> Rāmāṇanda gives a happier example : The sketch of a snake drawn on a paper is not a real snake ; it is only an appearance of a snake, yet it can give us correct knowledge of a snake. Similarly, the knowledge of the thing (*artha*, i.e., Brahman) produced by a study of the Veda is valid.<sup>11</sup>

Vācaspati's Reply :

Vācaspati has also given a more elaborate example to explain this. He says that the Veda is the cause of Brahman-knowledge, in the same way in which the false identification of body with self is the cause of Brahman-knowledge. He explains this in the



following way: When the body is hurt, one experiences that he himself is hurt; when the body is suffering from disease, one experiences himself to be suffering. This is an illusion generated by the false identification of the body with the self, and is similar to the illusion of seeing silver in nacre. The precept 'You are the eternal immutable Self' is meaningful only when a man has wrongly imagined himself to be the body. A man cannot know that he is Brahman, unless previously he has experienced himself to be something different from Brahman. A knowledge of non-duality presupposes a previous distinction of knower, known etc., and a realisation that they are based on false identification. So, Vācaspati says, since these distinctions based on a false identification invariably precede the intuition of non-duality, they are the cause of it. Similarly, as it is after hearing the Upaniṣadic sentences and meditating on them that true knowledge arises, so the former is the cause of the latter.

Vācaspati maintains that though based on the false distinctions of 'I', 'You', and 'That', *Vedānta Vākyas* generate true knowledge (*pramā*) in the same way in which all wordly usage, which is based on the false idea that the body is the self, produces true knowledge. Even pluralists and dualists, who are of the view that the world is not false, assert that the body is not the self; yet if the belief that the body is the self is gone, there can be no wordly usage in the form of 'I am walking', 'I am unhappy, because my wife is sick', etc. Scriptural injunctions are also based on this belief. In short, all valid knowledge (*pramā*), whether perceptual or inferential, is based on this false belief. Similarly, according to Vācaspati, Brahman-knowledge is based on Veda-knowledge which is false.<sup>12</sup>

*Brahmajnāna* also false:

At the same time, Vācaspati says that the knowledge that arises from a study of Vedānta is only as real as the nescience which it destroys. It is a product of nescience, because it is based on or presupposes the distinction between true knowledge, knower, and means of knowledge. But as soon as nescience is destroyed, the knowledge of Brahman, which is based on it, is also destroyed. According to Vācaspati, 'the intuition of Brahman' uproots the entire 'magical show of the world' including itself;

for the 'intuition of Brahman' (based upon the distinction of *jīva* and Brahman) is not distinct from the world.<sup>13</sup> Real intuition of Brahman, however, is not something to be caused, but is Brahman itself.<sup>14</sup>

Harṣa's View :

The great Advaita dialectician Śrī Harṣa also exercises much ingeniousness on this question. Distinguishing between a conception and the content of a conception, Śrī Harṣa says that though the conception of non-duality is illusory, its content is not illusory. A conception is demolished only when its content is shown to be false ; and as the content of the conception of non-duality cannot be shown to be false, the conception stands unrefuted.<sup>15</sup>

However Harṣa implies that this argument of his is only a *jalpa* (argument for the sake of victory in debate) ; because he says that as in fact *Non-Duality* (*advaita*) is Brahman or Pure Knowledge (*vijnāna*), there can be no knowledge of non-duality or knowledge of Knowledge. The statement that the Veda gives knowledge is only empirically true. Brahman cannot be known by anything other than itself, because Brahman is the self-luminous consciousness. Śrī Harṣa says that the contradiction apparent in the sentence ' Brahman knows itself ' is no more formidable than the contradiction in sentences like ' the fruit ripens itself ' and ' I know myself ', where there is no distinction of subject and object.<sup>16</sup>

This last statement of Śrī Harṣa involves confusion of levels of language, on which comment will be reserved for a future chapter.

In general, we might summarize the Advaita Vedānta position by saying that nothing correct can be said about Brahman, because anything that can be said presupposes ' difference ' and ' multiplicity '. Any statement about Brahman can only indicate (*lakṣyante*) or hint at it, and it would not be able to do so if it were not wrong. So all the things that may be said in order to make one cognise his identity with Brahman are found to be meaningless (*arīhahīna*), when the final truth is realized.<sup>17</sup>



*Does a Mahāvākya directly produce  
Anubhava?*

While all Advaita teachers accept the Veda as the supreme source of truth regarding Brahman, there is no unanimity among them about the *Karaṇa* (chief cause) of the intuition of Brahman. Deep meditation, the Upaniṣadic texts and the mind are each separately mentioned by different thinkers as the *Karaṇa*.

Śankara's View : *Mahāvākyas* directly produce it :

Śankara is of the opinion that the knowledge arising from sentences such as 'That Thou art', 'All this is but the Self', etc., suffices to remove the awareness of entities other than Brahman. As these sentences have no reference to anything else beyond expounding the true nature of the Self, they immediately lead to the realisation of Ātman. As soon as the knowledge of Ātman arises as a result of hearing the *mahāvākya*, it necessarily destroys all the previous false notions. When the false notions about the Self (e.g., that it is the body, that it is other than Brahman, etc.) are gone, memories and habits based upon them cannot continue ; and things other than the Self are realised as evil, i.e. as full of defects such as transitoriness, painfulness and impurity. So, Śankara says, the memories of false notions die out, and 'the train of remembrance of the knowledge of the non-dual nature of the Self is firmly implanted'. Besides this, as the scriptural texts say, grief, fear, delusion, etc., are removed by this knowledge. According to him, the Upaniṣads do not speak of anything other than the knowledge of the identity of the self and Brahman as a means to the attainment of liberation.<sup>18</sup> He also affirms that Brahman-knowledge leads to the highest End of man without the help of any auxiliary means. There is incongruity between this knowledge, which obliterates all action with its factors and results, and ignorance, on which is based the notion of difference, and without which rites, meditation etc., cannot be performed.<sup>19</sup> From the fact that Brahman-knowledge has been imparted to a lady, Maitreyī, by her husband, the sage Yājñavalkya, Śankara deduces

the conclusion that performance of rites does not form a prolegomena to the receiving of Brahman-knowledge ; for Maitreyī never performed any rites, nor was she entitled to perform, being a woman.<sup>20</sup> Elsewhere he says that just as the path of a man who wants to reach the Eastern ocean cannot be the same as the path of a man who wants to reach the Western ocean, even so he who wants to realise Brahman cannot follow the path of the performance of rites (*karma mārga*).<sup>20a</sup>

*Prasankhyāna*, the *Karāṇa* :

Some Advaita teachers led by Maṇḍana hold a different view. They say that after Brahman's nature is known from the Upaniṣadic statements, if these are intensely and constantly pondered, there will result an immediate awareness (*aparokṣadhīh*) that the self is Brahman. These teachers quote in support the scriptural text 'the indivisible Brahman is seen by meditation' (*tam paśyate niṣkalam dhyāyamānāh*). A lover is sometimes able to have a vision of his beloved through constant and fixed thinking, even though the beloved may be dead or away in a distant place. That, no doubt, is an illusion ; but the intuition of Brahman is no illusion, because this idea ('I am Brahman') is formed by the knowledge generated by the Upaniṣadic texts (*vedānta vākya ja jñāna bhāvanā*).<sup>21</sup> Maṇḍana admits that the knowledge, which *Vedānta Vākyas* produce is indubitable (*nirviçikitsa*) ; but he thinks that 'on account of the strength of the mental impressions (*samskāra*) born out of the ingrained habit of seeing the beginningless falsity', the false appearance of multiplicity continues, even after the truth about Ātman is known. So, he says, other means are necessary to remove this, even after the identity of self and Brahman is known.<sup>22</sup> He believes that *prasankhyāna* (deep deliberation or intense thought) is necessary to get direct and immediate knowledge (*aparokṣa jñāna*) of Brahman, even after hearing and understanding the Upaniṣadic texts. He is also of the opinion that 'That Thou art' is subsidiary to sentences which enjoin *Upāsanā* of Brahman, and knowledge generated by the hearing of these sentences is mediate, like the knowledge from all verbal testimony. This mediate knowledge cannot destroy the immediate appearance (*avabhāsa*) of the world. But he thinks that by *Upāsanā* or meditation the relational



knowledge (*samsṛṣṭa viśaya jñāna*) generated by the Upaniṣadic texts is clarified, and then *sākṣātkāra* (vision) of Ātman is possible. Even then the *avabhāsa* of the world is present, but Maṇḍana thinks that since 'the light of the reality of Ātman is eternal' it could not be doubted, and the appearance of the world does not touch it. (*na Ātma samsparśi*). This sort of thing is not possible in the case of *Śābda jñāna*, because it is *pramāṇa*-generated and momentary.<sup>22a</sup>

Sureśvara's theory : *Mahāvākyas*, the *Karaṇa* :

Sureśvara vigorously criticizes the above view. Upholders of *prasankhyāna* say that sentences such as 'That Thou art' are not a *pramāṇa* by themselves, as they are intended to enjoin *prasankhyāna*. Sureśvara replies that if a sentence cannot give rise to valid knowledge, any amount of *prasankhyāna* cannot give rise to it; for it consists only in repetition of arguments and words.<sup>23</sup> *Prasankhyāna* can only give rise to concentration and not to knowledge. If it is of the nature of *upāsana* or *dhyāna* (meditation), *upāsana* being an act of the mind, it cannot result in liberation; for the sort of liberation produced by an action cannot be eternal.<sup>24</sup> If the sentence 'That Thou art' cannot generate certain knowledge about the self, nothing else can; for it is a *pramāṇa*, which is in no need of confirmation by other *pramāṇas*.<sup>25</sup> Sureśvara says that only he who desires *mokṣa* hears the Upaniṣadic sentences; and unless one has got detachment (*virakti*) towards worldly 'goods', he will not desire *mokṣa*.<sup>26</sup> Sureśvara, however, admits that there are some who cannot realize their identity with Brahman by hearing the *mahāvākyas* once; and they have to resort to the *anvaya-vyatireka*\* method of reasoning, and to some the truth has to be frequently explained by a teacher. So if *prasankhyāna* is nothing but repeated hearing of the *mahāvākyas* and application of *anvaya-vyatireka* to them, then Sureśvara does not deny it a place; but he affirms that it is a part of the process of knowing the meaning of the *mahāvākyas* themselves.<sup>27</sup> According to him, it is the *mahāvākyas* alone that lead to liberation.<sup>28</sup>

\* The nature of this will be explained in a later chapter.

Madhusūdana supports it :

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also supports the standpoint of Sureśvara. He says that the *mahāvākyas* alone are the means of right knowledge regarding the self. A sentence conveys knowledge only through the knowledge of the meanings of the words contained in it. The meanings of the words 'That' and 'Thou', which accord with the purport of the sentence 'That Thou art', cannot be known except from scripture. In the Upaniṣads, texts which describe Brahman as the creator of the world<sup>29</sup> give us the *vāc्यārtha* of 'That'; while texts which say that 'Brahman is reality, knowledge and infinity'<sup>30</sup> give us the *lakṣyārtha* of 'That'. Similarly, texts which describe Ātman as 'moving' from the waking state to the dreaming and the sleeping states and *vice versa*, 'like a big fish from one bank to another',<sup>31</sup> give us the *vāc्यārtha* of 'Thou', while texts which say that 'he who is of the nature of knowledge inside the vital airs and the heart'<sup>32</sup> give us the *lakṣyārtha* of 'Thou'. Madhusūdana says that as these subsidiary sentences are already known and remembered, when there is no possibility of taking 'That' and 'Thou' literally according to their *vāc्यārtha*, the sentence is understood according to their *lakṣyārtha*. As this sentence has as its meaning an undifferentiated thing, and as *lakṣaṇārtha* is intended to achieve through the indirect implied sense of the words the purport of the sentence, the meaning of the sentence is intelligible, because nothing contradictory to it is known. Madhusūdana, however, admits that due to the objections and criticisms of the opponents of the Advaita, doubts will be raised in the minds of dullards, which will act as deterrents (*pratibandha*) to the destruction of ignorance by the *mahāvākyas*. This, he says, can only be removed by *viçāra* (discussion); and when there are no obstacles it is the *mahāvākyas alone* which remove ignorance and lead to liberation.<sup>33</sup>

The Vivaraṇa school upholds it :

The school of Padmapāda also advocates almost the same theory. It maintains that scripture is the direct and principal cause of the immediate knowledge of Brahman, because texts such as 'That person who is established in the Upaniṣads'



declare that Brahman is known solely through the Upaniṣads. Again, the texts 'He who knows the self goes beyond sorrow', and 'He who has a preceptor knows', make it clear that as soon as one hears the *mahāvākyas* from his preceptor, one knows the truth, and is released from the transmigratory cycle. Texts such as 'Those who have well ascertained the meaning of Vedānta attain That' make meditation (*dhyāna*) etc., superfluous. The text 'That which is not conceived by the mind' denies that mind is the principal cause of intuition. Texts such as 'It is not expressed by speech', and 'Speech along with mind returns failing to grasp it', indicate that words cannot denote Brahman, in their primary established sense; but sentences can have Brahman as their purport, and as has been already said, they speak of Brahman negatively and through secondary implication. So, the Vivaraṇa school maintains, scriptural testimony is the primary cause of the immediate knowledge of Brahman.<sup>34</sup>

The Vivaraṇa school says that *Vedānta Vākyas* cannot give mediate knowledge of Brahman, as the other schools say, because there can be no mediate knowledge of Brahman, which is an 'immediate thing' (*aparokṣa vastu*). It is true that usually verbal testimony cannot produce immediate knowledge; but as here Brahman, which is to be known, is not different from the knower (the subject), immediate knowledge is possible, even from testimony. The Bhāmātī school says that mind is the cause of the immediate knowledge of Brahman; but the Vivaraṇa school says that even if mind be considered a sense organ, it cannot be the cause of immediate knowledge. Otherwise, inferential knowledge, which is arrived at by mind, would also be immediate, while the ever-present knowledge of happiness or unhappiness would not be immediate, because no sense gave rise to it. Mind, the Vivaraṇa school says, is not a sense organ; and if, as the Bhāmātī school argues, it were only a sense organ that could give immediate knowledge, Brahman could never be immediately known.<sup>35</sup>

How does *śabda* produce immediate knowledge?

The Vivaraṇa school holds that the content of knowledge is immediate, not only when there is sense-object contact, but also when it is not different from the cognising consciousness (*pramāṭr-*

*çaitanya*), or when it is the generator of its own cognition, because there is no intervention or obstruction. Then as Brahman is the constituent cause of all cognising consciousness, the cognition of it in the form of Brahman, generated by scripture, is immediate from the beginning, either because it is not different from Brahman, or because Brahman is its generator.<sup>36</sup>

The Vivaraṇa school explains this by means of an analogy, which has been supplied by Śaṅkara himself in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka bhāṣya*. If a man standing in a row of people is told that he is the tenth, as soon as he hears it he immediately knows himself to be the tenth in the row. In short, the criterion of the immediacy of knowledge is not that it should be generated by sense-object contact only. Knowledge is also immediate if its content is immediate, i.e. if it is identical with the cognising consciousness. Now, as Brahman is always non-different from the cognising consciousness, it is always immediate; and so the knowledge given by the Upaniṣadic statements is immediate. Also, a statement such as 'this is nacre, not silver' is capable of giving immediate knowledge by removing illusion. Similarly, according to this school, the intuition which is generated by Upaniṣadic statements at once gives liberation (*sadyomukti*), for it removes delusion.<sup>37</sup>

But, the Vivaraṇa school admits that if the mind is vitiated by the defects of doubts and false notions, this stands in the way of the generation of Brahman-knowledge; or rather, even though Brahman-knowledge is generated, it appears to be mediate.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, though immediate knowledge of Brahman arises from scriptural testimony even in the first instance, it is not steadfast, but becomes so only when doubts and contrary views are rooted out. These formidable obstacles are removed by meditation and contemplation; the former being necessary to remove the idea that what scripture says is impossible, while the latter is necessary to refute all views contrary to what scripture says. According to the Vivaraṇa school, these two are auxiliary to the principal cause, viz. the hearing of *mahāvākyas*. It is also necessary that mind should be purified by the cultivation of 'poise' or serenity and other virtues (*śamādayah*), and by the due performance of duties. These qualify a man to hear the *mahāvākyas*. If he hears them when fully equipped and if this



hearing is aided by meditation and contemplation, then it produces a direct intuition of Brahman. But, if the mind is not fully equipped and if the hearing of the scripture is not aided by the practice of meditation and contemplation, it results either in mediate knowledge or in insecure (*apratiṣṭita*) immediate knowledge. In any case, according to Padmapāda and his followers, hearing of the Upaniṣadic texts is the chief cause of *Brahma-anubhūti*.<sup>39</sup>

A different theory: Mind, the *Karaṇa*:

Vācaspati does not accept either *prasankhyāna* or *mahāvākyas* as the principal means of Brahman-intuition. His school maintains that if the direct perception of Brahman is right cognition, its instrument must be a recognized sense, because perception results only from sense-object contact. So this school posits mind as the chief means of Brahman-intuition; and it regards mind as a sense organ. When mind (*antahkaraṇa* or *manas*) deeply contemplates the meaning of *mahāvākyas*, Brahman is manifested by the negation of all attributes such as agency and enjoyment from the 'I'. The 'I' is intuited by mind alone; so mind alone can be aware of it, as devoid of all adjuncts also. It is able to do this, when mind is perfected through a deep contemplation of *mahāvākyas*. Even in this intuition the pure Brahman is not revealed; for there still persists the mental mode which has Brahman for its content. Brahman as such is self-luminous and eternal. It can never be perceived, whereas in this intuition there is still the mental mode, which has assumed the form of Brahman. Though pure consciousness devoid of all adjuncts seems to be intuited, it is really consciousness, conditioned by the mental mode, which is intuited. But there is a difference between this intuition and ordinary perception. In this intuition, without any awareness of the conditions and the conditioning, 'the conditioned (*upahita*) Brahman' alone is known.

Vācaspati says that for the following reasons, Brahman-intuition is not an illusion, as the idea or vision of fire produced by imagination is. The individual self, who is of the nature of Brahman, is immediately present even from the beginning; but it is clouded by false notions of agency and enjoyment. When

these false notions are dispelled by right knowledge, it is seen to be the same as Brahman or pure consciousness. Thus the individual does not become different from what he was previously. He always was one with Brahman, but false ideas prevailed about his real nature; and when they are dispelled, he is immediately intuited as Brahman. Vācaspati says that just as a man versed in music experiences the different notes of music in all their cadences through the ear, so the individual experiences himself as Brahman through the mind, when he meditates on the knowledge of the meaning of the Upaniṣads.<sup>40</sup>

Amalānanda clarifies this position further in the following way. Brahman is never removed (remote or mediate = *parokṣa*) from oneself; but because of delusion it is experienced as removed. If Brahman is to be directly experienced, that can be done only through the instrumentality of a sense which is capable of doing so. Now (says Amalānanda) mind is capable of immediately apprehending the self, and this is proved from the fact that it is a mode of the mind in the form of 'I', which manifests the self with adjuncts. The eye, influenced by the innate residual impressions of previous experience, is able to recognise 'this' to be 'that', as in the affirmation: 'This is that Devadatta'. So, for the mind aided by the successive impressions of the identity of Brahman and the self (*śabda-janita brahmātmaikyā dhīśantativāsitam*), generated by Upaniṣadic testimony, it is possible to intuit the individual to be Brahman. Upaniṣadic testimony is not the direct cause of the immediate cognition of Brahman. The thesis of the Vivaraṇa school that knowledge of a thing is immediate merely because the thing is immediate, is wrong; otherwise (says Amalānanda) even the inference about the difference between body and soul would come under the heading of direct perception.<sup>41</sup>

Appayya Dikṣita adds that if scriptural testimony can produce immediate cognition of Brahman, then for one who has heard the Upaniṣadic sentences there ought to be no delusion that Brahman is a remote thing. But we find that even though the Upaniṣads have been heard and understood, the delusion of Brahman being a remote thing sometimes persists. So scriptural testimony cannot directly produce the immediate cognition of Brahman. Mind alone can generate immediate cognition,



because scripture says so,<sup>42</sup> and also because we see that it is the cause of the awareness of self through its modification in the form of 'I'.<sup>43</sup>

Amalānanda mentions another important point : On account of the authority of scriptural testimony, the immediate cognition of Brahman that results from it is not illusive. Nor is the knowledge derived from scripture in need of confirmation, for it is beyond doubt. It must be remembered that the knowledge that scripture gives is not in the form 'Brahman is remote', but is in the form 'Brahman is immediately present'. Still there is no direct experience of Brahman merely from the hearing of scriptural sentences, because verbal testimony cannot give direct knowledge.

Appayya Dikṣita explains this with the help of an example: From the sensation of touch which we experience, we infer the immediacy of air. This inferential knowledge is not itself of the nature of perception ; but it does not divine air to be devoid of immediacy.<sup>44</sup> Even so, though the knowledge of Brahman derived from scripture is not itself immediate, Brahman is immediate ; and Brahman is immediately experienced by mind only.

These are the main doctrinal differences among the Advaita teachers about the principal means of Brahman-knowledge.

## CHAPTER VIII

### ANUBHAVA

#### I

#### *Nature and Conception of the Intuition of Brahman*

We now come to the consideration of *Anubhava* or integral experience in which Brahman is known as one's self. This, as has been mentioned already, is one of the ways in which Brahman is revealed, according to the Advaita theory.

*Anubhava*, a *pramāṇa* of Brahman :

Śankara says that as in the case of virtue and duty, scripture alone is not the source of knowledge regarding Brahman. To some extent *anubhava* as well as scripture, are sources of knowledge regarding Brahman, because Brahman is an existent thing, and the knowledge of Brahman must culminate in experience.<sup>1</sup>

According to Śankara, *anubhava* of Brahman means the realisation of oneself as Brahman (*brahmātmabhāva*). *That Brahman is oneself is not known except from scripture*;<sup>2</sup> and as soon as the individual self knows that he is in fact Brahman, he becomes Brahman, and immediately he is liberated. There is no interval between the knowing of Brahman and liberation.<sup>3</sup> One difference between knowledge and action is this: while the fruits of action are realised at some future time, the fruit of knowledge is immediate experience.<sup>4</sup> As the fruits of sacrifices (heaven etc.) are not objects of experience, their existence may well be doubted; but Brahman cannot be doubted, as it is immediately experienced. The sentence 'That Thou art' teaches an objective fact, which is there already. An individual does not become Brahman after death, for he is already Brahman. Just as a prince kidnapped by robbers in his childhood does not know that he is a prince, but realises himself to be a prince as soon as he is told, a *jīva* realises himself to be Brahman as soon as he hearkens to the *mahāvākya*.<sup>5</sup>



## *Anubhava*

Śankara says that when the knower of Brahman realises that he is Brahman, which is never an agent or enjoyer, all actions and sins (*durita*) are simply annihilated, and thus liberation becomes intelligible.<sup>6</sup>

*Anubhava* is liberation :

Śankara argues that if the potencies of all actions done in previous births are not thus summarily destroyed, how could the merit and demerit accumulated from eternity be ever destroyed, and unless they are destroyed, how will transmigration cease? So he says that as soon as false knowledge is removed by the power of true knowledge, all actions previously imagined to be done (*kartṛtvam pratipeda iva*) are at once dissolved and destroyed. Moreover, from the time one knows himself to be Brahman, he will not experience himself to be an agent; so there is no question of future deeds binding him.<sup>7</sup> Not only is sin destroyed in this way, but also virtue (*sukṛta*), for the true self which is not an agent is untouched by sin as well as virtue; and unless both virtue and sin are got rid of, there is no liberation.<sup>8</sup> But there is one exception: Past actions which have already begun to bear their fruit in the shape of the present body and life are not thus destroyed. As a wheel set in motion cannot be stopped till its force works itself out, the actions which have already begun to bear their fruit are not stopped. Though right knowledge uproots (*ucchinatti*) all actions by sublating false knowledge, it persists (*anuvṛtta*) for sometime, because of its residual impressions.

Proof for *Anubhava* is one's own heart :

Śankara says that whether a man has knowledge of Brahman or not is to be judged by his own heart's conviction alone.<sup>9</sup> So, if one knows Brahman, he is immediately liberated, though, as he has to experience the fruits of past *karmas*, he is not completely liberated till death. To all outward appearances, a man may continue unchanged even after knowing Brahman; but in fact he is not the same transmigrating individual, because the realization of himself as Brahman, generated by scriptural teaching, is opposed to that.<sup>10</sup> Śankara explains this with the help of examples. A rich man, for whom money is everything, may be

terribly grieved if he is burgled. But the same man would not be grieved if he had lost all love of money, and had taken the life of a monk. Similarly, if a man is fond of having an ear-ring, he would derive pleasure from wearing it ; but once he has got over his fad, he will get no pleasure in wearing ear-rings. Even so, as long as a man thinks his body to be himself, he is subject to misery ; but when he knows from Vedānta that he is Brahman, he sheds his delusion and is freed from misery.<sup>11</sup> If anyone continues to be a transmigratory being, he has not yet realised Brahman ; and the only one to judge whether a person has become a *mukta* or not, is himself. According to Śāṅkara, the beauty of Vedānta is that once Brahman is realised, there is nothing to be sought after or done.<sup>12</sup>

*Sāṅkārā* of Brahman :

Śāṅkara says that yogins *see* the self devoid of all phenomena at the time of their *saṁrādhana*, *saṁrādhana* being the practice of fixing the mind on the self with devotion and meditation. Govindānanda explains *saṁrādhana* as the purification of mind with scriptural teaching.<sup>13</sup> From the fact that it has been said that the self is seen in *saṁrādhana*, it does not follow that there is a difference of the seer and the seen then. Śāṅkara emphasizes that though in meditation (*dhyāna*), Brahman *appears* to be different from the individual self, this difference is due to limiting adjuncts, and is created by false knowledge.<sup>14</sup> When Brahman is known, all duality, such as the distinction of the meditator and the meditated, is destroyed, and, in fact, Brahman is not known until this distinction is at an end ; and what has been put an end to cannot be revived.<sup>15</sup>

To sum up, according to Śāṅkara, *anubhava* is the assured conviction, the clear undoubted awareness that one is Brahman, which is *generated* by *Vedānta Vākya*s.<sup>16</sup> A man, who has realised this is unaffected by agency, pleasure and pain ; he continues to live, but for him his body and the world are dead, as a slough is for a snake.<sup>17</sup> His way of life and behaviour have been described in the *Gītā bhāṣya*.<sup>18</sup> Śāṅkara also says that such a man will have no change of condition after death ; he will only be not connected with another body.<sup>19</sup>



What happens in *Sākṣātkāra*?

The Advaita Vedānta conception of the 'vision' of Brahman (*Brahmadarśanam* or *sākṣātkāra*) is *altogether* different from the 'visions' which medieval European mystics such as Suso and Teresa had.<sup>20</sup> This will be clear if the Advaita psychology of perception is remembered.

According to the Advaita psychology, perception takes place when mind 'takes on' the form of an object. If the perceiving mind and the perceived object are distinct and apart, there can be no perception. To think that there is no relationship, even of 'non-difference', between the two would rob perception of immediacy. Moreover, what other relation could there be, and how is that relation related to the mind and the object? So perception takes place only when mind and an object are present in the same locus. The object (in perception) has no reality other than the percipient.<sup>21</sup> When mind comes into contact with an object through the senses, it goes out through the senses, reaches the object and becomes one with it, either by pervading it (according to Vācaspati's school) or by taking on the same form as that of the object (according to the Vivaraṇa school). Mind is able to assume the form of an object in the same way in which light is able to manifest an object by pervading it and assuming its form, or as melted copper, which has no form of its own, assumes whatever form into which it is cast.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, mind has no form, but assumes whatever form is presented to it by the senses. All perception need not be sense-generated; for perception means direct cognition, and there is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain. This is possible because pleasure or pain is a mental mode, and knowledge of it is also a mental mode. Thus the two are in apposition, and there arises a knowledge of pleasure and pain. The cognition of the self is immediate, because it is always directly in contact with the mind which limits it. So too, the knowledge of Brahman is immediate, because Brahman is not different from oneself and a direct cognition of Brahman is not different from the cognition of oneself, though the erroneous view of self is removed (as in the case of the removal of the 'rope-snake' illusion) by correct apprehension. As Vidyāraṇya said: *anubhava* means a particular mode of the mind, which has for its result the intuition of Brahman.<sup>23</sup>

This is explained by Śāṅkara and Sureśvara by means of an example. When I stand in a row of persons and am told that I am the tenth in the row, I directly apprehend myself as the tenth, because the percipient (myself) and the object of knowledge (the tenth man) are identical, and the mental mode in the form of the object and the object (here the tenth man, i.e. the percipient himself) are in apposition. Similarly, when I, who already have an awareness of myself, am told that I am Brahman, there is identity between the knower and what is to be known. This is direct cognition, which is not at all supernormal, for at all times one has an awareness of oneself.

### *Sākṣātkāra* and Non-Duality :

A critic may raise the following objection : the above theory of Advaita admits that in Brahman-intuition, there is the mental mode in the form of Brahman and Brahman. How is then non-duality established by *sākṣātkāra* ? The Advaita school replies that the mental mode in the form of Brahman (in other words Brahman-knowledge, for knowledge is a mental mode or *antah-karaṇavṛtti*) destroys itself as well as the universe, just as the powder of clearing-nut (*kaṭaka*), when mixed in muddy water, precipitates itself as well as the mud. There are also other instances where a thing annihilates itself as well as other things. Drops of water poured on a red-hot piece of metal *destroy* the heat as well as themselves. The raging prairie-fire extinguishes itself, after burning away all the grass.

### *Brahmajñāna* destroys itself :

The critic may then say that a thing cannot destroy itself ; for example, a pot does not break itself, but needs a blow from a stick to do that. The Advaita replies that this is like arguing that if a blow from a stick is necessary to destroy a pot, a similar blow would be necessary to destroy this mental mode.

The Advaita school has two other alternate explanations to solve this difficulty. (a) Brahman-consciousness associated with the mental mode (of the form of Brahman) negates the universe, including the mental mode. Brahman-consciousness is, no doubt, the ground of all error and illusion, but when associated with the mental mode in the final intuition, it destroys



error and illusion, just as sun's rays do not ordinarily ignite cotton, but do so if focussed through a lens. (b) Brahman-intuition destroys nescience, which is the material cause of the universe. Consequently, the universe including the mental mode, is destroyed. However, if the actions of previous births have begun to bear fruit, a trace of nescience continues even after *sākṣātkāra*.

A critic may still say: Unless there is first of all ignorance of Brahman, there is no sense in talking of the knowledge of Brahman. So it might be said that ignorance is the material cause of Brahman-knowledge. How then can Brahman-knowledge destroy its own material cause? The Advaitin replies that just as a cloth is the material cause of the fire burning it, even so ignorance can be the material cause of Brahman-knowledge, which destroys it.<sup>23a</sup>

By means of these various inadequate similes, the Advaita school wants to make the point that the knowledge derived from *mahāvākyas* is something like the finger which points to an object, but disappears when that object itself is perceived. Once Brahman is revealed in *anubhava*, all multiplicity comes to an end.

## II

### *Scriptural Knowledge Necessary for Anubhava*

A fundamental objection may be raised against the Vedānta contention that Brahman can be known only through the Upaniṣads. It runs thus: Brahman is the Self; and the 'self' is known by everyone as the content of the concept of 'I'; so it is absurd to say that Brahman can be known only from scripture; for if Brahman is the self, it must be evident to everyone.

The Logical Placing of 'Brahman':

Śankara replies to this criticism by saying that Brahman is not the *content* of the concept 'I', but the *witness* of it. The 'I' who is self-evident to each one of us is an agent and a person distinct from other persons. Brahman, on the other hand, is one, immutable and present in all beings.<sup>24</sup> It is not distinct

from others, nor is it an agent at any time. It neither does anything, nor knows anything, for there is nothing besides it. It is pure consciousness. Śankara's argument may be clarified further as follows: Every one knows himself, and knows himself as the doer of certain actions, the enjoyer of happiness or unhappiness, and as an individual standing over against other individuals. But Brahman, as taught in the Upaniṣads, is not this 'self', which is known as 'I' by every one. Brahman is neither a doer nor an enjoyer, nor is it an individual as against other individuals. It is omnipresent (*sarvabhūta-stha—sarvasyātmā*), the Self of all and immutable. No one knows himself as that Self (Brahman). The difference between 'I' and 'thou' is an illusion, the work of the *ahamkāra*, which mistakes the body for the self. Brahman as described in the Upaniṣads is not evident to any one, nor is it capable of being inferred. It can be known only from the Upaniṣads.

Elsewhere Śankara reiterates his argument: The embodied individual soul is known as the doer and enjoyer, and as related to adjuncts such as mind etc., in each body. The Veda does not teach anything about this 'soul'; for it is intended to teach us only about things which are not known otherwise. So it is about God (*Īvara*) only that scripture teaches.<sup>25</sup> Śankara's position is clear. Everyone thinks himself to be an agent and subject to pain and pleasure. Also, each one, identifying oneself with the body, thinks himself to be separate from others. This empirical 'self' need not be made known through the Veda. The Veda tells us about the true Self, Brahman—which is actionless, immutable and the sole reality. It is pure consciousness, and it has no attributes. When the true nature of Brahman is thus known and when one's non-difference from it is known, the highest End is realised. This knowledge can be given by the Vedānta alone.

*Anubhava* not an alternate *pramāṇa* :

Here the critic may point out a difficulty. To know Brahman is to know oneself truly, for there is no difference between Brahman and oneself. Brahman is known when one knows himself as pure consciousness untouched by pain and pleasure, action, inaction, or any other attribute. So to be truly aware of oneself



(one's own nature or form—*svarūpa*) is to know Brahman. Is this not another way of knowing Brahman, besides knowing him from the Upaniṣadic sentences? How is it then justifiable to say that Brahman is known solely from the Upaniṣads?

The Vivaraṇa school replying to this criticism says that it is wrong to say that through knowing oneself (or one's own nature or form) Brahman is known, because that knowledge itself is Brahman. Brahman, however, is not known as a pot or a chair is known; for in empirical knowledge there is the distinction of knower, known and the act of knowing. But in the knowledge of Brahman there is no such distinction. When a pot is known the content of that knowledge is 'pot', and knowledge of the pot means awareness of the pot. So here awareness or consciousness has for its content not itself, but another thing—a pot. But the content of the knowledge generated by the Upaniṣads is Brahman—pure awareness. Knowledge of Brahman is, in other words, awareness of awareness. When true knowledge of oneself arises from the Upaniṣadic sentences, that knowledge (or awareness) itself is Brahman.<sup>26</sup> Knowledge of oneself is not a means of knowing Brahman, because that knowledge itself is Brahman; and true knowledge of oneself arises from the Upaniṣads. The so-called knowledge of oneself, as the content of 'I', which everybody has, is not true knowledge. For, the 'I' is not the true Self. An analogy might help here. It is possible to infer what another man knows. This inferential knowledge has for its content what that man knows. The content of this inferential knowledge and the content of the other man's knowledge are identical, though the two 'knowledges' are not themselves the same. Both of them are independent cognitions and self-illuminating. Still the two have the same content. Similarly the content of the knowledge generated by scripture is identical with the content of the knowledge of oneself, but the former is not dependent upon the latter.<sup>27</sup>

Sureśvara's solution is simpler and straight forward. Raising the question, why the self-luminous and omnipresent Ātman cannot be known directly? Sureśvara replies in the following way: Ātman 'illumines' all that is to be seen, including the mind. But neither senses which can apprehend material things, nor mental modes which can apprehend only the body etc., are

capable of having Ātman as their 'object'. This is so, because Ātman is the eternal 'witness', present both when *pramāṇas* are operating and when they are not operating. Since all *pramāṇas* function by virtue of Ātman's eternal presence and self-luminosity, they can never apprehend it. 'How can the seer be seen' ?<sup>28</sup>

Sureśvara gives a slightly different reply elsewhere. He admits that the Upaniṣadic statements do not give knowledge about anything previously unknown (*na anadhigatādhigamah*); but they only destroy nescience by 'teaching' the *true* nature of Ātman.<sup>29</sup>



## PART TWO

### THE ATTITUDE OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA TOWARDS OTHER *PRAMĀṆAS*

#### CHAPTER I

#### PERCEPTION

Perception not a *pramāṇa* of Brahman :

The Advaita school is of the opinion that Brahman can never be known by sense perception, because having no colour and form, it can never be an object of senses. It is true that the world is the effect of Brahman, but Śankara says that by merely apprehending the effect, we cannot know its cause.<sup>1</sup> The world's cause may as well be atoms or matter. To believe that Brahman could be known either through perception or inference is mere wishful thinking (*manorathamātram*). Like what is 'good' and 'bad', and what 'should be done' and 'should not be done', it can be known from scripture only.<sup>2</sup>

Sureśvara enumerates three reasons for the unknowability of Ātman through *pramāṇas* such as perception: (a) Ātman is the eternal subject, the ever 'non-distant inner self' (*avyavahita pratyak ātmā*). (b) It is an End in itself (*svārtha*) and cannot be experienced by others. (c) It is incapable of being known (*aprameya*), as it has no attributes at all.<sup>3</sup> So it is knowable solely through *Vedānta Vākyas*.<sup>4</sup>

Now it is quite possible that the existence of some things, which are by their nature unperceivable, is known through other sources of knowledge, e.g., atoms, heaven, the power of sacrifices to enable one to attain heaven, etc. But if perceptual experience contradicts the information about such things, such information must be false. Is non-duality in conformity with perceptual experience? Such is the objection raised by the other schools of Hindu philosophy such as the Mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya, etc.

# Perception not Contradictory to *śāstra* :

Śankara's reply is that one *pramāṇa* is never opposed to another ; a *pramāṇa* gives us knowledge about those things that cannot be known by other *pramāṇas*.<sup>5</sup> If two or more *pramāṇas* are capable of giving only one kind of knowledge about the same thing, there is no sense in distinguishing them as two *pramāṇas*. Sureśvara says that two *pramāṇas* cannot be contradictory, if their objects are different ; e.g., the sense of sight which does not hear sounds never contradicts the sense of hearing which hears.<sup>6</sup> According to him only if two *pramāṇas* deal with the same object and are contradictory, they are opposed like ' the mongoose and the rat ' ; but if their object is not the same, then there could be no opposition between them.<sup>6a</sup> Each *pramāṇa* is intrinsically valid, and while *pramāṇas* need no mutual supplementation, there can never be also any mutual contradiction between them.<sup>7</sup>

Śankara says that even by citing a hundred examples it cannot be proved that ' Fire is cold ', or that ' the sun is cold ' ; and scripture is not meant for distorting facts.<sup>8</sup> *Śāstra* never seeks to produce anything new, i.e., it never misrepresents facts. What scripture does is to give information about things unknown through other means.<sup>9</sup> Śankara says that even if it is reiterated by a hundred scriptural texts, ' Fire is cold ' does not become true ; for *śāstra* is not a valid source of knowledge in matters that fall within perceptual experience. Even if *śāstra* anywhere makes statements such as ' Fire is cold ', it must be supposed (*kalpyam*) that it has a meaning other than the obvious one, because (Śankara says) scripture has no true authority regarding empirical objects ; its meaning lies only in the cognition of unseen things.<sup>10</sup>

The Advaita teachers, following the Mimāṃsā school, accept that in the case of texts such as ' The sacrificer is a stone ', or ' The sacrificial post is the sun ', the literal meaning is not to be taken into account, because in these cases, which contradict sense-experience, there is no reference to non-empirical matters, on which alone *śāstra* is the authority.<sup>11</sup> Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says that these statements cannot set aside sense-perception, because the latter is fully tested and corroborated by other sources of knowledge, while they themselves are subsidiary to other



sentences and do not fulfil any useful purpose by themselves. So they have to be taken in their implied and secondary sense.<sup>12</sup>

Now, Śankara argues that as the authority of the Veda is acknowledged in supersensuous matters, and as Ātman is supersensuous, the knowledge which the Veda gives about it must be true; and (as already shown) as Brahman-sentences are not subsidiary to any other sentences, they are a *pramāṇa*. Further, Śankara maintains that the *Vedānta Vākyas* are not opposed to facts.<sup>13</sup>

Perception not opposed to Ātman's not having Happiness or Unhappiness :

The Advaita Vedānta holds that scripture teaches that the *jīva* (individual) is in reality free from all limitations such as unhappiness<sup>14</sup> etc. Is this in accordance with perceptual experience? Śankara replies that there is no conflict between scriptural teaching and perception on this point. He says that the object of perceptual experience is the apparent self, i.e. the self in association with its limiting adjunct (mind). In a cognition of the form 'I am happy' or 'I am miserable', the self is found to be an object, because the sentences actually mean 'I know *myself* to be happy' etc. Now scripture tells us that the real self can never be an object; for it can never be known.<sup>15</sup> So what is known as 'happy' or 'miserable' can only be the reflection of the self in the limiting adjunct. In perception of the type 'I am this', the subject is only metaphorically spoken of as co-ordinate with the body (the object), to which only are related attributes such as happiness or misery. While it is of the real self that scripture speaks, perception has for its object only the apparent self. Śankara thinks that it is logical not to attribute misery etc., to the self, because as misery etc., are objects of perception, while the self is not, we cannot *perceive* whether the self is affected by misery etc., or not.<sup>16</sup>

Sureśvara has explained this further in the following way: That which is apprehended by scripture is different from that which is apprehended by perception; so there is no contradiction between the two.<sup>17</sup> The Upaniṣadic statements are about the inner self (*pratyak ātman*), while perception is of external things.<sup>18</sup> Sureśvara argues that it can never be known by perception whether

the Ātman is happy or unhappy ; because even if happiness and unhappiness are attributes of Ātman (as the opponent says), since the substratum (Ātman) itself is not grasped by any *pramāṇa*, its attributes also share the same fate. Without the essential form (*svarūpa*) of a thing (the qualified) being known, its qualities (*dharma*) cannot be cognised. As the opponent of Advaita also must admit that the *svarūpa* of Ātman is not known by any *pramāṇa*, it follows that none of its qualities also can be known ; but in fact it has no qualities. Sureśvara says that in all knowledge obtained through *pramāṇas*, the knowledge (i.e. the mental mode) can only adumbrate the object and manifest it and not the subject (consciousness limited by the mind). For example, in ' I am knowing a pot ', the object is manifested as a ' pot ', and not the subject ; otherwise the latter would become an object.<sup>19</sup>

Sureśvara then argues that even if it is admitted that Ātman is cognised as miserable or happy, that knowledge must be sublated by the knowledge generated by Upaniṣadic texts for the following reasons : (1) Vedānta sentences, not being statements of any person, *always* state the truth. (2) In sleep Ātman is experienced to be devoid of misery etc. (3) It is found that perception does not always give valid knowledge, e.g., the perception of nacre as silver. (4) The *perception* of Ātman as miserable is based on the supposition that Ātman can be miserable, and as suppositions are merely based on man's whims, they have no certainty. (5) Perception etc., can apprehend only external objects, while Ātman is the inner subject. (6) That Ātman has no misery is testified in sleep, when perception is not operative ; and surely inward testimony ought to be stronger than outward (*bahirmukha*) *pramāṇas*.<sup>20</sup>

Sureśvara says that all these arguments have been put forward only to show that even if the objector's contention (that in perception it is cognised that Ātman is miserable) is granted, scripture ought to sublate perception and not *vice versa*.<sup>21</sup> But, in fact, Sureśvara concludes, it is not possible that there is even ' the scent of contradiction ' between Vedānta and perception, for one *pramāṇa* is never opposed to another.<sup>22</sup>



## Is Perception opposed to Non-Duality?

Now we come to the consideration of scriptural texts such as 'Brahman is One only without a second' and 'Here there is no multiplicity whatever'. Is there no conflict between these texts and perception? for perception does cognise 'multiplicity' and 'difference'.

To this the Advaita school replies in the following way: The Real is that which is eternally immutable, while the unreal is that which is absolutely non-existent (e.g. a hare's horn). All people will agree that in this sense Reality is never perceived by the senses;<sup>23</sup> what sense perception apprehends is only the practically real. The empirical validity of perception is not denied by Vedānta; but it only says that when non-duality is realized, empirical perception is sublated; just as the mistaken cognition of silver in nacre is sublated by the correct apprehension of nacre. Thus only the absolute validity of perception is annulled by Vedānta. *Vedānta Vākyas* are infallible, because they are *apauruṣeya*; so they are self-evident and absolutely valid (*tāttvika-pramāṇa*). Hence they relegate the validity of perception to the empirical domain.<sup>24</sup>

The Advaita school holds that the validity of sense perception is not fully established, because: (1) in some cases it is sublated by itself (e.g. perception of a 'rope-snake' as a rope), (2) the scriptural text 'Indra (God) through his *māyā* became many' implies that all knowledge of duality is generated by *māyā* (the power of illusion) and (3) inference contradicts it in some cases (e.g., the perception from below of cows grazing on a mountain as very small is contradicted).<sup>25</sup> Though we know that duality is an illusion from scripture, it is true like a dream, insofar as it concurs with empirical experience. Further, Vedānta contradicts only the *absolute* reality of 'difference' which is perceived, and not its empirical validity. Even though the knowledge of non-duality is generated by scripture which is itself a product of illusion, that knowledge is not an illusion like the 'nacre-silver' illusion; because while the appearance of 'silver' is sublated as soon as the true nature of nacre is perceived, knowledge of non-duality is not sublated at any time, and is hence true.<sup>26</sup>

*Śabda pramāṇa*, Madhusūdana says, is, no doubt, based on sense perception, but not on its absolute reality. One may have an illusion of smoke and infer therefrom fire, and fire may really be there; this shows that a perception which leads to a valid inference need not itself be essentially real. The cognition 'This is not silver, but nacre', is based on the prior cognition 'This is silver'; so this prior cognition is in fact the basis of the later cognition, but is nevertheless false. Similarly, the Advaitin argues, sense perception on which *śabda pramāṇa* is based may be false, but this does not rob the latter of validity.<sup>27</sup> We may sum up by saying that the Advaita regards that there is no contradiction between perception and the Upaniṣadic texts, as their fields are different, the field of the former being the practical everyday world, and that of the latter absolute reality.

Śankara's own solution :

It would be instructive to see what the great master Śankara himself said on this point. He states the objection to the Advaita position thus : Objects such as sound, which are apprehended by the ear and so forth, are observed to be different from one another. So those who hold that Brahman is the one and only reality contradict perception. Śankara quibbles thus in reply : If the variety of sound and the rest does not contradict the oneness of ether, they need not contradict even the Advaita position. Śankara raises another objection: If Brahman is the only reality, who receives the teaching and who gives it? He replies that when the transcendent Brahman is realised as the only reality, there is neither teaching, nor taught; and then the Upaniṣads are also useless. But till then teaching is useful, and even before there were not many 'selves'. If you say (so Śankara argues) that you can infer a plurality of selves, who are 'you'? If teaching implies activity and if all activity implies difference (as the opponents aver), then even inference, which is an activity, depends on difference, and 'you', who infer a plurality of selves, must yourself be multiple. 'You' as such can never infer, but 'you' as associated with body, senses and mind can infer; and these are only limiting adjuncts as a jar and bowl are of ether. Difference due to limiting adjuncts cannot disprove that the self is one; and as the self cannot be seen or inferred, natural difference is



out of question. All this proves, Śankara concludes, that it is difficult to talk about the self logically. He says : ' The oneness of Brahman is a secure fort unassailable by logicians, those first-rate heretics and liars, and inaccessible to dullards and to those who are devoid of the grace of the scriptures and the teacher. This we know from the texts of the Veda and *Smṛti* : ' Who but me can know that Deity who has both happiness and the absence of it ? ' ' Even the gods were puzzled over this in ancient times. ' <sup>28</sup>

### Perception and Identity of *jīva* and Brahman :

Śankara says that perception is not also opposed to the teaching ' That Thou art ', because there can be no contact between the sense of sight (i.e. mind euphemistically called so) and Ātman. A critic may say that since to everyone it *seems* (*bhāsate*) ' I am different from God ', ' difference from God ' is a quality of the *jīva*, with which it can be conceived that the sense of sight is in contact. Śankara replies that this assumes too much, because in that case if it *seems*, e.g., that a pot is not in the other room, then as the ' absence of pot ' is a quality of the floor in the other room, it may be said that ' absence of pot ' is perceived, which is absurd. The critic may then say that since mind and Ātman are both substances, there can be conjunction between the two. Śankara says that whether Ātman is all-pervading or atomic, it can have no conjunction with mind in either case, because only things which have parts can enter into conjunction with each other ; and Ātman has no parts. To say that mind is a sense is only an euphemism ; it, in fact, only helps the senses, just as a lamp enables the eye to see. The critic may then say that even if difference between *jīva* and Brahman is not sense-cognised, it can be of the form of a witnessing awareness (i.e. self-evidence—*sākṣi svarūpa*). Śankara admits this, but says that this ' seeming ' or appearance (*dyotana*) of difference, caused by nescience, is between Brahman and *jīva*, as endowed with the adjuncts of *māyā*, while non-difference, taught by scripture, exists between them, when they are taken as in themselves, devoid of adjuncts. So there is no mutual contradiction. Lastly, Śankara says that even if for the sake of argument it is admitted that there is opposition between perception and scripture, since

perception precedes scriptural teaching, because of the principle of *apaṇcheda nyāya* (explained in a previous chapter), the earlier (i.e. perception) must be sublated by the later (*Vedānta Vākya*).<sup>28\*</sup>

*Brahmajñāna* and perception :

The Advaita teachers admit that a man, who has realized the oneness of Brahman and his identity with it does still behold multiplicity, just as a man suffering from *timira roga* (a peculiar eye disease) *sees* two moons, though he *knows* that there is only one. Until all *karmas* are completely destroyed by death, false perception of multiplicity persists because of them. Knowledge acquired from *mahāvākyas* does not *abolish* the perception of the manifold world, but only *sublates* it ; just as even a man who *knows* that the sun stands still while the earth goes round it, *sees* the sun rising in the east, moving across the sky and setting in the west and the earth unmoving. The perception of the manifold world does not disturb the assurance of a Brahman-knower, because he does not *believe* (*na śradhatte*) in it, thinking it to be false, just as one does not believe sugar to be bitter, even though it tastes bitter, and one spits it out, while in bilious fever.<sup>29</sup>

Some other views :

On this problem of the relation between perception and scriptural teaching of non-duality, some other ingenious views have been expressed by Advaita thinkers, which may be summarised as follows :

(i) A right source of knowledge is that which makes an unknown thing known. The material objects of the world are directly known, so they need not be made evident. But Brahman is unknown ; and so scripture, which makes it known, is a right source of knowledge ; while perception, which has for its content what is not hidden, i.e. material objects, is not a source of knowledge at all. So perception can never sublate scripture, though they appear to be mutually contradictory.

(ii) What is denied by the Vedānta is only the reality of things such as a pot, a table, etc. It is not denied that these are pots or tables, nor that they have mutual relations with other things and classes ; for so long as Brahman is not known as the real, they are perceived as real. But as soon as there is knowledge of Brahman, they are sublated.



(iii) Scriptural knowledge is subsequent to perceptual experience, and cannot arise without sublating the former ; even as the cognition of nacre does not take place unless the prior appearance of silver is sublated (*apaçcheda nyāya*). Both cannot be equally valid, for the latter cognition arises only when the former is sublated ; and the first cognition cannot be valid because it is sublated by the later one, while the later one is not so sublated.

(iv) Perception is not opposed to the knowledge of non-duality, because perception never apprehends difference. Difference cannot be perceived, unless perception has for its content what is perceived as well as its difference from everything else. Unless a thing is distinguished from everything else, its uniqueness cannot be apprehended. The apprehension of a thing and its distinction from everything else are not simultaneous, because 'everything else' cannot be immediately grasped in any way. If it is said that an object is first perceived and then everything else is negated from it, more than one perception is involved ; and a number of perceptions cannot grasp the difference of a thing from everything else. Inference which is based on perception can be of no help, when perception itself is useless. So the difference of each thing from everything else, i.e. its uniqueness, is just imagination, is indeed wrong, and has the same status as an illusion. Perception, which never apprehends difference and grasps only pure being, is in fact favourable to the scriptural statements of non-duality.<sup>30</sup>

How does Scripture deny multiplicity ?

A critic may say : Scripture teaches the illusoriness of difference, while it itself depends upon the perception of difference between words, letters, etc. Is this not a self-contradiction ? The Vedānta replies that scriptural texts about illusoriness deny only the reality of letters and words, and not their empirical existence in their own form (*svarūpāmśa*).

But, a critic may now say, there are other important Upaniṣadic texts, such as 'There is no multiplicity here', which deny even that existence. If they do not deny it, what else do they deny ? And if they deny it, are they not in conflict with perception, and are they not self-contradictory inasmuch as

they are based on perception? Four attempts to meet this difficulty have been mentioned by Appayya Dīkṣita :

(i) Even though letters and words are not real, they can give right knowledge, just as the sentence 'bring the bull', though misheard as 'bring the bullock', can give valid knowledge. To give us valid knowledge through words, only that amount of perception is needed which is common to both right knowledge and illusion. So even if the empirical existence of words is denied, there is no difficulty.

(ii) The existence of the world for all practical purposes is accepted till knowledge of Brahman arises, and this existence of the world is not unreal like a hare's horn. The world continues to exist till Brahman is realised, just as the non-existence of silver in nacre is compatible with its illusory existence, until the latter is sublated by the correct apprehension of nacre; and till then this appearance of silver is not unreal like a hare's horn.

(iii) The content of perception is not the reality of the world, but its apparent reality. Reality of the world is denied by *Vedānta vākyas*, because it appears to be present in the world. Statements like 'This is not silver, but that is', 'this is not my cow, but that is' deny something, but assert that what is denied exists somewhere else. So also the reality of the world is denied, because it appears to be present, and what is denied in the world (i.e. reality) is asserted to be somewhere else. The *apparent* reality of the world and hence of letters, words, and their distinctions on which scripture is based, is not denied; so negation of their *absolute* reality is intelligible.

(iv) Some thinkers do not mix distinctions in reality—absolute, empirical and illusory existences. As the world is non-different from its substratum—Brahman, Brahman's reality is wrongly attributed to the world. So there is no authority for assuming an appearance of reality. The cognition of reality in the world is due to not distinguishing it from Brahman, with which the world is identified. The silver perceived in nacre is said to be only an appearance of silver, because there is no silver within the field of vision, and what is not within the reach of the senses is not perceived. There is an appearance of reality in the world, because Brahman's reality interpenetrates everything and what we perceive is that, though we do not distinguish



Brahman as such from the world. So when the reality of the world is negated, there is no conflict with perception, for perception never apprehends the world's reality, but only Brahman's reality.<sup>31</sup>

Advaita Dialectic establishes that Perception does not prove 'Difference':

We may close this topic by mentioning what Śrī Harṣa, the most important dialectician of the Advaita school, has said. He says that Vedānta texts have for their subject all things in general, while perception and inference are always of particular things. On the basis of perception and inference a general proposition like 'There is duality' cannot be established. So Vedānta texts which assert the oneness of all things cannot be sublated by perception.

In every act of perception, a difference of the cogniser from the object is not cognised; in other words, perception is never in the form 'I see myself as different from the pot'. Perception does not apprehend the difference of one cognition from another; for there is no specific awareness that 'my cognition of the jar is different from that of the cloth'. Nor has perception anything to say about the difference or non-difference of a cognition and its object. If there is no difference (i) between cognitions and their objects and (ii) between one cognition and another, then Harṣa says that we must presume (*arthāpatti*) that the objects of cognitions are also not different from one another. Thus, presumption, based on an analysis of perception, supports non-duality as taught by Vedānta. Moreover, the idea of 'difference', derived from particular perceptive acts, can never sublate the knowledge of universal oneness derived from Vedānta, for Vedānta, which says that the cogniser is not different from the cognised, is not in any way harmed by perception, which also finds no such difference. As for the Vedānta thesis that all things are non-different from each other, it is strongly supported by the justifiable presumption that since cognitions do not differ from each other, their objects also do not differ. Śrī Harṣa admits that difference is immediately experienced, but says that it cannot refute Advaita because (a) Vedānta texts cast doubt on

empirical experience, and (b) empirical experience can be explained as caused by nescience. As the scriptural texts clearly and emphatically maintain absolute unity, they do not admit of any other explanation.

The proposition 'all things are different' means either that all things are different from something, or that they are different from all things. In the former case, Vedānta has no objection, because all unreal things are different from Brahman, the reality. As for the second meaning, it is absurd. This universal proposition cannot be demonstrated, because as the minor term includes everything, there can be no middle term. Śrī Harṣa agrees that there is a rooted idea that there is difference in the world; but he says that there is no guarantee of this being a true idea, since many of our ideas are false. The truth of an idea is established if it is intrinsically valid, and unsublated by another cognition. The idea of difference is not intrinsically valid and is contradicted by scripture.

The protagonist of Advaita Vedānta also carries on the discussion taking for granted empirical thought, speech and action which imply diversity; but he never takes this diversity to be real. As he holds that there is no difference at all, it is futile to point out any contradiction in his position, since the arguments advanced against him cannot be proved to be different from what they are intended to refute.

The final weakness of pluralistic realism, according to Harṣa, is that it cannot give any logical definition of 'difference'. Does 'difference' constitute the nature of a thing? If so, difference from what? For difference is always a difference *from* something. In that case nothing would have a distinct individuality, since the difference that constitutes the nature of a thing implies some other thing. For example, to say that a chair is an individual thing, would mean that a chair is different from a table and the chair's difference can never be defined without implying the existence of other things. Again, if the difference from other things enters into the chair's constitution, those things also enter into it in some way. Thus there is 'non-difference' between it and the other things.

If difference is a relation depending upon the very nature of the things related, that (says Harṣa) would mean that A's



nature is constituted by its being related to B, while C's nature is constituted by its being related to B. If the relation is the same in both the cases, since this relation enters into the very texture of things, the things themselves are not different from one another.

Harṣa contends that a definition of difference as 'reciprocal negation' would be subject to the above difficulties, in addition to the presupposition of 'mutual identity'. To say that difference of things consists in their having different attributes is to postpone the difficulty; for in what does 'difference of attributes' consist? Moreover, no two things differ from each other entirely, but only in some particular respects. Thus one chair differs from another in some particular respects only, so it must be first shown how the particularity or individuality of a thing differs from the general or universal aspects of all things. 'Difference' is thus an unintelligible concept, logically indefinable, and so (Harṣa says) cannot be real. It must, however, be remembered that it is not denied that difference is experienced. Its absolute reality alone is denied, because it is indefinable.<sup>32</sup>

Since only the absolute reality of difference or diversity is denied, and its illusory existence is allowed, that (according to Harṣa) is enough to account for the causal relation between the notions of difference and diversity and the Vedāntic declarations based on them.<sup>33</sup>

A critic may urge that since the Vedānta texts which deny duality presuppose it even while denying, they are contradictory. Śrī Harṣa replies that scriptural texts teach non-duality to be absolute, and as cognition of difference is not absolutely real it cannot sublate the former. The two cognitions do not belong to the same order. In admitted contradictions such as 'the fire is cold', what is asserted is contradicted by immediate experience, and the assertion as well as subsequent experience are both based on apparent reality; so one can sublate the other. 'As refutation of non-duality,' he says, 'can only be based on diversity and hence cannot be real (diversity itself being illusory only), there is no possibility whatever of non-duality ever being shown to be unreal.'<sup>34</sup> And even if the concept of 'non-duality' is illusory, yet since its content—non-duality itself—is not illusory, the conception is irrefutable. In fact, there can be no

knowledge of non-duality, for what is non-dual is awareness (*vijnāna*); and there can be no awareness of awareness. It is only from the empirical standpoint that Vedānta can be said to give us knowledge of non-duality. In whatever way oneness is defined, either as absence of diversity or numerical oneness or the essential nature of knowledge, possession of an attribute will be a contradiction of non-duality. So Śrī Harṣa says that the conception 'non-duality is an attribute' is an illusion. Still the substratum of that attribute (viz. consciousness) remains unsublated. When the conception of 'nacre-silver is sublated by the conception of nacre, what is sublated is the attribute of 'silverness' and not the real nacre. In the same way, when the illusory conception of the attribute of 'non-duality' vanishes, there manifests the one pure consciousness.<sup>35</sup>



## CHAPTER II

### YOGIC INTUITION

#### Conception of Yogic perception :

Some of the Hindu schools of philosophy maintain that it is possible to have a *visio Dei*, through the practice of Yoga. Through the control of the fluctuations of mind and continuous practice of concentration, the Yoga school thinks that it is possible to *master* anything from the smallest atom to a thing of the greatest magnitude, i.e. the mind can grasp anything unimpeded.<sup>1</sup> According to the Yoga school, everything is made up of the three elements—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. (See page 220.) When by leading a pure life of meditation and concentration, the *rajas* and *tamas* are kept in abeyance, the defect of obscuration (*āvaraṇa doṣa*) is removed, and due to the preponderance of *sattva*, mind attains a pellucid clarity and becomes like light. The Yogin then gains undisturbed calm (*adhyātma prasāda*), and when he is in that state he obtains an insight (*prajñā*) which is always true. A man endowed with that insight sees anything he wants as it is in itself. In that insight there is not even a trace of misconception (*viparyaya*) and the insight does not operate according to the usual processes of sense perception. The Yoga school says that this insight is different from the insight generated by scriptural and inferential knowledge.

This is capable of having as its object even subtle (e.g., atoms), hidden (e.g., things not visible as when separated by a wall) and remote things (e.g. things miles away or in the past or future);<sup>2</sup> and it destroys mental 'hindrances' (*kleśas*) such as nescience etc.<sup>3</sup>

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools also admit the existence of such an insight, which is called *Yogi-pratyakṣa* or yogic perception. These schools say that such a perception is a quality (*dharma*) of the mind arising from the practice of Yoga, and that he who has attained concentration can always, through his mind enabled by this 'quality', have knowledge of everything including merit, demerit, ether, atoms, etc.<sup>4</sup>

Praśastapāda, an author of the Vaiśeṣika school mentions another kind of knowledge—*ārṣa jñāna*. It is the knowledge of the seers, the promulgators of scriptural tradition (*āmnāya-vidhātā*), which is generated by the contact of Ātman and mind, and by a peculiar quality. It is of the nature of intuition (*prātibha*), and the divine sages have it in its perfection. But (Praśastapāda says) sometimes even ordinary people have it, e.g., when a girl says, 'My heart tells me that to-morrow my brother will come', and it happens so.<sup>5</sup> By *ārṣa jñāna* the sages know the past, present and future, and also *supersensuous things* such as merit and demerit etc.

Yogic Intuition cannot apprehend Brahman :

The Advaita Vedānta rejects Yogic-intuition as a *pramāṇa* of Brahman. Śankara emphatically asserts that in the case of supersensuous things the Veda *alone* is the source of knowledge.<sup>6</sup> The path of Yoga independent of the Veda can never lead to the ultimate End.<sup>7</sup> The Veda itself has clearly stated that 'He who does not know the Veda does not know Brahman.'<sup>8</sup> Śankara admits that extraordinary powers like *aṇimā* (power of reducing the body to an infinitesimal size) can be obtained by Yoga;<sup>9</sup> but he denies the capacity of the Yogic practices to vouchsafe the knowledge of the oneness of the Self, which can be had from the *Vedānta Vākyas* alone and which alone can lead to liberation.<sup>10</sup> Once Brahman is known, nothing else is needed, for knowledge of Brahman results in immediate liberation. So, Śankara says, control of mind or concentration, which is the principal method of the Yoga school, will not be necessary once Brahman is known. Further, according to him the Upaniṣads nowhere mention this as a means of the supreme end.<sup>11</sup> But Śankara grants that Yoga can be a proximate means to right knowledge,<sup>12</sup> because it helps to still the wayward and fleeting mind and enables one to understand the meaning of the *mahāvākyas*.

Yoga not necessary :

In the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā bhāṣya*, Śankara has explained why Yogic practice cannot be compatible with Advaita. Yoga, Patanjali defines, is the control of the mental modes. Śankara



says that those who regard Brahman alone as the Reality, and mind, senses etc., as superimpositions like a 'rope-snake', have already attained liberation; and for them the question of controlling the mind does not arise at all. Only Yogins, who are devoid of the true knowledge of Ātman and think that mind is a real entity apart from and related to Ātman, have to control the mind for obtaining knowledge of Ātman and liberation.<sup>13</sup>

Madhusūdana has clarified Śankara's position further. He says that according to the Advaita the world is false, and consequently what is witnessed to by the Self is also false. In fact what is called the witnessing of the Self is a mere superimposition on the self and not real. The witnessing self is the only absolute reality, and there is nothing else except that. Deliberation (*viçāra*) over this is the only way of destroying the mind, which is nothing but nescience. Madhusūdana says that Śankara *nowhere* admitted the need of Yoga for Brahman-knowers.<sup>14</sup> So for the purpose of directly intuiting Brahman, the followers of the Upaniṣads go to a teacher, and under his direction engage themselves in the discussion of the Upaniṣadic statements. According to Madhusūdana this purpose is not served otherwise. The Vedāntins never engage themselves in Yoga, because they hold that the defects of the mind are removed *only* by deliberation and discussion.<sup>15</sup>

Supersensual things not apprehended by Yogic Intuition :

Both the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmatī schools clearly deny the possibility of perceiving supersensual things through Yoga. Confirming what Vācaspati said in the *Nyāya Kaṇikā*, Amalānanda says that the 'capacity of Yoga' is limited only to those things, which could become the objects of senses for all men.<sup>16</sup> Prakāśātman says that things, which cannot be apprehended by us, cannot be apprehended by others also, for their sense-organs also are similar to ours. No doubt by Yogic practice one's senses may become sharpened, but even then only things perceptible by the senses are perceived in a more 'excellent' way. Prakāśātman gives the example of a cat's vision. A cat is able to see in darkness much that we do not see; still what it sees is not supersensual. Similarly Yogins may be able to see much that

we miss ; but it is impossible for them to ' see ' Brahman and *dharma*, which could be known only from the Veda. Prakāśātman says that even in the case of the ' divine eye ', which is said to have been granted by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna, only sensible things are perceived in a more ' excellent ' way.<sup>17</sup>

Acquirement of *Siddhis*, dependent on the Veda :

Elsewhere Śankara takes a somewhat different attitude. He concedes that *Siddhas*, i.e. holy men endowed with extraordinary powers, may have ' unimpeded knowledge ' (*apratihata jñāna*) ; but in his opinion extraordinary powers are the results of the performance of *dharma*. As *dharma* can be known from the Vedic injunctions only, extraordinary powers, which are dependent on the due performance of *dharma*, cannot be attained independently of the Veda. ' Unimpeded knowledge ' is therefore dependent on adhering to scriptural commands ; and the criterion for judging the statements of any person, even though they are alleged to be based on his ' unimpeded knowledge ', is their conformity with scriptural teaching.<sup>18</sup> Govindānanda says that it is a mistake to argue that the extraordinary powers of *siddhas* are natural and not derived from a faithful following of scriptural teaching, because extraordinary powers and perfection are not ' natural ' in anybody other than God.<sup>19</sup> Vācaspati says that even if some one is seen to possess extraordinary powers from his very birth, this is due to his performance of *dharma* in accordance with scripture in a previous birth.<sup>20</sup> Another point urged by Śankara is that since there are many *siddhas*, and since their intuitions are mutually contradictory, except the Veda there is no other decisive source of knowledge regarding Brahman.<sup>21</sup>

To conclude : according to the Advaita Vedānta, the Veda is the only source and criterion of Brahman-intuition. Śankara or his followers nowhere claim to base Advaita on the personal experience of themselves or others. An aspirant of liberation should mould his experience in accordance with the *mahāvākyas* by patiently weeding out all ideas contrary to the great truth ' That Thou art '. Not even the gods can intuit Brahman without having first known it from the Upaniṣads. The Advaitins



however, concede that it is possible for some to acquire the intuition of Brahman without hearing the scriptural sentences in this life, *if* they had heard them in a previous life.<sup>22</sup> Brahman-intuition is, therefore, not to be won through Yoga, the latter being at most a preparation for it.\*

\* In minor works such as '*Pañīkaraṇa*', reputed to be Śaṅkara's, the term '*Samādhi*' is used in the sense of the unshakable conviction 'I am Brahman', gained through the teaching of a preceptor, hearing of the Upaniṣads etc. just as '*bhakti*' is used in the sense of 'inquiry into one's own nature' (*svavarūpānusandhāna*).

## CHAPTER III

### REASON

#### I

#### *Inference*

Inference, an empirical *pramāṇa* :

Along with other Hindu schools of thought the Advaita Vedānta accepts inference (*anumāna*) as a *pramāṇa*. According to this school inferential knowledge is generated by the knowledge of the invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between the thing to be inferred (*sādhya*) and the reason or ground from which we infer (*hetu*). When there is a knowledge of an attribute of the minor term as for instance, 'This mountain is smoky', along with an awakening of the memory of past experience in the form 'smoke is always related to fire', then there results inferential knowledge in the form 'This mountain is fiery'.<sup>1</sup> Inferential knowledge of this sort is certain and valid, and results *only* from the knowledge of *vyāpti*.<sup>2</sup>

Inference, not a *pramāṇa* of Brahman :

The Advaita school maintains that *anumāna* is not a *pramāṇa* in the case of Brahman. As Brahman has no colour or shape, it can have no differentiating mark (*linga*) and as it is devoid of all internal variety and external relations, it has no *hetu*, with which it could have *vyāpti*. So it is impossible to infer the existence of Brahman.

The Advaita school criticizes the theological proofs formulated by the Nyāya and the Yoga schools and dismisses them as mere 'proofs'.

Criticism of the proofs for God's existence :

The Nyāya school gives the following proofs for God's existence: All produced things have a maker, who knows about their material cause, and the mode and end of their production.



For example, a pot has a maker—the potter—who knows all about clay, how to make it into a pot, and the purpose of a pot. Now the earth, mountains, trees etc., are ‘produced things’, because they are made up of parts, and unconscious constituents cannot of themselves shape themselves into aggregates. So the earth, mountains, trees etc., must have a maker; and that is God.

Amalānanda and Appayya Dikṣita admit that the existence of ‘the world’s cause’ can be inferred; but they argue that it cannot be established that there is *only* one such cause. Just as a palace is constructed by many intelligent beings, why cannot we suppose that the world has many authors?

The followers of the Nyāya school reply that the principle of parsimony obliges us to infer one such author only; because (they say) wherever there is scope for the consideration whether we should admit a single principle or a multiplicity of principles, all logicians are unanimous that the former course should be followed.

Appayya Dikṣita replies that the principle of parsimony cannot clinch this issue, because parsimony of supposition is not an independent *pramāṇa*. The principle of parsimony cannot establish that the world has only one author, because in experience we see that many wonderful and complex things like palaces are made by the co-operative effort of several persons. In the face of this evidence, it is not parsimonious to suppose that the world has only a single cause and that this cause is omniscient and omnipotent. Amalānanda concedes that when the existence of the cause of the world is inferred, and when a doubt arises whether it is one or many, parsimony of supposition makes it strongly probable that there is only one such cause; but there can be no certainty. But Appayya Dikṣita does not concede that. He says that there is no parsimony in supposing that there is only one author, because single authorship means authorship qualified by the absence of multiple authorship. But this is not a simpler supposition than the alternative one, and the so-called parsimony, which to secure simplicity makes the content of the inference elaborate and clumsy, is not really helpful to that inference. So, (Appayya says) since this argument based on parsimony (*lāghava tarka*) cannot independently prove that there is only one maker of the world, and cannot also be an auxiliary to the inference, it only serves to lend strong support to the first alternative when doubt arises

whether the world was made by one person or many. Moreover, as this can never make it certain that there is only one such person, the other alternative is never ruled out. In fact, Appayya believes, it is much simpler to assume that a number of persons collaborating together have constructed this world, as in the case of cities, palaces, temples etc., which are the results of the co-operative endeavour of many. Though the Naiyāyika can still ask, What singleness of purpose could have made such a co-operative effort possible in the case of the world? it is clear that the existence of God is not demonstrated.<sup>3</sup>

There is a second Nyāya argument which runs thus : Actions by themselves cannot bring forth fruits, since nothing unconscious can by itself be efficient. So there must be an intelligent person, who distributes happiness or unhappiness to everyone in proportion to his virtue or vice. The Advaita school remarks that bestowal of happiness and unhappiness in proportion to virtue and vice might be done even by a plurality of gods. The argument cannot be a proof for the existence of God.

The Yoga school gives the following proof for the existence of God. Whatever admits of degrees must have a maximum ; and so knowledge must also reach its limit in some one ; and that person in whom knowledge reaches its uppermost limit is omniscient. Such an omniscient person is God.

The Advaita school comments that this argument does not prove that there is only a single being in whom maximum knowledge is found. There might be a number of deities, who possess knowledge, glory, power etc., to an equally great degree. And why should not the same middle term be used to infer that bulk, hatred, pain etc., are also found to the greatest possible degree in some being ? Further, God is more than an omniscient being, and it can never be proved that wisdom, glory, power etc., are also found in the highest degree in the omniscient person.<sup>4</sup>

Theological arguments no proofs, but *Yuktis* :

The Advaita Vedānta holds that while the above arguments of the Nyāya and the Yoga schools cannot be inferences, they may be considered as *Yuktis*. An argument which gives certain knowledge is inference ; while an argument which shows that something is probable is *yukti*. By means of an analogy *yukti*



shows that there is apparently a relation between two things, because otherwise we cannot explain one of them. *Yukti* can only produce in us a belief in the probability of a thing. Rāmānanda gives an example : Since there is fire there, there is smoke. This is *yukti* because what is said is quite probable, but not certain. In a red-hot iron ball there is fire, but no smoke. The various arguments advanced as inferences for God's existence are only *yuktis*. They show that it is probable that God is; but they cannot *prove* that God is.<sup>5</sup>

Sureśvara has explained the function of reasoning in the Vedānta in the following way: Mere inference can never establish the existence and nature of Brahman; hence it can never lead to the desired end, i.e., *mokṣa*; but on the contrary it leads to undesirable consequences. Having taken inference alone as their sole guide and rejecting the Veda, the Buddhists (Sureśvara says) were led to the conclusion that there is no Ātman, and were thus deluded.<sup>6</sup> The conclusion is that arguments can only strengthen the teaching of the Upaniṣads; independently of scripture they cannot give inferential knowledge about Brahman.<sup>7</sup>

### Criticism of Rational Theology :

Though the Advaita Vedānta accepts the principle that ' whatever is an effect has a cause ', and that the world is an effect, it says that it can never be established that Brahman is that cause. We cannot establish that all effects are produced out of Brahman, because having never perceived Brahman we cannot be sure that a particular effect is related to Brahman.<sup>8</sup>

The Advaita develops a critique of rational theology in the following way. Those who wish to have a theology based exclusively on reason must be prepared to answer all criticisms rationally. But this, the Advaita says, they cannot do. They have no satisfactory answer as to why there is so much misery and inequality in the world. The blame for this cannot be thrown on the actions of living beings done in previous births. If it is said that God creates the world taking the fruits of actions of individuals into account, it may be asked : how can the fruits of actions, which are unintelligent, move God to create in a particular way? And why did omnipotent God allow his creatures to do bad actions at all, even in previous births? for, after all, he is the

supreme efficient cause (*pravartaka*) of all action. The beginninglessness of the world cannot be invoked to explain this difficulty ; because however far back we may push this, the defect of reciprocal dependence (i.e. that God acts in accordance with *karmas* and that these are productive of results when moved by God) is not removed.

All activity is admitted to be purposive, and so must creation be. What then is the purpose of creation ? If it is purposeless, it is like a mad man's action. If it is purposeful, whose purpose does it serve ? God cannot have any end, which he seeks to achieve ; nor can he serve the purpose of others. Some schools of thought say God is a person and that a person is one who is indifferent (*udāsīna*). It is incoherent to say that one who is indifferent has created this world.<sup>9</sup>

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains that God is distinct from matter and from individual souls. But how does he control matter and the creatures, unless there is some connection between him and these things ? Śāṅkara says that there cannot be conjunction of the one with the other, nor can God inhere in them or they in him, while conjunction and inherence are the only types of relationship admitted by those schools. God, being omnipresent and impartial, cannot be conjoined with anything. We cannot conceive of any other kind of relation, because in that case it is not first proved that there is a relation. If the Nyāya school resorts to the Veda to get over this difficulty, then it too abandons the claim to establish God purely on rational grounds. Moreover, since that school regards the Veda to be God's Word, its argument to establish God on the authority of scriptural testimony is circular.<sup>10</sup>

The Nyāya says that God moulds the world of things out of primal matter. Śāṅkara says that if this matter is visible and gross, there is no need to further mould something which has already a form and shape. If the primal matter has no form at all and so imperceptible, how can we conceive God working on it ? Nobody can work materially upon an invisible thing, for no potter made a pot out of invisible clay.

The Nyāya school claims that our perceptual experience can be the standard by which we have to understand God and his nature. If that is so, the Advaita says that since we nowhere see an



unembodied person doing something, we have to think of God as one having a body and subject to all the consequent limitations.<sup>11</sup>

The Nyāya says that God, matter and souls are all eternal and infinite. In that case the Advaita says that God will be unable to know the limits of himself, matter and the souls ; and he ceases to be omniscient. If God is able to know the limits of all these three, they cannot be infinite ; and what is not infinite will come to an end.<sup>12</sup>

The conclusion arrived at by the Advaita school is that on the analogy of our ordinary experience and by means of inference we can know nothing about God. Since inference can never establish anything that is not in conformity with empirical experience, an omniscient and omnipotent creator of the world can never be inferred.<sup>13</sup> In experience we nowhere meet an omniscient person, or one who is able to make something from nothing or from pure matter, or one who is entirely free from desires and passions.<sup>14</sup> So, the Advaita school says, on the basis of our experience alone, we cannot infer the existence of God.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, the Advaita Vedānta is never guided by the analogy of what is seen, but relies solely on the Veda ; and that is why it is able to accept Brahman or pure consciousness as both the material and the efficient cause of the world, though in experience we nowhere find a conscious principle to be a material cause, or even the same thing being both material and efficient cause.<sup>16</sup>

## II

### *Tarka*

Nature of *Tarka* : Vātsyāyana's account :

Hindu Logic enumerates *tarka* as a type of reasoning which is ancillary to a *pramāṇa*, but which is itself never a *pramāṇa*. *Tarka* is the formulation of a probable hypothesis (*ūhā*) in the case of a thing, whose real nature is not known, when there is a ground for such a hypothesis.

Vātsyāyana gives the following examples of *tarka*. Is the transmigration of man without any cause or is it caused ? If it is caused, is the cause eternal or non-eternal ? If it is uncaused, it will cease of itself ; and nothing need be done for the cessation of

transmigration. If this cause is eternal, then its effect—transmigration—will never come to a stop. So it is probable that the cause of transmigration is non-eternal. This is a *tarka*, and this strengthens the scriptural testimony that transmigration is caused by *karma*. Similarly doubt may arise whether the soul is eternal or non-eternal. If it is non-eternal, past and future births would be impossible. Then it cannot be said that the present life is the result of action done in previous births, and that if one wants happiness in future life, he should perform only good actions. So it seems probable that the soul is eternal. This sort of guess (*ūhā*) strengthens the scriptural testimony that the soul is eternal.

According to the Nyāya school, *tarka* by itself cannot result in certain knowledge, because it cannot conclusively establish something as a fact. It is useful because after such guesses are made, one tries to reach an assured conclusion through a *pramāṇa*. Further, *tarka* serves as an ancillary to a *pramāṇa* and serves to strengthen it.<sup>17</sup>

Mere *Tarka* useless :

Śankara says that since *tarka* is based on man's individual suppositions (*utprekṣa*) which<sup>18</sup> are unfettered, while some intelligent men may formulate *tarkas* with great care, more intelligent people may refute them, and their *tarkas* in turn may be refuted by others. The premises on which *tarkas* may be based are various and the intellectual capacities of men differ very much. So, according to him, there can be no finality in a conclusion arrived at by *tarka*.

A critic may say that the conclusion that all *tarka* is relative is itself arrived at by *tarka*. To prove that no *tarka* is final, the tentativeness of some arguments is shown and from this it is generalised that no *tarka* is final. Thus the uncertainty of *tarka* is itself established by a *tarka*. The critic may go on to say that if all *tarkas* are uncertain, empirical experience itself will come to an end ; for man acts on the hypothesis that the future will resemble the past. Further, in cases where there is a doubt about the meaning of scriptural passages, the true meaning is ascertained by means of *tarka* in the form of settling the purport. The critic may then urge that tentativeness is, in fact, the beauty of a *tarka*. By the rejection of defective *tarkas*, a sound *tarka*



becomes acceptable. If our ancestors have been fools, it does not follow that we should be fools ; similarly from the fact that some *tarkas* are defective, it does not follow that all *tarkas* should be rejected.

Having himself formulated a possible criticism in the above manner, Śankara replies to it in the following way: Though the finality of *tarka* is seen in some cases, in the present context—i.e. in determining the existence and nature of the cause of the world—*tarka* cannot certainly be final. Without the help of scripture, it is impossible to guess about this profound matter, i.e. Brahman, with which is tied up our very liberation. Perception and inference are of no use in the case of Brahman. So on what basis can one make a guess ? All those who believe in liberation are agreed that it results from right knowledge. Right knowledge can but be one, uniform and objective. In the case of right knowledge about a thing, e.g. fire is warm, there cannot be several valid alternate hypotheses. *Tarkas* are mutually contradictory, as is well proved by the many contradictory views about Reality of even great men like Kapila and Kaṇāda. While right knowledge is conclusive and uniform, *tarkas* are inconclusive and various. They are inconclusive because what one logician establishes as truth may be refuted by another. No single logician is accepted as the best logician by all logicians ; and we cannot assemble all the logicians of the past, present and future at one place and time, so that they may together arrive at a final conclusion. So (Śankara concludes) while *tarka* cannot be depended upon for a knowledge of Brahman, no logician can reject the validity of the knowledge generated by the Veda, provided it is eternal and capable of generating knowledge. Scripture and *tarka which follows scripture*—these two can, according to Śankara, establish that Brahman is the world-cause.<sup>18</sup>

*Tarka* confirms Faith :

Appayya Dīkṣita says that when a doubt arises whether there is one maker or a number of makers of the world, then, if the arguments such as those advanced by the Nyāya are aided by scripture, they lead to the conclusion that there is only one cause of the world ; and these arguments can help to strengthen what scripture

says. It is like the *vanasimhanyāya*, which may be illustrated thus: A lion can be easily killed by hunters if it is confronted in the open; but it becomes inaccessible if it hides in the interior of a forest; and because the lion is hiding in it, the forest also becomes inaccessible to the hunters, who must enter it with care lest they should fall a prey to the lion pouncing upon them un-awares from behind some tree or hillock. Similarly, in Appayya's opinion, the reasoning from parsimony is strengthened by scripture, while it serves to convince us of what scripture says; but it cannot be an independent *pramāṇa*.<sup>19</sup>

Need for *Tarka*:

Though it is true that *Vedānta Vākyas* alone give us the knowledge of Brahman, mere hearing of them may not produce that knowledge in all cases. Even after hearing, a lot of pondering over them, supplemented by *tarkas* not opposed to them, is necessary to remove doubts.<sup>20</sup> A critic may say thus: When, for example, we see a pot we make no more ado, but simply accept it as a fact. Similarly, if the Upaniṣads give us knowledge of Brahman, why should further deliberation and *tarka* be necessary? To this the Advaita school makes the following reply. To have knowledge means to have an idea of a thing. This happens when mind takes on the form of the object presented to it. Mind may take on the form of a thing, but we may not be sure of the content of that particular mental mode, and till then certainty is not to be had. In the perception of empirical objects, as soon as our mind takes on the form of a particular object, it becomes certain regarding the nature of its content; but there is no such immediate certainty when the mind comes to know Brahman through scripture. This is so, because mind is 'over-burdened' either with the idea that it is impossible that there should be such a thing as Brahman,<sup>21</sup> or else with ideas about the nature of Brahman which are contradictory to what the Upaniṣads say. Because of the first defect, mind is unable to concentrate, and fully realise the oneness of Brahman and the *jīva*; and because of the second defect, mind is unable to shake off the false identification of the body and the soul, and still continues to attribute to the soul the properties which really are of the body.

The Advaita school says that this is not a unique case, for



this sort of thing happens in ordinary experience also ; but usually disbelief is shattered by mere seeing. For example, as soon as we see the flight of birds we believe that it is possible to fly in the air. In a place like Banaras, though bunches of green pepper may be on view at a shop, yet, because they have never been seen there before, and have been brought from very distant countries, a man may not believe his own eyes ; and due to this disbelief, he has no certitude, in spite of his seeing.

Similarly, if a man has been believing himself to be an individual, limited in knowledge and happiness, and subject to all the limitations of this world of misery, he may very well feel doubt, if he is suddenly told that he is not at all different from Brahman, the Supreme, whose nature is eternal and infinite knowledge and bliss. This disbelief is a mental defect, and has to be removed by *tarka*, which can show the probability and validity of Upaniṣadic statements. These defects are due to the results of previous bad actions. These are removed by practising the duties that are proper to one's caste and station in life, and false notions are removed by acquiring calmness of mind and other virtues. The idea that the oneness of Brahman and *jīva* is impossible is removed by pondering over (*viçāra*) the Upaniṣadic statements. This is *manana* or meditation on scriptural statements. The next step is *nididhyāsana* or contemplation of the profound meaning of the Upaniṣads with concentration, after all contrary ideas have been dispelled. When these obstacles are thus removed, and scriptural meaning is well assimilated, the Vivaraṇa school says that it is the *mahāvākyas* alone that give us right knowledge.<sup>22</sup>

### Three-fold function of *Tarka* :

Application of the six criteria to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages involves *tarka*. That is why Vācaspati says that discussion of scriptural sentences is in fact *tarka*, and that it is aided by other *tarkas*, which are found in the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya.<sup>23</sup> These latter are the arguments which establish the authority of the Veda and the nature of perception etc. So (the Advaita school says) *tarka* is needed (i) to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages, (ii) to remove doubts (*samśaya*) and

contrary beliefs (*viparyāsa*),<sup>24</sup> and (iii) to convince us of the probability of the existence of what is to be known, i.e. Brahman (*prameya sambhava niṣṭaya*).

Nature of admissible *Tarka* :

But, Śankara warns, this should not be a pretext for importing pure *tarka* into Vedānta. Only reasoning in accordance with scripture should be admitted. Vācaspati enumerates three conditions, which have to be satisfied by such *tarka* : (i) It must be dependent upon scripture ; (ii) it must elucidate the content of scripture, and (iii) it must not be opposed to scripture.<sup>25</sup> Govindānanda says that such *tarka* must be used to drive away doubts and contrary notions, after the truth has been ascertained from scripture.<sup>26</sup>

Examples of such *Tarka* :

Śankara gives two examples of such reasoning : (a) The self is seen to be present in both the dreaming and the waking states, and Ātman is 'untouched' by both ; for if either is natural and essential to Ātman, it will be inseparable from Ātman, like warmth from fire. Since in deep sleep there is an abiding of the true self in itself, it confirms the scriptural sentence which says that in the state of sleep *jīva* attains oneness with Brahman,<sup>27</sup> and also shows that it is possible that the *jīva* is identical with Brahman, devoid of multiplicity (*niṣprapañca*). (b) Scripture says that the world comes from (*prabhava*) Brahman. Śankara says that since we see that an effect is not different from its cause, even as a jar is not materially different from clay, Brahman is not different from the world.<sup>28</sup>

Negative Role of *Tarka* :

While the above sort of *tarkas* elucidate the content of scripture and also render the existence of Brahman possible, the role of *tarka* in demolishing other philosophies is not less important for an Advaitin. By the mere ascertainment of the meaning of scripture, right vision is not established. There are various schools of philosophy such as the Čārvāka, the Sāmkhya, the Yoga etc., which claim to give right knowledge. Some of these are associated with the great names of Kapila, Kaṇāda



and others, who are reputed to be omniscient, and contain subtle arguments. So some people believe that the Sāmkhya and other systems are on a par with the Vedānta, and that like two lions of equal strength, which cannot defeat each other, both are valid.<sup>29</sup> To remove this mistake, it is necessary to show such people that systems like Sāmkhya are inconsistent with each other as well as self-contradictory, and this can be done by independent reasoning without the help of scripture. If the inherent contradictions in these systems are shown, their improbability is demonstrated. The Advaita school says that such a refutation of every other alternate system of philosophy will also serve to show that the Vedānta is true. This in itself is valuable, because (Vidyāranya says) there can be no positive demonstration of the Advaita Vedānta.<sup>30</sup>

*Tarka* also removes another danger. Other schools quote Vedic sentences and utilise them to establish their own positions, interpreting them with a view to their own end. Śankara says that such interpretations are not real interpretations, but are in fact distortions.<sup>31</sup> *Tarka* serves to eliminate these false interpretations.

### Value of Analogies :

The Advaita school finds analogies also to be of use in creating certitude in scriptural statements.<sup>32</sup> For example, scripture teaches us that though Brahman is the cause of the world it is not essentially different from the world. Advaitins say that we can understand this on the analogy of a pot which, though an effect of clay, is not essentially different from it. Thus non-duality is shown to be possible. Similarly, when it is said that agency, sorrow, etc., are wrongly attributed to the self, because of its association with the body, it can be understood on the analogy of a white crystal, which is spoken of as red, when the redness of a nearby red flower is reflected in it. Just as when a rope is mistaken for a snake, this 'rope-snake' has no existence apart from the rope, the world does not exist independently of Brahman. Just as the sun, when reflected in different media, appears in different colours and shapes, so Brahman appears variously, when it is reflected in nescience. These and various other analogies (the Advaitin says) make scriptural statements intelligible, and dispel the idea that they are improbable.<sup>33</sup>

### *Anvaya-Vyatireka Tarka*

Reasoning laid down by Upaniṣads :

The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* lays down that Ātman should be heard of, meditated upon and contemplated.<sup>34</sup> Unless this is done Ātman is not realised. Śankara explains that hearing (*śravaṇa*) is receiving instruction from one's teacher and from scriptures; meditation (*manana*) is discussion through reasoning (*tarka*); and contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) is steadfast knowing of it.<sup>35</sup> In Śankara's opinion the oneness of the Self is shown as clearly as a bael fruit on one's palm, only when scriptural testimony and argument together demonstrate it; the meaning of the scriptural texts should be explained and tested in the light of arguments.<sup>36</sup>

*Viçāra* is *Tarka* :

It has already been said that though the *mahāvākyas* are heard, the assured conviction that one is Brahman is not generated unless doubts and contrary ideas are removed, and so *tarka* becomes necessary. According to Sureśvara and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī hearing of the *mahāvākyas* is the principal means of Brahman-realisation, but such 'hearing' has to be aided (*sahita*) by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. Madhusūdana says that 'pondering over the Upaniṣad vākyas' (*vedānta viçāra*) is nothing but *śravaṇa*, aided by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*; and such a *śravaṇa* is of the nature of *anvaya-vyatireka tarka*.<sup>37</sup>

*Anvaya-Vyatireka Tarka* :

It was Śankara himself who first gave rise to this type of *tarka*. In the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, he says that to a man who enquires 'Who am I?', after rejecting mind, senses and body as not being himself, the Upaniṣad replies 'That Thou art'.<sup>38</sup> Taking a cue from this Sureśvara elaborates what is known as *anvaya-vyatireka tarka*, i.e. reasoning based upon the presence and absence of connection.

This reasoning is of the following kind: (i) Whatever is an object (*dṛśya*) of cognition cannot be Ātman. The body, senses,



mind (*manas*), reason (*buddhi*) and even the ego-sense (*ahamkāra*) are the objects of cognitions. So they cannot be Ātman. (ii) Whatever has to be manifested by another (i.e. whatever is not self-luminous) is material (*jada*), and body, senses, etc., are therefore material, because without the presence of the witnessing consciousness they cannot intimate their own existence. (iii) Whatever is mutable is material; and body, senses, etc., are seen as growing, decaying and coming to an end. So they are not Ātman. (iv) While in waking and dream states the existence of a perceiver, the perceived and perception is found, in sleep they are destroyed. After waking up from sleep, awareness in the form 'I slept well, I did not know anything then' testifies that even in sleep consciousness was present, though it had no object. This kind of reasoning shows that there is consciousness, which is one beneath the multiplicity of powers, senses and capacities; and which remains as the unchanging and common element behind the three states of dreaming, waking and sleep, and in waking state behind the play of imagination, feeling, desire and thought. While common sense understands the relation of soul to the body and things in a crude spatio-temporal way, through *anvaya-vyatireka tarka* we come to know that Ātman is wholly independent and different from all palpable objects of perception (*dṛśya padārtha*) and is qualitatively opposed to them.<sup>39</sup>

*Tarka* cannot lead to knowledge of the nature of Ātman :

But though we come to know that there is Ātman and that it is not a thing such as a pot or a cot, or even mind and reason, Sureśvara says that by *tarka* we cannot know the nature of it.<sup>40</sup> A critic may ask: How is the existence of Ātman known without anything being known about its nature? Sureśvara replies that from *tarka* we can only know that there is a perceiving principle (*dṛkpadārtha*), which is certainly not anything that is perceptible; but its special and extraordinary nature is not known. Sureśvara says that this is so even in an ordinary inference. When we infer that there is a fire on a hill, we certainly know nothing about the nature of this fire, viz., whether it is lit by burning mango logs or oak logs; and so is the case about the *anvaya-vyatireka tarka*.<sup>41</sup>

Hence, Sureśvara says, there is a necessity for *śravaṇa* in

addition to this *tarka*, for the Upaniṣads alone can inform us that Ātman is one, perfect and eternal. Through such a *tarka* we are able to distinguish the Self from the Not-Self, but since this *tarka* is based on the notion of 'difference', we still continue to think that there are two things: the Self and the Not-Self, though we will not any more confuse the two. Now if we hearken to the Upaniṣads, Sureśvara says, we come to know that 'difference' is a product of nescience and must be abandoned.<sup>42</sup>

Sureśvara emphasizes that even in formulating *anvaya-vyatireka tarka*, we should not cut ourselves adrift from the Upaniṣadic moorings, lest we may plunge into 'darkness' as the Buddhists did when they relied on pure reasoning.<sup>42a</sup>

Instances of *Tarka* in the Upaniṣads :

In the *Chāndogya*, for instance, it is taught : ' This person, who is seen in the eye is Ātman.'<sup>43</sup> Śankara explains that ' person in the eye ' means the ' perceiver of perception ', as is evidenced by another text ' the eye of the eye '.<sup>44</sup> Then it is taught that Ātman is that which experiences, ' May I smell this, may I speak, may I think '. The senses and mind are for Ātman's sake.<sup>45</sup> Then it is said : ' Ātman is that which a wise man discovers as himself, when he abandons the idea that the body is the self and attains the conviction that he is the light of consciousness.'<sup>46</sup> When thus Ātman is sharply distinguished from body, senses etc., and identified with consciousness, the final teaching is imparted : ' That is Reality, that is Ātman, O Śvetaketu, That Thou art.'<sup>47</sup>

Similarly, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* it is taught that Ātman is the person, who is (wrongly) identified with the mind, is in the midst of the sense organs, and is the light within the mind.<sup>48</sup> According to Śankara this passage means that though Ātman is proved to be other than the body, it is mistakenly identified with mind by all, while in fact mind is only a limiting adjunct of Ātman. Though the sense organs appear to be intelligent (not-material), they are not Ātman. As a rock in the midst of trees, Ātman is different from them. Nor is it the mind or its modes, but ' the light within it '. It is called ' light ', because it is self-luminous, and it is by its presence that the body and senses function. As it is thus ' mixed up ' with all the functions of the body and the senses, the attributes and functions of the latter are superimposed on the



former. That the Self is transcendent to them is proved by its presence and their absence in dreams. It is only the functioning of the mind\*, with which is associated the Self, that leads to the delusion that Ātman is thinking, doing etc.<sup>49</sup> Thus the Upaniṣad through *anvaya-vyatireka tarka* separates Ātman from other things, and then declares: 'I am Brahman.'<sup>50</sup>

Whenever *tarka* is needed, (Sureśvara says) *tarka* of the above sort approved by the Upaniṣads alone should be resorted to.

Taking the contradictories 'perceiver and perceived', 'witness and witnessed', 'unchanged and changed', 'supremely blissful and miserable', and 'absolute existence and non-existence', the Advaitins establish that what comes under one category cannot come under the category that contradicts it. For example, if the perceiver is not different from the perceived, there cannot be the perceiver when there is not the perceived. Analysis of the three states of waking etc., shows that there is the perceiver, Ātman, even when there are no perceived objects. Now by taking the other four pairs of contradictories, it will be shown by the Advaitins that Ātman is non-material, eternal, supremely blissful and absolutely existent, because the contradictories of these belong to the perceived, and so they cannot belong to the perceiver.<sup>51</sup>

#### IV

#### *Arthāpatti*

The Advaita Vedānta school considers *arthāpatti* as a *pramāṇa*. *Arthāpatti* is the postulation (*kalpanā*) of a factor that can explain a situation, based on a knowledge of that situation. This factor that is postulated must be such that without it the situation in question remains inexplicable. Dharmarāja cites the following example: The fatness of a man who does not eat in day time is inexplicable if we do not postulate his eating at night, though the latter is not seen by us.<sup>52</sup>

Advaitins hold that *arthāpatti* cannot be inference, because, firstly, in it there is no invariable positive relation between the fact to be explained and the fact that explains, as between smoke

\* The I-sense—*aḥamkāra*.

and fire. Secondly, whoever makes a postulation has an after-reflection (*anuvyavasāya*) in the form, 'I am postulating this' and not 'I am inferring this'.<sup>53</sup>

The procedure involved in *arthāpatti* is this: When we see that a man is fat and yet does not eat in day time, our knowledge of his fatness conflicts with our knowledge of his not eating in day time. And this conflict is removed by postulating his eating at night. That 'X is fat' is a 'general knowledge' (*sāmānya pramā*), which we have, and which is contrary to the specific detail 'He does not eat in day time'. This opposition is removed by the postulation, 'He eats at night'.<sup>54</sup> This process of thought is different from that involved in inference.

It is also impossible to reduce this to an inference, because we do not have any major premise. We require a major premise of the sort 'X, who is fat, must eat either in day time or at night'; or 'All men who are fat and do not eat in day time eat at night'. The major premise in either case involves the knowledge sought to be gained by postulation, and so involves a *petitio principii*.

The Advaitins say that postulation is of two kinds: (1) postulation to explain what is seen, and (2) postulation to explain what is known from testimony (human or scriptural).<sup>55</sup>

The first one may be illustrated thus. (a) We may see a thing in front as silver, but on closer inspection find that it is not silver, but a pearl-shell. So from this we postulate that the silver we *saw* at first is false, as otherwise its being pearl-shell is inexplicable (*anupapanna*).<sup>56</sup> (b) Previously (*supra* pp. 131-2), it has been mentioned that Śrī Harṣa maintains that on the basis of an analysis of perception, we can postulate the non-difference of all objects from one another.

Postulation of the second kind is possible in cases such as: (a) After hearing from a reliable person that Devadatta, who is living, is not in his house, we postulate his existence outside his house. (b) The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says: The knower of Ātman goes beyond (lit. crosses) grief.<sup>57</sup> Now illusions only can be removed by knowledge. Since grief is said to be removed by knowledge, and since grief, which is *real*, cannot be removed by knowing that it is false, grief must be an illusion. Here 'grief' means the bondage of transmigration; so this bondage is an illusion.<sup>58</sup>



We may conclude the Advaita standpoint thus : Since it could be demonstrated that all empirical experience is relative and finite, we are justified in postulating the Absolute. Since no relation other than that of non-difference is tenable between subject and object and the different objects of cognition, 'non-difference' can be postulated. This is not the same as the argument from the idea of the Absolute to its existence. Here it is argued that since we experience the finite and the relative and find it to be not self-existent, the Absolute is postulated in order to understand it. But *arthāpatti* cannot tell us the nature of the Absolute ; that should be known only from the Veda. *Arthāpatti* is also useful in deriving certain conclusions from Upaniṣadic statements. While the Advaitins accept that *arthāpatti* is an exercise of reason, they do not reckon it to be inferential reasoning.

## CHAPTER IV

### REASON AND SCRIPTURE

#### I

#### *The View of Gauḍapāda*

The problem of the relationship between reason and scriptural testimony arose with Gauḍapāda the grand teacher of Śaṅkara. He was a staunch believer in the authority of the Upaniṣads, while at the same time Buddhist doctrines appealed to his reason. If the Vijnānavāda and the Śūnyavāda are the results of the untrammelled exercise of reason, and if their conclusions are solely dictated by the necessity of dialectic, they cannot be ignored. On the other hand, a faithful follower of the Vedānta cannot accept anything opposed to it. So in his *Kārikas* he endeavoured to show that though the followers of the Upaniṣads may seek the aid of reason *only* to draw out their content, their conclusions will be in accord with the findings of philosophers (the Buddhists), because truth cannot contradict itself.

On the authority of the *Aitareya*, the *Taittirīya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads*, Gauḍapāda first establishes that consciousness (*vijnāna*) is the one Reality.<sup>1</sup> He argues thus: The wise have 'seen in the Vedāntas' that this world is like a dream and a city in the mirage, *māyā*.<sup>2</sup> Scripture has proved by argument that what is seen in a dream is non-existent.<sup>3</sup> Upaniṣadic texts assert that there is no plurality, that the One became many through *māyā*, and that unborn it is *born* in many ways.<sup>4</sup> The *Kaṭha* text 'This does not become anything from anything' implies that there is no cause for the soul's birth.<sup>5</sup> Finally, since the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says that all predications are impossible of Ātman, concepts such as birth and becoming are inapplicable to Ātman.<sup>6</sup> Like the barren woman's son, the unreal can never be born, while the immutable Reality can never be born. Of the real there could be birth only by illusion, i.e. as in a dream there appears duality.<sup>7</sup> So no *jīva* is born,<sup>8</sup> and none is in bondage.<sup>9</sup> [This is the theory of non-origination (*ajātivāda*).] Non-difference between Ātman



and *jīva* has, therefore, been extolled by scriptures, while plurality has been rightly condemned.<sup>10</sup> This non-dual reality has been *seen* by sages, who are devoid of desire, fear and anger, and who have studied the entire Veda.<sup>11</sup>

Thus having shown that the theory of non-duality and non-origination is Upaniṣadic, Gauḍapāda says that the Buddhist non-dualists (*advaya vādins*) also proclaim the theory of non-origination, and asserts that it can be accepted by the Vedāntins also, as there is no quarrel between the two.<sup>12</sup> Throughout the last chapter of his work, he tries to show how Buddhist thinkers support the theory of non-origination, which he believes to be Upaniṣadic. In the course of this attempt he extensively quotes from the Buddhist classics, and at other places reproduces the ideas in them.<sup>13</sup> Thus much as the Christian Fathers appropriated Greek philosophy into theology, Gauḍapāda sought to incorporate Buddhist philosophy in the Vedānta.

In his endeavour to reconcile reason and scriptural testimony, he lays down two principles : (1) The meaning of the scripture can be only that which is (a) conclusively established (*niṣcītam*), and (b) in accordance with reasoning (*yuktiyukta*).<sup>14</sup> (2) Since 'non-difference' and 'non-origination' are its principal teachings, all the statements in the Scripture about creation and the difference between Ātman and *jīva* have to be taken in a secondary sense.<sup>15</sup> Such statements are intended for the sake of worship (*upāsana*) for those who are yet unable to perceive the truth,<sup>16</sup> and they gradually pave the way for grasping the profound truth of non-duality.<sup>17</sup>

Gauḍapāda's twin principles imply that reason sets fourth the norm of truth, and that scriptural statements are untenable, if they are unconfirmed by reason.

## II

### *Śankara's View*

Śankara's standpoint seems to differ from that of Gauḍapāda. At one place he raises a possible objection thus: Brahman is a real entity (*pariniṣpanna vastu*); and in the case of such things there is scope for *pramāṇas* other than scriptural testimony. Just as when two scriptural passages are opposed to one another, one is subordinated to another, so when scripture is opposed to another

*pramāṇa*, scripture should be subordinated to it. *Yukti*, which seeks to establish an unseen thing on the analogy of a seen thing, is nearer to experience; while scripture, which is a mere tradition in respect of what it propounds, is far removed from experience.<sup>18</sup>

Śankara replies to this by saying that since Brahman is a unique thing, it is mere wishful thinking to believe that *pramāṇas* other than scriptural testimony have any scope here. As in the case of dharma, Brahman can be known only from scripture. He quotes in support various texts from the Upaniṣads and *Smṛtis*, including the *Kaṭha* passage 'This knowledge (of Brahman) cannot be gained by *tarka*', and the *Gītā* passage 'This is unmanifested and unthinkable'.<sup>19</sup> Śankara says that though the Upaniṣadic passage enjoining *manana* shows that *tarka* should receive due respect, that cannot be a pretext for introducing 'dry' (pure) argumentation (*śuṣka tarka*) into Vedānta; only the *tarka*, which follows scripture, can be accepted as a help towards Brahman-intuition (*anubhavāṅga*). Since such *tarka* is admissible, he says that scriptural or *smṛti* texts which condemn *tarka* condemn only mere *tarka*, as it cannot by itself be a *pramāṇa*.<sup>20</sup>

Nothing can be clearer than this statement of Śankara, yet he apparently voiced a different view in some places. We will now discuss two such passages:

A. The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* consists of three *kāṇḍas*—*Madhu Kāṇḍa*, *Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa* and *Khila Kāṇḍa*. In the introduction to the last but one section of *Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa*, Śankara says, 'The knowledge of Ātman, which is the means of immortality, is obtained by *tarka* also, for the *Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa* preponderates in that.'<sup>21</sup> Now let us see the reasoning which has been advanced in *Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa*. The most important section of this *Kāṇḍa* is that in which the dialogue of Yājñavalkya and Gārgi is narrated. In his *bhāṣya* on that Śankara says: Scripture has indicated the existence of the immutable by negating various attributes. Yet, to remove popular misconceptions, inferential evidence is now adduced. Śankara then says that the sun and the moon, which give light to all beings at day and night respectively, are held in their positions, as a kingdom remains unbroken and orderly under the mighty rule of a king. As a lamp, which gives light to people, has its maker and regulator,



so the sun and the moon must have been created for the purpose of giving light by a Universal Ruler who knows their use. That exists which has made the sun and the moon and which compels them to rise and set. Similarly, That must exist which maintains heaven and earth in their positions, without allowing them to fall. Were there not a conscious, transcendent Ruler, it would be impossible for heaven and earth to obey a fixed order. Śankara says that this is the 'unfailing sign' of Ātman's existence.<sup>22</sup> Two other arguments mentioned by Śankara are: (i) There must be a Ruler, who, knowing the various results of the actions of men, awards to them proportionate happiness or unhappiness.<sup>23</sup> (ii) That must exist, the knowledge of which puts a stop to transmigration; because rituals, which are perishable cannot lead to eternal *mokṣa*.<sup>24</sup> Śankara resorts to arguments of this kind at other places also. For instance, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Kena Upaniṣad* and the *Sūtra bhāṣya*, he gives the same two arguments which are given by the Nyāya school.<sup>25</sup> Just as houses, palaces, chariots etc., are built by conscious beings, so this world of infinite variety, complexity and regularity must be the result of the effort (*prayatna*) of a conscious being. At another place he gives the argument from movement: An unconscious thing cannot move of itself and evolve into the world, for we nowhere see, for instance, a wagon or clay moving by itself. So a conscious principle alone can be the cause of the world.<sup>26</sup> He also formulates the cosmological argument: Ātman has been mentioned as the cause of the evolution of the world, for it is said by scripture, 'From Ātman was ether generated'. Ātman also cannot be a product, for the chain of evolution cannot endlessly stretch backwards; otherwise nihilism will be the result.<sup>27</sup>

Now in view of what Śankara has said at various places in very clear terms, we must conclude that he does not give any independent value to arguments of the above sort. In the opening portion of his *bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* he raises a possible objection in the following way: The Veda itself points out certain grounds of inference for the existence of Ātman which depend on perception. So inference is possible in the case of Ātman. Śankara replies to this thus: That the Self is eternal, and that it does not come to an end with death cannot be perceived; for were this perceptible, the Čārvākas and the Buddhists would not deny

it. The existence of Ātman can be known only from the Veda and from certain empirical grounds of inference cited by it. The followers of the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya imagine that these grounds of inference, mentioned by the Veda, are products of their ingenious minds, and declare that the self can be known by inference.<sup>28</sup> In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* there occurs the following conversation: 'By what is the world of Brahmā pervaded?' 'Do not, O Gārgī, ask too much, lest your head should fall off. You are asking too much, O Gārgī, about a Deity, about whom too many questions should not be asked.'<sup>29</sup> Śāṅkara commenting on this says that Gārgī has tried to know through inference about a deity, who must be approached only through scriptural tradition (*āgama*). He says that since the nature of the deity is to be known from scripture alone, Gārgī's question, being inferential, disregarded this method of approach.<sup>30</sup> Śāṅkara and his followers never go against the emphatic statement of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: I ask you about that person, who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads.<sup>31</sup> Commenting on this, Śāṅkara says that Ātman cannot be known through any means other than the Upaniṣads.

In view of all this we must conclude that when he says that by *tarka* also *Ātma-jñāna* can be obtained, he means by *tarka* not *śuśka tarka*, i.e. mere reasoning, but *śṛtyanugrhīta tarka*, i.e. *tarka* that is dependent on and that follows scripture. In his *Kena bhāṣya*, Śāṅkara himself explains why arguments like the cosmological, the teleological etc., are needed. He says that they are mentioned for making scriptural meaning certain (*niṣcaya*) for ourselves.<sup>32</sup> In the opening portion of the *bhāṣya* on *Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa* also, saying that this *Kāṇḍa* will be mainly argumentative, while the previous one was mainly expository, Śāṅkara remarks that unless *tarka* is coupled with scriptural testimony, the oneness of Ātman cannot be shown as clearly as a fruit in one's hand.<sup>33</sup> *Tarka* tests the meaning of scripture, i.e. it rebuts all possible criticisms and produces certitude in scriptural teaching. Winding up, Śāṅkara says that while the first part of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* merely states the great truth, the second part discusses it out in debate, and in the last section it is again restated. Thus scripture and reasoning together reach a decisive conclusion.



By itself reasoning is useless, while by themselves mere scriptural statements cannot clear doubts and produce conviction.<sup>34</sup>

B. Another statement that needs discussion is made by Śankara in his *bhāṣya* on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās*. He says, 'Is Advaita to be known from scripture alone, or by reasoning also? To this Gauḍapāda says that it can be known by reasoning also'.<sup>35</sup>

If at all anywhere Gauḍapāda demonstrates the truth of Advaita by pure reasoning, it is in his third chapter. A perusal of it shows that by means of familiar analogies such as the ether in a pot and the sparks rising from a fire, the doctrine of non-duality is sought to be made intelligible. The truth of the doctrine presupposed throughout the discussion is explained by analogies. It is, however, true that dualism (*dvaita*) is ruthlessly criticized by *anvaya-vyatireka* inference and by *yuktis*. The said inference is of this sort: 'When mind is "unminded" (completely stilled) there is no duality; so all duality is *only* a perception of the mind, having no independent existence.'<sup>36</sup> Though Śankara calls it an '*anumāna*', it is in fact only a *tarka* or *yukti*. He is himself aware of it when he says that the non-existence of duality is maintained by *yuktis*,<sup>37</sup> and surprisingly enough he says that even these *yuktis* are known from the *Vedānta Vākyas* only.<sup>38</sup> In the introductory portion of the *Māṇḍūkya bhāṣya*, Śankara himself enunciates the methodology of the Vedānta. First, we must be sure of what scripture says, for that alone is the means of knowing the truth about Ātman.<sup>39</sup> That this world of duality and misery is a product of nescience and that by the knowledge of Brahman it is removed—this is known from scripture.<sup>40</sup> The second step is that of demonstrating the untenability of dualism;<sup>41</sup> and the third step is that of showing how 'non-dualism' is intelligible (this is done by analogies and *yuktis*). Finally, all other doctrines are shown to be mutually contradictory and self-contradictory. When the mind has passed through these four stages, the conviction that Advaita is the truth sinks in. In the very last sentence of his *bhāṣya* on the *Kārikās*, Śankara says that the final truth of Advaita can be known *only* in the Vedānta, and that though Buddha came very near to it, he never taught the very same. We therefore conclude that in the above passage also Śankara means by *tarka* only the reasoning that is in accordance with scripture.

## III

*Tarka and Āgama*

According to Śāṅkara any reasoning that contradicts the Veda is fallacious. In criticising the Vaiśeṣika theory that the Self has desires etc., Śāṅkara says that the arguments which the Vaiśeṣikas advance are wrong, because they contradict the Veda.<sup>42</sup> While Śāṅkara holds that the ascertained meaning of scripture can never be contradicted by reason and is always in accordance with reason,<sup>43</sup> and though he says that one *pramāṇa* cannot be contradicted by another,<sup>44</sup> he is also of the opinion that what scripture says may sometimes not be in accordance with empirical experience. For example, scripture says that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world, while we nowhere find in our experience the same thing being both a material and an efficient cause. In such cases (Śāṅkara says) we should remember that this is a matter that does not fall within the domain of inference.<sup>45</sup> Similarly, rational theology can never explain the relationship between God and the world on the analogy of perceptual experience, for the relations of 'conjunction' and 'inherence' which are accepted by the Nyāya, cannot subsist between God and the world. Since God cannot be proved to be the cause of the world, it cannot be said that they are related causally. On the other hand, the follower of the Vedānta maintains Brahman to be the cause of the world on the strength of scripture, and for the same reason he maintains that the relation of 'non-difference' holds between God and the world. So a Vedāntin is not bound to accept everything that is in accordance with perceptual experience.<sup>46</sup> We might sum up by saying that according to Śāṅkara, while scriptural teaching does not contradict reason, it is *supra*-rational.

Vācaspati takes a more dogmatic stand. He says that while inference should accord with empirical experience, scripture is capable of application (*pravartati*) in matters which are never perceived, and also in matters which go against perception. In the course of learning about God's existence from scripture, we should not follow perceptual experience, for many things that transcend perceptual experience and even go against it are postu-



lated in scripture, and yet it should not be charged with even the semblance of defect.<sup>47</sup>

Appayya Dikṣita says that when once it is established that inference cannot independently lead to Brahman, inference cannot contradict scriptural testimony, just as our sense of sight, which cannot hear, is unable to contradict our auditory experience. He says that like a sword's keen edge, when applied to a rock, inference is 'dented' when used to criticise scripture; and to say that inference is stronger than scripture is 'improper bravado' (*asthānavijṛmbhitam*).<sup>48</sup>

Govindānanda says that since scripture is the basic source (*upajīvyā pramāṇa*) of our knowledge of God, and since inference cannot demonstrate the existence of God in opposition to scripture, inference cannot be used to argue that one and the same thing cannot be both efficient and material cause.<sup>49</sup>

To conclude: The existence of God or conditioned Brahman (*saviśeṣa Brahman*) is known only from scripture; and scripture tells us that it is the efficient-material cause of the world. Inferential syllogisms cannot condemn this teaching, because the logical subject (*pakṣa*) of God-syllogisms itself has to be supplied by scripture.<sup>50</sup> If God's existence is not proved, and it is not proved by inference, it is foolish to debate whether he is only the efficient cause or efficient-material cause. If God's existence is known with certainty from scripture only, then his nature also should be known from the same source.\*

\*Throughout this chapter by scripture is meant *śāstra*, i.e. the Veda.

## CHAPTER V

### THE METHOD OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

In our day Wittgenstein has advocated the view that nothing correct can be said in philosophy, and that the right method of philosophy is only to demonstrate that all metaphysical statements are meaningless. Philosophy only elucidates, i.e. makes certain propositions clear, which otherwise are opaque and blurred. In the course of this elucidation, the philosopher has to state certain propositions and they too are equally senseless. Philosophical propositions, Wittgenstein tells us, are like the ladder by which one climbs up and then throws away.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to see that this is essentially the method of the Advaita, as Śrī Harṣa conceives it.

Harṣa says that nothing other than consciousness (*vijnāna*) is real and self-luminous (*svayam prakāśa*). We cannot establish anything else to be real, because reality cannot be predicated of a thing as an attribute. If reality were an attribute which can be predicated of a thing, it would be something over and above the thing. For example, whiteness can be predicated of a thing, but it is not the thing itself. Nor can reality be conceived as constituting a thing; for that would imply that reality (a generic character, for reality is no monopoly of any one thing) enters into the essence of the thing. But then, is this thing, into the constitution of which reality enters, real or not? So (says Harṣa) nothing except consciousness can be said to be real.

There is not, as the Buddhist says, a series of successive cognitive states, because (Harṣa says) cognition can have for its object all the terms in the alleged series, including itself. In other words, self-consciousness includes all consciousness. So awareness (consciousness) is one and eternal. It is an undeniable fact. As nothing other than consciousness can be shown to be real, all that is material (*jāda*) is unreal, and is a superimposition.

In fact, according to Harṣa, consciousness has no attribute. Statements such as 'consciousness is self-evident' are only figurative, because consciousness cannot be the subject of any judgment. Words such as 'eternal' and 'all-pervading', when applied



to consciousness, merely mean that it is free from all limitations. When we say that there is no duality in consciousness, our judgment is of the same type as when we say 'there is no nacre-silver here'. What Harṣa means is this: When a man mistakes nacre for silver, he is told that there is no silver there. Just as silver (which was never present there in nacre) is negated by this judgment, so duality, which is never present in consciousness, is negated by the judgment that it is 'non-dual'.

A critic may ask, how can self-luminous consciousness be the sole reality? for then there would be no distinction of subject and object (the perceiver and the perceived, the knower and the known), and without this distinction there can be no self-consciousness. This criticism is answered thus by Harṣa: If subject and object are two different things but nevertheless related, this relation must be distinct from the two. How is this relation related to the two terms? If another relation relates this relation to the two terms, in what way is that relation related to the first relation and the two terms? So it is much simpler to assume that there is no difference between the relation and the related terms. The realistic Nyāya school admits that in the judgment 'The jar is not here', there is no relation in addition to the two terms 'the absence of the jar' and 'this place'. In the same way, subject and object may be related without there being any distinction between them and the relation (of identity) may be cognized without the difference between subject and object being apprehended.

Harṣa admits that it is opposed to empirical experience to say that knowledge (cognition) is self-apprehended, but he justifies this by saying that cognition cannot be explained if the knower and known are different. Unless the identity of the cogniser and the cognised is postulated (*arthāpatti*), we cannot explain the fact of knowledge. Such postulation may be contrary to empirical experience; but in such cases postulation is stronger than perception.<sup>2</sup> Many things not directly perceived may be postulated to exist, when there is a valid means of proving them.\* The truth of the doctrine of non-duality is shown by the impossibility of maintaining any contrary theory.

\* Here one may wonder: If *arthāpatti* is a *pramāṇa*, why should it be regarded that Advaita is not positively established, when *arthāpatti* establishes it?

The upholder of the Advaita cannot do more than demolish the arguments of his opponents. The non-dual reality of consciousness cannot be positively established by arguments. The Advaitin maintains that the world of things is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal; but if he is asked to state what the world is, he throws up his hands. The world cannot be defined; not because we are incompetent, but because its nature is such. At the same time, the Advaitin holds that he can refute all positive definitions of the world given by others. But in such a debate, even the assumptions and definitions which are taken for granted by the Advaitin are not held by him to be real, but are merely assumed for the sake of debate (*jātyuttara*).

A few examples of such arguments, which are futile in themselves but serve to rebut the opponents' arguments, will make this clearer. Suppose a nihilist says that the self is not eternal. His opponent argues thus: 'As the self is all-pervading like the ether, it must be eternal like the ether.' To this the nihilist retorts, 'Since the self is conscious, *unlike* the ether, it is non-eternal, *unlike* the ether.' Here the nihilist assumes the eternity of the ether only for the sake of argument, but he does not believe in it. This argument again can be met thus: 'Whatever things are non-eternal are not all-pervasive, as, for example, things like pots and tables. As the self is all-pervasive, unlike these non-eternal things, it must be eternal.' To this the nihilist can reply: 'As the self is also a thing, like a pot, which is non-eternal, it must also be non-eternal, like other things.'<sup>3</sup> In all such debates nothing positive is established; only the contrary arguments are effectively countered.

Harṣa says that the arguments of the Advaita are of the above sort. The assumptions underlying the arguments are not taken as real by the Advaitin, for he regards the world and everything in it to be indefinable. Harṣa further explains this method in the following way: Every definition which may be given of anything in this world can be shown to be self-contradictory, from which it follows that everything is indefinable. The Advaitin is not concerned with positively proving either the reality or the unreality of the world, but finds full satisfaction and peace in Brahman or pure consciousness. The opponents' arguments are refuted by their own rules of argument, and so they cannot



object. But since the Advaitin does not accept his own arguments to be real, the others cannot find either loopholes in them or taunt him as inconsistently accepting definitions. After all, for the purpose of carrying on a debate, the principles or the method or the conclusions of the debate need not be accepted as real. It is enough if both the parties to the dispute accept certain rules as binding on them. Such an acceptance involves the knowledge of the proofs as well as what is proved, but it does not imply their reality.

An example will make this clear. An idealist, a realist and a materialist can carry on a debate about a point, though none of them holds the thing under dispute to be real. It is enough if they have an idea of 'cause' as that which precedes an effect to discuss whether a particular thing is the cause of another or not. Causation need not be real, nor need there be a thing, a real cause, independent of thought (*vijnāna*). So when x is asserted to be the cause (or denied to be the cause) of y, it is not necessary that one should believe in the objectivity of causation or in the objective reality of x and y.

Harṣa then comes to the question: What is the proof of Advaita? First of all he quibbles over it. He says that the question either implies a conception of non-duality or not. If it implies such a conception, the next question is, is it true or false? An opponent of the Advaita doctrine would evidently choose the latter alternative. Then the question would amount to this: 'I have a conception of non-duality; I know it's false. Now what is your proof for maintaining your doctrine?' Since there cannot be any proof for a false conception, the question is begged.\* Lastly, any proof which might be given cannot be the proof for the opponent's conception of non-dualism. Supposing the question is allowed to stand in some way, the only reply of Harṣa is that the proof of non-duality is *nothing else but the Veda*, in which we meet with texts such as "one only without a second", "there is no diversity whatever."<sup>4</sup> These texts alone can refute all other considerations, and they cannot be invalidated in any way.<sup>5</sup>

\* Harṣa does not consider this probability: Cannot one ask the question accepting non-duality to mean what is usually understood by it, without accepting it to be either true or false? I am indebted to Prof. Ramsey for this suggestion.

Śrī Harṣa's position may be summed up in the following way: All philosophical statements are false, and that is why metaphysics, which seeks to define the indefinable, is a mire of puzzles and paradoxes. So while no definite theory can be established, by studying metaphysical systems and criticizing them truth may be revealed to us in an odd way and evidence may be furnished for convictions which cannot be described in a logically cut and dry form. Statements of the scripture, which too are nonsense, *show* us which way truth lies, and reinforce our convictions.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE LOGIC OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that according to Śrī Harṣa (and modern philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Wisdom), we can never have a metaphysical system; but we can point out the faults in other systems, and through showing them we perhaps indicate to some extent what truth is. At the same time though a philosopher may avoid building a system, he cannot avoid making statements involving various words. For example, the Advaitin uses words such as 'Brahman', 'māyā', etc. Now how are these words used by him? What sort of factual relevance have they got? What sort of examples does he give to make an inroad into the problem? Answers to these questions will be provided by examining the words in as many contexts as possible, and finding their language-setting. Clarification of the language structure of a 'philosophy' in this way will reveal its 'logical structure' or 'logic'. Then we can find whether the various statements made by it are consistent at least in its own linguistic setting.

Now every sort of statement has its own sort of logic, and every statement is made at a certain language-level. 'The Rose is red', 'Smith is bald'—these are at one level, and have one logic. 'Life is a myriad-coloured dome', 'Thy face is like the moon in autumn'—these are at another level. ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ', 'Water boils at  $100^{\circ}\text{C}$ , under one atmospheric pressure',—these are at yet another level. There is confusion of levels of language in statements such as: 'India is bald', 'There are four things here, three people and a group'.

When the linguistic setting of a philosophy is displayed, we can find whether there is any confusion of levels of language or not; and whether more than one logic is used or not. When the mixed logics are separated out and better organised, it may be that we will find a clue to a fact, which the mixed logics have been talking about in a confused way. And, if, perchance, we do not find any confusion of language-levels and mixture of logics,

it is possible that the various statements in a philosophy are not really inconsistent, and that they are all at one language level. In that case any inadequacies and defects, which the logical structure of that philosophy displays, may be due to the permanent irremediable inadequacy of language; but (and here is the important point) such a philosophy will not fail to hint at or *show* (as Wittgenstein says) the odd Fact that eludes the linguistic grip.

So to bring out the factual reference of the Advaita Vedānta, its logic will be attempted to be laid bare in thirteen small sections in the form of replies to criticisms, to enable us to judge whether Śāṅkara is justified in saying: There is no inconsistency or doubt in the Upaniṣadic philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

1. A critic may say that if there is no difference between cause and effect, the whole world, with all its defects and differences, will pollute Brahman when it merges in Brahman, at the time of the dissolution of the world. If the world of difference loses all its difference when it merges in Brahman, why should there be any creation again? And if the actions and their results in individual souls lose their differences when they are merged in Brahman, but become active again at the next creation, then even the 'destroyed actions' of liberated souls would again be the causes of transmigration.

To this Śāṅkara replies that vessels of clay differ in size, shape and colour, but when they are destroyed they just become clay without in any way retaining their previous properties. Similarly when ornaments of gold are melted down, they become simply gold and do not carry over their distinctive characteristics into this new state. On this analogy, we can understand that, when the world of name and form is dissolved and merged in Brahman, the defects and differences of the world are not retained. They do not affect Brahman. Unless the effects lose their properties and become one with their cause, they are not dissolved.

Scripture says that the world, which is 'effect', is not different from Brahman, which is cause in the past, present and future. This is so because the effect and its properties are imagined in (or superimposed on) Brahman because of nescience. A magician is never deluded by his own magic, for what is produced by magic is not a real thing (*avastu*). Even so the Supreme Self is not



contaminated by the *māyā* of transmigration. The individual soul is not affected by the states of waking and sleeping, and the dream state, like these, is also transient, and does not affect the soul. If even the ignorant soul is not affected by dreams which are false, how can we say that the omniscient Brahman is affected by delusion?<sup>2</sup>

Like the appearance of the snake in the rope, when there is an illusion, the appearance of the three states—creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world—in Brahman is only an illusion. Just as in sleep there is an end of all experience of differences and distinctions, but these are resumed again on waking, even so, though there is no distinction or difference in Brahman in the state of dissolution, at creation all these come forth. The potential ignorance (*ajñānaśakti*) of individual souls is not lost even in the state of dissolution, and this again causes their birth. The power to create, which is related to false ignorance (*mithyābhūta ajñānasambaddha sṛṣṭivibhāgaśakti*), must be inferred to exist even in dissolution.<sup>3</sup>

2. Again, a critic can say that there is another contradiction in the Vedānta. Brahman is said to be devoid of all attributes, and yet is the material cause of the world. How can a thing be a cause when it has no qualities at all? Clay, for instance, is capable of becoming a jug, because it has attributes which enable it to do so. So anything becomes a cause when it is transformed into another thing (the effect) and is capable of such transformation. But Brahman, which has absolutely no attributes, cannot be transformed.

The Advaita Vedānta replies that modification (*vikāra*) can be of two kinds. Milk is transformed into curd, while a rope may become the substratum for the illusion of a snake. Brahman becomes the world in the latter way. Brahman devoid of attributes is not transformed, but can be the basis (substratum—*adhiṣṭhāna*) of delusion (*bhramā*). An analogy might help: 'Caste' (*jāti*), for example, has no attributes. A 'caste' is neither dirty nor clean. Still, if one sees a sick, old, and dirty *Brāhmaṇa* one may mistake him for a *śūdra*. Thus there can be an illusion of his being a *śūdra*, because we think of 'śūdra caste' as dirty, though 'caste' as such is neither dirty nor clean.<sup>4</sup>

3. A critic can point out another apparent inconsistency in the Vedānta: The Vedānta says that Brahman is the material cause of the world. But how could Brahman, which is pure intelligence, be the material cause of the inanimate world of things? There can be no causal relation between things disparate in nature. A buffalo is not born from a cow, nor is a golden ornament made of clay.

The Advaitin replies that it is not invariably found that a cause and its effect are similar, for scorpions and other insects are generated from cow-dung,\* and nails and hair from man. If it is replied that it is only the bodies of scorpions which are generated from cow-dung, and that their souls are not so generated, even then, how dissimilar are a scorpion's body and cow-dung? And how great is the difference between hair, nails etc., and their material cause, the human body? The analogy of the earth and its products is also useful to make the relationship between the one Brahman and the world of diversity intelligible. Diamonds, coal, ordinary pebbles and stones, marble, granite—all these are products of the earth, but are bewilderingly different, both in their appearance and nature; though they are all produced from the depths of the same earth. The critic may retort that between these causes and effects there is at least one similarity—all of them are material. The Vedāntin would say that there is one characteristic (*lakṣaṇā*) which is shared by Brahman as well as its effect. Both have 'existence'. It is not necessary that each and every attribute of the material cause should be present in its effect. The world and Brahman are similar at least in this, viz. both are existent. Finally, the critic should remember that it can never be proved that whatever is insentient must have a cause other than Brahman. The cardinal point that should never be forgotten in such discussions is that reasoning is unstable, and can never establish any proposition as final truth.<sup>5</sup>

4. The critic may then say that only the lesser in magnitude can be the material cause of the greater in magnitude. It is the small slender threads that constitute the cloth. Brahman is greater than the greatest; it is all encompassing and omnipresent. How could it be the cause of things, which, however great in

\* In Śaṅkara's day such a theory was believed, but Pasteur's experiments have exploded such theories.



magnitude, are lesser than it? So the cause of the world must be an entity, which is infinitesimal in magnitude, such as atoms.

To this the Vedānta replies : Brahman is not *really* transformed into the world. Brahman is only *apparently* transformed into the world. The world is only an illusion based on Brahman. In illusions it is not necessary that the cause must be smaller in magnitude than the effect. Huge trees on the top of a mountain are seen as tiny plants from below. This is an illusion, and the material cause of the illusion (the giant trees on the mountain) is very much bigger than the effect—the illusion of tiny plants. So it is intelligible that Brahman is the cause of the world, though Brahman is the greatest thing.<sup>6</sup>

5. Then a critic may say that if Brahman is the sole Reality and if everything is non-different from it, then all distinctions would be abolished. For example, Devadatta who eats and the rice that is eaten would be one and the same, for both are Brahman. This would be impossible because it would be a travesty of our experience.

The Vedānta replies that really there is no world, but even if it is taken for granted that the world is we can explain it. The waves, foam and ripples of the ocean are not different from the ocean, still we speak of their mutual difference and conjunction. Though they are not essentially different from one another, they are also not identified by us with one another. Even so subjects and objects are not different from Brahman, yet our minds do not identify them with it.

But as a matter of fact the distinctions of subjects and objects are not real, because the Upaniṣads say that Brahman alone is the reality, and that everything else is a mere name (empty words—*vācārambhanam*). At the same time the same thing cannot really be both one and many. Difference and non-difference, being mutually contradictory, cannot be equally true. As the Veda is emphatic that Brahman is the sole reality, this is the ultimate truth ; for experience is no judge in these matters.

Scripture tells us that the world is a modification of Brahman, just as jugs, pots and pans are modifications of clay. Pots and jugs are not materially different things ; they are merely forms in which clay appears (*ākāra-viśeṣa*). So though they appear differently, there is only one ultimate substance—clay. When we

know the nature of clay, we know the real nature of its modifications such as pots and jugs. It is true that by knowing the essential nature of clay, we do not know all its shapes and forms. There is no harm in that, because shape or form is not an 'entity'. Modifications are seen by the eye, but apart from clay they have no essential (substantial) nature. That which is perceived, but has no substantial nature, is an illusion. So all modifications are illusions. The essential nature of clay, which remains even when there are no modifications, alone is real. Since the relationship between Brahman and the world is of the same kind, the world being non-different from Brahman, Brahman alone is the absolutely real, though the world is perceived.

Ordinary people, who cannot think out all this, believe that while Brahman is the sole reality, as Scripture says, the world of difference is also real, because it is experienced. From the empirical standpoint they can understand this relationship on the analogy of the ocean and waves which are non-different from each other, but yet are distinct. But the absolute truth is that Brahman is the only Reality.

The analogy of clay and its modifications should not lead us to suppose that Brahman is capable of being modified; for scripture declares that Brahman is immutable. It has been said by some thinkers that just as the same man can stand as well as sit, Brahman is both capable of, and also incapable of, modifications. This is wrong, because Brahman remains always in the same state. Brahman never undergoes any modifications, because it has absolutely no attributes. Passages which speak of the world as a modification of Brahman, are intended to bring home the essential nature of Brahman and hence are subordinate to the main theme. Further, from the knowledge of a mutable Brahman one cannot attain immortal bliss. Knowledge of the eternal and immutable Brahman alone can lead to that.

6. The critic may now ask: If there is no distinction of controller and controlled, creator and creatures, how is God the cause of the world?

The Advaita replies that from the standpoint of imagined duality, Brahman is spoken of as God, but in reality there is non-difference.<sup>7</sup> Advaita will admit no self-contradiction here. In reality there is no controller and controlled; only from the



empirical standpoint there is such a difference. The idea of God as one with omniscience and omnipotence is contingent on his being limited by adjuncts which are of the nature of ignorance.<sup>8</sup> In reality the self devoid of all limitations cannot be spoken of as creator, creature, or omniscient.

7. The critic may bring forward another argument: The Upaniṣads say that the individual soul itself is Brahman, for they clearly teach, 'That Thou art'. So if Brahman is the creator, then the individual soul also is the creator. How can this be? If the individual soul is the creator, why does it create for itself all sorts of misery like birth, disease, senility and death? No free person would create for himself a prison and this world of transmigration is verily a prison for the individual soul. Supposing the individual is the creator, why is it that it does not know itself to be so?

To this the Advaita Vedānta replies that the creator of the world is Brahman, which is omniscient, pure and omnipotent. It is transcendent to and distinct from the embodied soul (*śārīrāt adhiḥkam anyat*). As Brahman is eternally free, nobody can do it any harm or good. Its knowledge and power are unlimited, while the embodied soul is not like that. Scripture itself has spoken about the difference of Brahman from the individual soul in such passages as 'It (Brahman) must be sought after and known (by the individual soul)'.

All these statements are made from the standpoint of empirical experience which in reality is nothing but illusion. When the non-difference of everything from Brahman is known from the Upaniṣads, then the transmigratory nature of the individual soul as well as the creatorship of Brahman drop away, because both of these—the transmigratory world and Brahman's being creator—are illusions and false. So as a matter of fact there is neither creation, nor inequality, nor evil. The world of difference in names and forms is erected on (*pratyupasthāpita*) nescience and is a delusion (*bhrānti*). In truth there is no world.<sup>9</sup> But as long as there is no firm knowledge of the supreme truth of non-duality, the empirical experience of difference will continue, and from the empirical standpoint Brahman is transcendent in relation to the individual soul.

8. The critic may then say that the immutable Brahman cannot be the cause of diverse effects unaided by anything, and the eternal Brahman cannot be the cause of successive creations in time. The effects of an eternal timeless thing must themselves be eternal.

To this the Vedānta replies that from the empirical standpoint Brahman becomes the world as milk becomes curd. Heat etc. only expedite the transformation of milk into curd. If milk does not have the capacity to transform itself into curd, no amount of heat can do so. Nor can heat in any way increase or decrease the kind and degree of modification which milk can undergo by itself. So milk is the principal cause of curd; and heat etc., are only causal auxiliaries which expedite the effect or contribute to its perfection. Now Brahman, being perfect, needs no auxiliaries. The critic may reply that there can be no analogy between milk, which is inanimate, and Brahman, the Spirit. Śankara replies that we can understand Brahman's causality on the analogy of the supernormal power of gods and sages, who by their sheer volition produce anything. The *Purāṇas* etc. are full of such incidents. The spider brings forth the web from itself. Though Brahman is one and immutable, through the power of nescience it is able to generate the world. Due to nescience there arises the appearance of the succession of effects in time.

9. The critic may raise another objection: Scripture speaks of the transformation of Brahman into the world, and the analogies of milk and curd, water and ice are given. But if Brahman is liable to transformation, it cannot be eternal. If at least Brahman has parts, we can assume that some of its parts may undergo change, while the others remain changeless. But Brahman has no parts. So if it changes, it must change as a whole, or it must remain for ever without change.

The Vedānta replies to this that Brahman is not transformed into the world as a whole, for scripture says that it transcends the world. While the modifications of Brahman are perceptible, Brahman is beyond the pale of the senses. It may be asked, how can the indivisible Brahman change, and yet remain unchanged? Śankara replies that as Brahman cannot be perceived, scripture is the only authority regarding Brahman. Scripture tells us that



Brahman is impartite, but partly transformed (*akṛtsnaprasaktim niravayavatvam* *ça*). That is the final word on this subject.

It may now be urged that even scripture cannot make us accept what is self-contradictory. That is true; but it should be remembered that the transformation of Brahman is only from the standpoint of empirical experience. All modifications and differences are the fabrications of nescience. Just as to a person having an eye disease the moon may appear double, even so, because of the indescribable differences in name and form imagined by our nescience, Brahman is spoken of as transformed. But in reality Brahman transcends all empirical usage and is eternally changeless. The things of the world which differ so much in name and form are empty words, and so they cannot affect Brahman's indivisibility. Scriptural statements about creation and Brahman's transformation are not final, but are only intended to lead up to the final doctrine of non-dualism.<sup>10</sup>

Śankara's position may be summed up thus : Brahman is the material cause of the world. But Brahman is eternally immutable and impartite ; and so its transformation into the world is only an 'appearance', like the appearance of water in the mirage. Till this supreme truth is digested, one has to accept it from scripture that Brahman, though indivisible and immutable, is the cause of the world. The analogies of dream experience and magic may help to explain how there can be all sorts of appearances, without the cause undergoing any essential change. As the magician is able to show his magic without the help of extraneous things, Brahman is capable of being the substratum of illusion though it has no body or parts.

10. To the atheist the Vedānta would say that from the empirical standpoint Brahman creates the world 'in sport' as easily as one breathes. But Brahman has no purpose in the creation of the world, because it is perfect and self-sufficient. As kings and nobles engage themselves in sport without aiming at anything and as our breathing in and out takes place easily and naturally without having any aim, so Brahman also engages himself in the creation of the world as if in sport.

11. From the empirical standpoint the Vedānta claims that it can tackle the problem of the world's inequality and evil. God

(says the Advaitin) creates the world of inequality and misery considering the merit and demerit of the individual soul.<sup>11</sup> To each being, God gives its due. The sufferings and evil which living beings undergo are the results of past deeds in previous births. God may be compared to rain. Without rain no crops can grow, but the differences in the crops—barley, wheat, rice etc.—are due to the differences in the seeds. While rain is the 'general' cause of crops, seeds are the 'special' causes. Even so, God is the creator of the whole universe; but the differences among creatures are due to their own accumulated merits and demerits. We know from scripture that God creates taking into account the merit and demerit of individuals. This is in no way derogatory to God's omnipotence, even as the master's power in rewarding his servants according to the merits of their services is unquestioned.<sup>12</sup>

An atheist may ask, how could there be any merit and demerit of individual souls before creation? for then they could neither have acted nor accumulated any merit and demerit. The Vedānta replies that the world of transmigration is beginningless. The beginninglessness of the world can be known through reason. If the world had a sudden and definite beginning, then even liberated souls would be liable to birth. Further, if the world had a definite beginning, how are the evil and the inequalities accounted for? For whose faults do souls suffer? It cannot be said that nescience is the cause of the world, because nescience which is of uniform nature cannot be the cause of inequalities. So the fruits of one's own actions in previous births must be the cause of one's happiness and unhappiness in the present birth. God only sees that each one reaps the rewards of his actions—whether good or bad. Unless the world of transmigration is beginningless, there cannot be an ever-present causal relation between *karmas* and inequalities. Reason (says the Advaitin) forces us to assume the world's beginninglessness, and there is also clear scriptural testimony for this.<sup>13</sup> Thus while from the empirical standpoint Brahman is the creator of the world and while all criticisms of an atheist can be met with forcibly, the Advaitin says that accounts of creation found in the Upaniṣads are not absolutely true. They are from the standpoint of name and form, fabricated by nescience. To rebut materialism, it is first



propounded that pure consciousness is the cause of the world; and then that consciousness alone is the sole reality, and that the world of multiplicity is a mere illusion.<sup>14</sup>

12. The critic may say that there is self-contradiction in the Upaniṣads regarding the process and successive stages of creation. For example the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says that 'Ether came out of the Ātman'; while the *Chāndogya* says, 'It (Brahman) created Fire'; the *Itareya* says, 'It creates these worlds'; and the *Mundaka* says, 'From this is born life'. Similarly, the Upaniṣads are not unanimous about the cause of the world. The *Chāndogya* says that 'Being was at the beginning'; the *Taittirīya* declares that 'All this was non-being in the beginning', and the *Itareya* maintains that 'the Self alone was the beginning of all this'. The critic can say that we cannot select one of these texts at our pleasure and reject the rest. The sensible thing would be to reject all of them, and come to a conclusion independently of them, on the basis of reasoning and *śrutis*.

To this Śankara replies that there may be discrepancies in the Upaniṣadic passages dealing with the process and order of creation, but there is no discrepancy in the statements about the cause of the world. The all-knowing Lord of all, who is the Absolute and the Self of all is always asserted to be the cause of the world in all the Upaniṣads. Brahman who is spoken of as 'being' at one place is spoken of as the 'self' at another place, to show that he is the inner Self of all beings. The text 'Non-being was at the beginning of the world' does not refer to absolute non-existence, but to undifferentiated Brahman devoid of name and form. Thus (says Śankara) there is complete unanimity among all the Upaniṣads about Brahman being the cause of the world.

There may be, Śankara says, apparent contradictions in the passages which speak of the process and successive stages of creation; but these contradictions can be reconciled by closer study. Even if they cannot be, Śankara thinks, there is no harm, for the main purpose of scripture is not to describe or explain the created phenomena. The main purpose of scripture is to impart *saving* knowledge; and knowledge of the transient world and its creation cannot lead to liberation. From the way in which the passages dealing with creation begin and end and from the way in

which they carry on discussion, it is evident that the main purpose of the Upaniṣads is not to give accurate accounts of creation, but to impart knowledge of Brahman. With the help of various examples such as that of clay becoming pots, sparks emanating from fire, etc., scripture teaches us that the world is not different from its cause. The Upaniṣads are not concerned with the way in which the process and successive stages of creation are explained, but they give some such accounts to help us to grasp the supreme truth of the absolute non-duality of Brahman, by the apprehension of which truth the apparent transmigratoriness of the self drops away.<sup>15</sup>

Vācaspati, however, does not admit any contradictions even in the passages dealing with creation. He says that the order of creation may be ether, air and fire. As God is the cause of all of them, to say that God is the cause of ether is as appropriate as saying that God is the cause of fire. There would be contradiction if at one place it is said 'From ether arose air, from air fire', and at another place 'From fire arose air, from air ether'; but there is no such contradiction. An example will make this clear. Devadatta may be efficient in many handicrafts—in making pots, in grinding flour, in fetching water with that pot, and in making cakes with that flour. One may say that Devadatta prepared the flour and that the flour became the cakes, or one may say that Devadatta made the cakes. There is no contradiction in this. Similarly there is no contradiction in saying either that from Brahman came ether and from it air, or that from Brahman came air.<sup>16</sup>

13. Lastly a critic may raise another difficulty: a conscious principle is nowhere seen to be the material cause in our experience. Now conscious beings are always efficient causes. For example, a potter, who is a conscious being, is the efficient cause of a pot; but he is not its material cause. So it is a violation of our experience to say that Brahman, i.e. pure consciousness, is the material cause of the world.

Śankara replies that scripture clearly says that Brahman is the constitutive cause of the world: 'Brahman desired "May I become many" and it became (*bahuśyām prajāyeya*); he made himself into the created world (*ātmānam svayam akuruta*);



the wise regard it as the source (locus of origin) of all beings (*yad bhūta yonim paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ*).<sup>17</sup> Such are some of the Upaniṣadic texts, which say emphatically that Brahman is the material cause of the world. Further, the Upaniṣads clearly say that just as by knowing about a ball of clay we know about all possible modifications of clay, so knowledge of the one thing, Brahman, gives us knowledge of all things. The analogy of clay would not be appropriate unless Brahman were the material cause of everything; knowledge of it cannot give us knowledge of all things. If it is only the efficient cause, its effects would be different and diverse (in their essence) and from the knowledge of it we cannot have the knowledge of all the effects. As for the critic's objection that nowhere is intelligent agency (*īkṣāpūrvaka kartṛtvam*) seen in material causes, the Vedānta replies that empirical experience is no criterion in these matters. This thing is not to be known through inference. It is to be known from scripture alone and must be understood accordingly.<sup>17</sup> Further, Brahman is a material cause, in the sense that it is the substratum of illusion. Even a conscious principle, devoid of all attributes, can be a material cause in that sense. So (Śāṅkara concludes) there is nothing that can be questioned about the Upaniṣadic doctrine.<sup>18</sup>





## BOOK TWO

'Advaita contents me not, but dear to me  
The service of Thy feet.

O grant me this reward ! To sing of Thee  
To me how sweet.'

—Tukārām.

### NOTE

Part One contains criticisms of the Advaita Vedānta made by the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya schools, and the author's brief comments on these criticisms. Part Two endeavours to develop a conception of God and Revelation through an appraisal of the Advaita Vedānta in the light of contemporary trends of thought in Europe, but the theory so developed is fundamentally based on the Gitā conception of God and the Nyāya conception of the Veda.





## PART ONE

### CHAPTER I

#### THE VIEWS OF OTHER HINDU SCHOOLS ON 'THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD'

##### I

##### *Non-Logical Systems*

The Point of View of the Upaniṣads and the Gītā :

In the Vedic *Samhitas* and the Upaniṣads we see two trends of thought—monistic idealism and monotheism.<sup>1</sup> Theistic conceptions are to be specially found in *Kaṭha* and *Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣads*. Besides the Upaniṣads, another book of supreme importance, which is recognized as a *Smṛti* by such authorities as Bādarāyaṇa, Prabhākara and Śankara, is the *Bhagavadgītā*, which definitely teaches monotheism. Since our present purpose is not to trace the evolution of monotheism in the Hindu scriptures, we need not go into details.

It is sufficient to say here that in the *Samhitas* or the Upaniṣads the existence of deity is never treated as if it were a truth to be demonstrated. The early Vedic seers never doubted the existence of the gods Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa etc., and in the *Śvetāśvetara*, which is hailed by Deussen as a monument of theism, the seer declares that he knows the Supreme Person (*vedāhametaṁ puruṣaṁ mahāntaṁ*).<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere it is said that the sage Śvetāśvetara knows Brahman through the power of *tapas* (*askesis*) and the grace of God.<sup>3</sup> God is the light of one's reason (*ātma buddhi prakāśaṁ*); he is seen by Yogic meditation (*dhyānayogānugataḥ apaśyaṁ*). The *Śvetāśvetara* also says that he is to be seen by his grace alone (*tam-apaśyati-dhātuh prasādāt*). The same idea is found in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*. God is to be attained by those whom he chooses (*yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyah*).

The Gītā again says that it is from God that knowledge comes (*mattah smṛtiḥ jñānam*), and that he is to be known through all the Vedas (*vedaiṣca sarvairaham eva vedyo*); God, however, cannot be intuited by a mere study of the Veda (*na vedayajñādhyayanaiḥ*), but only through devotion (*bhaktyātvānanyayā śakya aham jñātum dṛṣṭum*; *bhaktyā mām abhijānāti*) and through his grace (*mayā prasannena*). Ignorance, which clouds spiritual vision and which hides God from men, is removed by surrendering oneself to him and obtaining his grace (*mām eva ye prapadyante māyām taranti*). It is clear from this that in the Vedic-Upaniṣadic age or in the Gītā-age the problem was never that of demonstrating God's existence or the existence of Ātman. In the Rg-Vedic age if at all there was a problem, it was 'to whom shall we offer worship'? (*kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema*); the problem in those days was how to select a god out of the many. In the Upaniṣadic passages Ātman's existence is never sought to be proved; but what is expressly taught is the identity of Ātman, whose nature is bliss and consciousness, and the individual. So, too, in the Gītā the problem is never to convince the atheist of God's existence. There was too much of worship and too many objects of worship for that (*yajante sāttvikā devān* etc.—*prapadyante anya devatāḥ*); and indeed more of false-worship than that of true (*yajante nāma yajnaiḥste*). The endeavour of the Gītā was to teach about the one true God and the way of true worship, not to prove his existence.

### The Necessity for a Proof of Theism:

But in later times, when Buddhism and Jainism and the Cārvāka arose, not only was the existence of God and Ātman doubted, but emphatically denied. They claimed that the new type of arguments (such as those found in *Kathāvastu* of the Buddhist scriptures) and the new way of thinking ruled out God, and exposed the mischief of the priests, who had invented 'God'. This gave rise to a critical attitude in theology, and in answer to that the apologetic method arose. Whereas in the previous age of intellectual development the authority of scripture and the existence of God were accepted as axiomatic, they now had to be proved.

Two definite streams of thought crystallized themselves in



the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya. The Mīmāṃsā sought to counter scepticism, materialism and relativism in morals, by attempting to prove that there is an eternal scripture, which is nobody's work and hence free from all possible defects. The Nyāya attempted to prove God's existence on rational grounds, and justify the authority of the Veda as God's Word (*āptavākya*).

Mīmāṃsā :

Jaimini (fourth century B.C.), followed by Śābara (first century B.C.), held that God's existence is indemonstrable, and that the Veda is eternal scripture. The next great Mīmāṃsā writer, Kumārila, subjected the proof for God's existence to a searching criticism, pronounced an 'omniscient person' to be a myth, but accepted the conception of Supreme Self and knowledge of it as the means of liberation. Prabhākara, another great Mīmāṃsaka, was more reserved; he did not criticise the theological proofs, and held that the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā cannot satisfy the pure in heart, who have no desires. Writers of Mīmāṃsā manuals such as Āpadeva and Laugākṣi Bhāskara were theists, but held the Veda to be eternal. But their 'God' is not the Creator-God of theists. We may say that Mīmāṃsā is in general atheistic, while Kumārila and Prabhākara were inclined towards some type of Vedānta.

The early writers on Mīmāṃsā felt either that God's existence was indemonstrable or that he was non-existent, or that it was not necessary to prove that there is a God in order to exhort people to lead a moral life (*dharma*); but they found the concept of Vedic revelation indispensable.

Śālikanātha, a great Mīmāṃsā writer, opines that the Mīmāṃsā school wished to establish the Veda as a self-evident, unquestionable and eternal source of truth; and as acceptance of God and a scripture composed by him would make the conception of eternal scripture superfluous, they out of spite denied his existence and *hastily* interpreted the Vedic passages which frequently speak about 'God' in another way.<sup>4</sup> Another Mīmāṃsā writer Nandīśvara also says that anything said by way of criticism of the theological proofs does not mean that there is no God.<sup>5</sup> The *Mānameyodaya* also says that for the Mīmāṃsā, 'God, the most compassionate' is acceptable.\*<sup>6</sup>

It is quite possible that Jaimini though he believed in God did not deal with that subject, because he was only concerned with the principles

\* cp. Marcionism.

of scriptural exegesis in his *sūtras*. Jaimini nowhere says anything about God or even *apūrva*. He only says that the relationship between words and their meanings are natural (*autpattika*) and therefore an eternal scripture is conceivable.<sup>7</sup> Even in saying this, he quotes Bādarāyaṇa as the authority for it; and as nobody can say that Bādarāyaṇa is an atheist, the holding of the conception of an eternal scripture alone cannot prove Jaimini to be an atheist. His immediate commentator, Śabara, commenting on that *sūtra*, says that just as the Himālayas are not remembered to have been made by anyone, words and their relations also were not fixed by anyone. This implies that like the Himālayas (and the world), words and their meanings are natural and uncreated. We are left to conjecture whether Śabara believed in a God who is not a creator, or in a supreme Ātman.

Kumārila, the next great Mīmāṃsā writer, emphatically rejects all proofs for the existence of a world-creator and finds the conception of an omniscient person untenable. If creation is admitted, we cannot say why inequalities and evil should have been created, and if a definite end of the world is admitted, we cannot explain how the unreleased souls and wicked people will also become free all at once. How can the inexorable operation of the moral law be put a stop to, all of a sudden, by such a thing as the end of the world? These difficulties cannot be satisfactorily answered. But though Kumārila rejects the conception of a creator and an omniscient person, Hindu tradition believes that he was not an atheist. In the *Saṅkara Vijaya* he is reported to have said that he denied God, who is known both in the Veda and in the world, to establish the self-validity of the Veda.<sup>8</sup> This is supported by the fact that Kumārila begins his book with a prayer to Śiva and his commentator Pārthasārathy explains that this is a prayer to Viśveśvara (the lord of the universe). This view is further strengthened by a passage in the *Tantra Vārtika*, where it is said that the Vedic passages which speak of 'the meditation of the sinless self' as leading to liberation are not to be understood in a secondary way. Due knowledge of the Self does give rise to the attainment of the Supreme Self. Kumārila further adds that knowledge of the self and performance of duties are both distinct, and neither of them have to be abandoned. Each has its distinct purpose; for while knowledge leads to liberation, performance of duties results in happiness in this world.<sup>9</sup> His commentator Pārthasārathy explains that the knowledge which leads to liberation is that which is in the form of worship and meditation (of the supreme self?). This standpoint is not very different from that of the Advaita Vedānta.

Hindu tradition believes that Jaimini did not deal with Brahman and Īśvara (God), because many cannot understand it; the majority of men are concerned with worldly matters alone and to benefit them he dealt with morality and duty, the



cultivation of which is the means of attaining Brahman. The Mīmāṃsā criticism of theological proofs means only that God's existence is not a matter of proof, but to be known from the Veda.<sup>10</sup> In short, Jaimini wrote on ethics (*dharma mīmāṃsā*), the science of right living, and not on the supreme self.

This interpretation of Jaimini's work is supported by no less a person than Prabhākara. He says that in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 'action' alone is dealt with ; hence it strictly concerns itself with what constitutes the goodness of an action, how it is known and what actions should be regarded as duty. Quoting the Gītā, he says that those who are still at the level of thinking that rightly done action is the end of life should not be disturbed, lest they lose that faith. But there are others who have lost all impurities (*mṛdita kaṣāya*) and who have no desires. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (Prabhākara says) has no occasion to deal with their case.<sup>11</sup> This implies that it is intended only for those who think the Law to be the last thing and the due observance of Law the end of life. Those who are seeking to go beyond the Law and hankering after the spirit must turn to the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (Vedānta).

Kumārila also facilitates the above interpretation ; for he says : The knowledge of the Self, which leads to liberation, is strengthened by the study of Vedānta.<sup>12</sup> According to him, he who correctly understands the nature of the Self will have no desires, but will continue to discharge all obligatory duties. He who has no desires will accumulate no *vāsanās* and hence will have no future births, and when the fruits of past actions are spent by enjoying them he will be disembodied and be free for ever.<sup>13</sup>

Yoga :

Patanjali (second century B.C.) and Vyāsa (fourth century A.D.), authors of the *Yoga Sūtra* and *bhāṣya* respectively, added their support to theism and the Veda. They held that the existence of an Omniscient Being can be inferred, and that the Veda is taught by God. 'God' of the Yoga school also is not the creator-God ; nor is worship of or meditation on him necessary for salvation ; though one way of attaining concentration is devotion to God.

God, according to the Yoga school, is a Person (or spirit) untouched by nescience, *Karma*, its fruits, or any taint of imperfection. Whatever admits of degrees of excellence, must have a maximum ; and so knowledge must also reach its limit in some one ; and that Person who possesses omniscience which is unsurpassed and unequalled is 'God' (*yatra kṣāṭhā*

*prāptirjñānasya sa sarvajnah*). That is the Yoga inference for the existence of God.

God in the Yoga is eternally free and most compassionate. He was the great teacher of even the first men, because he was never non-existent, and at the beginning of each world-epoch he imparts *saving* truth in the form of the Veda. All souls are inherently free from imperfection, but due to association with matter, souls are spoken of as bound and imperfect, just as victory or defeat, which are really the soldiers', are spoken of as a king's victory or defeat. God is never associated with matter even in this way. But the contact of souls with matter is unintelligible unless we posit God's will as its cause. (Bhoja\*) He wills so because he is most compassionate and wishes to save all beings from transmigration at the periodic dissolutions and the great dissolution of the world. He is capable of redeeming the whole world by his mere will to do so ('*içchāmātreṇa sakala jagaduddhāraṇa kṣamāh*'—Bhoja).

Vyāsa does not think that the above inference tells us anything special about God. He says that since an inference can only end in telling something in general, nothing special is known about the major term (here God), but from scripture we learn that there is only one such omniscient Person and that he is free, omnipotent etc.<sup>14</sup>

This argument of the Yoga school does not seek to prove that God is the being, who has all positive properties in the highest possible degree. As Vācaspati expressly says it is intended to establish only one thing: that knowledge must have a maximum limit.<sup>15</sup> This is altogether unlike the ontological argument of Western philosophy. It must also be noted that the Yoga school does not claim that inference can establish that there is only *one* such being.

Vācaspati thinks that a similar argument cannot be applied to 'magnitude' etc., i.e., it cannot be argued that magnitudes must have a maximum limit, because they have got degrees; for whatever may be the 'magnitude' reached, a greater 'magnitude' may be thought of. On the other hand, maximum knowledge is the apprehension of all past, present and future things, severally as well as in their totality, and is possessed to some extent by all, and so it can have a *kāṣṭhā*—an upper limit.<sup>16</sup>

Comment :

The Yoga argument presupposes (i) that knowledge has an upper limit, and (ii) that it abides in one person at least. The conclusion is hypothetical, for as Vyāsa puts it: '*That* is God, wherein knowledge reaches its uttermost limit.' But is there any '*That*', wherein this happens? This only proves that the

\* A commentator on the *Yoga Sūtra*.



notion of omniscience is involved in knowledge, and that if anyone has it, he is God. If cognition implies the reality of the object of cognition (as the Advaita holds), and if all knowledge is always the knowledge of the real, then we must grant that the conception of absolute knowledge is a valid concept. At the same time we must conclude that it is an abstract concept which is so general that it has no concrete content and that it merely shows that all knowledge involves the apprehension of an Absolute, whereby we judge that our own knowledge is fragmentary and finite. The Yoga has not given a logical demonstration (*anumāna*), but a logical explication (*tarka*), which shows that the idea of an omniscient being is possible (*sarvajñāstīva sambhāvanā mātra buddhi*), and is already present in our consciousness. (See *infra* pp. 220-1.)

Sāmkhya :

Kapila is claimed as the founder of the Sāmkhya, but some modern scholars doubt whether he is a historical personage. The *Sāmkhya Sūtra* alleged to have been written by Kapila is available, and if its author was the Kapila, mentioned in many of the *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas*, it must be a Pre-Buddhistic work. Otherwise it must have been written sometime before the fifteenth century, for Aniruddha who lived in that century commented on it; and Vijnānabhikṣu of the sixteenth century wrote another commentary. Another important book on the Sāmkhya is Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāmkhya Kārikā*, written sometime before the fourth century. Since Īśvara Kṛṣṇa does not mention 'God', the following account is based on the *Sāmkhya Sūtra*, and it shows that Sāmkhya is atheistic.

Kapila says that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated; because if there were to be a God, he would have to be either a liberated self, or a self in the bondage of transmigration, and in either case he could not be the creator of the world.<sup>17</sup>

A 'bound' person is incapable of creating the world, while a 'freed' person has no motive in creating it. The passages in the scriptures, which appear to be theistic, are either mere eulogies of liberated souls or meditations of perfected souls like Brahmā or Viṣṇu, 'figuratively called eternal gods'.<sup>18</sup> Kapila says that the distribution of happiness or unhappiness in proportion to one's good or bad actions need not be made by God, because the *necessary* (*āvāśyaka*)

*harma* itself will achieve that.<sup>19</sup> For, what purpose could God have in such distribution? and if it is for his benefit (*upakāra*), then he will be like a king, or some other worldly lord, i.e. he will himself be created, 'bound', and subject to passions and desires.<sup>20</sup> Such a person cannot be 'eternally liberated', and to call him 'God' is to abuse a technical term.<sup>21</sup> How does God become the creator? Is it by association with matter or by his mere existence? In the former case (Kapila says) he will be subject to the defect of 'attachment' (*sanga*), and not independent; in the latter case all souls would be Gods, for all of them exist.

According to Kapila there is no *pramāṇa* for the existence of God; for the senses do not apprehend him and inference is impossible; whereas Scripture (says Kapila) maintains that *matter* is the ultimate cause.<sup>22</sup>

But Kapila has two perplexing *sūtras*: (i) He is the all-knower and all-doer; (ii) Existence of this sort of God is proved.<sup>23</sup> The commentator explains that thereby Kapila means the primal person at the commencement of the world, who is himself a created god (*janya Īvara*), but not creator. This 'God' ordains (*vyavasthāpaka*) the later unfolding of *matter*.

Vijnānabhikṣu thinks that the Sāmkhya is reconcilable with Vedānta (not Advaita) doctrine of Brahman, and believes that Kapila's 'atheism' was meant to show that the postulation of God is not necessary for philosophy, and that a man can develop 'independence' (*kaivalya*) from *matter* much better, if he is not excessively concerned with thinking over 'God'; and according to the Sāmkhya, liberation consists in realising that one is entirely independent of and unattached to *matter*.

Vaiśeṣika :

Kaṇāda (later than 300 B.C.) and Praśastapāda (fourth century A.D.) are the earliest writers to whom Vaiśeṣika doctrines can be traced. Śāṅkara<sup>24</sup> and Uddyotakara understand the Vaiśeṣika to be atheistic, though at one place Śāṅkara says that 'the followers of Kaṇāda advance arguments to prove that God is the efficient cause, while atoms are the material cause of the world'.<sup>25</sup>

Kaṇāda says that names and effects are the 'middle terms' for inferring persons who excel us; for naming and producing an effect depend on perception.<sup>26</sup> The commentator, Śāṅkara Miśra, says that by 'persons', God and great sages are meant.

Śāṅkara Miśra says that only after Čaitra and Maitra were born and perceptible, their fathers named them; similarly, nothing can be named, if it is imperceptible. So the signs 'heaven' and '*Apūrva*'



(extraordinary potency, which is instrumental in giving a man his due) could have been used only by a person to whom those objects were perceptible. So, firstly, since the name 'heaven', for instance, could have been given to its referent only by one who *made* it and sees it, this proves the existence of God. Secondly, since earth etc., are products, they must have an author. Thus (Śankara Miśra says) is God proved by Kaṇāda.<sup>27</sup>

Praśastapāda accepts the existence of the Lord of the entire universe, Maheśvara, the Supreme Lord. For the sake of enabling 'beings' (*prāṇī*) to enjoy the fruits of their actions, God desires to create, and by his will motion is set up in the atoms under the influence of the 'unseen tendencies' (towards future births) in souls. So the process of creation starts. From then on souls transmigrate. After a fixed number of world-epochs, God desires to give rest to the souls tired of transmigration. As soon as God so desires, the 'unseen tendencies' in souls come to a stop, and the world is destroyed, leaving atoms and souls alone isolated, for they are eternal.<sup>28</sup> Again creation restarts, when God so wills, and this process of world-cycles is eternal.

Comment :

Praśastapāda gives no proof for God's existence, but merely believes, while Kaṇāda's statement is puzzling. His phrase 'persons who excel us' might just mean beings of a higher order than man, and not God. Further, he speaks of not one such supreme being, but of many beings. He might have believed in gods, though not in God; but it is strongly probable that he was a theist, because according to Hindu tradition the Vaiśeṣika school is Śaivaite, and Praśastapāda uses the word 'Maheśvara' for God. Śankara Miśra's first proof is too flimsy to be taken notice of, while his second proof is the same as that of the Nyāya school, and it will be commented upon in connection with Nyāya.

## II

### *The Rational Theology of Nyāya*

Gotama (sometime about the third century B.C.), and Vātsyāyana (sometime before 400 A.D.) are the earliest available writers on Nyāya. Using the principles of logic and the syllogistic

form of argument formulated by them, Buddhist thinkers such as Dingnāga (460 A.D.), Dharmakīrti (635 A.D.) and Śānta Rakṣita (749 A.D.) refuted the arguments for God's existence and rejected scriptural testimony as a source of knowledge. Uddyotakara (635 A.D.), Vācaspati (841 A.D.), Udayana (984 A.D.) and Jayanta (850-910 A.D.) took up the cause of theism and the Veda, and gave effective replies to atheists.

### First Nyāya Proof:

The argument given by Gotama and Vātsyāyana is different from that given by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, and is thus formulated: There must be an intelligent person who distributes happiness or unhappiness to everyone in proportion to his accumulated virtue or vice. Actions by themselves cannot bring forth fruits, as nothing unconscious can by itself be efficient. God cannot be the independent cause of man's lot, as then inequalities and evil would be due to him, and as it would become immaterial whether we act rightly or wrongly. So God bestows fruits at the proper time and in the proper way, in accordance with man's deserts judged on the basis of his actions.<sup>29</sup> This argument is never put in a formal form, probably because it was not found possible. A critic (e.g. an Advaitin) may ask, 'Why should only *one* God be assumed as the ruler of *Karma*? Why cannot a plurality of gods be conceived as ruling over the operation of *Karma*? The Nyāya answers that it is against the principle of parsimony to posit a plurality of gods, and that a plurality of gods, with a unity of purpose, is inconceivable.

Udayana developed this argument in the following way: The Mīmāṃsakas taught that duty is made known to us in the form of self-evident injunctions. But (asks the Nyāya) who gave us these injunctions? Who is it that commands us to do good, and claims obedience? It is absurd of the Mīmāṃsaka to reply that it is an eternal scripture; as if there could be an eternal book in this mortal world, as if there could be a command without one who commands, and as if a static book could exact obedience! So, if we regard duty (dharma) as an obligation which we must fulfil and as an injunction (*vidhī*) which we must obey, we must and can conceive it as coming from God alone. Even if duty is made known to us in Vedic injunctions, they are obligatory



because they are God's commands. The authority of a scripture is derived from its author only; and since none other than God can be the ground of our belief (*viśvāsaikabhūva*), the Nyāya concludes that he should be conceived as the giver of the Law, and also the Ruler of it.<sup>30</sup>

Everyone other than the materialist, whether a Mīmāṃsaka or a Buddhist, admits that actions are 'right' or 'wrong' and that they produce good or evil. Acts such as charity, truth-speaking, sacrifice, meditation etc., admittedly result in 'the good'. Such acts are not indeed seen to produce any immediate result, like the massage of the body which at once produces pleasure, or as the pricking of a thorn which gives pain.\* Yet not even the Buddhists or the Mīmāṃsakas would declare meditation, charity etc., as useless. The Mīmāṃsaka rightly postulates that every act—good or bad—produces an unseen transcendental factor (*apūrva*), which inheres in the soul and will determine our life hereafter, while our present life is determined by the *apūrva* due to past deeds in past lives. But *Apūrva* (says the Nyāya) is a blind unconscious principle, which cannot operate by itself; so it must be directed by an intelligent being, God, and is, in fact, a unique (*asama*) concurrent energy (*sahakāri śakti*) of God. As it is mysterious, it is called *māyā*; as it is the primal principle, it is called *prakṛti*; and as it is removed by knowledge, it is called *avidyā*.<sup>31</sup> The Nyāya says that virtue and vice—dharma and adharma—accumulated by individuals because of their actions from beginningless time are the causes of their births and rebirths; but they being unintelligent principles cannot be efficient by themselves; they must be put into motion (*adhiṣṭita*) by an intelligent being—God.

The above argument of the Nyāya school presupposes that matter cannot be efficient by itself, but must be put into motion by a conscious principle. The Sāṃkhya, however, contested this pointing out the examples of milk, which automatically flows out of the udder for the calf's sake, of water, which finds its own level, and of magnets which draw to themselves iron filings. The reply given by theists is that we do not see anywhere an unconscious thing independently bringing about anything specifically purposeful. As for the examples cited, milk (theists reply) flows out because the cow out of its love for the calf wills so, or is drawn out because the calf sucks it. As for the behaviour of water, magnets etc., the theists hold that it is the working out of a general law laid down by God. It is an accepted principle in syllogistic debate that none of the parties should cite as an instance any case which is not mutually accepted as such. Since the theist does not accept that the cases cited are natural, they cannot be brought in by the opponent. Moreover the behaviour of magnets or water does not serve any purpose of theirs, since it is always uniform. The

\* This is the Mīmāṃsā distinction between 'vidhi' and 'kriyā'.

Nyāya argues that operation of the law of *Karma* cannot be uniform, because in every case it is determined by the virtue or vice of the individual concerned ; and this can be accomplished by an intelligent principle alone.<sup>32</sup>

Comment :

We see then that this Nyāya argument presupposes that (i) moral precepts present themselves as commands ; (ii) that commands imply a giver ; (iii) that there is an inexorable law operating in the universe ; and (iv) that this implies a purposeful intelligent operator. To one who does not feel any loyalty to the moral good and who thinks he can and ought to obey the moral law, even though Reality is indifferent to righteousness, this argument means nothing. Even those who feel that the universe is rational as well as righteous, are only entitled to draw the implication that the 'ground of the world' is in some sense both good and rational. The argument cannot demonstrate the existence of a single personal, omniscient, omnipotent and eternal Creator. Further, it cannot be logically proved from self-evident premises that the universe obeys the laws of ethics, any more than it can be proved that the universe is intelligible and that its laws can be unravelled by patient inquiry. The argument of Udayana, that since it is our duty to engage ourselves in sacrifices, meditation, charity etc., and that since these cannot give the benefits they are supposed to give unless there is God who bestows happiness in proportion to the virtue thus acquired, may be valid against the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists, who believe in after-life and another world without admitting God's existence. If moral responsibility is revealed to man in the form of a mere obligation which he must obey, it is not possible to infer from this that it is God who is making a claim upon man's will. On the other hand, if it is said that God is not deduced from the experience of moral life, but is directly *known* in it, the statement is unobjectionable. But it must be remembered (i) that this *knowledge* of God is not of the kind found in mathematics and science, and so could never be reduced into a scientific account ; and (ii) that for those to whom God is not so directly present in moral experience no such argument can be convincing. This Nyāya argument is valid only against a religious background.



## Second Nyāya Proof:

The other argument which is more fully worked out by the Nyāya school was first formulated by Uddyotakara, and later in detail by Vācaspati and Udayana. According to the Nyāya, souls and atoms are uncreated. Out of atoms God shapes or constructs the world. All sensible things, such as bodies, the earth, trees, mountains etc., have been made by God. God is the efficient cause of the world, while atoms are the constituent cause. God has made this world so that souls may have the opportunity of reaping the fruits of their past actions and also acquiring right knowledge which is a means of liberation. Yet, as the cycles of creation and dissolution of the world are beginningless, God is not the independent (*nirapekṣa*) author of the world.

The inference for God's existence is not gained by reasoning from effect to cause, such as the inference of very heavy rains from floods in the river. Nor is it reasoning from cause to effect, like that of the inference from dense black clouds of imminent rain. But there is another kind of inference, in which, on the basis of a general law known to us, an unseen thing is inferred from a seen middle term. Vātsyāyana gives an example of this: All qualities must abide in substances; desire etc., are qualities; so they must abide in some substance; and that which is their 'locus' is soul.<sup>33</sup> Other inferences of this kind are—All horned animals are seen to have tails; this animal has horns; so it has a tail. Or again: Wherever cranes are seen in groups, there is water; there are a number of cranes yonder; so there must be water yonder. In reasoning of this sort, which is based on what is generally seen (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*) in a number of particular cases, a specific object is inferred.

Now the Nyāya school thinks that a similar kind of inference is possible in the case of God: All produced things have a maker, who knows about their material cause and the mode and end of their production. For example, a pot has a maker—the potter—who knows all about clay, how to make it into a pot, and the purpose of a pot. Now the earth, mountains, trees etc., are 'produced things', because they are made up of parts; and unconscious constituents cannot of themselves shape themselves into aggregates. So the earth, mountains, trees etc., must have a maker.

As against this, some critics have said that the individual souls themselves may be postulated as the makers of the world; but (Nyāya

replied) this is unintelligible because no individual soul has knowledge of the material cause of the world—the atoms; and without this, nothing can be made out of them. If individual souls have made this world, why did they make it in such a way that they have to experience so much evil? No co-operation is possible between the untold number of individual souls, with all their different ideals, wills and desires. So (Nyāya says) we cannot even conceive the universe as the product of the co-operative endeavour of individual souls who have no unity of purpose. Further, each individual soul cannot be conceived to be the maker of his own body, because then everybody would have made a perfect body for himself. Since there is general agreement that souls are embodied to reap the fruits of their merit or demerit, and since merit and demerit are unobservable, it would be impossible for souls to make bodies for themselves exactly in accordance with their merit and demerit, and then inhabit them.

To the Buddhist who says that intelligent or conscious *Karma* itself can be conceived as the author of the universe, Vācaspati replies that if the Buddhist's 'intelligent *Karma*' has cognition of the world's constituent cause, then it is not something other than God.

The Sāṃkhya theory that primal matter evolves into the sensible world for the sake of providing experience for souls is untenable, according to the Nyāya, because experiences which arise from objects cannot cause them.\* If experiences were already there before the evolution of matter, of what was it an experience? Matter, which is defined by the Sāṃkhya as the state of equilibrium of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, must be disturbed in order that it can transform itself into the world of multiplicity; and the Sāṃkhya cannot account for the cause of this change. On the other hand, atoms cannot by themselves become active and constitute the world, since no inanimate thing is seen to be independently and purposefully active. So (the Nyāya argues) we have to accept the fact that there is an intelligent principle, which is the efficient cause of the world.

On the strength of the properties possessed by the minor term (the earth etc.) the Nyāya says that we are entitled to infer a maker of it, who is altogether unique. The simultaneous production of bodies, trees, mountains etc., would not be possible, unless their author is omniscient. If God is assumed to have a body, we have to postulate another as its maker. So it is much better to suppose (*kalpanā*) that God's cognition is eternal, than to suppose a number of supernatural persons. In other words, the cause of an effect must be sufficient, and in the case of earth etc., nothing less than an eternally omniscient being is a sufficient cause.

The Nyāya says that though we find cognition in our experience always associated with a body, we have no right to assume that the

\*The Nyāya here confuses final and efficient causes. What the Sāṃkhya argues for is the final cause, while the Nyāya thinks that an efficient cause is being postulated. I am indebted to Prof. Price for this criticism.



two are invariably related in such a way that *wherever* there is cognition there is a body. We only know about impermanent, caused cognition; and this is invariably associated with a body; but that cognition which is permanent and eternal is not *seen* to be associated with a body. Merely because God's cognition is also cognition, it cannot be assumed that it must be associated with a body; just as we cannot say that sound must have shape, because it is non-eternal like a pot which has shape.

Our incapacity to see God cannot prove his non-existence, just as our incapacity to perceive atoms, space, duty, goodness etc., does not prove them to be non-existent. If a thing regarded as belonging to the class of physical objects is unperceived, we can conclude it to be a myth, such as a hare's horn. Though we have not seen for ourselves that earth etc., never come into being when there is no God, the Nyāya says that we are justified in inferring this, because earth etc., belong to the class of produced things, and as other things of that class are seen to be produced by a conscious being, we can conclude that such is the fact in this case also. If we know that cloths are produced by a weaver, as soon as we come across a cloth, we know that it has had a maker, though we have not met him.

Arguments such as, 'all products of clay are made by a potter; the ant-hill is a product of clay, so it is made by a potter', are untenable, because they contradict perception. But in this case nothing prevents us from inferring an unperceivable conscious being as the cause of the ant-hill. The inference that God exists is not at all contradicted by perceptual experience.

Arguments such as 'God's knowledge must be like ours, since it too is knowledge', or 'God must have a body, because conscious beings cannot be agents without bodies', are untenable, because these syllogisms have no subject. If God's existence is not admitted, it is foolish to debate about his omniscience or his having no body. If the inference for God's existence is once validly made, the Nyāya says that these inferences which try to prove that God is neither the maker of the world nor omniscient, cannot even arise. 'Agency' implies not only knowledge but also will and effort; so, according to the Nyāya, it is proved that God has all the three.

But the Nyāya school maintains that though God is eternal, he is not an independent author; he cannot, for example, cause a man to die, unless that man's merit or demerit warrants it. As the factors such as *Karma* on which he depends when he makes the world are neither simultaneous nor of uniform nature, the effects of his creation are not uniform, simultaneous or eternal.

According to the Nyāya the difference between God and individual souls is that while both are spirits, God is eternally self-conscious, human individuals are not; and while man's cognition is limited by his senses, body, etc., God's cognition is not; for his cognition (which is of the nature of perception and not of thought) has for its content all

things of the past, the present and the future. In God's non-sensuous cognition there is no element of inference, or knowledge derived from testimony and memory. Only 'right knowledge', which is properly definable as 'independent apprehension of facts as they are' (*samyak pariçhitti*), is inherent in God.

God's knowledge (the Nyāya says) has for its content even illusions, but is not on that account illusory. For example, he would know that somebody perceives nacre as silver. As he who knows an illusion to be such is not himself under an illusion, God's cognition is not illusory though it has a knowledge of illusions.

The Nyāya conceives the relationship between God and individual souls as one of *samyukta samyogī samavāya*, i.e., it is neither that of 'inherence' nor that of 'conjunction'. God is in contact (*samyukta*) with atoms; and souls in which merit and demerit are inherent are in contact with atoms. As a person is able to move a red-hot piece of iron with tongs which are in contact with his hand, so God can govern the souls in accordance with the merit and demerit inherent in them, though he himself is not directly in contact with either. Or (the Nyāya says) we can conceive of some ungenerated relation (*aja sambandha*) between God and souls, though we do not know more about it.

The Nyāya maintains that God is able to put the atoms and *karma* into action without frustrating their inherent capacities, as a competent chemist is able to prepare medicines out of poisonous substances without causing them to lose their properties.

Udayana has an additional interesting argument against atheists. If God's existence is denied, it must have a locus, i.e., when God's existence is denied, what is the subject of that judgment? An absolutely non-existent thing, such as a hare's horn, can neither be the subject of a negation, nor be negated.<sup>34</sup>

Gangeśa's replies to criticisms :

But it has been objected by critics that (a) the Nyāya argument does not prove that there is only one such being, or (b) that he is omniscient.<sup>35</sup>

The Nyāya reply to (a), is that the principle of parsimony obliges us to infer one such being only. The critics say that the principle of parsimony (*lāghava*) is not a *pramāṇa*—a means of knowledge. Gangeśa, a stalwart of the Neo-Nyāya school, replies that wherever there is scope for the consideration whether we should admit a single principle or a multiplicity of principles, all logicians are unanimous that the former course should be followed; and that therefore the principle of parsimony, though not an independent means, is a subsidiary means of knowledge. Whether in the perception of the relationship between cause and



effect, or in analogical reasoning (*upamāna*), which apprehends a thing on the basis of which we act, or in the case of inference, which apprehends the meaning of a sentence, the principle of parsimony is admitted by all logicians to be a useful auxiliary to the main *pramāṇa*. If there is no objection to the alternative favoured by 'parsimony', that alternative must be accepted; otherwise all our behaviour based upon simplicity of supposition would come to an end. In looking for the cause of an event or the meaning of a scriptural passage, it is 'audacious' to say that parsimony is not a part of the means of knowledge itself. It is true that in the case of an inference about a pot or a palace, one may establish from 'parsimony' that each of these has only a single author, but later other means of knowledge may prove that they have many authors, and this will contradict the inference of a single author. But Gangeśa says that in the case of the earth, mountains etc., there is no other means of knowledge which can contradict the view that they have only one author. The absence of any positive proof that there is only one such author cannot be held to 'sublate' such an inference, because the inference itself, aided by parsimony, establishes that there is only one such maker.<sup>36</sup>

Coming to objection (b), the Naiyāyika replies that since proof of agency presupposes direct knowledge of the material cause out of which the thing is made, and since the material cause here is to be found in atoms, which are unperceivable by ordinary human persons, we must conclude that their maker is omniscient. For, since the world has been in existence from a beginningless time and as its cause (the atoms) always existed, he who has direct knowledge of them must be eternal and omniscient.<sup>37</sup>

It is also in accordance with the principle of parsimony to suppose that God's knowledge of things is one and not made of many cognitive states. Though knowledge in our case is finite and non-eternal, it does not follow that all knowledge is such. Nor are all productions produced only by an embodied being; for all parties agree that there is no such author of the trees and grass in the forest, which are nevertheless products. There is no contradiction between that which qualifies the middle term and that which qualifies the major term, as in the case of 'this fire is that of sandalwood, because this has smoke of a bad odour'. Gangeśa thinks that the inference that the author of earth etc., has eternal knowledge has no such defects.<sup>38</sup>

He also argues that 'knowledge' and 'eternity', 'agency' and 'bodylessness' are not contradictory to each other, because either God and his knowledge are known to exist, or not. If the former is the case, then the apparent contradiction between the said properties vanishes; while if God and his knowledge are not known to us, our knowledge of any contradiction between 'knowledge' and 'eternity' has little significance. This cannot be called *tarka*, because such reasoning is possible only where there is doubt, and doubt is impossible about what is known.<sup>39</sup>

Gangeśa says that we cannot infer the maker of the earth, plants etc., to be one who produces them with his hands (*hastādi vyāpāra kṛtimān*), just because in the case of trees and grass we do not see any such one. In 'effort' (*śeṣṭā*), which is generated, we do not see that hands etc., are necessary causes; mere will may be enough to produce 'effort'. Nor are all products other than effort wrought by bodily action, because this is not the case with regard to trees and grass, or the earth.<sup>40</sup> Though in the case of a potter, we see that products are made by one who has a body, there is no invariable relation between agency and body. It may be that a body is an auxiliary cause in the production of pots etc., but that does not mean that body is an auxiliary cause in the production of everything; for to say so is to deny that production as such is always caused by an agent. An example may help. In a particular case blue smoke may be caused by a fire, on account of the nature of the fuel used, but we cannot conclude that all fire causes blue smoke.<sup>41</sup> In a kitchen fire may be lit, by fanning, from coal, but this does not entitle us to say that all fire is lit in that way only.

Replies to other criticisms :

Other possible criticisms, such as, (i) that the necessary consequences of an eternal thing must themselves be eternal, and (ii) that to say that there must be only *one creator*\* of the world having eternal knowledge and omniscience is absurd, are not unknown to the Naiyāyika.

In reply to (i), the Nyāya would say that though God is eternal, he is not the only cause of the world, and so, though he is eternally present, all things are not simultaneously present. God is a cause among a causal collocation, but is not a completely independent cause, for he brings things into existence only when he is aided by the fruition of merits and demerits. Moreover, God being not a thing but a person, nothing can follow from his mere existence as a necessary consequence. He can *will* to do a thing

\* In the sense of one who creates *ex nihilo*.



or not *will*. (Uddyotakara). So, though he is eternal, it does not follow that everything in the world is simultaneous or eternal. Further, though his will is also eternal, his will is not that everything should come into existence at one and the same time. In human life, if I to-day will that such and such a thing should be done by such and such a date, my will is present even from to-day, but *what is willed* is not present. The difference between my willing and God's willing is that whatever God wills is bound to happen, and he wills only what ought to happen.

As regards objection (ii), the Nyāya would maintain that things are real apart from ideas, that the relations between things, such as that of causation, are also real, and lastly that every 'product' (though not everything) must have been made by a conscious principle, as matter cannot order itself purposefully. For the Nyāya, the relation between God and the world is that of an architect and his construction. Only, while making his inference, the Naiyāyika will not have as his minor term 'the entire world'. He will have one by one 'the earth, plants, bodies, mountains etc.,' as minor terms and finally argue that 'parsimony' compels us to posit one maker of all of them. He does not believe that souls and atoms are created. As *all* souls are uncreated, we cannot ask (says the Nyāya), who made God? The Nyāya books emphatically say that they do not seek to prove a creator of the world out of nothing or from himself, or *even* creation at a definite time (*sargūderanabhyupagamāt*, as Uddyotakara says); but that God is the maker of the world in accordance with the merits and demerits of souls; and that creation and dissolution are cyclic.

The Nyāya theory is refutable in two ways: (i) by denying that the earth, mountains etc., are products, or (ii) by saying that matter can by itself evolve into all that we see and also into consciousness. The Buddhists have followed the first alternative, while the Čārvākas have chosen the second.

To the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas may reply that acceptance of the law of *Karma* and rebirth implies the persistence of a substantive soul, as well as a ruler of *Karma*. To this the Buddhist (or the Mīmāṃsaka) has no satisfactory reply. Buddhists, who do not accept anything to be, cannot deny the non-eternity of the earth, etc., and consequently their being 'effects'. The Mīmāṃsaka accepts that 'composite' things (things having parts) are 'destroyable', and that being an 'effect' and being 'destroyable' are inseparable.

The wearing down of the earth, mountains etc., is perceptible ; so the Mīmāṃsaka should also accept them to be 'effects'. The Nyāya agrees that the arrangement of parts in the earth etc., is altogether of a different type from that found in things like pots or houses ; but, he asks, is the arrangement of parts found in a pot, a cloth, and a hall exactly similar ? Still, are not all these regarded as 'composite' ? Even so, the earth etc., must be regarded as 'composite', and since whatever is 'composite' must have a maker, God's existence is proved. The uniqueness of the earth etc., only proves the uniqueness of their author. As for the Čārvāka, he regards the Veda to be just like any other book, in spite of its uniqueness. Cannot he, the Nyāya asks, regard the earth etc., also as products in spite of their uniqueness ? In fact their uniqueness justifies us in inferring an unique author, just as when we see a fine muslin we infer its maker to be an expert weaver. The Nyāya says that God creates the world not by physical action, but by his *will*, just as the soul, though incorporeal, *moves* the body by merely willing. While the Nyāya says that unconscious *Karma* cannot be the cause of the world, it maintains that neither can God be the *only* cause, for then he will be responsible for the evil of the world. If the law of *Karma* is not in operation, there will be no sense in scriptural injunctions.<sup>42</sup>

Summary of the Nyāya Argument :

The Nyāya syllogism can be thus schematised :

| Syllogism  | Schematisation     |
|--|--------------------|
| 1. Whatever is a product has a maker<br>(intelligent cause), | All P is M         |
| 2. For example a pot.  | Some P exists      |
| 3. Whatever is not a product has<br>no maker,                | All non-P is non-M |
| 4. For example an atom.                                      | Some non-P exists  |
| 5. The earth and plants etc., are<br>products,               | X is P             |
| ∴ They have a maker.   | X is M.            |

The second step in the syllogism is necessary, because unless 'some P exists', some P (X) cannot be M, even though All P is M; and in ordinary language this condition is met by mentioning an existent instance of PM in a premise, for which reason Indian syllogism has the second step. Similar is the necessity for the fourth step. The first and third premises together guarantee a stronger connection (*vyāpti*) between P and M, while the second and fourth premises secure that this connection is due neither to the emptiness of P, nor the universality of M.



It being thus proved that there is an intelligent cause of all 'produced things', such as mountains, earth, bodies of animals and men and plants, the Nyāya maintains this cause is proved to be omniscient, because nothing short of an omniscient cause can be sufficient to accomplish this task. The strength of the properties possessed by the minor term (*pakṣadharmatā bala*) requires the cause to be omniscient, and as makership or agency (*kartṛtva*) involves knowledge of the material cause (in this case, atoms) and the necessary will and effort, the Nyāya claims that it is proved that God has these. Moreover, as atoms are eternal, God's knowledge of them must also be eternal. The further conclusion that the cause is *one* only is based on the principle of parsimony, which amounts to an independent proof (*pramāṇa*), when it is in conjunction with perception or inference, and if it is uncontradicted. The Nyāya has another inference to prove that the earth, bodies etc., are products. All composite things (it says) are products, and earth, bodies etc., are composite. Also, all things which can be experienced in more than one way are composite; for example, we can touch a pot as well as see it.

Comment :

If the Nyāya premises are accepted, their conclusion follows; for the syllogism is technically flawless, according to the rules of Indian logic, and the possible formal objections of the Buddhists and others have been answered by the Nyāya. A perusal of the above detailed account will show that all the criticisms of the teleological and cosmological arguments, which were made by Hume and Kant, have been anticipated hundreds of years ago by the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas. Even the recent criticism of Broad, that the effects of an eternal being (whose will is also eternal) cannot be temporal and successive,<sup>43</sup> is found in the Buddhist works of the sixth and seventh centuries. The Nyāya writers have replied to all these criticisms. With regard to Broad's criticism, Dorothy Emmett has said that if the relationship of dependence (between the world and God) is shown to be unique, the cosmological argument is cogent.<sup>44</sup> The criticism of Broad however is concerned with God and the world in time. But, as the Nyāya points out, all such criticism presupposes that there is God. So long as we do not grant that God exists, such discussion

is useless ; but if we are sure of him, these difficulties are not insuperable. I think the only valid criticism against the Nyāya argument is that of the Advaita school, though the Buddhists also mention it. Critics of the calibre of Appayya Dikṣita and Vidyāranya are of the view that the argument does not prove that there is only one maker of the world, and they do not admit 'parsimony' as a consideration which can clinch the issue. To this Gangeśa has replied : 'Is parsimony to be rejected here only, or everywhere?' Surely, in view of the fact that almost all modern developments in scientific theory are based on a recognition of 'parsimony', it is hard to reject parsimony in this case. But (as Appayya Dikṣita says) since we are proceeding on the basis of observed facts, is it not simpler to suppose that the world is the co-operative endeavour of many intelligent beings? Further, the Nyāya cannot disprove the Ārvāka hypothesis that matter can of itself evolve into the world. Lastly, though a man may not be able to confute this or other theistic proofs in syllogistic debate, if he has no belief in God, arguments cannot make God a living reality to him. Belief cannot be coerced.

Udayana on Belief and Argument :

Udayana, the great Naiyāyika, who is reputed to be a victor in many debates against atheists, recognises this truth. He begins his treatise by saying that the existence of God and his worship is accepted in some form or other by all. Conceptions of him may be truer and better than one another, but no one lacks an idea of God entirely. God is well known in experience (*supra-siddhānubhava*). In a clear or vague way everyone has a sense of God's presence. God is revealed not only in experience (*anubhava*), but also in the scriptures. The arguments for God's existence do not start from atheism, but from an awareness of God which all people have. Inference or logical discussion about God (Udayana says) is only meditation on him, who is already known.<sup>45</sup> The function of argument is not to prove that God exists, for Udayana holds that nobody starts from the position 'There is no existence of God', and then proceeds to prove it.<sup>46</sup>

To sum up, he implies, arguments for God's existence lead to no truth previously unknown, but are only a kind of meditation



on truth which is already known, so that what we already know may become clearer, or may be shown to be implicitly logical. Udayana has another interesting passage. While in experience we know God, and logical discussion about God is only meditation on what we know, we obtain a full knowledge of him from scriptures, and any reflection on God's existence and nature subsequent to scriptural study becomes worship (*upāsana*).<sup>47</sup> He who has digested the revelation contained in scripture is not in need of further clarification or supplementation. He already knows the truth, and through expending thought on God, he is but worshipping God, for he who knows about God dares not think of him in any irreverent manner, and he who has the conviction that God is the supreme lord of the universe and that compared to him man is nothing, cannot but willingly accept this fact. This 'sense of God' and the attitude of adoration towards him is but worship and the more we meditate on God's true nature the more we worship him.

The question may be raised: Are there not atheists who have no experience of God? It is true that the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jainas, the Buddhists and the Čārvākas are supposed to be atheists. But are they? With a surprising depth of insight, Udayana says that when the Mīmāṃsaka speaks of the one taught to be worshipped (*mantra*), the Buddhist of the 'omniscient one', or the Čārvāka of 'the one whom worldly experience establishes', they are talking of God, though the theist has to accept only that much of what they say, which is fit to be predicated of God (*yāvaduktopapanna*).<sup>48</sup> Udayana clearly suggests here that though the Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas and others think that they do not believe in God, they do so without realising it; because the conceptualisation of their belief differs from what they believe. The facts which they describe and the experiences which they interpret in their own terms are described and interpreted by the theist in his own terms. From Udayana's mention of Pāśupata, Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva sects, we gather that Udayana thinks that different people believe in God in different ways, and though they all fall short of the true conception of him, they are yet ways of believing in God. As for the Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas and others, who claim that they do not believe in God, Udayana thinks that they are in fact aware of God and are speaking of God

when they talk of 'dharma' or 'the spirit of sacrifice', etc. Under names which are not usually ascribed to God, they are in fact thinking of God. (It is to be remembered that Spinoza and Socrates were accused of atheism, and the early Christians were martyred, because they were 'atheists'. The Muslims again accuse the Hindus of being atheists 'Kāfirs' and idolators.) But are all these really atheists? The experience in which the conscious theist finds God, is interpreted in another way by others, just as, while a connoisseur finds a very important meaning and significance in a painting or a musical symphony, a large number of men find nothing significant in them. But that does not mean that they do not have any real experience of these things. That is why Udayana is able to say of God '*suprasiddhāmubhava*', 'well manifest in experience'.

At the same time, Udayana reminds us that we should not ignore the fact that there are those in 'whose hearts God does not find a place', in spite of what the Veda says and *Nīti* points out. Udayana's use of the word '*Nīti*' is significant; it means both moral behaviour and principles and also reasoning. It may be that there are some people who are unable to accept God, however conscientiously they may analyse their experience and study the scriptures. Seeing that belief in God is associated with so much of priest-craft and ritual, probably some people, such as the Čārvākas, have rejected the grain along with the husk, while others such as the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists, rejecting God as a reality, are able to formulate a theory of the universe without God. To such 'iron-hearted' men, arguments are of no use. They may be unable to rebut an argument, but they will not be convinced by it. Neither moral experience nor reason can make all men infer God. But even atheists will be convinced (says Udayana) in course of time by God's grace and compassion, and will shed their doubts and denials. As to *when* grace will be bestowed, Udayana does not say anything beyond the statement that 'in course of a long time' even the deniers of God will come to *meditate* on him. Here again his use of 'meditate' is significant; it means that even the denier of God is not devoid of all knowledge of reality; and by the bestowal of God's grace (*anugraha*), he develops a deeper insight into reality, and he sees the world (so to say) with new eyes, finding everywhere God,



whom he did not find previously. [Cf. Arjuna's experience of God (*Gītā*, chap. XI) through God's grace.] This is not the case with atheists alone. Even theists who have *plunged* themselves into God, by accepting God's reality with all their heart, and who have surrendered themselves to him, do not obtain peace and complete freedom from all doubts and misgivings, unless God bestows his grace upon them. Much of the divine reality is not revealed to men through reasoning or scriptural study, but only through God's grace, and until that happens, there will be no peace for them.<sup>49</sup>

It is clear from these accounts that almost all the great Hindu thinkers (barring Kapila ?) were of the opinion that our knowledge of God is non-inferential. While we find arguments for God's existence in the Nyāya works, they seem mainly to have been intended as syllogisms, which the Buddhists and others could not refute. This interpretation of the function of theistic proof is justified by a consideration of the implications of the opening and closing portions of Udayana's *Kusumāñjali*.

Some passages from Udayana lend support to the view that God is revealed directly in experience; but most other Hindu writers think that revelation of God is mediated only through the Veda, and that no knowledge of God is possible except through the Veda; but in either case this knowledge is 'non-inferential'. The Vedānta and the Yoga systems, however, hold the view that it is possible to advance arguments (*yuktis*) to show (i) that it is very likely that there is a God, and (ii) that atheism is not a coherent philosophy.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CONCEPTION OF THE VEDIC REVELATION IN OTHER HINDU SCHOOLS

#### I

#### *Views of the Mīmāṃsā School*

One Vedic passage speaks of the Veda as the eternal word heard by the sages who have qualified themselves through *tapas*, while other texts say that the Veda arose from sacrifice.<sup>1</sup> The author of the *Nirukta* said that this means that the eternal Veda manifested itself in the minds of persons who were performing *tapas*, and as they saw the Vedic truth they are called the seers (*Ṛṣihmantradrāṣṭā*).<sup>2</sup> We find also another conception of the Veda in the Veda itself. It is there said to be 'the breath of the great spirit',<sup>3</sup> and to have been first manifested by God to Brahmā (*Hiranyagarbha*).<sup>4</sup> Brahmā is said to have obtained the Vedas from Agni, Vāyu and Sūrya.<sup>5</sup> So in the *Samhitas* and the *Upaniṣads* there are two trends of thought : (1) that the Veda which is eternal was intuited by the sages, and (2) that the Veda is God's revelation to the first-born Brahmā and the sages. The Mīmāṃsā worked out the implications of the first view, and the Nyāya that of the second view, while the Vedānta agreed with the Mīmāṃsā, but accepted God as the source of the Veda (*śāstrayoni*).

All schools of Hindu Philosophy are unanimous in accepting the Veda as the supreme scripture which informs us about things which cannot be known otherwise (*ajñāta jñāpanam*) ; but as to the nature of the Vedic revelation, there is no unanimity. While the Mīmāṃsā regards it as eternal and without any revealer, the Nyāya thinks it is revealed by God, and the Vedānta occupies a position midway between the two.

Some modern exponents of Hinduism have stated that the Vedas are the records of the spiritual experiences of sages, and that the truths in the Vedas can be discovered by any man by the



exercise of his own faculties, if he has the time and qualifications. But this is directly opposed to what has been expressly stated by great authorities like Kumārila and Śāṅkara. Any contemporary thinker is entitled to his own views regarding the Veda, but he should not impute his view to authoritative writers on Hinduism.

Mīmāṃsā :

The Mīmāṃsā accepts the authority of the Veda for the same reasons for which the Advaita school accepts it. The following doctrines are common to both the schools : (i) eternity of words, (ii) intrinsic validity of cognitions, and (iii) *apauruṣeyatā* of the Veda. The cardinal doctrinal differences between the two schools are : (a) while the Mīmāṃsā says that the world is eternal, the Advaita maintains that it is subject to cyclic rotation of creation and dissolution ; (b) while the Advaita holds that there is a God, the Mīmāṃsā finds the concept of an omniscient being an absurdity.

The Mīmāṃsā argues that anyone who believes in the absoluteness of 'good' and 'bad' must admit that we can have some knowledge of them ; and since the Veda gives us such knowledge, which is not contradicted by perception or inference, it must be accepted as valid.<sup>6</sup> Since nobody is remembered as the author of the Veda, and since it is so unique that no one could have composed it, it is eternal and not composed by anyone. The Mīmāṃsā argues that the world must be eternal, because we cannot conceive a time when it was not ; and since the Veda could not have sprung up suddenly, it is conceivable that there have always been a number of men teaching and studying it.<sup>7</sup>

The Veda could not have also been the work of an omniscient person, because, Kumārila argues, we do not see any omniscient person at present, and so we can also infer that there was none in the past.

If some alleged scriptures say that there has been (or is) an omniscient person, there is no ground for believing it, because no book composed by a human being can be infallible. On the other hand, the one true scripture, the Veda, (Kumārila avers) does not say that there ever was an omniscient person ; and if anywhere it appears to say so, it is only an *arthavāda*. Kumārila also gives two logical objections against the conception of an omniscient person : (i) Does the omniscient person know everything through the six *pramāṇas* or through only one of them? In the former case, Kumārila says, there is no objection, as the Veda also is included in the six *pramāṇas*. In the latter case, it would be as good as saying that through the eye alone one can see as

well as taste ; for while the empirical *pramāṇas* alone cannot give us any knowledge of supersensual things (e.g. dharma), the Veda by itself cannot tell us about empirical things. (ii) Though there are degrees of knowledge, and though one can acquire more and more knowledge, by developing his sense-faculties through Yoga, the maximum limit of such knowledge cannot go beyond the domain of senses. However much a man may *refine* his senses (Kumārila says), he cannot cognise the supersensual, though he might perceive even subtle and very far-off things.<sup>8</sup> So an 'omniscient person' is a myth.

There are no real prophets according to Mimāṃsā :

Some argue that the statements of the Buddha, for example, about supersensual matters are true, because his statements about empirical matters are proved by our cognition of their truthfulness. This would mean (Kumārila argues) that the Buddha's authority regarding supersensual things is based upon our knowledge of the truthfulness of his other assertions. But this means, in other words, that his statements have no independent or self-sufficient authority. Since the truthfulness of some of his statements is to be guaranteed by their conformity with our experience, why not extend the argument and say that all his other statements not in accord with our experience are false ? Kumārila says that is possible to reverse the argument : The Buddha talks about so many things, which no one has come across, and which no one can verify ; so his assertions about ordinary things must also be false. What applies to the Buddha applies to other so-called prophets and seers.

The Mimāṃsā contends that since the world is eternal, there was never even a person who first uttered the Veda, or handed it down to others. The Veda, which gives a consistent body of knowledge, uncontradicted by knowledge derived from other sources, needs no confirmation.<sup>9</sup>

Mimāṃsā says, ' There are no assertions in the Veda ' :

According to the Mimāṃsā, the purpose of the *entire* Veda is to lay down injunctions, and the portions of it which do not do so are meaningless.<sup>10</sup> The Veda need not, and does not, say anything about existing things, because such things can be perceived. Further, scripture, which is meant to show wherein the end of man lies, and how to achieve it, should only inform us



about what we should do, and what we should not. Knowledge of existential things cannot be conducive to this ; for action alone can take us nearer to our end.

There are, no doubt, passages like 'He howled' in the Veda ; but to avoid the rejection of them as useless, Jaimini says, they should be taken as *unitary passages* with injunctions. All scriptural sentences should enter into relation with some action, either by stating the nature of an action, or the means to be employed in performing it. Moreover, injunctions should not only be commands to perform actions which have not been yet performed (*aprarṛtāpravarṛtaka*), but also commands to perform actions which were not known to man before (*ajñāta jñāpana*). Therefore, the Mīmāṃsā argues, the Upaniṣadic sentences cannot be independently authoritative. They should be taken as sentences which throw light on either the agent of actions or the deity of an action (*kartṛdevatā-prakāśakāh*). As they tell us what the nature of the 'soul' is, this knowledge throws light on the doer of actions, while sentences such as 'He is omniscient and all-doer' inform us about the nature of deities. Or else, they may be taken as injunctions enjoining the activity of meditation, which results in some 'good'. Mere existential statements like 'the earth consists of seven continents' cannot be of any use to a man who seeks to achieve 'merit', but he must be told what it is, and by what way and means it is achieved (*sābdī bhāvanā—kim, kena, katham*). So, Mīmāṃsā says, scripture is concerned with telling man about the fruit (*sādhya*), the means of achieving it (*sāadhanā*), and the best method of achieving it (*iti kartavyatā*). If at all anywhere the Veda teaches about existent things, this is because some things are the means of performing certain actions, and achieving certain results. Further, (the Mīmāṃsā concludes) bare statements of fact serve no purpose, and no one, in fact, makes such statements ; all propositions are meant to start some activity ; for example, the sentence 'Your maiden daughter has become pregnant' is not intended merely to convey that fact, but to make the hearer do something about it.<sup>11</sup>

**Mīmāṃsā Views: Vedic Revelation Exclusive, and No Freedom of Interpretation of Scriptures :**

The Mīmāṃsā maintains that *Smṛtis* (Hindu scriptures other than the Veda) are authoritative only in so far as they do not conflict with the Veda, and in so far as they are based on the Veda. Sometimes, however, a *smṛti* may prescribe a certain act that is not found to be enjoined in the Veda ; and in that case we must assume that it is sanctioned in some portion of the Veda not at present remembered by us. As the *smṛtis* have been accepted by Vedic scholars as authoritative from very ancient times, we must presume them to be in accordance with the Veda. The Mīmāṃsā says that we may go farther and say that the Veda alone

is the source of truth for the *smṛti* writers also, because they, being men like us, could not have known 'good' and 'bad' through direct experience; yet they do not seem to be impostors out to deceive the world. So they must have got their wisdom from the Veda, and expounded it in their works.

The Mimāṃsā is cautious to emphasize that all religious books in the world are not *smṛtis*. *Smṛtis* (the *Purāṇas*, the *Manusmṛti* and the *Itihāsas*) are only those books which are applicable to all men in *Āryāvarta*; whatever in these texts directly deals with dharma is based on the Veda only. Kumārila says that the scriptures of the Buddhists etc., are not at all based on the Veda, since they not only do not claim any support from the Veda, but on the contrary, they claim equality with and even superiority to the Veda. Moreover, much of what the Buddhist scriptures say is opposed to the Veda, except when they preach virtues like self-control and piety. The Buddha, who was not a *Brāhmaṇa*, and who could not have had any experience of transcendent things such as dharma (for no human being can have this), had no right (Kumārila says) to teach about it, and the followers of the Veda have no business to pay any heed to him, or to any such person.<sup>12</sup>

While Kumārila holds that dharma cannot be known from other scriptures, he admits that there is some truth in the scriptures of the heretics (the Buddhists etc.); but as it is mixed up with so much that is false, 'it is like milk placed in a vessel made of dog-skin'. What seems to be truth on a study of the Buddhist and other scriptures cannot be confirmed to be so, unless the Veda and the *smṛtis* are studied. But once the Vedas and *smṛtis* are studied, (Kumārila says) full knowledge of dharma is obtained; and then a study of other scriptures is useless.<sup>13</sup>

The Veda cannot (according to Kumārila) be understood by everybody such as, for instance, a *śūdra* and a man who does not study it under a preceptor. So he who wishes to know dharma must be qualified to do so and must study it under the proper man.

A critic may ask: Cannot there be many customs followed by good men, which are not motivated by any wrong motive, but which nevertheless do not seem to be enjoined by the Veda?



Kumārila replies that in so far as they are regarded as dharma and practised as such by 'good men', they may be assumed to be based on some portion of the Veda not at present known to us,<sup>14</sup> provided such customs do not directly conflict with the Veda.<sup>15</sup> And for Kumārila 'good men' (*mahājanāh*) are only those who inhabit *Āryāvarta*, follow the Vedic religion and are fully imbued with Vedic knowledge and tradition.

Mīmāṃsā Demythologises Scripture :

According to the Mīmāṃsā, no history and certainly no factual empirical knowledge can be had from the Veda ; because in the eternal book, which is prior to all individual persons and things, there cannot be any reference to persons and places.

An example would serve to show the Mīmāṃsā method : A passage in the *Taittirīya Samhitā* says, 'Prajāpati (the creator) drew out his own omentum, and placed it in fire ; from it the goat arose, and it is thus that people get cattle.' Śābara explains this passage thus : 'Prajāpati' must be an eternal object : wind, sky, or sun. 'It drew out its omentum' means it gave forth rain, wind, or rays (respectively). The 'fire' in which it was thrown was either lightning, or ordinary fire. 'Goat' means food, seed, or creeper, by using which men get cattle. Thus all these words are metonyms (*gaṇa*).<sup>16</sup>

Vedic passages such as 'Bound by the gods, fire cried and its tears became silver' have no sense of their own ; they are to be taken as meant for extolling or condemning a certain action ; for instance, in this case it is meant to bring home the unsuitability of that worthless metal (silver) as a sacrificial gift.

Similarly, Kumārila tells us, the numerous stories about creation and destruction, the rise and fall of nations, which are to be found in the *Purāṇas* etc., are not factual ; but they are only intended to teach some maxim such as that 'The gross comes from the subtle', 'Earthly goods are impermanent', or 'Destiny is stronger than human effort'.<sup>17</sup>

Though the Mīmāṃsā holds that there are gods to whom offerings are made in sacrifices, it maintains that these 'gods' are not persons with bodies. Statements such as 'Indra killed Vṛtra', found in the Veda, cannot prove that Indra was a person with a physical body, because this sentence is an *arthavāda*, and has no independent significance. Nor are 'gods' the bestowers of fruits, for by their own potency actions enable the agent to

obtain the proper fruits. Āpadeva, a popular Mīmāṃsā writer, says that 'gods' have no existence apart from the *mantras*; a 'god' is only a name inflected in the dative case in formulae (*mantras*) uttered while offering oblations.<sup>18</sup>

### The Place of Reason in Mīmāṃsā :

The place of reason in the Mīmāṃsā has been clearly set forth by Kumārila in the following way. The Mīmāṃsā is based upon the Veda as well as experience, and is developed by a long chain of teachers. The Veda is very extensive, and in many places the sense of the words as used in the Veda is different from that which they have in everyday usage. A great deal of obscurity and confusion will arise if anyone seeks to interpret the Veda without properly equipping himself. The sense of the Veda is to be ascertained only by discussion and reasoning. The meanings with which words have been used have to be known by experience and with the aid of those who have worked on this problem.

Kumārila says that more people are at present on the wrong path than previously, and their intuitions are clouded. The right path can be shown to them only by reasoning based upon scripture and experience. For reasoning alone can show the alternate views on a point, the relative strength of the arguments in support of each view, and finally the right view. Unless all the phases of a problem are known and a point is discussed from all possible sides, people will fall for the first argument which they come across, even if it supports a wrong view. In carrying on a discussion, in addition to setting forth the arguments from both the sides, the right conclusion must be rigorously demonstrated.<sup>19</sup> Since the Veda never teaches anything about existent things, according to the Mīmāṃsā, there can be no conflict between the Veda and perception or inference. The sole function of reason in the Mīmāṃsā is (i) to endeavour to prove the authority of the Veda, and (ii) to interpret the Veda consistently.

### Comment :

It is very difficult to see any sense in the theory of eternal sound, and the conception of an eternal book. Since the Nyāya has made a devastating criticism of these doctrines of Mīmāṃsā, an account of Nyāya criticisms will serve our purpose.



In these days when the Logical Positivists say that sentences on ethics and theology cannot be *a posteriori* synthetic propositions, generalizations from common experience, or self-evident propositions; there is much to commend in the Mīmāṃsā theory that scripture consists of injunctions only, and that 'good' and 'bad' can be inculcated only through command-sentences. The West is only now coming to realize what the Mīmāṃsakas have said centuries ago about scriptural sentences, viz., that they do not primarily deal with either perceptible objects or historical incidents. It is not the business of scripture to provide us either with science or history. The school of Bultmann is, unawares, almost advocating the Mīmāṃsā theory.

But, as the Advaita so pertinently pointed out, religion consists not only of imperatives, but also assertions. It is a loop-hole in the Mīmāṃsā that it is unable to see man's need for *saving* knowledge regarding ultimate verities, and his constant (though often unconscious) endeavour to establish a living relation with the Divine. At the same time it should not be forgotten that this defect is more than rectified by the statements of Kumārila and Prabhākara, that the Mīmāṃsā is not a self-sufficient philosophy, and that those who are seeking Ātman and liberation should go to the Vedānta. Very often, the Mīmāṃsakas as well as their critics forget this.

The view of Jaimini and Kumārila (acceptable to all authorities such as Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja) that the Vedic faith is exclusive, shows that Hinduism is as exclusive as the Semitic faiths and brooks no rivals. So modern exponents of Hinduism should make it explicit that such statements as 'All religions are true' are made only on their own authority, and do not represent the orthodox Hindu tradition. The point whether the followers of any religion can justifiably claim exclusiveness will be discussed in the next part of this book.

# Views of Other Schools

Yoga :

Having said that God is the perfect person untouched by any defect whatsoever, Vyāsa raises the question 'Has this any proof?' and replies that scriptures are its proof. Vācaspati explains that the Vedas, *smṛtis*, the *purāṇas*, and the *ītiḥāsas* are the Scriptures. Vyāsa again asks 'what proof have the scriptures?' and replies that 'they have their proof in the perfect quality of God's *sattva*'. Then he adds that 'both scriptures and perfection are present in God's *sattva*' and that there is an eternal relation between the two'.<sup>20</sup>

To understand this we have to remember the Sāṃkhya-Yoga conception that in all things are present the three qualities or modes viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Sattva* is the principle of light and harmony in nature; *rajas* the principle of movement, characterised by desire, action and passions; and *tamas* the principle of inertia or obscurity. While all souls are in reality untouched by nature and its three qualities, they falsely imagine themselves to be entangled in it; and some souls realising this truth become liberated by attaining isolation (*kaivalya*) from nature. God, on the other hand, (Vācaspati says) is eternally isolated from nature, but assumes perfect *sattva*, in order to impart to living beings right knowledge and dharma. A critic may ask, God could not have such a desire to benefit living beings, unless he first assumes *sattva*, for all souls are in reality free from all desires whatsoever; they are *aśaṅga*. To this, the Yoga replies that as the cyclic rotation of the world is eternal, God's desire to benefit living beings and his assumption of *sattva* are also eternal; and the question of one of them being prior does not arise.<sup>21</sup>

Vyāsa says that God 'may be conceived as resolving' to instruct all living beings in right knowledge and dharma;<sup>22</sup> and Vācaspati says that as God intended to teach the methods of getting temporal as well as eternal happiness, the Veda was composed by God.<sup>23</sup> He also adds that the Veda should be *supposed* to be based on the 'perfection of God's thought'; for according to Vācaspati the scriptures are the 'expressions of God's perfect thought'.<sup>24</sup>

Comment :

Vyāsa is unable to give any real proof for his statement that the Veda is composed by God; he only believes it. But the



sentence with which Vyāsa starts his theistic discussion shows that he is not concerned with giving any rigorous logical proof either for the existence of God, or for the authority of the Veda. His opening sentence is, 'Is there any proof for the *universally admitted* eternal superiority of God?'<sup>25</sup> So his argument is, like Anselm's ontological argument, an elucidation of faith. By saying that Scriptures are present in God's *sattva*, Vyāsa, however, implies that such a person, who is perfect and endowed with pure *sattva*, cannot be conceived as indifferent to mankind's misery, because a *sāttvika* (i.e. one in whom *sattva* predominates) always tries to help others; and how kind and full of grace would be the most perfect *sāttvika* !

Sāmkhya :

According to Kapila, testimony of a reliable person is a *pramāṇa*.<sup>26</sup> He says that no one composed the Veda, because no one could have done so. A person in bondage, lacking in omniscience, could not have composed it; while a 'freed' person will have no motive in doing anything. But, Kapila says, just because there was no person who composed it, it cannot be eternal. He gives an example to explain this. The trees and grass in the forest are not produced by any person; they germinate spontaneously; and so is the case with the Veda. Since the Veda itself says that it is a product, it is not eternal. Vijnānabhikṣu says that like breath, which issues out without conscious effort (*abuddhipūrva*), under the influence of the unseen factor (*adr̥ṣṭa*), the Veda came forth from the Self-born Brahman (a god, not God). Kapila thinks that the validity of the Veda is intrinsic, and self-proved. While he regards the relationship between words and their meanings to be natural, he thinks it can be known by teaching, usage and context. Statements may be of both the kinds: injunctions and assertions. Though some of the things of which the Veda treats are supersensual, Kapila says, it can give us valid knowledge, because meanings can be known from etymology (*vyutpatti*).<sup>27</sup>

Comment :

Kapila's theory of the Veda involves self-contradiction, because while he regards 'testimony' to be that of a reliable

person, he says that the Vedic testimony was given by no one. The Veda, he affirms, is a product, yet it has no cause ! His commentator offers an explanation which is more confusing than clarifying : *adr̥ṣṭa* is the unseen factor, which is the cause of birth, happiness, unhappiness etc., and is itself the result of past actions ; and thanks to his *adr̥ṣṭa*, the god Brahmā produces the Veda, but not consciously ; so it could be nobody's work. We are now entitled to ask : then how could the Veda, which is not the deliberate teaching of anybody, be the ' testimony of a reliable person ' ? And if it is not testimony in that sense, it cannot be a *pramāṇa* on Kapila's own assumption.

Vaiśeṣika :

Kaṇāda says that sacred tradition is a *pramāṇa*, because it is their teaching (*tadvaçana*).<sup>28</sup> Praśastapāda explains that ' sacred tradition ' means the Veda and the *smṛtis*.<sup>29</sup> The authority of the Veda and the *smṛtis* is (says Praśastapāda) dependent on the reliability of their authors. The Veda cannot be eternal, because in the Veda (Kaṇāda says) we find a planned conscious construction of sentences. The names in the *brāhmaṇa* portion of the Veda, and the passages prescribing charity etc., cannot but be the deliberate assertions of some person. So, Kaṇāda concludes, the Veda must be the work of some person,<sup>30</sup> and it is authoritative because it deals with dharma.<sup>31</sup> Praśastapāda says that *pramāṇas* are only two—perception and inference ; the so-called *pramāṇa* of testimony is only an inference from the reliability of its giver to the truth of what he says.<sup>32</sup>

Śankara Miśra gives a different interpretation. He interprets Kaṇāda's *sūtra* in this sense : The construction of Vedic sentences is preceded by their author's right knowledge of what these sentences speak of ; so they are authoritative. The names in the *brāhmaṇas*, and the injunctions about charity etc., such as ' He who wants heaven should give a cow as a gift ', are facts which could not have been known by any man. So the Veda must be the composition of a person, unlike us.<sup>33</sup>

Comment :

While Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda regard the Veda as the work of a reliable person, they give no proofs for this belief of theirs. But their position marks an advance over the Mīmāṃsā in that



it regards an eternal book as an absurdity. Kaṇāda's argument that the Veda is authoritative, because it teaches dharma is open to question. Unless it is proved that there is only *one* right way of life (dharma), and that the Veda teaches it, this argument is useless. The *sūtras*, even if interpreted according to Śankara Miśra, do not prove that the composition of the Veda is based on right knowledge, unless its statements produce an 'impact', or are verified.

### III

#### *The Nyāya Conception of Vedic Revelation*

##### The Nyāya Conception of *Śabda Pramāṇa* :

The Nyāya accepts testimony as a source of right knowledge, holding that the teaching of a reliable person is 'testimony'. A 'reliable person' is one who directly experiences a thing and is able to impart knowledge of it to others through his statements, with the sole aim of communicating truth as he knows it. Any one who fulfils these conditions is a reliable person irrespective of his nationality and occupation.<sup>34</sup> As nobody can express a judgment except through a sentence, testimony is given in the form of a group of words syntactically and significantly connected. If the meanings of the words forming a sentence are previously known, its meaning will be known as soon as it is heard. Thus the cause of the understanding of testimony is the knowledge of the meanings of the words through which it is communicated, and not the thing about which it is.<sup>35</sup> Testimony (the Nyāya says) need not be always an injunction; any sentence which conveys information useful to others is testimony.<sup>36</sup> The cognition of sensible or supersensual things which arises through the hearing (or reading) and understanding of a sentence is testimony.<sup>37</sup> But, according to the Nyāya, the understanding of the meaning of a sentence does not help us to know that it is in conformity with facts, or that it is a reliable person's statement.

##### Nyāya Theory of Truth :

The Nyāya school, adopting realism in epistemology, defines 'right knowledge' as the cognition of things as they are; and maintains that if the validity of a cognition is self-apprehended

(i.e. if it is simultaneously known with the cognition), there would be no doubt at all in the case of the validity of any cognition.<sup>38</sup> But as the validity of a cognition is not self-evident, it must be proved in other ways—by inference. A man may have a perception of water, but it need not be right cognition simply because he has such a perception, for many in the desert have been deluded by mirages. The perception of water is inferred to be valid when one is able to go near the water and quench one's thirst with it.<sup>39</sup> Cognition on the basis of which there is fruitful activity is valid, and knowledge which is able to culminate in the attainment of what it reveals is valid;<sup>40</sup> but the cause which engenders validity is not the same as that which causes the knowledge. If the cause of the validity of a cognition is identical with the cause of the cognition itself, then (the Nyāya asks) why are some cognitions false? True and false cognitions are alike cognitions, but true cognitions have something which false cognitions lack; just as, though a pot and a cloth are both 'things', a pot has qualities which a cloth lacks.

Since there is general agreement that defects are the causes of false cognition, the Nyāya school says that absence of defects must be the cause of the validity of a cognition. Thus, in the perception of a white crystal, the sense of sight is the principal cause of the cognition, while the validity of the cognition is due to the absence of any defects like bad light, jaundice, and short sight etc., in the eye.<sup>41</sup>

Coming to testimony, the Nyāya holds that we do have a cognition as soon as we hear and understand what somebody says, and we shall be able to understand it if we know the language, and if the words are arranged meaningfully and syntactically. In this case, the cause of the cognition through testimony is words. The validity of such a cognition is established if the reliability of the person giving the testimony is proved, while the validity itself is due to that reliability. The Nyāya says that just as the validity of perception may be established by inference, but what is perceived cannot be known through inference, even so, the validity of testimony is inferred from the trustworthiness of the person who gives it, but it is impossible to infer the knowledge which is the content of that testimony. If the words used are known to us, they can give us knowledge



even about what was entirely unknown previously,<sup>42</sup> provided they are syntactically and 'compatibly' connected. In such sentences as 'the fire is cold' words are not connected 'compatibly' and so cannot make sense.

Testimony can give new knowledge :

Even though the meaning of each single word is known previously, a sentence may (says the Nyāya) give us entirely new knowledge, because it may denote a mutual relationship between things, which was wholly unnoticed before. So for understanding the meaning of a sentence uttered by anyone, we need not always know either the man's authority or the context in which it is spoken ; and we cannot determine the context unless we know the meaning of the sentence. Sentences uttered out of their context can also be understood, as for example, the utterances of a child, or a parrot.<sup>43</sup>

Testimony, the Nyāya maintains, is an independent source of knowledge only to him who receives it ; for him the knowledge conveyed through it is neither perception, nor inference ; but for the *giver* of the testimony, the knowledge so conveyed is based on his own direct experience. The case is similar with inference, for (the Nyāya says) when one infers the presence of a fire on a distant hill from the column of smoke rising from it, the inference is based on one's experience of the invariable connection between fire and smoke ; but the inference of a fire on the hill at that moment is independent of perception.

Testimony is not inference :

The difference between inference and testimony is that inference compels assent as soon as it is made ; while testimony compels assent only when the reliability of the person who gives it is established. Even though we hear and understand, we do not assent to statements of unreliable persons. While in inference, the relationship between the major term and the middle term is invariable and natural, and both are found in the same locus, the relationship between words through which we receive testimony and their meanings is not invariable and not natural, because the meanings of words are set up by convention. So, the Nyāya concludes, the nature and process of inference is altogether different from that of testimony.

Nyāya criticism of ' eternity of sounds ' :

The Nyāya rejects the Mīmāṃsā view that words are eternal. Words, the Naiyāyikas say, are nothing but particular sounds made by the movements of human lips and muscles of the jaws and the throat. Sound is clearly seen to be produced by the impact of two objects, such as a drum and a stick, or the two lips of a human being. Whatever is an object of the senses, such as colour, is not eternal ; and why should an exception be made in the case of sound alone, which is an object of the sense of hearing ? An eternal entity cannot have any internal differentiation ; but sound has different degrees, such as loud, deep, mild, etc. The same letter may be pronounced in different ways and with different accents ; and this shows that there are different sounds, and what we call ' sound ' is only a class-concept, like the word ' cow '. Finally, if sound is eternal, why do we not always hear it ? There cannot certainly be any eternal obstacle which prevents us from hearing it. Though sounds are not eternal (says the Nyāya), like the movements in a dance, they can be imitated. He who is learning how to swim imitates the strokes and attitudes of his master ; but he does not make the identical movements of his master, for that is impossible. Similarly, when two people pronounce ' Ka ', it is not actually the same ' Ka ' \* which is pronounced by both ; the two sounds are different, but are of the same kind. Letters are, after all, uttered sounds and since it stands to reason that they are not eternal, words and sentences made up of them are also not eternal.

Import of words not universals only :

It is also extremely foolish (according to the Nyāya) to say that words denote only forms, or classes. The word ' cow ' does not mean form alone, because though a clay figure of a cow has got all the formal properties of a cow, as such it is not really a cow ; nor would anybody think of it when he wants to buy a cow. The clay figure of a cow is not a cow, because it is not a member of the class ' cow '. But the class or genus ' cow ' cannot be thought of in any significant way apart from the individuals and the form. The genus is manifested in the form and in the individuals, and abides in them only ; and apart from them we cannot apprehend it. So, the Nyāya concludes, a word means all these together—



genus, form and individuals; but according to the context one of these three is primarily meant, and the other two are kept in the background. For example, in a sentence such as 'that cow is going' an individual cow is referred to, for an individual alone can go. But in a sentence such as 'the cow should not be ill-treated' the reference is obviously to the whole class of cows. From all these considerations the Nyāya concludes that the meaning of a word is not primarily the species or class in *all* cases. According to the Nyāya, the relationship between a word and its meaning is fixed by convention; and so it is found that among different nations different words are used to denote the same thing, while the same sound denotes different objects in different languages.

'Eternal Book' an Absurdity, says the Nyāya:

As the view that words are eternal has been shown to be defective, the Nyāya contends that there can be no eternal book made up of eternal words. Further, even if words are eternal, they have to be grouped into sentences by someone. The Veda itself mentions God as its author. It is ridiculous to say (as the Mimāṃsā does) that nobody remembers someone as the author of the Veda; for no one has met *all* people, living and dead. But in fact, nobody has 'forgotten' the author of the Veda. Even if we have not seen the author of the Veda, we can infer his existence from the fact that the Veda is a composition, and a composition must have had an author. Moreover, those who have the Yogic vision can have an intuition of God. If it is asked, how did God, who has no body, compose and teach the Veda? we can suppose (*kalpyate*) that he embodies himself whenever necessary (Jayanta). The Mimāṃsaka says that the Veda might have been handed down by a continuous succession of teachers and students; but surely (says the Nyāya) there was at the back of this a supreme teacher. Otherwise, the Vedic tradition would be a mere superstition going back to immemorial times.<sup>44</sup> If the Vedic sentences are eternal, the Nyāya asks, are not other sentences also eternal? If all sentences are eternal, and if the eternity of sentences guarantees their truth, even a mad man's statements must be regarded as true! So Vedic study and teaching is continuous only from the time of the creation to the time of the dissolution of the world. In every

subsequent aeon God recreates the whole world, and also the Veda, in the same form in which they were in the past aeon. If this makes them eternal, then (says the Nyāya) even mountains and rivers are eternal, because in every aeon they are reproduced exactly alike. In this sense, even Manu's code is eternal, for there will be a Manu in each aeon, and the way of life which he teaches would be the same always.<sup>45</sup> The Nyāya finds the idea of the cyclic rotation of the world incompatible with the eternity of the Veda.

### The Logic of Theological Assertions :

Now if any statements have been made about supersensual things such as heaven, the results of sacrifices, the utility of prayer etc., by some persons, their testimony must be regarded as true if such persons are reliable, i.e., if they could be credited with direct experience of the things about which they speak. Just as the validity of perception is confirmed by inference, and that of inference by perception, the validity of testimony regarding transmundane things is inferred from the reliability of the persons who have given it. So, the Nyāya says, supersensual things, though known only from testimony, are in one sense objects of inference.<sup>46</sup>

The Veda is a *Pramāṇa*, because it is a reliable person's work :

The Nyāya school says that the claim of the followers of the Veda that it is a genuine scripture can be substantiated in the following way :

Firstly, no one is likely to dispute that at least some statements in the Veda are correct ; then why not infer that the others also are like that ? Secondly, the Veda is systematically classified (*arthavibhāga*) into different relevant topics, as other authoritative books are. The cogent way in which the Veda treats the various topics, under separately classified and meaningfully ordered heads, shows that it is the work of a reliable person. The Nyāya says that these arguments only show that it is highly probable that the Veda is a source of truth ; because even the Buddhists and others can argue in a similar way that their scriptures are authoritative.<sup>47</sup> After thus proving that the reliability of the Veda is probable, the Nyāya school advances the following argument to



demonstrate the validity of the Vedic testimony: Statements in the Veda are true like the statements in the treatises on medical science, because they are the declarations of reliable persons. Experience confirms the statements contained in the treatises on medicine; and medical science does not contradict facts (*artha aviśamvāda*), because it is based on the statements of reliable persons. So having as a universal proposition, All statements of reliable persons are true and authoritative,<sup>48</sup> ('reliability' being understood in the sense defined), we can conclude that the Veda is the work of reliable persons, because some of its statements are verified by experience, and the rest which speak about supersensual things may be inferred to be true likewise;<sup>49</sup> for what is proved to be a correct source in certain matters may be inferred to be so in other matters also.

The Nyāya makes it clear that conformity with experience may confirm (for example) the statements in a medical treatise; but that does not give rise to their reliability. They are reliable (true) because they are the assertions of reliable persons. Their truth may be ascertained by their conformity with experience, but (says the Nyāya) they owe their truth to their being statements of reliable persons; just as, though our perceptual experience is proved to be true, because conclusions based on it are practically justified by subsequent experience, this justification itself is not the cause of that perceptual knowledge. To give another example, medical science is not true, *because* propositions in it are verified under all possible conditions, for some statements in it are not proved to be true in all cases, e.g., 'cinnamon cures cold' is not proved to be true in every case. Nevertheless such statements are generally true, and they fail to be true in some cases because of defects in the administration of dosage, the purity of drugs, or the condition of the patient. So it is not by observation and verification that medical science is built up; and if that were the way of building up medical science, no single man could have discovered all that is in *Ayurveda*, the treatise on medical science. So he who wrote that treatise (*Çaraka*) must be omniscient. Thus (says the Nyāya) medical science is true and authoritative because of *Çaraka's* omniscience.<sup>50</sup> As medical science is credible and authoritative due to its author's reliability, so also the Veda is true because its author is reliable,<sup>51</sup> though its validity is proved by its consistency and accordance with facts.

Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara are content to say that the Veda is the work of reliable persons, and do not expressly mention God as its author; but later Nyāya writers—Vācaspati, Jayanta and Udayana—assert that God is its author.

The Veda is God's Work :

Granted that what makes a book reliable is the trustworthiness of its author, if the Veda is proved to be the work of a reliable person, its reliability can be accepted. Now in what way can it be proved that it is the work of a reliable person? Vācaspati was the first Nyāya writer, who replied to this question, though at one place Jayanta gives the simplest answer, viz., the Veda is so unique that God alone could be its author.<sup>52</sup> Vācaspati says that a maker of the world, omniscient and most compassionate, can be inferred. He cannot but be distressed by the ignorance and misery of people, and he can neither remain without teaching them the way of attaining the good and avoiding the evil, nor teach what is false. So after creation, this most compassionate being taught the means of attaining good to all. The teaching of this person, who (Vācaspati says) is like a father to all people, must have been accepted and preserved by all—gods, sages and men of the four castes—with great respect. Therefore that scripture which establishes the institution of the four castes and the four stages of life (*varṇāśrama*), and which is accepted by good men (*mahājana*) is God's work, and therefore its authority is unquestionable. Now which scripture could that be? The scriptures of the Buddhists and the Jainas clearly trace their authority to finite men such as Gautama and Mahāvīra. None but the credulous (says Vācaspati) can believe in their omniscience. Moreover, those scriptures are not able to provide for the regulation of life according to the four castes and stages, nor are they able to enjoin any sacraments to be followed from birth to death. In short, they do not give us a way of life or worship. That is why even the Buddhists are compelled to follow the Vedic way of life. As for the *mlecchas* (Muslims) and others (Vācaspati continues) they are 'almost brutes', and they follow a way of life opposed to the *varṇāśrama*. So, Vācaspati concludes, the Veda must be the genuine scripture taught by God, because (i) it teaches *varṇāśrama*, and (ii) is accepted by good men.<sup>53</sup>

Jayanta explains that 'good men' are those who belong to *Aryāvarta* (roughly the modern Panjab and Uttar Pradesh), and are bound by the institution of caste (*varṇāśrama*).<sup>54</sup>

Jayanta argues that the Vedic law is the natural one enjoined by God; for what is prohibited by the Veda (adultery etc.)



is not openly practised even by those who follow other scriptures. Everybody desires in his heart to conform to the Vedic law as much as possible, and they interpolate into their scriptures what is contained in the Veda.<sup>55</sup> Jayanta also says that since only an omniscient person could know what is good and what is bad, which action is right and which is not, the Veda, which gives such information, could only have been composed by God, who created the universe, and so knows everything. As all the four Vedas have a unity of purpose (*ekābhiprāya*) all of them are the one God's work.<sup>56</sup> We cannot believe (says Jayanta) that the Veda is the work of many omniscient sages, because it is much simpler to suppose that there is only one omniscient person than a number of them. Also, it is difficult to conceive a finite omniscient being. Udayana concludes that none other than God could be the ground of belief (*viśvāsaikabhuvam*), and the Veda is the work of God alone.<sup>57</sup>

Nyāya argues that the Veda is inerrant :

The Nyāya endeavours to show that the Veda contains no falsehoods or contradictions. For example, the Veda says that the performance of a sacrifice called *putreṣṭi* is sure to bless a couple with a son. But in many cases a son is not born, even after the sacrifice is performed. Now if the Veda is admitted to contain such falsehoods, may not its teachings about unseen things, like heaven and after-life, be also false? Uddyotakara and Vācaspati reply that the Veda does not mention the *putreṣṭi* sacrifice as the sole, invariable and direct cause of a son's birth. Vācaspati says that the sacrifice is only an accessory and not the main cause. Not only must the sacrifice be performed in the right way, but the other factors, such as good health, and the proper sexual life of the parents, must be present. Just as, if it is said that a match is lighted by striking it against the surface of a match-box, it does not mean that it will be lighted even when the surface is wet, or when the match is not struck with sufficient force; so the Vedic statement that a son is born when *putreṣṭi* is performed must be understood correctly, and it does not mean that a son is sure to be born even when the parents are senile and impotent.<sup>58</sup> Also, sometimes the results of past evil deeds do not allow the *putreṣṭi* to be effective even when it is rightly performed; on the other hand, on account of the 'good' done in previous births, sons may be born even to those who have not performed it.<sup>59</sup> Further, the results of certain actions are not instantaneous. He who takes a tonic does not become instantaneously strong; but it will not fail to show its results in course of time. Similarly, if a man does not get the fruits of the sacrifice

immediately, he will get them later or in the next birth.<sup>60</sup> The Veda has only said that certain acts like the said sacrifice will have certain good results ; it has not said that these results would be immediate or necessarily in this birth itself. So (says the Nyāya) the Veda does not make any false statement.

All apparent contradictions, which the Veda seems to contain, present us with alternative ways of doing a thing.<sup>61</sup> For instance, in a passage it is said that a particular sacrifice is to be performed before sunrise, and it is immediately added that it is to be performed after sunrise ; but this is not a contradiction, (says the Nyāya) because it only shows that either time could be chosen.<sup>62</sup> Apparent tautologies are only necessary repetitions either for emphasis or for clarification ; and (the Nyāya adds) statements which appear incredible are not meant to be taken literally, but metaphorically ; e.g., the statement ' silver was generated from Rudra's tears ' is just a disparagement of silver, and not a fact (*vyttānta*).<sup>63</sup>

### Reason *versus* Scripture :

According to the Nyāya system, an inference which is opposed to perception or the scripture is only an apparent inference.<sup>64</sup> Reasoning alone cannot give us all truth. It cannot establish what is ' good ' or ' bad ' ; for example, it cannot be proved that eating out of a scooped-out human skull is ' bad '.<sup>65</sup> In the realm of dharma, the Nyāya holds, reason is useful only in protecting the truth revealed by scripture from heresies, and has no positive role.<sup>66</sup>

## IV

### *Jayanta's Views*

All scriptures are true :

While the undoubted opinion of the greatest authorities like Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini, Śankara and Kumārila is that the Veda is the only true scripture, we find some Hindu writers of considerable importance stating a contrary view, as far back as the tenth century A.D. Among these philosophical writers, Jayanta of the Nyāya school deserves special attention. Jayanta is well-versed in the Mīmāṃsā and is an authority on the Nyāya. He comes of an orthodox Mīmāṃsaka family ; and in the light of this his views are surprising.

His argument runs thus : The Veda is proved to be authoritative, because it contains no falsehoods and inconsistencies. But



the scriptures of many other faiths are in the same position. All of them conform to experience to some extent. So it can be argued that all of them are the compositions of reliable persons, and are of equal validity. It is true that they are mutually contradictory. But is the Veda itself fully and logically self-consistent? or is any other scripture, for the matter of that, entirely self-consistent? In fact, the conflict between the several scriptures does not go deep, for all of them agree that liberation (*apavarga*) is the chief end, and that knowledge is the means of attaining it. Though they differ in their conceptions of the nature and content of this knowledge, most of them agree that Ātman is the object or content of saving knowledge. Thus in a general way, there is not much dispute about man's end, or the means of attaining it. Religious practices do differ, but what does it matter whether one is a Hindu *sannyāsin* or a Jain ascetic? The Veda itself mentions several alternate ways of reaching heaven. Buddhism and Jainism may be (says Jayanta) additional alternate ways.

If anyone says that some of these faiths have objectionable religious practices, does not the Vedic faith sanction animal sacrifices and enjoin some of them such as the *Agnisomiya* as obligatory? If to a Buddhist animal sacrifices seem to be a heinous sin, to the follower of the Veda, eating out of a human skull—a practice of the Kāpālikas\*—is abominable. If the Veda is a true scripture in spite of its preaching of animal sacrifices, why not regard other scriptures also as authoritative? Śābara has said that scripture indicates both what is good and what is bad, and it is for men to choose. He says that the Veda may tell us that certain rituals, e.g., exorcision ceremonies, animal sacrifices etc., produce certain results; but it never assures us that those acts are free from sin; on the contrary he who performs them will get the said results as well as the sin. Jayanta says that this principle of Śābara may be extended to other scriptures, i.e. it is not obligatory that a man should follow all that is contained in a scripture—objectionable as well as acceptable.

Now some may object that the Buddhist works which condemn caste cannot be true scriptures; but (Jayanta argues) Buddha's condemnation of caste was not meant literally, and was only meant to extol the importance of compassion and love towards all

\* A Śaiva religious sect.

beings, which is proved by the fact that people of low birth (says Jayanta) are not admitted into the Buddhist monastic orders. So all scriptures are authoritative, and if so, they must all be works of omniscient beings.<sup>67</sup> But applying the principle of parsimony, Jayanta holds that it is much simpler to say that God himself is the author of all scriptures than to posit a number of omniscient beings. God sees the untold miseries of living beings, due to their actions in previous lives, and out of his compassion, he wishes to teach them the way of salvation. He also knows that not all of them can follow the same path, and that there are many ways of attaining the end. So through his power he is able to take on different bodies, and is called by different names such as Mahāvira, Buddha, Kapila etc., and teaches different ways of attaining salvation, each suitable to a particular type of men. Jayanta quotes here the Gītā verse about incarnations and their purpose. Though God is the author of all scriptures, Jayanta adds, he has shown his compassion to a greater number of people through the Vedic faith, for that is suitable to the majority.

It is true that scriptures seemingly contradict one another; but (Jayanta reminds us) so do many Vedic passages; and the contradictions will be removed if we view them as alternate ways of attaining the supreme end.

Jayanta puts forward another possible theory also. There is an accepted principle of Mīmāṃsā that if something found in the *smṛtis* is not to be found in the Veda, we must infer it to be based on some Vedic text not at present known to us; for the extent of the Veda is infinite. Similarly, we may regard the scriptures of different religions as different *smṛtis*, and maintain that their contents will be found in the unknown portion of the Veda if not in the known portion. So the scriptures of the Buddhists etc., may seem to differ from the Veda as we know it, but may be in agreement with the portion of the Veda unknown to us.

Then, a critic may ask, is the Lokāyata (Çārvāka)—materialistic hedonism—also based on the Veda? Jayanta replies that it is not a religion, because it is not a positive way of life, or a body of beliefs. Its teaching, 'Live happily as long as you live', is so self-evident that it needs no mention. As for its theory that there is



no soul, and that personality emerges from matter and dissolves in it, this is condemned in the Upaniṣads and so it is not based on the Veda.

Except for this theory, the scriptures of all faiths—Buddhist, Jaina, Sāmkhya, etc., (says Jayanta) are true and authoritative, either because God is directly the author of each, in his several incarnations, or because they are ultimately based on the one Vedic revelation.<sup>68</sup>

### Revelation Progressive :

Jayanta is catholic in another way also. He says that the sages who wrote the *smṛtis* had Yogic intuition, and their works are based on it. Vācaspati while agreeing that the *smṛtis* contain what the sages directly experienced, asserts that this too is rooted in the Veda,<sup>69</sup> while the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta deny the capacity of Yogic intuition to discover dharma and Brahman. But Jayanta says that things needful for salvation and *not contained* in the Veda are found in the *smṛtis*, and that the Yogic intuition by which they were known was granted to the sages by God himself. So it is ultimately God who is the authority for both the Veda as well as the *smṛtis*. While God directly composed the former, he caused the sages to compose the latter, by bestowing on them the power of directly intuiting supersensual things. He is thus the ultimate authority and source for all truth, whether in the Veda or in the *smṛtis*. If at all *śruti* and *smṛtis* are in conflict with each other, Jayanta says that we can accept either view-point, just as we do when two passages of the Veda are in conflict. But fortunately (says Jayanta) there is no such conflict and hence the *smṛtis* are called the fifth Veda. It savours of 'arrogance' to restrict the status of equality with the Veda to the *smṛtis* only, for, as has been said, the *itihāsas* and the *purāṇas* explain and enlarge the contents of the Veda (*upabṛmhana*). So, Jayanta concludes that the four Vedas, the *smṛtis* and the *purāṇa-itihāsas* are the six canonical sources, from which we directly know about the way of salvation.<sup>70</sup>

Jayanta formulates a Criterion by which to judge a Scripture:

Jayanta is not blind to the problem which confronts us if all the scriptures of different faiths are declared equally authoritative.

Why then cannot I, he asks, write a book to-day, and declare it 'a scripture'? All that has been said about existing scriptures could be said of this new one also. After a few generations, the passing of time may invest it with sanctity, and it may become an authority to some people, and a religious sect may form round it. Or again, some one may now proclaim some nonsense written in an ancient book as 'revelation'. What is the criterion by which to judge that these are spurious works? Jayanta formulates some principles by the application of which we can decide whether an alleged scripture is really so or not: (i) It must have become well-established in the societies of good people; (ii) it must be acceptable to a large number of good people; (iii) its doctrines and practices must not appear to be altogether new, even while being propagated now; (iv) its aim should not be to serve the self-interests of impostors; and (v) its teachings should not be such as to frighten people. Jayanta gives as an example of false religion a ritual concocted by some debauched persons, in which men and women behaved in abnormal and indecent ways. It was called 'the vow of the blue cloth', and promptly suppressed by the then king in whose reign it arose. But religions like Buddhism and Jainism are not of this sort, and so, (he says) the scriptures on which they are based are true and authoritative.<sup>71</sup>

Comment :

To me it seems that the arguments of the Nyāya against the eternity of words and an eternal book are cogent; and with its definition of a 'reliable person', the Nyāya conception of testimony as a *pramāṇa* is acceptable. The logic of theological assertions developed by that school has much to commend itself. Only one of their theories requires criticism: (i) that the Veda is a scripture directly composed by God, and (ii) that the conception of God and his nature are implied in this. The next part of this book will be concerned with these criticisms.

While the Nyāya writers in general subscribe to the view that the Vedic revelation is exclusive, it is a relief to find Jayanta voicing a catholic view. It is interesting to speculate whether Jayanta himself would have accorded to Islam and Christianity an equal status with Buddhism and Jainism; for in justification



of Buddhism he said that its condemnation of caste was not meant seriously as it gives a place to caste. Moreover, in the principles he laid down for judging whether a religion is based on a true scripture or not, he says that it must be acceptable and established among many 'good men'. By 'good men' (*mahājānāh*) he meant only those who belong to *Aryāvarta* and are bound by the institution of caste. So, in his opinion any scripture is true and valid if it does not subvert the *Varṇāśrama Dharma*, and if its followers practise it. It is, however, to be noted that Jayanta while expressing these views often adds that they are the views of some, without criticising them, and indeed showing obvious sympathy to them. At the same time throughout his book he vigorously attacked not only the Jaina and the Buddhist views, but also the views of the Sāmkhya and the Mīmāṃsā.

Another noteworthy point in his exposition is that he says that the *smṛtis* add to the Vedic revelation, and that they too are the disclosures of God—thus all knowledge about supersensual things having its source in God alone. This implies that the Veda is not the complete 'once-for-all' given revelation, and that God also bestows insight upon some chosen men, whereby they are able to have intuitions of transcendental truths, and are able to convey that knowledge to others. Though the other scriptures were written by sages, He in fact wrote them, who inspired them to write. It appears to me that these are views which will appeal to many right-thinking people.

Comparative table showing the doctrinal differences on 'God':

| <i>Mīmāṃsā</i>   | <i>Nyāya</i>  | <i>Vedānta</i>  |
|--|---|---|
| 1. The existence of God is not demonstrable; the world needs no creator, because it is eternal. There are no world-cycles.         | 1. The existence of God can be proved by syllogistic inference.       | 1. The existence of God cannot be proved; but he exists.  |
| 2. There are a number of gods, but they are neither personal, nor are they distributors of deserts in accordance with our actions. | 2. God is the architect of the world; atoms, and souls are eternal.   | 2. God's existence is known from eternal scripture.   |
| 3. Each man gets his due on account of the unseen potency ( <i>adṛṣṭa</i> ) of his actions, and <i>karma</i> .                     | 3. He creates the world in accordance with the past actions of souls. | 3. So-called inferences for the existence of God suggest that theism is not an impossible view. |

# REVELATION AND REASON IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

| <i>Mīmāṃsā</i>   | <i>Nyāya</i>  | <i>Vedānta</i>  |
|--|---|---|
| 4. Passages in the Veda about God are <i>artha-vādas</i> . | 4. There was no first creation; creation and destruction of the world are cyclic.<br>5. God is the operator of the law of <i>Karma</i> .<br>6. The Nyāya writer, Udayana, suggests that theistic proofs may not convince all men; and that faith is God's gift. | 4. God is the material and efficient cause of the world; yet he is immutable.<br>5. God creates the world in accordance with the past actions of souls, souls being eternal.<br>6. Creator-creatures, and God-world, these are concepts valid only in empirical experience. From the standpoint of absolute truth, Brahman is the one and the only reality, and the conception of 'creator-creature' is a myth. |

*N.B.*—The Sāṃkhya is atheistic. The Yoga and the Vaiśeṣika systems accept in general the Nyāya theory.

Comparative table showing the doctrinal differences on 'the Veda':

| <i>Mīmāṃsā</i>   | <i>Nyāya</i>  | <i>Vedānta</i>   |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Vedic revelation in the form of eternal words is beginningless and everlasting, like the world. | 1. God's existence is demonstrable, and it is inconceivable that he, the most compassionate, should not have taught to his creatures, who are his children, the right kind of life and the way to salvation, which cannot be known in any other way. The Veda contains God's revelation, because from immemorial times good men have accepted it as such, and because no other scripture can claim to have God as its author. | 1. God is the source or cause of the Veda, but not its author, in the sense in which e.g. Kālidāsa is the author of <i>Śakuntala</i> . At the time of each creation, God manifests the Veda exactly as it was in the past aeon. There was never a time when God was an independent author, or composed it newly and spontaneously. |
| 2. The truth of the Veda is self-evident, as all truth is.   | 2. Veda was composed by God at the beginning of creation, and was handed down to sages and gods.  | 2. The Veda is not eternal in the sense in which Brahman is, but is beginningless and everlasting, in the empirical sense.   |



# THE CONCEPTION OF THE VEDIC REVELATION

## Mīmāṃsā

3. The authority of the Veda is beyond doubt, because it is not composed by anyone, and so no likelihood of falsehoods in it, and because it is consistent and uncontradicted.

4. In the Veda is not to be found any historical or factual knowledge; only the command-sentences in it are valid and binding on us.

## Nyāya

3. The truth of the Veda is due to God's authority—his absolute trustworthiness; and not because it is self-evident.

4. The absence of inconsistencies and falsehoods in the Veda proves its validity.

5. The Nyāya writer, Jayanta, admits that other scriptures also could be conceived as composed, or inspired, by God, provided their teachings are acceptable to 'good men'.

## Vedānta

3. The authority of the Veda is intrinsic and self-evident, as all truth is. Its authority is not derived from God's trustworthiness or authorship. As no one composed it, it is free from the limitations due to authorship. So its authority is beyond doubt.

4. The Veda is self-consistent and uncontradicted.

5. The Veda is only as real as the world; from the standpoint of absolute truth, both are unreal. Still, the Veda can give rise to true knowledge, as the picture of a snake (false snake) can give a correct idea of the real snake, or as one may get the solution of a problem in a dream.

*N.B.*—The Sāṃkhya says that the Veda has no author; yet the Veda for it is not eternal. The Yoga and the Vaiśeṣika support the Nyāya in general.





## PART TWO

### CHAPTER I

#### REVELATION IMPLIES A REVEALER

‘*Vedānta kṛt vedavideva cāham*’ (‘I am the author of Vedānta and the knower of it’).

—The Gīta, XV, 15.

#### I

#### *There is no Eternal Scripture*

We have seen that the Mīmāṃsā and to a certain extent the Advaita Vedānta claim that there is an eternal scripture, and that this is possible because sounds and words are eternal. The Nyāya has criticized this (*supra* pp. 226-8). But we are left wondering whether in this debate between the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, both the parties attach the same significance to the words they are using. When men of the stature of Jaimini and Kumārila say that sound is eternal, they certainly cannot mean by ‘sound’ that which is deep, loud etc.

‘Word’ is Thought :

We might understand the Mīmāṃsā theory much better by comparing it to similar theories.

We find that in *Cratylus* Plato discusses the nature of words and their significance. One of the characters in this dialogue, Hermogenes, says that names are conventional and arbitrary. Socrates refutes it in the following way: There can be no knowledge, if all things are in a perpetual flux ; if (*e.g.*) there is absolute beauty, there should be also absolute knowledge ; but there cannot be absolute knowledge, unless each word constantly refers to the same thing.<sup>1</sup> Besides this (Socrates argues), speech is a kind of action, and every action has a special nature of its own ; so, only he who speaks naturally can be speaking

aright.<sup>2</sup> Each name, Plato maintains, is the likeness of the thing which it names.<sup>3</sup> Plato (through Socrates) does not deny that there is an element of conventionality in language,<sup>4</sup> but says that primarily it is natural.<sup>5</sup> We find that Patanjali, the Hindu grammarian, advances a similar argument. He says that the relation between words and their meanings must be eternal, if knowledge is to be stable; and unless words are eternal this relation cannot be eternal.<sup>6</sup> This is precisely Jaimini's argument. So it comes down to this: As the Hindu grammarians said, there is no thought without speech, and there is no speech without thought; the two are inseparable (*śabdārthāvapyrdhiak stitau*).<sup>7</sup> Whatever is existent, is capable of being named (*yad vartate tad vyapadeśyam*); the 'unnameable is non-existent'. Sound is the natural means of expressing human thought, needs and feelings; to wit, a new-born infant also expresses himself through the sounds of his cries. This is the argument of Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*.

Psychology supports this conception:

Modern psychology shows that there is an inseparable connection between the brain-movements in thinking and the movements of vocal organs in speech. The latter express the former. In silent thinking also we are conscious of a corresponding movement of vocal organs. So there is much truth in saying that man, who is a rational animal, cannot but speak; for (as J. G. Herder pointed out) without language man is not man, he had to invent it in exercise of his powers.<sup>8</sup> In spite of Darwin, who says that there is no difference in kind between the 'faculty of language' in men and animals,<sup>9</sup> we find that animals are not capable of uttering conventionalised sounds with a definite significance; and they do not show any tendency to increase the number of their natural sounds, which, though purposive, are inarticulate. Language is the system of symbols, which man invented in order to progress in knowledge; and he made language out of sounds and not out of gestures, because (as Yāska said) speech is easier and definite.<sup>10</sup> To conclude: though we may not go with Watson through the whole gamut of Behaviourism, there seems to be no incongruity in accepting his thesis that speech is thinking aloud in words.<sup>11</sup>



Did the Mīmāṃsā understand in that way ?

Now when the Mīmāṃsakas said that 'unmanifested sound' is eternal, did they mean thereby 'thought'?<sup>12</sup> If so, the Mīmāṃsā theory (which is also that of the Vedānta) will be exempt from some of the criticisms of the Nyāya (*supra* p. 226). But curiously enough the Mīmāṃsakas nowhere mention it clearly. So it is quite probable that the Mīmāṃsā theory had its origin in the primitive belief that words are 'things', and that they have fetish power. The Semitic peoples as well as the Vedic Āryans regarded 'words' with superstitious awe; and as many passages in the *Atharva Veda* and the Biblical story of Balaam prove, they believed curses and praises to be existent entities. The doctrine of the 'eternity of words' may be a vestige of this ancient belief, resurrected to defend the infallibility of the Veda.

Thought implies a thinker :

Even if by 'sound' the Mīmāṃsā meant thought, thought must be the thought of somebody; and whose thought was expressed in the Veda? If they maintain that there is such a thing as eternal thought, eternally expressed in the form of the Veda, they must admit that there are other thoughts, which are not eternal. Otherwise, even a madman's statements (being expressions of thought which is eternal) must be eternal; and if eternity is the criterion of validity, these statements also must be eternal! To sum up: unless all words are eternal, the Vedic words cannot be eternal; and if all words are eternal, all statements including those of lunatics and liars are eternal.

Vedic Words are those used in Speech :

The Mīmāṃsā cannot escape the above criticism by saying that the Vedic words are not the words of any spoken language; for then the Veda becomes meaningless, and it could only be regarded as a group of magical incantations, intended to be mechanically recited on sacrificial occasions. This was, in fact, the view of certain Hindu sages e.g., Kautsa and his followers.<sup>13</sup> But the Mīmāṃsā denies this, and holds that the words in the Veda and in the spoken language (of those times) were identical.<sup>14</sup> Yāska, the authority on the etymology of

Vedic words, maintains the same view. It follows that Vedic words, like the words in ordinary speech, are non-eternal.

Sentences not eternal :

If the Mīmāṃsā were to say that though all words are eternal, the constitution of them into Vedic sentences alone is eternal, while the composition of sentences in ordinary speech is not eternal, even then it would not be an improvement, because it is absurd to say that words have formed themselves into vedic sentences from eternity. Besides that, as nothing composite can be eternal, (so the Hindu philosophers say) sentences made up of words cannot also be eternal.

Language, man's invention :

Our final conclusion is that language is a system of symbols, invented by man, and depending upon its environmental *milieu* each race developed its own language. None of these languages can be eternal ; so there can be no eternal scripture.

Language, God's gift ?

The Nyāya theory that God established the convention of words and their meanings is much better than the Mīmāṃsā theory, and is similar to the 'divine-origin theory' of language, held in Europe till the eighteenth century. The latter theory is based on the Biblical story that God brought each kind of animal (and thing) to Adam, and Adam named them, and the names so given stuck to them. In course of time this story was interpreted to mean that language was a direct gift of God to man ; to wit, Locke says that God 'furnished' man with language.<sup>15</sup> While this story cannot be literally true, it can be interpreted to mean that man is so designed by God that man has to manifest his thought in speech. Taken that way the story may be accepted as true by a modern theist.

## II

### *The Word of God*

The *Logos* :

While thought without a thinker is an absurd notion, 'eternal thought' will not be nonsense, if there is an eternal thinker. That God and his thought are both eternal is a conception we



meet with in the Biblical Book of Wisdom which paved the way for the doctrine of *Logos*. St. John's conception of the 'Word' of God, which was in the beginning, and without which nothing was made, is similar; and the Alexandrine Fathers—Clement and Origen—developed their doctrine of *Logos* from these texts. God cannot be without the Word; so the Word, or the divine reason in God, is eternal. The Fathers conceived Jesus Christ as the eternal *Logos*, which appeared in the world of space and time.<sup>16</sup> The problem of the relationship between eternal, divine reason, and temporary human word was supposed to be solved by the conception of the *Logos*; but as to how God's 'eternally generated Son' (Origen) became a human person is not explained; Clement is only able to say that the earthly advent of the *Logos* is a miracle of unsurpassable significance.

#### *Kalām of Allāh :*

Islamic theology had a similar problem. The Hanbalite theologians argued that if God is *Kālim*, one who speaks, since God is eternal and his attributes are inseparable from him, his speech, *Kalām*, must be eternal. God speaks from eternity to eternity, and his words are eternal. While the Christians conceived the *Logos* becoming a human person, the Muslims conceived *Kalām* manifesting itself as the Qurān. The words in the Qurān are God's very words, and were conveyed to Muhammad by Gabriel. The Qurān is eternal, not new, *muhdath*, and recited revelation, *wahy Matluww*.<sup>17</sup> The Jewish Cabbalists had an almost similar conception, holding the words of the Bible to be eternal and sacred, and regarded mispronunciation of '*Jahweh*' as dangerous.

#### Śankara's Conception :

Śankara's conception of the Veda as the Word from which the Creator created things (*supra* pp. 35-6) is similar to the conception of St. John and Clement, who also say that all things were created from *Logos*. [On the other hand, if we interpret Śankara as Appayya Dikṣita did (*op. cit.* pp. 36-7), his theory is untenable.] Like the Islamic theologians, the Hindu thinkers conceived God's thought to be embodied in a book. While in Islam the archangel Gabriel conveys this to Muhammad, in Hinduism

God vouchsafes the Vedic revelation to Prajāpati and the primal seers.

What is implied in saying, 'the Veda expressed God's Thought'?

Now if there is an eternal God, who is personal, it is inevitable that he should have thought. So if the Veda is taken in the sense of God's thought, clearly it must be eternal, and it must be in accordance with his thought that God creates the world in space and time.

But now the question arises: Is it possible that God's thought is directly expressed in the Veda, or the Qurān? If so, what proofs are there for this? One thing is, however, clear. If a book expresses the idea or thought of X, X himself must have composed it. So if the Veda expresses God's thought, God must have composed it. But even then it need not be eternal, because theologians generally agree that all products of God need not be eternal. The world is made by God, but no theologian accepts it to be co-eternal with God. If so, why should a composition of his be declared to be eternal? The Vedāntins reply that because creation is cyclic, and because the same scripture is composed at the beginning of each creation, the Veda is eternal. As the Naiyāyikas said, (*supra* pp. 227-8), in that case the world also is eternal, because the same world is re-created at the time of each creation (as is admitted by the Vedāntins), and even the mountains and rivers are the same. The Vedāntins are confusing 'similarity' with 'sameness', when they say the Veda is eternal in spite of world-cycles.

To conclude: in any case, the concept of an eternal scripture is to be given up; but if there is a God, it is logically possible\* that he may have composed a scripture and communicated it to mankind through sages or prophets. In the next chapter, we shall examine whether theism is justifiable.

\* Whether this is probable will be discussed in another chapter.



## CHAPTER II

### THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

‘The universally admitted eternal transcendence of God—has that any proof, or is it without proof? *Śāstras* are its proof. Again, what proof have the *śāstras*? They have their proof in the perfection of God’s *sattva*.’

—Vyāsa, *Yoga Bhāṣya*, I. 24.

#### I

#### *Refutation of the Advaita Doctrine*

Brahman cannot reveal :

It is time for us to face the question : Has Śāṅkara any right to claim that the Veda is a revelation? According to Śāṅkara, the highest reality is the one non-dual principle which is pure consciousness. Now if there is at least an impersonal Supreme Reality—an Absolute, a Law, or some such thing, and if it is working out its purpose in the world process or realising itself through the evolution of the world, then it is possible to regard cosmic history, and the ordering and pattern of events, as the revelation of it. There would be no sense, on this basis, in saying that there is a *special* revelation of the type which is believed in by most religions, but we might still say that nature reveals purpose, though it would be almost nonsense to say that a law or a purpose is revealing itself through nature to us.

But if the metaphysic of Śāṅkara is accepted, then even this cannot be said; for there is no sense in saying that the eternal consciousness (Brahman), without a second, is revealing itself, because there is no one else to whom it could reveal anything. Even though the Advaita says that Brahman is self-luminous, a revelation without a revealer and a recipient is unintelligible. There can be no Veda, no God and no man. Śāṅkara fully accepts this conclusion. The reply of the Advaita teachers is (in brief) that from the absolute standpoint, there is no scripture and no knowledge of Brahman, but from the empirical standpoint

both of these exist (*supra* pp. 99-102). We have also seen how Śāṅkara and his followers try to deal with the problem : How can scripture that is not real give us absolute knowledge ? Indeed the Advaita Vedānta seems to lead to the absurd conclusion that an illusory individual illusorily knows from an illusory scripture that what he previously regarded as ' himself ' is an illusion, and that he is something other than ' himself ' (*loc. cit.*).

There is no ' Non-Dual Brahman ' :

I seek to prove in the following paragraphs that Śāṅkara cannot easily get over the difficulty in his system, namely, that in the teeth of perceptual experience his Veda, however sublime it may be, does not convince us that there is only one Brahman, and that all perceptual experience is an illusion.

The school of Śāṅkara does not hold the principle of excluded middle to be a true principle. Reality and unreality are not (according to it) mutually exclusive. Reality is that, the cognition of which is never sublated, and unreality is that which is never cognised. ' The sky-flower ', ' the hare's horn ' etc., have never been cognised, nor will be, because they are unreal. But objects of empirical existence like tables and chairs are apprehended as existing, and so they are not unreal. Neither are they absolutely real in the sense that the cognition of them is never sublated. They are *sadasadanadhikaraṇa*, i.e., not the locus of either reality or unreality.<sup>1</sup> Whenever the Advaitin says that the world is ' false ', what he means is that since reality and unreality are not mutually exclusive (*paraspara viraharūpa*), the world can be declared to be false, in the sense that it is neither real nor unreal.

From this we see that instead of Being and Non-Being, Śāṅkara's logic has a three-fold division : Being, Empirical Being, and Non-Being. This is similar to Plato's distinction of *Being*, *Becoming* and *Non-Being*, and Kant's *Noumenon*, *Erscheinung* (appearance), and *Schein* (illusion).<sup>2\*</sup> Śāṅkara's theory implies that objects are real only in so far as they are perceived. Since ' square-circles ', ' sky-flowers ' etc., are never perceived they are entirely false. As empirical objects are not perceived all the time, they are not fully real, but neither are they fully

\* I am indebted to Prof. C. D. Broad for suggesting this latter comparison.



unreal. As Brahman is cognised always, it is fully real. The Advaita cannot cogently reply to the question: By whom is Brahman cognised always? If it is said 'by Brahman itself', (*supra* p. 102) we may say how do you know that? And what is the sense of saying that Brahman cognises himself? Can this be understood in the same sense in which I can say 'I know myself?' Can there be self-consciousness without consciousness of another? Further, in 'I know myself', 'I' is not equal to 'myself', here 'myself' = 'me', i.e. my thoughts and feelings. I cannot say 'I know I'. On the other hand 'the fruit ripens itself' (given as an example by Harṣa) is not a logical parallel to 'Brahman knows itself', for the former is an abstract, objective and descriptive sentence like 'I see that'; while the latter is nonsense like 'I know I'.

If the 'illusory' is that which is neither real nor unreal, then is Brahman real or unreal? Again if Brahman is devoid of all attributes (*nirguṇa*), how can it be real or unreal? And, what is not either is illusory. If in spite of this it is real, why not admit the world also to be real?

This shows that the Advaita does not accept any universally valid logical principle and so has a double standard of truth. It also fails to distinguish clearly between ideas and objects. Modern logicians have shown that non-existent things such as 'square circles' are not just another class of things and that there are no *kinds* of existence.<sup>3</sup> To say that the 'barren-woman's son is unreal' means that he has no existence; it does not mean that he has a special kind of existence. So his 'existence' cannot be contrasted with that of the objects like pots and pans.

The Advaita school says that if there is no permanent unchanging substance underlying the world, the world is not intelligible. Even granting the Advaita contention, it cannot be proved that this substance is what the Advaita describes as Brahman. Brahman may be self-luminous, but how do we know that?

Another argument of the Advaitins is that if the ultimate reality is consciousness, the world of material things which is just its opposite, cannot be equally real.<sup>4</sup> Ultimately, therefore,

the issue is between monistic idealism of some sort and realistic pluralism.

Against pluralism, the Advaita has only one positive argument, viz., that difference cannot be logically defined, and 'individuality' or uniqueness is not really perceived. But inability to give a logical definition only shows either the incapacity of our thought or the inadequacy of our language. It cannot deny an universally evident fact, and (as Śāṅkara said while arguing against the Buddhists) it is absurd to deny the testimony of senses (*supra* pp. 131-4 and 166f.).

The contentions of Harṣa may be disproved on the following grounds :

(i) I do not see how Harṣa is able to say that perceptual experience exists at a level where there is no distinction of subject and object. Perception cannot arise at all unless there is an awareness of the object as 'not-I', for perception presupposes it. An infant, and perhaps an animal, do not perceive 'an object' as the not-I; but it is impossible that a self-conscious man should not be aware of the object as 'not-I'. And, in fact, if there is no such awareness, the experience one has is not perception. It may be called (in Bradley's language) 'immediate experience', but even in such a 'feeling' there would be (as Bradley himself admits) 'internal diversity', and an 'indefinite amount of difference'.<sup>5</sup> What may with some justice be contended is (as Bradley does) that though the object experienced (or perceived) is certainly more than what is experienced, it is experienced only in direct awareness, i.e., in other words, consciousness is relational, but falls within a non-relational direct awareness.<sup>6</sup> Even if there is an experience in which the awareness and the object of it are not distinguished, why should that experience be taken as the standard, brushing aside the *usual* experience\* in which there is the distinction of subject and object? We are also entitled to ask Harṣa: If perception does not *prove* 'difference', does it prove non-duality? If not, what is it that it *proves*? If it proves non-duality, then why do not all people accept the Advaita doctrine, and why is the Veda necessary?

(ii) Harṣa has contended that 'difference' is a self-contradictory idea. We may reply: As Wittgenstein pointed out, to say that *two* things are not different from one another is nonsense; while to maintain that *one* thing is non-different from itself is a tautology.<sup>7</sup> 'Identity' and 'difference' are both inadequate ideas and this only shows that knowledge based on them is incomplete, but not that it is false. And till better concepts are found, they must do.<sup>8</sup>

(iii) Harṣa's criticism of the general proposition that all things are distinct from each other amounts to little, because modern logic

\* That such experience is the usual one is accepted by Bradley.



has established that *all* general universal propositions must be based (if they are to be true) on either omniscience, or exhaustive enumeration where it is possible; otherwise they are only probable.<sup>9</sup> Now since man's experience, which is to some extent based on the proposition questioned by Harṣa, is so far seen to be effective in fulfilling expectations, it is very likely that this proposition is true; while the proposition which Harṣa desires us to accept in its stead, (viz. everything is non-different from one another; *ergo*, e.g., a snake is a fish) is certainly not proved to be true, nor is it likely to be true.

The theory of *māyā* is again a difficult one. The illusory appearance is due (says the Advaitin) to *māyā*. But where is this *māyā*? In Brahman or in the souls? How can Brahman, which is pure consciousness be associated with *māyā*? or if *māyā* or *avidyā* belongs to the souls, how is there monism? If *māyā-avidyā* can co-exist with Brahman, it can never be annihilated.

Vācaspati holds that nescience belongs to the individual, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī explains that since individuals (*jīvas*) as well as nescience are *anādi*, i.e., beginningless, the two are related as the ether enclosed in a jar and the jar are.<sup>10</sup> The question may then be raised: If the jar is eternal, how will the ether in it be ever freed from it? Probably the Advaitin will reply that the jar will move to another position, so that the former portion of ether is not now enclosed, but a new portion comes to be enclosed. Here again is a difficulty. Will not the new portion so enclosed become a *jīva*? This shows that to use spatial metaphors in connection with Brahman and then take them literally is a dangerous procedure.

Sarvajñātman, Sureśvara and others say that Brahman itself is the locus of nescience. They hold that *avidyā*, present in Brahman, hides Brahman's nature from the *jīva*, who though identical with Brahman regards himself as separate and finite; but when the *jīva* knows himself to be one with Brahman, the veil of nescience is removed. For the Advaitin nescience is a positive principle; and he seeks to prove it thus: Firstly, judgments of the type 'I do not know' show that he who makes the judgment is ignorant of something, but is at the same time conscious of his ignorance; so ignorance (nescience) as well as the consciousness of it can abide together, which shows that nescience (*ajñāna*) is not the contradictory of consciousness. Secondly, in judgments such as 'I did not know anything till now', made

by a man just rising from sleep, mere ignorance is cognised, and not ignorance *of* something; so ignorance (nescience) must be a positive principle, like darkness, which is not a mere negation of light, but something that veils objects but is removed by light.<sup>11</sup> We may reply that in the judgments cited as examples, the ignorance and the consciousness are not of the same thing; and it may be pointed out that the analogy of darkness and its removal by light is irrelevant, because *in* light there is no darkness, while Advaitins say *in* Ātman there is nescience. Further, as Rāmānuja said, ignorance may be found only in a finite conscious person and not in absolute consciousness. Brahman is not a knower (for what does it know?) and so it cannot have ignorance. If nescience is a positive principle (as the Advaita says), it cannot be removed by knowledge. What is cannot be destroyed by our 'knowledge' that it does not exist.

How can *māyā-avidyā* which is beginningless have an end, for only produced things come to an end? By whom and how was it known that *avidyā* has an end? Cognition of non-dual Brahman cannot arise in the face of the direct evidence of senses, and if anyone has such a cognition he will not say about it, for there is no other to whom he can communicate. It is no wonder that faced with such insuperable difficulties, an Advaitin of the stature of the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi* had to say: 'Impossibility is an ornament of *avidyā*'.<sup>12</sup> *Credo quia impossibile*! Śankara has said that the beginningless *avidyā* can end by knowledge, just as the beginningless 'prior non-existence' (*prāgabhāva*) of a pot ends when a pot is made.<sup>13</sup> This is quibbling; and the example is not apt, because 'prior non-existence' is negative, while *māyā* is positive.

Finally, the Advaitin has again no satisfactory answer to the question: Is the 'falsity' of the world false or true? If 'falsity' is false, the world is real; if 'falsity' is true, there is another real entity besides Brahman. The Advaitin replies that when it is said that 'the barren-woman's son is not fair', it does not mean that he is black, for the barren-woman's son is himself non-existent. So though falsity and reality may be contradictory, denial of reality does not entail affirmation of falsity and *vice versa*. To this we reply that if the status of the world is similar to the barren-woman's son, it is ridiculous for the



Advaitin to deny it reality. On the other hand, if the world is real (as empirical experience correctly presupposes) unlike the barren-woman's son, then it is absurd to deny it reality.

Accepting the premise that whatever is an object (like the rope-snake) is false, the Advaitin says that the world's truth as well as its falsity are perceived\*; and since both share this common characteristic of 'being perceived', both are false, and so the world is neither true nor false. He argues thus: For example, 'being a cow' and 'being a horse' are not co-existent; for whatever is a cow is not a horse, but it is not true that whatever is a not-horse is a cow. On the other hand, 'not-horseness' and 'not-cowness' can co-exist, e.g., in an elephant. Similarly, (he says) the world may be both not real and not unreal. The whole Advaita position hinges on the premise that when Brahman is cognised the cognition of the world's reality is sublated. We reply that (as a host of able thinkers like Pārthasārathi Miśra, Gaṅgeśa, Vyāsarāja etc., have pointed out) the cognition of the world is never sublated; for as long as perceptual experience lasts, scripture cannot sublate it, and when there is no perceptual experience, we cannot learn anything from scripture. And, (says Rāmānuja) if anyone has realised non-duality, he will not teach others, for there are no others for him, and one cannot talk to reflections.<sup>14</sup>

The conclusion which I wish to draw from the above discussions is (i) that the doctrine of 'non-dual Brahman' is contradictory and so logically untenable, and (ii) that inasmuch as no one convinced of its truth can teach it, no scripture maintains it (for any scripture must have an author). While a scripture cannot give us *knowledge* of 'non-dual Brahman', were 'non-dual Brahman' the truth, there can be no scriptural testimony at all (since there are *not two* realities, empirical and absolute).

## II

*Does 'Anubhava' Prove the 'Non-Dual Brahman'?*

The logical refutation of the Advaita in the previous section cannot fully demolish the theory of Śāṅkara's school, because so far we have only shown that a scripture cannot teach non-duality.

\*The former in empirical experience and the latter in Brahman-intuition.

Now Śankara and his followers do not rely on scripture and logic alone as proofs, but claim that 'intuition' (*anubhava*) also is a proof for the 'non-dual Brahman' (*supra* pp. 112 ff.).

*Anubhava* not an independent proof :

Mystics of all ages and climes have claimed that the truths which they proclaim are based on their experience, and that no one who has not those experiences can deny their doctrines. For example, Corderius claims that '*theologia mystica est sapientia experimentalis*'.<sup>15</sup> Śankara nowhere claims that his doctrine is the fruit of the experimental science of mysticism ; he does not base Advaita on his personal experience or on the experience of others. The Veda is (for him) the only source of knowledge in this matter ; experience has to be moulded in accordance with the Upaniṣadic declaration 'That Thou art', by patiently weeding out all ideas contrary to it. Independent personal experience does not confirm and much less can it refute scripture. Only that experience (says the Advaitin) is true, which is able to realise the truth taught by scripture. A genuine mystic will never accept such an external authority as the cause and the criterion of his experience, but will like Kabir say : 'The *Purāṇa* and the *Qurān* are mere words ; lifting up the curtain, I have seen.'<sup>16</sup> As it has been already pointed out, since scripture cannot give rise to any such experience, and since Śankara does not accept that such experience can arise independently (as mystics do), there cannot be any such *anubhava* of the 'non-dual Brahman'.

*Anubhava* not mystic experience in the usual sense :

Rudolf Otto has defined a mystic as 'one in whom the *intuitus mysticus* has dawned—the man of *divya cakṣu*—*vui videt oculis Dei*—"the seer", who perceives the wholly other, be it Ātman or Brahman or *Śūnyata*'.<sup>17</sup> If the *Daśaśloki* and other minor works are those of Śankara, they prove that he has perceived Ātman devoid of all relations and modes. And he must have obviously arrived at such a perception through the Upaniṣadic *vākyas*. But Goethe has defined mysticism as 'the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of feelings',<sup>18</sup> and Bevan has said that in mystical experience there is a sense of knowing, but no conceptual content.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, in the *anubhava* of Śankara,



emotion plays very little part ; it is assurance gained by removing the notions of improbability (*asambhāvanā*) and contrariety (*viparīta bhāvanā*) from the teaching of the Upaniṣads. *Anubhava* is a reasoned conviction arising from deliberation over scriptural texts. So we may still ask : is *anubhava* the mystic experience ? And the reply must be that which Otto has given, viz., that Śāṅkara's mysticism ' is no mysticism in the usual sense of the term '.<sup>20</sup> From this the conclusion that *anubhava* cannot be *sapientia experimentalis* follows.

Does *Anubhava* reveal Non-Duality ?

A modern apologist for the Advaita may argue that *anubhava*, though rooted in scripture, does not fail to be a proof of Advaita. An experience may be caused by anything ; its history is no proof of its falsity. I think an adequate reply will be suggested to this by studying the method of reaching the *anubhava* state.

By concentration on the idea ' There is only one Brahman and nothing else ', Advaitins seek to withdraw their minds and senses into themselves and eliminate external multiplicity, and by thinking away the manifold of the world reflected in the diverse contents of the minds, they endeavour to divest the minds of all their contents, so that the way may be prepared for the insight (*sākṣātkāra*) that there is no duality at all between the self and the Absolute it perceives ; and in that state (Advaitins say) all multiplicity vanishes (*supra* p. 114).

Granted that such a state of mind is possible, we may ask, ' Does not the intuition of the One without the manifold of the world presuppose the self as standing over against the One, which is perceived ? ' To this the Advaitin, on the analogy of the ' perception of the tenth man ' (*supra* p. 116), replies that in such intuition the self does not perceive an Other as the One, but perceives itself as the One. I think this Advaita contention is based on a confusion. When a person knows *himself* as the tenth man, what is this *himself* ? It is certainly not the ' I ', for that is never known, nor can it be the Tenth (only a thing in space-time can be allocated a position, e.g. tenth, eighth etc.). In fact, in this example, what happens is that the body previously unnoticed is now noticed as occupying the tenth place. An example of this

sort cannot make the concept of the *anubhava* of non-duality intelligible.

### No *Anubhava* of Non-Duality :

Even if we concede the point, and suppose that there is such a state of mind, the main difficulty remains ; for in spite of the fact that there is an experience of the unity of being, there is, on the one side, the said unity and, on the other side, the mental-state (*cittavṛtti*) perceiving it. The Advaita school advances some clumsy similes to get over this difficulty (*supra* pp. 116-7).

Even if *Anubhava* is granted, it is not 'lived reality' :

We can, therefore, conclude that it is extremely doubtful whether anyone has such a lasting state of mind to which the *anubhava*, described in the Advaita Vedānta, corresponds. There is, however, 'abundant evidence' (to use Dean Inge's words)<sup>21</sup> to show that a fleeting blank trance 'exempt from "I"- or "Thou"-ness, and apart from all duality'<sup>22</sup> is possible by an exclusive concentration on the idea of the oneness of the Absolute. The experiences of many Indian saints, Sūfis, Neo-Platonists and European medieval mystics bear witness to it. But it should be noted that such an experience has nothing in common with our normal waking experience. Such a doctrine (as Buber said) may provide guidance for absorption into a state, resembling deep sleep, where there is no consciousness and memory ; but it has no relation to 'living reality', based on personal relations, and effective action.<sup>23</sup>

*Anubhava* does not prove the world to be unreal :

One may still defend Advaita in the following way : Why should waking experience be taken as the standard, and the perceptual world taken as the real world ? Why cannot one, e.g., take a dream or a hypnotic state as the criterion, and the world revealed by it as the real world ? The answer, as it is given by Śankara's school itself, is that the waking world is more comprehensive, rational and harmonious. But (now the Advaitin may say) if a dream, a hypnotic state, or a state of mind such as *anubhava* reveals to us an experience which is more comprehensive and harmonious than waking experience, why should not the



reality revealed therein be regarded as more real than the waking world?<sup>24</sup>

To this, we may reply in the following way: Jung has established that integration or unification is a fundamental impulse of 'the *psyche*' towards wholeness, and religion is one of the profoundest expressions of this impulse.<sup>25</sup> 'Harmony of being,' said Westcott, 'is the final aim towards which man reaches out in religion.'<sup>26</sup> The Upaniṣadic comparison of the man who does not know the self with the man from the Gāndhāra country, who has lost his way in the jungle, who has been robbed and who has been roaming wild, unable to find his way home—illustrates the central motif of all religion, namely, that the soul has become a prodigal by being separated from God, and that it has to reach its true home in the state of final union with God. Now if any experience enables us to achieve this union with God, it is fully and truly religious; even otherwise, if it can achieve the reintegration of personality, it must be a valuable experience; and if the Advaitin has an experience in which he finds a unity and a harmony, which he does not find in the world, he certainly is justified in concluding that he is in touch with a reality higher than that realised in the waking world. But, from this it does not follow that what is revealed to him is *the* only reality, and that this world is *not* real. For, anyone must start from perception and the world of facts. The higher reality should comprise this world, and must realise itself in this world; but it should not exclude this world, for the higher must include and transcend the lower and not simply deny it. Nor should an Advaitin deny that there may possibly be deeper experiences than his. The depths of reality can be plumbed by no man.

'Non-Duality' based on a wrong interpretation of *Anubhava* :

The Advaitin claims that the cognition of non-dual Brahman, which he has, is the final *unsublatable* cognition, because it is based on Upaniṣadic assertions (*supra* p. 87). His contention is open to the two-fold objection: (i) that the Upaniṣads do not teach *nirguṇa* Brahman as the final truth, and (ii) that the character of the *anubhava*, and the interpretation of it as the discernment of an all-engrossing non-duality, will change when this presupposition is gone. An experience such as the Advaitin

claims to have follows from the notion of Brahman as the abstract unity excluding all distinctions, which he believes to be the teaching of the sacred scripture; and any genuine experience, which he might have, is then interpreted in terms of such a belief. As the mystics themselves admit, while in a trance a mystic does not know what he is experiencing; but after coming out of the trance, he interprets his experience in terms of his beliefs. St. Teresa has said: 'How can a person, who is incapable of sight and hearing, know these things—that it has been in God and God in it? I reply that she (the soul) does not see them at the time, but sees them clearly *later*, after she has returned to herself, and knows them *not by vision*, but by a certitude which remains in the heart.'<sup>27</sup> Śankara himself says the same (*supra* p. 113).

Correct Interpretation by some Sūfis :

We should also bear in mind that the Advaitin cannot claim any monopoly to the experience of unification,\* for, as was said earlier, all religion seeks to achieve wholeness. The Sūfis, for example, believe that a state, where nothing but *alḥaqq* (the one real) exists, can be realised; but they are careful to point out that though in that state one may feel *ittihād* (union) with God, and say 'I am God', what is really experienced is the realisation of God's unity or *tawḥid*.<sup>28</sup> I think that when the Advaitin says that Brahman is *jīva*, he mistakes the 'mysterious togetherness' of God and soul for literal unity, and the vitalising indwelling of God in the soul for non-difference between the two.

### III

#### *Our Knowledge of God*

It has been shown in the two previous sections that 'non-dual Brahman' is an untenable conception, and that *anubhava* also does not establish an Absolute *without* the manifold world. In the last but one chapter we found that the arguments offered as proofs for the existence of God are not proofs, and that they presuppose a belief in God. I now propose to discuss briefly

\* The Buddhists (e.g.) experienced a state in which there was a cessation of mind's perceiving faculty, but they did not take it as a proof of the Advaita Brahman. (Vasubandhu, *Trīṃśikā in Vijnaptimātra Siddhi*, Paris, p. 29.)



whether a belief in God is justified, and if so on what grounds. I will also have something to say on the relationship between God and the world, and God and the souls.

There is a universal awareness of God :

St. Bonaventura maintained that though God is immediately present to all, he is 'concealed',<sup>29</sup> that is, he is known only through hints and suggestions. Salutary truth, clear and complete truth regarding God, can be known only from scripture, and the 'fruit of scripture' is the plenitude of eternal felicity.<sup>30</sup> Now is not this view implied in Śankara also ? He says that no one would have the desire to know Brahman unless he had learnt to discriminate between the eternal and the fleeting (*nityānityavastu viveka*), knows that all things of the world are worthless, and has the desire for liberation. Unless he knows the eternal, he cannot discriminate it from the temporal, and unless one has an idea of liberation how should he desire it ? As Bonaventura says, 'How indeed could the human mind surmise that the particular things with which it comes in contact are defective and incomplete, did it not possess some knowledge of a being who is utterly devoid of imperfection ?'<sup>31</sup> So what Śankara ought to have said is that we are all aware of Brahman to some extent, only we do not know him fully, and fuller knowledge is to be had from scripture. As Pascal said, one would not seek God if he had not already found him.

It seems to me that this is a sounder view than that of the Vedānta, which says that Brahman is known from scripture alone, for (there being no eternal scripture) we cannot believe in any claim that a scripture contains revelation, unless we have the prior belief that there is a God who reveals.

Now not only did Śankara say that man can discriminate between the eternal and the temporal, the permanent 'good' and the evanescent 'good' (*śreya, preya*), but he also said that of all creatures man *alone* has this power of discrimination, and freedom of will.<sup>32</sup> Śankara does not ask, why is it that man alone has the moral sense, and seeks the eternal ? I think the only adequate reply to this could be that moral ideas have developed because humanity has been in intercourse with God. Humanity has hungered after the eternal because the eternal

has called to it, and it is because man is in relationship to the Divine that he is better than plants and animals. As Berdyaev said, man without God is no longer a man.<sup>33</sup>

Atheists unconscious of their belief in God :

There are people who think there is no God, either because they do not know that they believe in God, or because the experiences which the theist interprets in terms of God are interpreted otherwise by them. The case is not without an analogy in other situations. Europeans, prior to Rousseau and the Romantic Movement, did not realise the beauties of landscape and mountains, because they did not realise the aesthetic significance of what they saw and nobody trained them to do so ; but the capacity to appreciate these things was latent in them. Again all of us know that we are bound to die, and that the goods of earthly life are fleeting ; but we are not conscious of the full significance of these beliefs (and they are only beliefs which cannot be logically proved) ; but when they are brought home to us vividly with a full realization of their implications, a new insight into the meaning of life is gained by us, such as the Buddha had when for the first time he *saw* sickness, old age and death, and realized what they meant. Similarly, the sincere atheist has an implicit belief in God, though he is unconscious of it and of its full significance, and though he has not developed it.

We know God in the way we *know* ourselves and our fellow-men :

I now come to the question, how is man aware of God ? The proper reply is that God, being spirit, cannot be known in any way other than as spirit, that is, in the same way in which we know ourselves and other persons, through immediate awareness. This is endorsed by Eddington who has said that our relationship with God is like that of our relationship with our friends.<sup>34</sup>

The next question is, how do we know ourselves ? Here, I think, Śāṅkara's answer is fundamentally correct. According to him the self is not known through inference, but through an immediate apprehension. He asserts that the self is never the object, but always the knower. That which we see, (*say*) ' Rama going to school ', ' Hari praying on the river's bank '—is not the self, the real ' I ', but the body in certain postures and attitudes.



Similarly, when it is said 'I am writing', it is not true to say that 'I' = that which is seen as holding the pen and writing. In short, as Śāṅkara himself emphasises, what is known is never the self, and to attempt to describe it is to reduce it to the status of an object with certain qualities. The 'I' is the common element that runs through all experience, and there is an immediate awareness of this fact; and language cannot deal with this awareness without, to some extent, objectifying the self. For instance, Śāṅkara's frequent talk of the self as 'eternal' commits a linguistic fallacy. My self, e.g., is what I am aware of as 'my activity'. It is neither eternal, nor non-eternal. Talk of the self as 'eternal' objectifies it.

Similarly, the awareness of other persons is a primary, non-inferential awareness, like that of the awareness of oneself; and neither of them is prior to one another, but both of them are present from the beginning and neither of them can arise without the other.<sup>35</sup> If we are not already aware of our fellow-men, no inference could prove their existence; but if we are already in some relationship with them, then solipsism, however ably presented, cannot convince us. There can be no idea of an 'other' unless it is directly experienced,<sup>36</sup> and from the beginning we know the world as a 'common world', shared by ourselves as well as others. Self-awareness, Śāṅkara admits, is presupposed in all knowledge; but he fails to notice that it involves the awareness of other selves, as well as 'things'. Self-awareness can never be awareness of the self as an independent entity, but (as Sureśvara himself recognized)<sup>37</sup> of an 'I' in relation to other things and other 'I's, as well as to an 'Other I', who is wholly unlike the other 'I's. We may call all these 'I's persons, while the supreme 'I' is the Supreme Person—the *Puruṣottama*, God. In all cognition there is an awareness of all these—the self, other selves, the world experienced by all these, and the Supreme Self.

God, an unique Person :

While the relationship with other persons is such that we always know them as different, God is known not only as present without, but within us, not only above but below (*Brahmaivedam, brahma purastāt, brahma paścāt*). We 'know God', because he

confronts us in all experience, and he is present to us, not as present to us from outside, but as working through us and thinking through us. (*Īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ hṛddeśerjuna tiṣṭati. Ya ātmānam antaro yamayati.*) Unless man has been confronted by God in this way, unless he has been spoken to and known by God in this way, man would never know God and would never seek to know more about him.

This is not a Proof :

This awareness carries conviction in proportion to its intensity, comprehensiveness and persistency ; but to reduce it to any formal argument of the type 'There is a God, because men have an awareness of him ', is to rob it of its distinctive cogency.

God is the highest Reality :

The mistake of the Advaita Vedānta was not clearly to differentiate the knowledge of God from intellectual knowledge of the type found in science, etc. Knowledge of the latter type can never bring us into personal relationship with others or with God. While we are aware of other persons as soon as they confront us, trust, loyalty and devotion—these alone can beget in us an insight into their nature ; so if we wish to *know* God more and more, we should develop a loving trust in him (*bhaktiā māṃ abhijānāti*-Gitā). As Rāmānuja says, knowledge of God must be of the nature of devotion (*bhaktirūpāpānam jñānam*). When God is so known thus, we find that we can justly speak of him as wise, loving, etc. This does not mean that 'wisdom inheres in God' or that a 'thing called knowledge is possessed by God'. It only means that on the basis of the relationship which we have with God, we are justified in referring to him as 'good', and 'loving'. The conception of God which the religious consciousness justifies and demands can only be a God who is personal;<sup>38</sup> for as Bradley has said: 'The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks'.<sup>39</sup> We conclude then that the view of the Advaita school that though 'God' is the highest reality which the worshipper knows, he is not the highest reality that *can* be known, is unjustified.



## God and the world :

Śankara was in agreement with all theists when he said that the world is not as real as Brahman, but his use of the word *mithyā* (illusion) was unfortunate. He has in some passages made it clear that *mithyā* does not mean the *wholly* non-existent; but he could have made it clearer. It was unnecessary to have used the words 'illusion' and 'false', to emphasize the world's dependent reality (*āpekṣikam satyam*) and God's independent reality. For Śankara, *māyā* is not a subjective principle, nor is the world an individual hallucination which comes to an end when the individual knows this or when he dies;<sup>40</sup> but *māyā* does suggest this. By *māyā* Śankara really meant the eternal power of Brahman by which it is able to give rise to the world without suffering any change in itself.<sup>41</sup> The relationship of the world to God and the way in which he is able to bring it into existence will never be intelligible in terms of logical categories. In this sense, it is 'mysterious'; but to compare this to the juggler's power to make non-existent things appear, or to the illusion of the 'rope-snake' is most undesirable. To conceive God as a juggler would be, for any thoroughgoing theist, a blasphemy, while to say that the world created by God's will is an illusion is to say that his will is not directed to true things. The saying that Brahman, on account of his *māyā*, experiences within himself the world of multiplicity, is unintelligible.

A balance should be struck between the two contrasting valuations of the world: (i) that the world is real and good, because it is God's creation; and (ii) that the world is empty and transient like a 'broken shard, withered grass and a fleeting dream',<sup>\*</sup> because it is a *mere* created thing. Even when God's reality is apprehended, there is no sense in saying that the cognition of the world as real is 'sublated'. Awareness of God's absolute reality and the world's dependent reality do not clash, just as a scientist's knowledge that the well-cooked bacon on his table is nothing but electrons and protons in motion, does not contradict either his experience of taste, or 'bacon' as an item in lived reality.

\* Jewish Mussaf prayer at the New Year. Cf. Karl Barth, who says that the world is 'radically relative', 'dust', 'a drop in the bucket'.<sup>42</sup>

The relationship of God to the world is that of dependence, and is neither like that of the relationship between a triangle and its properties, nor like that of the relationship between the atoms of Hydrogen and Oxygen and the water-molecules. It is a wholly unique relation, which can to some extent be understood on the analogy of biological dependence, and somewhat more adequately on the analogy of a creative artist and his product. As Jayatirtha, the famous Mādhva philosopher, has said, a father gives birth to a son without himself suffering anything in substance, but once the son is born he is an independent being by himself. The analogy, however, is not complete because even after it is created, the world is dependent on God. To recur to the other analogy: God and the world are related in some such way as a creative musician is related to the music he composes and plays. A father may be able to give birth to a son, but he cannot determine what kind of person the son will be. An artist, on the other hand, can plan, design and choose what his music and its purpose shall be. But here again, the analogy should not be taken too literally.

God is not the Cause of the world :

While to a theist it may appear that to conceive God as the efficient cause *only* is more appropriate than the conception of him as an efficient-material cause, the conception of God as an efficient cause is impossible, for the activity of God which brings the world into existence and sustains it is not causation, because it is the free activity of a person. So the whole idea of God as a cause will have to be given up. The Hindu theory of world-cycles, along with the belief that God with the jivas and *prakṛti* included in him from eternity enters into creation, implies that creation takes place in eternity and not in time. Berdyaev has said that the Aristotelian-Thomist understanding of God as a pure act ought to mean that the creation of the world is accomplished in eternity.<sup>43</sup> Berdyaev himself (along with another Russian thinker Sergius Bulgakov) thinks that creation takes place in eternity.<sup>44</sup> And like him Pringle-Pattison, while affirming God's transcendence and self-completeness, says that creation is necessary to God and is co-eternal with him.<sup>45</sup> Whitehead



advocates a similar view.<sup>46</sup> All this proves that the concept of creation needs revision and deepening.

God and the souls :

None of the Hindu schools, except the *Pāṇṇārātra*, maintain that souls are 'created'. Pringle-Pattison deplored that the English language has only one word 'creation' to express both the relation of God with the material world, and the relation of God with the souls. Iqbal said that in Arabic there are two words: God *creates* (*khalq*) the world and *directs* (*amr*) the souls.<sup>47</sup> Since we have seen that the word 'soul' is logically a misnomer for that which each of us is aware of only as 'my activity', and since the conception of the soul as a thing must be given up, it is improper to say that God creates the souls in the way in which he creates things. If, as Jaspers said, freedom is 'Existenz', then the self must be free activity, and it is nonsense to speak of created freedom in the sense of caused freedom. So it seems to me better to conceive the souls as uncreated,\* and acquiescing in the creative act in the sense that it is *partly* their actions (*karma*) that lead to creation (not in time). Accepting the Qurānic terminology, may we not say that God only directs us?

Souls not identical with God :

Lastly, the state of salvation as consisting of realisation of our identity with Brahman, which is impersonal consciousness, is unsatisfactory to a theist, as well as to all who value personality and ethical freedom. Theism is irreconcilable with a view which says that the individual is 'a portion of God', or 'a ray of God'. Analogies such as 'portion' and 'ray' suggest that the conception of God and soul are not yet sufficiently spiritual. Also, if the conception of revelation and incarnation are valid, we cannot say that God reveals himself to his parts or portions. Whether we posit a multiplicity of 'nesciences' 'delimiting' portions of Brahman, as jars 'limit' the ether within them, or whether we conceive souls as numerous reflections of Brahman in different 'nesciences', like the sun's reflections in water,—in either case

\* Prof. C. D. Broad has told me that except McTaggart every Western thinker has said that souls are created. But I find Bulgakov and Berdyaev maintaining an opposite view. Perhaps Russians are Easterners !

the analogies are hardly edifying. At the back of these conceptions is the conception of Brahman as a vast reservoir of consciousness diffused (as ether is) throughout space, or as a luminous ball of pure intelligence shining for ever like the sun. Either of these involves the untenable conception of Brahman as a thing—as something 'solid', though not made up of matter.

The Śāṅkarite *faux pas* :

Śankara, his apologists may say, identified the higher self and not the lower self with Brahman. But what is this higher self? It is an abstraction from which personality has been evaporated away. A perusal of the discussion in Book One would show that Advaita teachers have had great difficulty in interpreting 'That Thou art'. Once we abandon the notion of scriptural infallibility, there is no reason why a repugnant statement should be accepted even if it is found in a scripture. But thinkers of the eminence of Rāmānuja and Madhva maintain that 'That Thou art' does not have the meaning which Śankara and his followers give it.

The Advaita writers themselves find that it is absurd to say that God and soul are identical; so they say that we have to 'think away' all that makes an individual to be an individual; and to think of the jīva as having no body, no mind, and no personality. Then he is pure consciousness. We have also (they say) to think of God as having no creatorship, omniscience and omnipotence; so that there remains only pure consciousness. Then the two (God and soul) are non-different. There is no sense in this kind of abstract thought, for supposing we do 'think away' all that makes an orange an orange, and all that makes a stone a stone; then we may argue that both are non-different because both are mere 'things'; but have we gained any insight thereby? That God and souls are both to an extent similar (both are persons) no theist would deny; but the theists would say that they are also distinct.\*

Śankara has said that if a king has no kingdom and if a noble has no baronetcy, both would not be different. (*supra* Bk. I, Pt. I, I.) But will they not remain—kingdom or no kingdom—two separate

\* Cf. Bradley who says that to identify the self with the Absolute is 'to postulate in the teeth of facts'. (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 497.)



personalities? Moreover, who is able to take away God's supremacy, and a man's individuality? So the analogy is irrelevant. Advaita teachers knowing this say that God's godness and the individual's individuality are both an illusion. Their argument is that since scripture says that 'Knowledge removes the world' and that 'He who knows does not see the world', there is no world in reality; for if there were a real world, how could it vanish by our merely believing that it is non-existent? Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Śrī Harṣa plainly say that this is the sole positive proof of the world's unreality. But if a scripture said that a cat is not a cat but a dog, should we believe it? The Advaita school replies that as their scripture is infallible, we must say that perception itself is fallacious. This vicious conception of revelation as a body of sentences communicated (not composed!) by God and literally infallible for ever is the foundation of the entire Advaita architectonic and if such a conception of revelation is abandoned, the whole system falls to the ground.

God is God and we are ourselves :

The inference advanced by later Advaitins that 'The self is non-different from Brahman, because it is conscious like Brahman' is similar to the inference 'The table is non-different from the chair, because it is made of wood like the chair'.<sup>\*48</sup> Such an argument can prove only the similarity (*sādharmyatā*) of the properties possessed by the two things. It cannot abrogate the distinctiveness of either.

Von Hugel has said that 'God is emphatically not simply our highest selves' and that if a man has failed to know this, 'he has not waked up the *specifically* religious consciousness'.<sup>49</sup> This view has been expressed with equal emphasis by Rāmānuja and others, and this has led some to charge Śāṅkara with atheism and nihilism. Śāṅkara is not unaware that his view can be taken for an atheistic view, and has replied that he did not deny God, but only denied anything other than God.<sup>50</sup> This is very much like what Hegel said. To speak of God (so Hegel taught) as Supreme Being is to admit that something besides him—the world—also has being

\* Prof. C. D. Broad has pointed out to me that this argument probably presupposes something like Leibniz's 'principle of the identity of indiscernables'. Wittgenstein has tried to show that such a principle is untenable.

and positive permanence ; and we begin to know God when we understand that apart from him there is no being and truth in things. We only rise to the idea of God (says Hegel) when the world as immediately given is negated.<sup>51</sup> To many great thinkers, in the West as well as in India, such a view has seemed to be the most satisfactory. In India a host of thinkers, whose eminence either as thinkers or as religious personalities is not inferior to the Advaita writers, have pronounced such a conception to be atheistic.<sup>52</sup> The two attitudes (Advaita and theism) are irreconcilable and as philosophies each of them will appeal to one type of mind. But if the analysis of the awareness of God offered in this chapter is correct, i.e. if God is a Person whom one 'encounters', then we must accept theism, which, according to the Nyāya thinkers, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and a number of Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava thinkers, is also the true Vedic tradition. When Arjuna was granted a vision of God, he said trembling (*vepamānah*): 'O, Father of the sentient and insentient world, you are worthy of worship ; you are the great teacher. There is none like you, who could surpass you ? Peerless is your glory (*prabhāva*) in the three worlds. So I bow down to the ground, and worship you, the Lord and worshipful (*īdyam*). Bear with me as a father does with his son, as a friend with another, and as the lover with his beloved.' (Gītā, XI. 43-44).



## CHAPTER III

### A CRITIQUE OF REVELATION

Whoso the Faith and Wisdom hath attained—  
His states of mind, well-harnessed, lead him on.

—The Buddha, *Samyutta Nikāya*, V. p. 6.

#### 1

#### *General Revelation*

Religion presupposes a revelation :

In the last chapter we were led to the conclusion that belief in a personal God is not unjustified, and that on the basis of theism the idea of a 'revelation' made by a personal God to human persons is not incredible. We can now advance further and say that if God is a silent and unresponsive deity, faith in him can never be supported, however much religious consciousness may testify to the existence of such a God. An Aristotelian deity who does not respond to man can hardly be said to exist, and even if he does, he does not concern us much. So it is impossible to conceive of religion without a revelation.

It is sometimes believed that only the Semitic religions claim to have revelations, but earlier chapters of this book must have convinced the readers that Hinduism also claims to be in possession of a revelation, namely, the teaching which God is said to have imparted to mankind through the primal sages and gods at the beginning of creation, and which is found word for word in the Veda. It appears that the Buddhists and the Jainas also claim to have the final truth, because while for the Buddhists anything that contradicts Buddha's teaching cannot be true,<sup>1</sup> the Jainas believe that only he who 'believes the true teaching' is 'righteous'.<sup>2</sup>

A special revelation presupposes a general revelation :

It seems to me that unless we admit that there is an universal awareness of God, which hereafter we shall call 'general revelation', (any knowledge of God must be a disclosure by him,

since we cannot expect to know him if he is unwilling to disclose himself) (see *infra* p. 321), it is difficult to maintain that there has been any particular revelation such as that contained in the Veda, or in the Qurān. Unless there is a prior belief in God, it is impossible to believe in any particular revelation, even if God himself directly vouchsafes it. Revelation through a particular book or person cannot be judged to be genuine without a knowledge of God derived independently of that book or person. A few examples will make this clear. It seems that for a long time Muḥammad wondered whether he was receiving revelations from an evil spirit or God,<sup>3</sup> and in the end it was obviously the nature of the message, of which he was made the bearer, that convinced him of its being divine. Now, unless he had some prior awareness of God and his nature, he could not have judged his message to be the divine truth. Similarly, the claim of Jesus that he was the Messiah was accepted by his disciples, not merely because he made such a claim, but because they thought he was worthy to be identified with the promised Messiah. St. John suggests that Jesus ascended to the Father, because Jesus' holiness allows no further evolution.<sup>4</sup> Again, Tertullian says that it is the soul that bears witness to Christ as the incarnate Word.<sup>5</sup> This shows that according to the Apostles and the early Fathers, man can have some knowledge of God independently of Christ. Right up to St. Thomas Aquinas this was the accepted Christian position; otherwise, St. Thomas would not have argued that God became Jesus Christ, because there was need for redemption. Coming to the Hindu scriptures, we find that in the Gītā, Arjuna tells the incarnate God (Kṛṣṇa) that he (Arjuna) believes him to be God, not only because Kṛṣṇa tells him so, but because the great sages also have testified to that effect (how did they know it?), and (most important of all) he (Arjuna) himself thinks this to be true.<sup>6</sup> Obviously, the idea that Kṛṣṇa was an incarnation fitted in with Arjuna's ideas about God and his nature; or else he would have disbelieved it (like, e.g. Śiśupāla, who denied Kṛṣṇa to be God). We are, therefore, led to conclude that unless there is a general revelation, there can be no special revelation. This is confirmed by, what Cicero has called, the general consensus of mankind, i.e., there never was a race on earth which did not witness the existence of God.



Unfortunately this fact has not been fully acknowledged by the great Christian reformers, Luther and Calvin, because unlike the Apostles, the early Fathers, and even mediaeval thinkers, they did not know about the religions of the East, and so came to believe that independently of the revelation granted through Christ, man cannot know God. But modern Christian thinkers in general do not deny the possibility of men knowing God independently of Christ. Similarly, many modern Hindu religious leaders (e.g. Rāmākṛṣṇa Paramahansa and Aurobindo) recognize that God has not kept the non-Hindu races in ignorance of himself. But for many ancient Indian thinkers India was 'the world', and they could not conceive how there could be any religion other than their own (*supra* p. 52), and they regarded Buddhism and Jainism as mere heresies to be stamped out.

Śāṅkara, Brunner and Barth : a comparison :

The four-fold revelation as conceived by Śāṅkara (*supra* p. 6f.) may be compared to the Christian conception of the three-fold disclosure of God through nature, through the Hebrew prophets, and through Christ. There are however differences on this matter among Christian theologians. Brunner, for instance, allows this scheme but says that as man is essentially sinful, his knowledge of God through nature is inadequate and distorted, and is not of 'saving value'. Full revelation is given only in and through Christ. Śāṅkara's view seems to have some points of similarity to this, when he says that there is a general manifestation of Brahman, for all that exists speaks of Brahman. But from this we cannot know anything about Brahman's nature, and so it is practically useless. We can have true knowledge of Brahman (says Śāṅkara) from the Veda alone; not because we are sinful, but because it is impossible to know about supersensuous things through our senses and the inference based on sense-perception. Brahman is not a *Deus absconditus*; but is immediately present and self-revealed (*aparokṣa, svayam prakāśa*). In that sense only there is a general revelation. But from the Veda alone we can know this. In thus accepting one and only one authority as the source of final truth, Śāṅkara's attitude is very similar to that of Brunner; for Brunner has said that

'only at one place, only in one event, has God revealed himself truly and completely'.<sup>7</sup>

Barth's criticism of Brunner is trenchant. He asked: Is God known apart from Christ, or not? If he is, however incomplete that knowledge may be, it must be 'saving knowledge'; and if not, then there is no general knowledge. Śāṅkara also, admits only one revelation,—in this case, the Veda. Nothing else (he says) can tell us about Brahman, for Brahman is '*śāstraika pramāṇa*', i.e. one who can be known through the Scripture only. The knowledge which we get from other canonical books—whether the Gītā or the *Manusmṛti*—is only a restatement of what the Veda contains. His attitude (like that of Kumārila) towards Buddhism and Jainism, as well as towards the other schools of Hindu thought which accepted the Veda, (e.g. Bhāgavata and Śaiva schools) is uncompromising. The former are condemned for having dared to claim a knowledge of dharma and transcendental matters without any warrant, while the latter are criticised for misinterpreting the Veda (*supra* pp. 50f.; pp. 215-6). Here again is a striking similarity in attitude between Barth and Śāṅkara. Barth thinks that Christianity has no point of contact with other religions, and that it cannot 'howl with the wolves'<sup>8</sup>; and that the non-Christian religions are '*Unglaube*' (unfaith)—'not acts of response to God, but acts of resistance to God'.<sup>9\*</sup>

Criticism of the claim to exclusivity:

An attitude such as that found in the writings of Śāṅkara and Barth is open to a two-fold objection:

(i) It is (to use Canon Sheppard's phrase) an 'intolerable idea'<sup>10</sup> to say that God exclusively disclosed himself to one people and left the others in darkness. Karl Jaspers has rightly said that 'in its motive and in its consequences, this claim (to exclusivity) is catastrophic for men. We must fight for the truth and for our soul against this fatal claim.'<sup>11</sup> God as revealed to the best type of religious consciousness does not seem to be a tribal or national God, who reveals himself only to a chosen few. 'The path men take from every side is mine,' says God in the Gītā.<sup>12</sup>

\* Śāṅkara, however, admits that the points on which other Hindu *Smṛtis* do not contradict Vedānta, he will accept them. Similarly Augustine is ready to accept 'sought That is true and in harmony with our faith'.<sup>9a</sup>



St. John has spoken of the 'Light which lighteth every man'; and Justin Martyr recognised Christ as the Word of God because Christ said excellently whatever the philosophers and law-givers said before. St. Augustine says that the true religion which existed from the beginning was called Christianity after Jesus came.<sup>13</sup> The Qurān endorses this when it says: 'There is no people but a warner has gone before them; every nation had an apostle.'<sup>14</sup> Then again, those who say that there has been only one revelation must either deny that there has been any other revelation at all, or must admit that there have been other partial revelations at least. Those who, like Śankara, Kumārila and Barth, have opted for the first alternative have done so, because they start by taking the distinctive element in a particular revelation (e.g. the Vedic, or the Christian), define 'revelation' in terms of it, and then conclude that since this element is absent elsewhere, nothing else is a revelation.

(ii) Denial of a general revelation coupled with the assertion of a unique revelation will make the latter a sort of miracle. It will then have no continuity with either the past or the present. An illustration from the Christian context will make this clear. Jesus Christ did not come into the world like a bolt from the blue; there was a continuity between his advent, and the history of the Jewish people, their discovery of God, and God's self-disclosure to them down the centuries; and all this presupposes man's capacity to move towards God through universal revelation, of which the created order and the moral law in the hearts of men are the medium (as St. Paul tells us in *the Romans*). So, Christ's 'new commandment is the old commandment, which you had from the beginning'.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, in the Gītā Kṛṣṇa said that his teaching *then* was the same which he imparted to the Sun at the beginning of creation.<sup>16</sup> But those who maintain that there has been one and only one revelation do not want any such continuity and connection between history and what they claim to be *the* revelation. It must for them be discontinuous, radically different from everything else,—in short, a miracle;<sup>17</sup> or else they cannot believe it. They cannot give any explanation of the phenomenon, and they do not wish to, for what is rational they cannot believe.<sup>18</sup> One such theologian, H. Frick, said that the Gospel comes down from above, 'like a stone into water'!<sup>19</sup>

As against these theologians, that noble and heroic figure of the Middle ages, Roger Bacon, said that all knowledge is from God, and that even the knowledge possessed by and found in the works of Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes is a revelation of God, and that Jesus Christ himself drew much from Hebrew and non-Hebrew knowledge, while adding much to it.<sup>20</sup> I endorse this view and conclude that the conception of revelation found in the Advaita Vedānta, and the Nyāya schools has a grave shortcoming, because it denies the universal awareness of Deity, and thus ignores the truth which Wordsworth's poetic insight has discovered: 'Spirit knows no insulated spot, no chasm, no solitude; from link to link it circulates, the Soul of all the world.'<sup>21</sup>

## II

### *Verbal Inspiration*

Nyāya, Christian and Jewish views of 'Verbal Inspiration':

We now come to the Nyāya conception that God is the author of the Veda, which we found to be more satisfactory than the Mimāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta theories.

The Nyāya conception of revelation is similar in an important respect to that outlined in the '*Providentissimus Deus*' of Pope Leo XIII. According to Leo, God is the author of the Bible; he composed it; it is a letter written by God and transmitted by sacred writers to the human race. He says that the ancient and unchanging faith of the Church is that the holy books were 'wholly and entirely written at the dictation of the Holy Ghost', 'and have God for their author'. The men who wrote them (says Leo) were 'inspired instruments' who by 'supernatural power' understood and wrote with 'infallible truth'. If in these sentences we substitute the word 'heard' for 'wrote' wherever the latter occurs, there would be very little difference between the Nyāya conception of Vedic revelation and the Catholic conception of Biblical revelation. Similarly, the Jewish Encyclopaedia says that *all* the books of the Bible were composed under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; and till about ninety years ago the Protestant Christian thinkers held that the Bible was 'particularly inspired' and that *all* of its



parts—'sentences, letters as well as syllables'—are 'absolute, faultless, unerring and supreme'.<sup>22</sup> Even now some Fundamentalists hold such a view. We have already referred to the Islamic view that the *very words* in the Qurān are those of God.

Implication of this view :

We must now examine the philosophical implications of such a conception. Unless God is an omniscient, omnipotent person who is compassionate towards all people, he would not reveal truth in this way. But if there is such a God, and if there are truths necessary for salvation, which we cannot know through perception and inference, and if God is moved by the desire to save us, then it is conceivable that God should have communicated truth to fit persons. It is not logically impossible for God to have made these persons free from all error both in receiving it and transmitting it to others. No believer in a personal God will theoretically deny God such a capacity. Karl Barth has said that God is quite capable of revealing truth even to stocks and stones, and the Qurān says that a revelation has in fact been granted to inanimate objects and animals.<sup>23</sup> Though this is not antecedently impossible for God, do we find any evidence of this ?

Hindu and Christian Apologetics of 'Verbal Inspiration' :

Anybody who has cared to go through the Veda critically knows that it teems with self-contradictions, inaccuracies, and tautologies. Even in the fifth century B.C., the Buddhists and others pointed out this fact, and Gotama, Jaimini and their followers had to develop an elaborate theory of interpretation that wherever two texts contradict one another, we must take them as alternative theories or alternative ways in which we can act ; that wherever the Veda seems to contradict sense-experience, we may be sure that it is not the obvious meaning that is intended ; and that the Veda is not meant to supplement or supplant perceptual experience (history and science), but is concerned to inform us the truths that transcend sense-experience (*ajnāta jñāpanam*). This Hindu theory is very similar to that developed by Augustine with regard to the Bible ; for he maintained that the Holy Ghost 'did not intend to teach men these things (i.e. the essential nature

of the things of the visible universe), things in no way profitable unto salvation'.<sup>24</sup> In spite of this, the Hindus and Christians had to admit that there are certain 'truths', the knowledge of which is essential for salvation, but which are opposed to sense-experience. For example, some schools of the Vedānta admit that their doctrine that God is both the constituent and efficient cause of the universe is opposed to empirical experience. Still (they say) we must accept it. So again the doctrine of Advaita is admittedly opposed to the perception of multiplicity, but (they say) it is nevertheless true. In such cases again, the principle which the Hindu teachers follow is similar to the Augustinian principle, viz., 'whatever . . . is contrary to these scriptures . . . we must either prove it as well as we can to be entirely false, or at all events, we must, without the smallest hesitation, believe it to be so'.<sup>25</sup> In other words, if a scripture contradicts experience, try to prove that experience is in error; if you cannot succeed, then believe that experience is a delusion (e.g. Vācaspati, who says that the wise man believes in 'non-duality' in spite of sense-evidence to the contrary—*supra* p. 128).

From this it would seem that if one were to admit some kind of 'verbal inspiration' in sacred scriptures, one would be led to develop the same kind of theory in order to explain its imperfections, whether one happens to be a Hindu Pandit or a Christian theologian.\*

### Criticism of the 'Verbal Inspiration' Theory:

It is quite understandable that man should crave for an absolute knowledge which is once-for-all given and adequate for all times; and think that if any scripture is God-given, it must be free from all errors, and every word and letter in it must be true. The *Nyāya bhāṣya* says that *any* error in a scripture would destroy its trustworthiness as a whole. Such a view presupposes that the recipients of revelation are mere instruments without any personal responsibility. But is that possible? Does God supersede the natural powers of those to whom he reveals to such an extent that they cease to be human, and become either omniscient or mere machines? From the vagueness, ambiguity as well as the self-contradictions found (e.g.) in the Veda, it must be acknowledged

\* I am indebted to Dr. A. C. Bouquet for this suggestion.



that those who received and transmitted it have failed to be perfect and infallible, and that it does not contain God's very words. We also know from the *Gītā*, which is an acknowledged canonical book of the Hindus, that the Veda is not the sufficient source of all that is to be known; and that for the seer who knows, the Veda is as useful as a well when the rivers and ponds are flooded with water.<sup>26</sup> The *Gītā* also says that the conflicting passages as well as the interpretations of scripture, i.e. the Veda, bewilder the mind (*śṛtīvipratipannā*).<sup>27</sup> But how can we know which is the real and true meaning of scripture, which alone can be the genuine revelation?

From the *Gītā* we also know that when God reveals, he does not thrust the truth upon a man, or nullify human faculties and limitations, for he reveals to persons, who are free agents, and not machines and he fully respects the spiritual liberty of persons. For the reception of revelation, a 'one-pointed mind' (*ekāgra citta*)<sup>28</sup> and faith are needed. God could, of course, reveal himself to stocks and stones, but it is unanimously agreed that the revelation contained in any scripture is not of that kind; and no such exhibition of omnipotence has occurred when God thus revealed himself to mankind.

Vācaspati has said in his exposition of the Nyāya that it is out of compassion that God reveals. Revelation can be a divine gift (*mauhiba*, as Islam says) of the All-Merciful (*al-Rahman*)<sup>29</sup> only when what is given is freely accepted. It is no 'grace' (*anugraha*)<sup>30</sup> to thrust something on another person, when it is unwanted and unappreciated. After imparting the highest truth to Arjuna, God says, 'Reflect critically (*vimśya*) on it in full, and then do as you please'.<sup>31</sup> Our own conclusion is in accordance with this, namely, that God's revelation is adjusted to the capacity of those to whom it is made; those who receive God's teaching do not cease to be men of a particular time and place, however much their mind may be quickened for this great task. Only that much is revealed which a man can receive without any derogation to his spiritual freedom and integrity. So whether it is in the case of the Veda or in the case of the *Gītā*, they cannot be free from the limitations of the men who wrote them. A scripture contains a revelation as far as it was understood and appreciated by its author. In order to discover which part of a

scripture contains truth, and which part of it is a mere accidental accretion, we have to extend to any scripture Jowett's well-known canon regarding Biblical exegesis, namely, to interpret any sacred book like any other book.<sup>32</sup>

### III

#### *Content and Modus Operandi of Revelation*

One of the important questions which we must now tackle is, what is it that is revealed?

Revelation through an Incarnation :

Luther and some modern Christian theologians think that historical events are the medium of revelation, and that an evocation of an appreciation of the events in men's minds is revelation.<sup>33</sup> They also believe that God reveals himself essentially in the life and acts of a person, for the best way in which a personal God can disclose himself is through a personality. We find this to be similar to a view not much emphasized in the Nyāya and the Vedānta, but taught by the Gītā and *Purāṇas*, namely, that the world-process—the rise and fall of kingdoms and dynasties, and the lives of men and women—reveal to us God's hand;<sup>34</sup> and that God discloses himself more directly through his incarnations (*avatāras*). The lives and acts of the incarnations (so these books say) disclose to us God's love and concern for his devotees, his wrath against evil-doers, and the way he enters into a loving communion—as teacher, friend, husband etc.—with those who deserve it. According to the Gītā, an *avatāra* is a descent of God in human form into the world of space and time, in order that men may meditate on it, and mould themselves in thought, feeling and action on the lines of the *avatāra* and thus be raised into the divine nature and consciousness.<sup>35</sup> Bishop Appasamy thinks that the Hindu doctrine of *avatāra* is fundamentally akin to the Christian doctrine of incarnation;<sup>36</sup> but some Christian theological authorities (e.g. Prof. H. H. Farmer) have denied this.<sup>37</sup>

Śankara and *Avatāra* theory :

Now, consistently with his Advaita, Śankara cannot accept the theory of *avatāras*. When all individuals are Brahman, in



what way is an *avatāric* person superior to others? Śankara's reply (*supra* pp. 8-9) implies that the appearance of an *avatāra* is an illusion in a double sense, while that of the appearance of Brahman as *jīva* is an illusion in one sense only. Firstly, in so far as an *avatāra* is a phenomenon in the empirical world it is an illusion; secondly, inasmuch as God does not really become a man, his appearance as man is an illusion even from the empirical standpoint. Thus for Śankara, it is an illusion twice over. Śankara's explanation that while an *avatāra* has awareness of his identity with Brahman, we have not, is untenable; because then even sages such as Śuka and Vāmadeva would be *avatāras*. Moreover, God incarnates in every aeon (so the *Gītā* says); and if the *avatāra* is only a Brahman-knower (who can never be reborn), how does he incarnate in every aeon? Thus we find that Śankara's Advaita breaks on the rocks of the theory of incarnation, and this failure also shows that Śankara attempts in vain to give his Brahman a theistic basis, making it absorb the conception of *Īvara*, so that it may be given a theistic valuation. It is needless to say that the Hindu theistic schools do not accept the Advaitic interpretation of *avatāras*, and they regard *avatāras* to be real occurrences.

Faith, the only possible witness to an Incarnation :

But is there any necessity for an incarnation? Indeed, has there ever been an incarnation?—these are questions which we should consider now. There are many modern thinkers who feel they cannot accept the theory of incarnation, and to them the lives of good and holy men like the Buddha and others are only symbols through which God's goodness and majesty are disclosed. What Pringle-Pattison said with reference to Christ, many Hindu thinkers say of Kṛṣṇa: 'In order to give us authentic tidings of the character of God, Christ did not require actually to be God.'<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, there are no less competent thinkers, such as A. E. Taylor, who consider that 'the whole "power of the Gospel" to remake human personality is intimately bound up with the conviction that the story of the passion and exaltation of Christ is neither symbol nor allegory'.<sup>39</sup> But a thinker who adopts this attitude cannot give any proof for his belief. Ultimately it is his own personal conviction which can lead a man to

such a belief, and he can only say what Brunner has said about his conviction that Christ is the only and perfect revelation: 'I know this from God himself.'<sup>40</sup> It seems to me that it is wise to endorse the view of Prof. Ramsey, who has said that this is a question which can be only answered by each man for himself. It is for history to say whether a particular event (e.g. Crucifixion) has occurred or not, but it is only faith that can take it as an event which discloses God in a more direct way than other events.

Revelation involves some 'intellectual content':

However much some Protestant thinkers (e.g. William Temple) may say that revelation does not include any intellectual content, and that it occurs through events, it seems to me that even the most elementary belief involves some amount of knowledge, for without it nobody can make an affirmation; and faith is preeminently an act of affirmation. For example, an external event cannot by itself serve to rouse the belief that it is a vehicle of God's disclosure, until an evaluation of that event is evoked. Now, if some events are intended by God to be his self-disclosures, he must also enable man to evaluate them *properly*; otherwise they would be ineffective. Few, I believe, would care to deny that such evaluation involves some intellectual content; so *mere* events cannot be the channels of revelation.

Nor can this problem be evaded by saying that what God reveals is not truth, but himself through a human personality. Revelation through a person involves belief in him as a revealer of God, and this is impossible without that person revealing something about himself and our believing it to be true; and this 'something about him' must involve an intellectual core, which, however little, can be expressed, at least inadequately, in a proposition.

Religion not mere feeling:

Unless we adopt a theory like that of Schleiermacher in his early stage, that religion is essentially feeling, 'fleeting and pellucid', and that in religion the idea of God is not important,<sup>41</sup> we must admit that revelation involves an intellectual element. Again, in recent years Edwyn Bevan has compared religious emotion to the vague terror of the madman, to the feeling of the



beautiful and the sexual emotion, and has concluded that in all these types of feeling, there is no *definite* intellectual content and that they differed from each other only in the quality of their feeling. He sums this up by saying that though religion must have a dogma, it only expresses inadequately something that is felt to be there, but which our mind cannot grasp.<sup>42</sup>

But this conception of religion as mere emotion evades this problem: is not something experienced in religious feeling? If it has a content, how can it be validly interpreted in two or more contradictory ways? If it has no content, how does religious feeling differ from other feelings? If it is said that it has a different 'quality', which can be judged by the conduct of the man who has such a feeling, this is extremely difficult to substantiate, because there are many who have never doubted that God exists, and yet have lived like 'devils', while there are atheists who in moral conduct are saints. Conduct and practical considerations can never wholly justify belief.

Indeed we may question whether there is such a thing as *mere* emotion or *pure* feeling. Taking the instances given by Bevan, when the madman feels a thing to be 'sinister', he may not be able to 'visualise' what it is that is 'sinister', but he finds it 'sinister' because he has a conviction that it is something which is dangerous. Sexual feeling, again, involves the conception of the beloved as a 'person' with whom it is desirable to enter into relationship; but without some knowledge of the qualities of a person—such as his or her physical beauty or character—love cannot be evoked. So, we conclude that in religion also, as the theologians have said, faith must have a *fides quaerens intellectum*, and hence is the necessity for *dogmatic* theology, which brings to light the intellectual content involved in revelation and formulates it into a 'dogma'. In fact, the fundamental presupposition of theism is that God is Reality independent of men's subjective feelings. It is true that theologians are not exempt from human limitations, and so their efforts are never perfectly successful. That is why though revelation contains a genuine intellectual content, which is for ever final, the credible formulae in which it is embodied tend to become obsolete.

Can 'Truth' be revealed?

Hindu thinkers of old, as well as Catholic Christian thinkers, believe that the content of revelation consists of information regarding the right way of life, and about God. But modern Protestant Christian theologians veto out the conception of revelation as a number of propositions about any topic. Now, do they mean by this that God is barred from communicating truth expressible in propositions? i.e. cannot he quicken the mind (*dhīpraçodanā*) to form certain judgments expressible in propositional form? I agree that, *pace* Croce, there may be judgments inexpressible in propositional form. But it is not also unlikely that certain judgments (e.g. evaluation of events or moral convictions), which God has enabled man to make, are expressible in propositional form; and this does not mean that the propositions themselves are framed by God and implanted in man's head; nor does this mean that the propositional form in which it has been found possible to express a God-inspired judgment is adequate and final for all time. Further, an incarnation of God (if there has been one) teaches us not only through his life, but also directly by speech; and he must have spoken in a way that his audience could understand; but, those who heard him did not always fully understand the import of the words they heard, or commit them to writing without a mistake. To suppose otherwise would (as we have seen) reduce those men to the status of automata. Later generations should be careful to endeavour to separate the yolk from the shell.

Revelation through 'confrontation' of the human by the Divine:

Though revelation *may* take place in the above way, the more frequent way in which it happens is through direct disclosure and immediate contact. We can certainly know something about a man from what he says about himself; but however capable he may be and however intelligent we may be, his entire personality is never disclosed to us through anything which he may say. By direct personal encounter and by feeling the full 'impact' of his activity, we come to know him much more fully and adequately. Such is the disclosure of God made to the 'devotee' who has faith. God in the *Gītā* says: 'By devotion alone can I be perceived, *known and seen* in essence, and entered



into';<sup>43</sup> 'By devotion he knows me in essence who and what I am';<sup>44</sup> 'That supreme person is attainable by unswerving devotion'.<sup>45</sup>

To sum up: God reveals himself fully only to those who 'appropriate' him as their father or friend through loving trust.<sup>46</sup>

## IV

*Conclusion*

It would seem from our discussion in this chapter that revelation is not *sui generis*, and that it is a kind of direct awareness, which is essentially similar to our awareness of ourselves and our neighbours. Since in this type of awareness what is known is God, a person, and since a person can never be known 'objectively', but by his own disclosure through his activity, our awareness of God is his self-revelation. We also arrived at the conclusion that nobody is deprived of this revelation, and that those who say that they do not have it are perhaps not conscious of their own belief in God as of many other elements in their subliminal minds. Unless there is such a general revelation, the claim of many world-religions to be in possession of special revelations is unintelligible.

Provided we accept a personal God, who is good and omniscient, and a general revelation, special revelations are intelligible; but this takes for granted man's freedom. Revelation depends upon the whole activity of man, and presupposes that he can think and will. A chunk of wood cannot receive a revelation, in any proper sense of the term.

It follows from this that revelation is not a purely one-sided activity, and that man is active in receiving and assimilating it, and that it is limited by man's conditions. Hence we cannot accept that any sacred book consists of a body of propositions communicated by God *ab extra*.

We have seen that some modern Western thinkers make an unsuccessful attempt to show that there is no element of 'knowledge' in revelation. On the other hand, the position of Brunner and of the Barthians that revelation is neither an idea, nor events, but the *Einmalige* (the Unique),<sup>47</sup> is unintelligible to us; but they welcome it, because, as Kierkegaard said, for them faith can

arise only 'in virtue of the absurd'. If this is a correct position, then philosophy will have no relevance to revelation, since revelation is then put outside our categories, as well as outside our experience, because (according to these theologians) there is no analogy between revelation and experience of any form. The result of this would be that nothing whatever can be significantly said about revelation, and this is a conclusion which the Logical Positivists will heartily endorse.

I maintain (following Berdyaev) that revelation *must* be the revelation of Truth.<sup>48</sup> But revealed truth, it seems to me, is *not* universal truth, such as is found in the sciences, but is *absolute* truth.

Jaspers was the first philosopher to make a clear distinction between absolute truth and universal truth.<sup>49</sup> Long ago al-Ghazzali made a similar distinction between *al-aqlīya*, and *ad-dīnīya* or *ash-sharīya*.<sup>50</sup> The former is intellectual knowledge, which is axiomatic or deductive, while the latter is religious knowledge, mediated through prophets and traditions. The distinction which the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* makes between *parā-vidyā* and *aparā-vidyā*, the distinction of *vidyā* and *avidyā* in the *Īśa Upaniṣad*; and the distinction of *jñāna* and *vijnāna* in the *Gītā* have also some similarity to this.

Absolute truth is that by which a man lives, and for which he dies, and from which he derives a sense of supreme 'repose in being' (i.e. integration in himself and harmony with reality). On the other hand, universal truth is relative, particular, and obtained by all when they start from finite premises and follow a definite method, and it is expressible in propositions, which are recognised as cogent by all who understand them. On the other hand, absolute truth is the primal awareness of a real presence that confronts man as holy and good.\* Absolute truth and the activity wherein it is apprehended are inseparable; so it cannot be proved, for a 'provable' truth is external to man, and he cannot relate himself absolutely to it; but it is not irrational, because through self-conviction it can elucidate itself.

Truth so revealed is expressible in propositions, but they

\* It is immaterial whether such an awareness is evoked by a non-inferential leap to a new level of apprehension, or by an external event or a person; but in any case it itself is 'inward'.



fail to be universally recognised as true ; but if a man can *relive* the truth expressed in such a proposition by meditation on it, and by entering into communion with the historical consciousness to which it was disclosed (i.e. by developing what Wobbermin has called<sup>51</sup> 'productive empathy', which consists in feeling our way into it on the basis of our faith and experience), then he will come to recognize its absoluteness. A Sūfi has rightly said, 'No understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is actually revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet.'<sup>52</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

### SYMBOLISM AND REVELATION

'Mankind, it seems, has to find a symbol in order to express itself. Indeed, expression is symbolism.—Symbolism is no mere idle fancy or current degeneration, it is inherent in the very texture of human life.'

— A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism*, p. 23.

Religious language, one type of symbolism :

We are now in a position to examine in brief the relation between revelation and the symbols in which it is expressed. Symbolisation is necessary for all communication, and perhaps for all thinking ; for it is through symbols that man seeks to hold and make permanent the flux of events, which constitutes his experience. Language is a system of symbols, and as it has been said earlier (*supra* p. 53), language is not homogeneous, but has many levels. Science is one such level of language, while poetry is another. The mistake often made by critics of religion is to think that scientific language is adequate to deal with all types of experience. There are certain fundamental types of experience which cannot be treated by scientific language ; and religious experience, which arises from the encounter of man with God, has given rise to a symbolism of its own.

The disclosure of God occurs in a way which is closely akin to the non-inferential apprehension which we find in aesthetic appreciation, e.g., the awareness of the world that may open out before one while listening to music. When a man desires to communicate such an experience to others, he symbolises it by signs drawn from the types of relations which seem intelligible to him in the familiar setting of everyday life. For example, Arjuna says to God, whom he beheld : ' I see your face like a sacrificial fire blazing with splendour and burning up this world.'<sup>1</sup> Now, he could not literally have meant that God is burning the visible world as fire burns straw, but he uses metaphorical language in order to try to express a deep truth which cannot be expressed in any other form. There is another passage in the



Gītā, where God says, 'I am in them and they are in me' (*mayi te teṣu ca aham*). Here again the language is not meant to be taken literally, but figuratively; but nevertheless it expresses a truth, which the author of the Gītā could not express otherwise. When a man says of Beethoven's Sonata that it is 'penetrating' or 'moving', he does not mean that anything has 'physically entered through the skin' into his body, or that something has shaken him up and down. The expressions endeavour to describe a musical experience which cannot be expressed in any other way, and can be understood only by one who can to some extent share such experience. In the same way, figurative expressions used in scriptures are understood only with reference to a religious situation, and cannot be explained in any other way. Statements such as 'God is compassionate,' or 'God's anger is terrible', are indeed true, because knowing what compassion and anger are, we can conceive what they mean when applied to God. Again, if we know something about God, expressions such as 'God's terrifying teeth are like the destroying flames of Time',<sup>2</sup> or 'God carries (*vahāmi*) the burdens and difficulties of his devotees',<sup>3</sup> may suggest something more about God's nature through poetic symbols.

Śankara's position :

Śankara would say that descriptions of the experience of God such as that given in the above paragraph are from the lower standpoint; for he maintains that what we think of and speak of as God is not reality (Brahman) as it is in itself, but only an approximation to truth—a justifiable, but at the most an unsuccessful conceptualisation of the reality that for ever baffles all thought and attempts at definition. While this theory of Śankara and the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the Supreme One are similar in so far as both deny any plurality at all in the divine unity, and conceive the Supreme Reality as having no attributes, the Advaita Vedānta cannot accept the position that positive conceptions of it are altogether impossible. By itself mind cannot form any conception of it, but (says Śankara) scripture does tell us about Brahman through the three methods mentioned earlier (*supra* pp. 58ff.). Śankara is careful to emphasize almost all the important points in connection with religious symbolism: that

the symbols are not to be taken literally; that the paradox and ambiguity in religious symbolism is the result of the difficulty of presenting the infinite in the forms of the finite; that the phrases used cumulatively convey some sense of the absolute significance, which never depends upon this or that way of speaking about Brahman; and lastly, that words conjointly indicate a fact qualitatively other than the facts, of which they are usually used as symbols (*supra* pp. 58-9, 61-2, 65-6).

### Criticism of Śankara :

Thus for Śankara, Brahman is not the 'Supreme Void' of the Buddhists, and he would not endorse Scotus Erigena's saying, '*Deus propter excellentiam non immerito nihil vocatur*'. He says that Brahman is consciousness and bliss; and adds that when it is said that 'Brahman is knowledge', this means that Brahman is in its essence awareness,—not the awareness of somebody or of something, but pure awareness as such without a subject-object distinction. Similarly, (Advaitins say) 'Brahman is bliss' means that obtaining of Brahman is a joy; and 'obtaining' again is metaphorical, for Brahman is not something 'unpossessed' by anyone, since the self of all is Brahman (*supra* pp. 117-8). (This last sentence 'Brahman is the self of all' is a howler, for my 'I', 'my activity', cannot be your 'I', 'your activity'.) To me it seems that there is no sense in saying that there is 'consciousness' or 'joy', unless these are the consciousness and joy of a person. In sundering personality from consciousness and joy, in conjunction with which alone they are to be found, the Advaita seems to be doing something unwarranted. It may be said that to conceive Brahman as a person is anthropomorphic, but it is no less anthropomorphic to think that the ground of the universe is wisdom or purpose, even though that wisdom or purpose is not the wisdom or purpose of anyone.

### Use of Anthropomorphic Language :

It is in this context that anthropomorphic language has some justification. No one supposes that he or anyone else can tell the *whole* truth about God. To speak of God as the world-ground, the Absolute devoid of all attributes, may sound imposing; but does this give us any greater insight into the nature of



reality? Is the inadequacy of language overcome by using such phrases? While these are 'models' drawn from one language-level, terms such as 'Father' (which is found as early as in the *Rg Veda*)<sup>4</sup> and 'Lover' (also found in the *Rg Veda*)<sup>5</sup> are analogues provided by personal relations. Now if the reality disclosed in revelation is a person, as we maintain, then these terms serve to express man's sense of a confronting presence much better than the terms such as the Absolute devoid of attributes, or the world-cause. It is futile to search for anything which can tell us about God in a more adequate way than analogues drawn from the realm of personal relations can.

But unless these symbols are taken as just pointers and not as literal copies of the unseen world, we lapse into gross idolatry and anthropomorphism. On the one side, we should avoid what Xenophanes long ago warned against, namely, anthropomorphisation of God as an all-powerful potentate, and on the other side, we should guard ourselves against the conception of God as 'the absolute nothing, which is above all existence' (Dionysius).<sup>6</sup> In what way can we strike a balance between these two extremes?

The solution of St. Thomas :

Here the solution of St. Thomas Aquinas was that just as man's properties are related in an appropriate way to man's existence, so God's properties are related in the manner appropriate to God's existence. According to St. Thomas, not only do good things serve as analogues for saying something about God, but all things are in their degree 'similitudes' of God, since whatever perfections are contained in created things are formally contained in God. But this does not enable us to say much about God. St. Thomas is aware of this, and so he resorts to another method called the 'analogy of proportion'. This means that if we know that there is a certain relationship between God and creatures, we can illustrate this by means of a familiar relationship such as that between the parent and the child, and so we call God 'our Father'. It follows that the fatherhood of God should not be taken literally but figuratively; for to think that God and man are related exactly in the same way in which a man and his child are related would be sheer anthropomorphism.

Since St. Thomas steers clear of the two pitfalls : (i) that of thinking that there is no reality which corresponds to the symbol we use, and (ii) that the unseen reality is *exactly* like the symbol ; it seems to me that his view is fundamentally correct. Such a doctrine reminds us that while God is an inexpressible mystery which cannot be adequately expressed in our concepts and words, anthropomorphic symbolism is not a wholly unsuccessful endeavour to elucidate the content of revelation in which God has been apprehended as a loving and responding person. For example 'God is our Father' shows that he who came to *know* God could not convey his knowledge to others in a better way than by saying that 'God is our Father'. Similarly, 'God is Love' means that the supreme person whose presence has been revealed is of such a nature that his response towards us can only be described in terms of the activity 'love', sometimes exemplified in our relations with other persons.

Śankara's views on Theological language fundamentally correct :

While almost all that Śankara and his followers say with such great insight about the relationship between Brahman and language (*supra* pp. 53 ff.) can be accepted by all theists, the latter would only differ from the former in saying that while a conception 'which puts God himself into the soul and the soul into God'<sup>7</sup> is true, it is a mistake to posit absolute identity between the two. The Advaita school would agree with modern thinkers such as Buber, Griesbach or Bowman, who say that what is called 'the experience of the self' is of an altogether different kind from the subject-object type of experience. Like Buber, Śankara's school would refuse to use the word 'experience' in connection with Ātman, because he who is directly aware (*aparokṣatā*) of the self can only be loosely spoken of as 'experiencing'; or as Vidyāranya says, he who is aware of God as the inner self (*pratyagātma*) cannot 'think of' God, for one thinks of only that which is aloof from or distinct from himself. The 'experience' of the self is so concrete and so unanalyzable that it cannot be described as the 'this'. Vācaspati says it is something like the tasting of sugar, which cannot be described or differentiated in language from the experience of tasting honey (*supra* p. 56).



This example reminds us of Prof. Ramsey's illustration of eating a cake which cannot be expressed in abstract language.

### Conclusion :

The language of religious symbolism must therefore be regarded as consisting of words, which are justified by a certain type of concrete experience ; and consequently theology has to be treated by a logic which differs from the logic of other languages (cf. *supra* pp. 171-2). But theology has not yet developed a language fully appropriate to deal with the personal encounter between man and God. This is not surprising if we remember that it was only within the last two centuries that science has (as James Jeans says) 'constructed its own language, or jargon as some may prefer to call it';<sup>8</sup> and that theology has to deal with 'things' which are more concrete and complex than 'scientific things'.<sup>9</sup> Eddington has also showed that the vocabulary of scientific intercourse has had a far-reaching effect on the development of science, leading us to the conclusion that the limit to scientific observation is the limit of our logical vocabulary. It follows from this that the foundation of Quantum theory (e.g.) is linguistic, and that Heisenberg's principle is a consequence of the atomicity of scientific language. May we not be justified in concluding from this that science and theology are just two languages which seek to describe reality from two different standpoints, while metaphysics tries to assume the role of a uniting and co-ordinating language ?

## CHAPTER V

### THE FINALITY OF REVELATION

*'Una religio in rituum varietate'*

—Nicholas of Cusa.

While most thinkers, both Hindu and Christian, are to-day ready to admit that there is a general revelation, they would claim for their respective special revelation (Vedic or Biblical) 'finality' or 'uniqueness'. Though Prof. C. D. Broad has said that 'the claim of any particular religion or sect to have complete or final truth—seems to me *too ridiculous* to be worth a moment's consideration', other thinkers of equal calibre have deemed this to be an important problem worthy of careful thought. So I now propose to discuss it.

#### Different Meanings of 'Finality':

The claim to 'finality' made on behalf of a religion has been understood in the following ways:

(1) For some thinkers (e.g. Luther and Barth) finality means *exclusiveness*; and they regard that there is only one religion, while all other religions are (to use Barth's phrase) *unfaiths*. We had occasion to criticize this view previously (*supra* pp. 272-4).

(2) While Brunner does not say that all other religions are wholly lacking in an apprehension of divine reality, he regards that Christianity is *essentially different* from them, for (he says) while in other religions God reveals himself impersonally, in Christianity he meets men personally.<sup>1</sup> Much earlier, Canon Streeter said that the revelation in Christ is neither exhaustive, nor exclusive, but *distinctive*,<sup>2</sup> i.e., an expression through human personality of the very being of God.

Those who have an intimate acquaintance with the living religion of *bhakti* as practised by many Vaiṣṇavas in India cannot accept the claim that God has revealed himself in the personality of Christ *alone*. Further, those who wish to maintain that Christian revelation is of a class by itself would have to deny



that God's personal presence and activity was revealed to the Hebrew prophets. How at all should a personal God reveal himself if not personally? But can this be (and has it been) done *only* through *one* human personality? These are claims which cannot be substantiated except by the faith 'by virtue of the absurd' (Kierkegaard).

A view such as that of Brunner is derived from the conception of a wholly transcendent God; it presupposes that before Jesus Christ there was no relation and no point of contact between God and man. This vicious separation of man from Deity, and the positation of an unbridgeable gulf between the two is sought to be overcome by the conception of a miraculous irruption of the transcendent God. The religious consciousness of mankind before and after Christ disproves this theory. The concept of any special revelation sundered from general revelation fails to be intelligible. The scriptures say: 'Think not that I am come to destroy—but to fulfil.' (*St. Matthew* v. 17.) 'This imperishable Yoga, I declared to the Sun.—This same ancient Yoga has been to-day declared to you by me.' (*Gītā*, iv. i f.)

(3) (a) There are some thinkers who regard only one religion to be the *complete truth*, while all other religions are in their view only partial truths. In one of his books Madhusūdana Sarasvatī makes such a claim for the Advaita Vedānta; and Jayanta also seems to think that the Vedic faith is universal and complete in comparison with Buddhism and Jainism. Liberal Islamic thinkers claim that in the Qurān, revelation is brought to perfection.<sup>3</sup> The Lambeth Conference Report claims that while other religions are also true, they all 'are approaches to the truth of God revealed in Christ'.<sup>4</sup> Niebergall has said that in Christ, God has revealed himself clearly and completely;<sup>5</sup> and according to Baillie, in Christ religion 'reaches its full expression'.<sup>6</sup>

Two possible criticisms may be urged against such a view: (i) If we remember that man's role is not a passive one in revelation, and that God does not thrust a once-for-all complete truth on man, but one that is suitable to his finite mind and social environment, no revelation of the inexhaustible mystery of God can be complete. (ii) One can say that a particular religion fulfils all other religions, only when one ignores the differences in spirit and ethos that distinguish the many great religions of

the world. Each religion is an all-embracing system of moral and religious ideas and of a theory of life, having its own distinctive quality. So none of them can be called 'approaches' (as does the Lambeth Report), or 'steps' (*sopānas*—as the Advaitins say) to any one of them.

(3) (b) Hegel and Schleiermacher held that Christianity is *the absolute religion*, because they thought that the religious ideal was realized in Christianity. According to them there was an irruption or downrush of absolute religion in the life of Christ. Similarly, Harnack regarded Christianity as the realization of a concept.

Troeltsch ably criticized both these views in the following way: The Absolute lies beyond history, for though history does not exclude the norm, its essential function is to achieve consummation of the ideal. So even if Christianity is regarded as the religion which advances beyond all others, there might be a higher revelation; and so it cannot be regarded as absolute, changeless truth in its final form. 'To wish to have the Absolute in history in an absolute form at one single point is a piece of foolishness,' says Troeltsch.<sup>7</sup> He himself regarded Christianity as the 'highest unfolded scheme of religion',<sup>8</sup> because he *believed* that personalistic religion of a redemptive character is the goal of religious development; but he was aware that the 'cosmic position and significance of Jesus, such as is contained in the Church's doctrine of Incarnation and Redemption' cannot be '*apparently spoken of*'.<sup>9</sup>

We have earlier remarked (*supra* pp. 279-80) that philosophy cannot prove incarnations to be either possible or real. Nor can historical investigation establish any human being as *the* highest point which the religious ideal has reached in history.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, one world-religion at least says that there have been many incarnations, while two others maintain that there cannot be any incarnation of God.

(4) To some theologians the revelation contained in their own religious tradition is not of any value unless it excludes further revelations *after* it. For example, to William Temple the significance of Christianity depends on its claim to be *the last* and final revelation.<sup>11</sup> Barth and Brunner, as may be expected, advocate the same view.<sup>12</sup> Unless one is the spectator of all time and



existence, I cannot see how one can make a prophecy that there will not be another revelation. The claim that Christianity depends on the very last, and in that sense final, revelation of God is directly contradicted by the claim of Islam that Muhammad was granted a more complete revelation after Christ. Though one may dispute the claim of Islam that it possesses truth more completely than that found in Christianity, its claim to be in possession of some revealed truth at least cannot be dismissed, unless Muhammad is brushed aside as an impostor, and the religious lives of al-Ghazzali, Ibn-Arabi and others are succinctly characterised as 'bunk'.

The scriptures say: 'The Spirit will come and will lead you all to truth.' (*St. John* xiv. 25-26.) 'Whenever there is a decay of righteousness and exaltation of unrighteousness, I myself come forth.' (*Gitā*, iv. 7.)\* It is well to remember the wise words of Soderblom: 'It is absurd to look upon revelation as finished with Christ';<sup>13</sup> and the stronger words of Berdyaev: 'When men maintain that the revelation of the truth which must bestow real freedom is final and complete, they fall into the wiles of anti-Christ.'<sup>14</sup>

(5) Some of the best minds have argued that though in all revelations there is intimated an apprehension of God, one of these revelations alone can be the *classic pattern* or *archetype* of all other revelations. Prof. Farmer has advanced such a view,<sup>15</sup> and Dr. Bouquet has tried to make out a strong case for his thesis that Jesus Christ's career gives us the fixation and definition of the character of God as personal, unique, eternal, living and holy love.<sup>17</sup> But what is the argument which these thinkers advance in support of their position that Christianity is the norm for judging all religions? Prof. Farmer confesses that he takes Christianity as the norm on the basis of his own religious experience and conviction;<sup>18</sup> and Wendland, with whom Dr. Bouquet seems to agree, says that it is faith which pronounces Christianity to be the norm.<sup>19</sup> Regarding this view one may comment that a Hindu or a Buddhist can on the basis of his 'productive empathy' declare his own religion to be the norm, and then judge and classify other religions with reference to that

\* Cf. Bulgakoff's view that the incarnation is a continuous act, and not an event which took place only once.<sup>12</sup>

norm. It also appears to be evident that unless one has a prior apprehension of God as personal, holy and loving, one cannot derive such knowledge from observing the life of any human person, however holy and loving he may be ; and one would not be led to take the life of a historical person as providing 'the fixation of God's character', unless one believed that life to be the direct disclosure of God. Here again, since there is no reason why all men should believe that the life of a single historical person is the revelation *par excellence* of God, only on the basis of one's own predilection one can declare a particular religion to be the classic pattern of all religions.

Each Revelation is 'Absolute' to its receivers :

My conclusion is that there can be no 'finality of revelation' in any of the above senses. I suggest that we can understand 'finality' in a different sense. But before that a possible criticism may be raised thus : Why should we at all regard any revelation as final ? Cannot we maintain that God revealed only that much which was necessary for each recipient ? To this it may be replied that no revelation can be tentative inasmuch as it comes from God. Any revelation of God must be final. Also, if no revelation is final, then we lapse into a state where we are constantly on the lookout for better and greater revelations. If the view adopted in this book (*supra* pp. 284-5) is correct, it is absolute truth that is revealed in all revelations, 'absolute' not in the sense in which various thinkers have used that word while claiming absoluteness for the revelations of their respective religions, but in the sense in which we have used that word (following Jaspers). In this sense, a revelation is absolute only for him who has received it, *and* for the others who have entered into the same spirit as the original recipient by attuning themselves with the historical consciousness in which that revelation occurred. Understood in this sense, the revelation that was made to the Hebrew prophets is as much absolute as the revelation made to the Vedic seers ; and both of them are final.

Revelations not mutually contradictory :

But a critic may ask, does not the mutual contradiction between the Semitic and the Vedic religions prove that both of



them cannot be absolute? Now, if the critic remembers that no religious tradition embodies the very words of God, and that God reveals himself only to the extent to which the recipients are fit to receive a revelation, and that the formulation of the revelation so given in fixed creeds or rites is always a later process, then he must admit that we do not have revelation in its purity in any religious tradition. Yet, even as now formulated, religions do not merely contradict one another, but show a large measure of agreement; and if the revelations embodied in each religion were available in their purity, might it not be that there would even be a larger measure of agreement? If we remember that God is a person, and that the impact of a person's activity may reveal him in various aspects—to some as a friend, to some as an avenging foe, etc.—may we not say that the scriptures and the credible formulae of various religions are but imperfect appreciations and explications of the apprehension of that one reality, which is holy and personal? The intuitions of a Wordsworth are not contradicted by those of a Shelley; similarly, various religions can all be absolute and yet be different.

#### Revelations Final, Formulations Transitory:

The protagonists of each religion while claiming finality for their own religion do not separate revelation as such from its formulation in symbols. While the former is final and 'absolute', the latter cannot be; but even the former cannot be complete, for it is impossible for a free and finite human person to receive the entire truth.

#### The Goal is one, but the paths are many:

From this view of 'finality', it follows that God welcomes us in whatever way we approach him,<sup>20</sup> and that for each man (as the *Gītā* says) that religious tradition suits best in which he is born and bred.<sup>21</sup> This would mean that there neither is (as Hocking says) nor can be (as Vivekānanda says) a world-religion, because though truth is final, it cannot be formulated and presented in any one way that is intelligible and useful to all people for all time. But this does not mean that all religions are equal; for we only maintain that all religions do lead to God, and that the best and safest way of developing a deeper apprehension of

God is to live in communion with one's own historical tradition. 'A change of religion,' says Jaspers, 'is difficult without a breach in the soul.' I conclude by endorsing the wise words of a Christian missionary, 'There is a distinct type of religious thought and life in India which God has been evolving through the centuries and this must be saved for India and for the world—the Hindu must be saved as a Hindu ;'<sup>22</sup> and a man 'is saved (says Cardinal de Lugo) by practising those elements in his cultus and teaching which are true, good, and originally revealed by God'.<sup>23</sup>

Relevance of 'old' revelations :

We have come to the conclusion that revelation is final, but its formulations are not final. Now, it may be asked : First, if revelation is always adapted to the mental capacity, the needs and circumstances of the receiver, what relevance can a revelation, given centuries ago, have to a modern man ? How can the teaching in the *Gītā*, for instance, intended for a prince of the feudalistic pastoral India, thousands of years ago, have any significance to-day in the world of jet-planes and atom-bombs ? And second, what is the use of a special revelation, which, though final, is not available to us in its integral purity ? Is it possible to distinguish the absolute from the relative in a formulated revelation (historical revelation) ?

These questions may be answered in the following way :

(i) Though the teachings in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā* date back to thousands of years, they are of value to us, because the basic problems of life are still the same, i.e. the 'existential situation' in which they were revealed recurs even to-day, and so the solutions which they provide to life's problems have a relevance to us and also to coming generations. This is not the case with religion alone. Able scholars are still discovering something new and original and of perennial value in Homer and Plato ; similarly, we may come to know how to live and respond properly to reality from the revelations made so long ago. It is not impossible that essential, living truth should have been revealed ages ago ; and if only we knew how to appropriate it, it would become absolute for us too. The 'meaning' which was disclosed



to a Beethoven or a Mozart still *lives* in their compositions, and we have to let it be re-revealed to us by entering into a situation conducive to that. Again, the way in which problems arise and their mode of formulation differ from country to country and from age to age. If the answers given are based on an insight which goes to the depths, which lays bare all the issues involved, and which exhibits possible ways in which they can be met, they will be of perennial value. For example, many of the 'insights into life' of Euripides and Sophocles are of help to us to-day, both in understanding life and adjusting ourselves to it. Similarly, a religious insight can be of value and relevance to us even though it was evoked at first, centuries ago.

(ii) It is true that we do not have to-day an 'old' revelation in its integral purity, because as soon as man receives a revelation, it becomes human, for it has to be apprehended through the forms of human understanding; and when he intends to communicate it, he expresses it in a symbolism drawn from his familiar experience; and in course of time during its passage through the tradition of a religious community, it may become still more corrupt, though it is equally possible that it may come to be formulated in a better way. But, either way, it cannot be denied that a revelation as it comes down to us contains much that is of merely temporary relevance. The confusion of the accidental with the essential, of the relative with the absolute, and of the temporal with the perennial, cannot altogether be avoided in any human composition, whether it is a religious scripture or a philosophic treatise. But just as a philosophic classic may be studied and understood, and the grains of truth in it may be lifted out of the husk, even so the elements of value and relevance in a formulated revelation can be separated from the accidental accretions and external trappings. For instance, in spite of the fact that Plato's *Timaeus* was written in the Athenian age, and that it presupposes so much of physics, cosmology and psychology, which are now obsolete, in our own day a competent thinker such as Whitehead has been able to grasp the core of its teaching, and derive so much inspiration that he was able to say that the entire European philosophic tradition is only 'a series of footnotes to Plato'.<sup>24</sup>

Some men may find that it is possible to do with reference to a historical revelation what Whitehead has been able to do with reference to Plato's works ; and in a sense similar to that in which European philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, an entire religious tradition (including the subsequent religious insights of a community) can be an explicatory supplement to a special revelation which is itself 'final'.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE PROBLEMS OF AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS SCRIPTURES

'If thou canst not prevail upon thyself to become a Christian in the situation of contemporaneousness with Him . . . then thou wilt never become a Christian.'

—S. Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity*.

Need for self-authenticated Authority in religion :

In religion as elsewhere some authority seems to be inevitable. The judgments of the common man regarding a musical composition or painting cannot be entitled to the same respect as those of an expert critic in those fields. Similarly, in physics or medicine, one should respect the accumulated experience of mankind and the pronouncements of genius in that field. A Napoleon's judgments in the field of battle are in most cases proved true ; and an experienced farmer's estimates of harvest are true more often than not. From this it is clear that acknowledgment of authority is not mere blind acceptance of the guidance of an institution or an individual, but reliance on a self-authenticated source of evidence. In almost all the fields of human experience no one can lay a foundation other than that which has been laid from the beginning. Acceptance of authority is the appropriation of the treasures which man has garnered down the millennia.

Science also does not discard the past :

It is often brought as a charge against religion that it requires us to accept a standard of authority, while in science (so the critics say) no authority but that of experimental evidence is heeded. It is again alleged that while science is progressive, always discarding the dead weight of the past, theology and philosophy continue to dispute about the same problems which were discussed by Plato and Yājñavalkya. In reply to this criticism, I can only quote what Prof. Oppenheimer has said :

'It is inherent in the very notion of culture and of tradition that there is a cumulative aspect to human life. The past underlies the present, qualifies and moderates it, in some ways limits it, and in some ways enriches it.' 'When we find out something new about the natural world this does not supersede what we knew before: it transcends it, and the transcendence takes place because we are in a new domain of experience, often made accessible only by the full use of prior knowledge.' Oppenheimer gives the theories of Huyghens and Fresnel, Newton, and the theory of valency as examples to explain what he has said, and then adds: 'The foundations of solid fact and the laws which describe it preserve through the whole course of science to be refined and adapted to new contexts, but never to be ignored or cast out.'<sup>1</sup>

Theology is progressive:

A process similar to this occurs in theology, and philosophy also. As I have said earlier (*supra* p. 281), dogmas are only efforts to formulate in language the content of a revelation. But since no experience, whether of the sensuous or the super-sensuous, can be described completely and exactly as it is, and since there is in all communication an element of constructive interpretation, there can be no entirely correct and unambiguous couching of a revelation in a system of dogmas. Even if that were possible, dogmas can never be understood in the precise way in which they were originally meant, because (1) a concept can never express all that is intended, and (2) the content of a concept changes with time. Thus when it is said that God is our Father, what does 'Father' mean? Does it mean a stern inexorable person, dominating over us and rigorously exacting obedience to his commands; or a loving benevolent person, befriending us and guiding us with his mature experience? In the Roman patrician families, a father was usually of the first type, while in the families of the cultured societies of to-day, a father is usually of the second type. Now we can never know with which connotation 'Fatherhood' was first predicated of God. So arises theology or the interpretation of dogma.

Since numerous interpretations of a single text are possible, divergent deductions can be developed from the same source,



consequences can be deduced from these deductions, and applications of them made to particular problems of life. Difficulties arise, then discussions take place, and a fresh interpretation, or an interpretation of an interpretation is evolved; and in this process it is quite possible that men of to-day or of the future will be better able than those of the past to describe and interpret the revelation contained in a dogma.

Revelation not 'finished':

While recognising that total rejection of the authority of tradition results in the destruction of the foundation of religion, we should admit that God may disclose himself in a way better suited to the developing mind and growing needs of man. Suppression of new religious insights will shut the door to 'the inrush of the spirit'. But if such a new revelation occurs, it does not 'destroy' an earlier revelation, but may 'fulfil' the earlier one, or to adapt Prof. Oppenheimer's words (used in another context) a new revelation may 'transcend' an earlier one, but does *not* 'cast it out'.

The problem of 'New' Scriptures:

This consideration serves to answer the question raised by Jayanta, 'Why should not a book composed by me or someone else be accepted as a sacred scripture?' (*supra* pp. 235-6) As none of us are without an awareness of God, we can, first, find out whether a 'new' scripture contains a revelation from God as claimed by its author; and, second, whether it extends and fulfils the revelation contained in its religious tradition. If it satisfies these conditions, there seems to be no reason why it should not be accepted as a sacred scripture. For example, the Gîtā was composed several centuries after the Veda; yet, because it fulfils these conditions the Hindus accepted it as a holy scripture along with the Veda.

Rousseau's Objection:

An objection which is usually raised against the authority of a revelation, enshrined in a tradition, is as follows: If God wishes to disclose saving truth, why does he not do so direct to each individual? Why should he disclose it to some particular

man or group of men, and through them to the whole world? As Rousseau said, 'Is it simple, is it natural, that God should have gone and found Moses in order to speak to Rousseau?'

Reply to Rousseau :

To this the proper reply is that God has not, as the theologians criticized by Rousseau apparently supposed, denied his revelation to anybody; but he may disclose himself to some in a way which is much fuller than in the way he does to others.

Is a special revelation given only to some?

But if what we have said earlier (*supra* pp. 276-7) is correct, even in a special revelation man is not purely passive. It takes for granted man's act of choice—the exertion of his will, and the purity of his soul. It is useless to try to reveal anything to one who cannot apprehend it, or will not accept it, or who does not choose to mould his life according to it.

Yāska (authority on Vedic etymology and interpretation) and Śaunaka (who has written on the gods and myths of the Veda) say that the Vedic truths were revealed to the seers, who prepared themselves for that not only by leading a highly moral life, but also by increasing their general knowledge (*bāhuśṛtyā*), and by practising mental control and *tapasya*.<sup>2</sup> Says the Psalmist: 'Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord, or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath clean hands and a pure heart.'<sup>3</sup> Here for once, I agree with Brunner who says that revelation presupposes 'a consciousness of vital need',<sup>4</sup> and Barth who says that 'One must know the darkness of Sinai and of Calvary and must have faith',<sup>5</sup> to know God. But these conditions presuppose that one is already aware of God in some way, and that one is 'pining' to enter into a more intimate relation with him; and so this reinforces what we have said earlier about general revelation. If anyone were to fulfil these conditions (and all of them amount only to faith in God, i.e. complete surrender of oneself in a total positive response to a reality, which we are aware of as beckoning us),\* he would receive even

\* This is called *Śaraṇāgati* in Hindu theistic literature. *Rāmānuja bhāṣya*, Gītā, XVIII, 62-66.



to-day a special revelation. 'He that believeth in Him hath the witness in himself,' said St. John.<sup>6</sup>

Is Moses' Revelation for us also ?

Returning to Rousseau's objection, we reply that the revelation which Moses had was relevant only to Moses ; and unless we let the experience of Moses be repeated in our own spiritual life, we can never appropriate it, which is as good as saying that God is ready to give a special revelation of himself to all of us as he did to Moses, provided we prepare ourselves for it and receive it :

' God is not dumb, that He should speak no more.  
If thou hast wanderings in the wilderness,  
and Find'st not Sinai, 'tis thy soul is poor.  
There towers the mountain of the voice no less,  
Which whoso seeks shall find.'

(J. R. Lowell)

It is probable that some scriptures are true :

We have said that scriptures and dogmas are not by themselves a revelation, but only an attempt to give an account of a revelation. But it is probable that some scriptures are spurious ; while it could be also logically urged that none of the existing scriptures contain revelations, since they are mutually contradictory. This latter alternative is extremely unlikely, because, first, the authors of all scriptures could not have been impostors ; and, second, from very ancient times there have been men, not inferior to others in intellectual calibre and moral integrity, who have accepted some scriptures as containing a revelation from God, and who declare that they have studied them for years with immense benefit to their spiritual life. Third, it is a gratuitous assumption to say that the various religious scriptures are simply contradictory (*supra* pp. 296-7).

Attempt at a Proof :

This consideration leads us to the problem of proofs for the authority of sacred scriptures. One possible line of argumentation is to seek an external source of authority. Catholic Christian thinkers, for instance, endeavour to prove the authority of the Bible from the fact that the Christian Church selected the

books which constitute it, and then accepted it as the scripture, and that there is evidence for this in the history of the Jewish nation, in the fulfilment of prophecies in the old Testament, and in the miracles and claims of Jesus Christ recorded by eye-witnesses (so they say) in the New Testament. This argument is similar to that of Vācaspati; the only difference is that in the place of the Hebrew nation and the Christian church he had primal sages and gods and the Āryan *mahājanas* (*supra* pp. 229-30).

Hobbes' criticism :

Hobbes trenchantly criticised this sort of argument in the following way : We have not heard God speaking to us ; if we believe the Bible to be God's Word, we are really believing the person or the tradition (the Church) saying so, rather than God, because we have not ourselves seen him revealing what is in the Bible. So in this case what we believe is that person or tradition, not God himself ; and if we disbelieve the Bible to be God's word, we are disbelieving that person or institution, and not disbelieving God. Hobbes gives examples to make this clear : If Livy wrote that the gods once made a cow speak, and if I do not believe it, what I distrust thereby is Livy and not the gods. If a historian writes that Julius Caesar fought alone against a battalion and won, and if I do not believe it, it is that historian whom I do not believe, and not Caesar.<sup>7</sup> Hobbes concludes that if anyone claims that God has spoken to him, and if another cannot believe him, no argument of the former can convince the latter.<sup>8</sup> Prof. Broad finds these arguments to be irrefutable.<sup>9</sup>

Criticism of the Vedānta theory :

We have already seen how the Vedānta would attempt to answer an objection of this sort. Basing itself on the self-validity and self-luminosity of all cognition (*supra* pp. 12-14) and the *apauruṣeyatā* of the Veda (*supra* pp. 44f.), the Vedānta would say that since the Veda gives rise to cognition, which testifies to its own truth, the Veda is proved to be true. This theory is similar to that of Descartes, and is, as Prof. Ryle puts it, ' a piece of para-optics ', because it posits ' consciousness ' to play a role similar to that played by light in the external world ; and (following Ryle) it may be criticized thus : While it is true that we usually know



what we have been just doing, feeling, or seeing, we are not actively and concomitantly cognisant of them. Nor is there any sense in saying that we *know* that we *know* something, because we can only know something as the case, and not knowledge. To take an example given by Ryle, we know that that rumble is a clap of thunder; it is nonsense to say that we know this clap of thunder. This shows that there is no analogy between the illumination of a thing by light, and knowing something as the case; and even if there were some analogy, it would not explain how we can ascertain a truth, or correct a mistake. Lastly, many times what a man supposes he knows is false.<sup>10</sup> So we must reject the Vedānta theory that knowledge testifies to its own authenticity.

How is a statement verified?

In advocating the theory of the intrinsic validity of the Veda, the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta confuses the significance of a sentence with its truth. The Vedānta correctly says that he who knows the word-senses comes to know the meaning of a sentence; for, as Russell pointed out, a sentence such as 'The good, when they die, go to heaven' is significant like an unverifiable proposition in physics, because (he says) every 'constant' in the sentence is derived from experience.<sup>11</sup> But the significance of a sentence cannot make it true; for even false sentences are not nonsense.<sup>12</sup> The significance of a sentence is what it expresses, namely, the state of the speaker, i.e. his belief.<sup>13</sup> The criterion for the truth or falsehood of a statement is independent of the statement itself; and is its 'truth-content', which is nothing else than reality. (Dr. Walter Brugger has called it 'the metalogical order of Being'.) A sentence is true in so far as what it expresses—the belief of its speaker—corresponds to reality; and a belief corresponds to reality when the expectation on which it is based is fulfilled. To take the instance given by the Nyāya school (*supra* pp. 223-4): 'That is water' expresses the speaker's expectation that the object so called would be felt to be cold when touched, and quench a man's thirst when drunk. If these expectations are fulfilled, then this sentence is true. This, as the Nyāya school correctly maintained (*supra* p. 224), is the only way in which verification of a sentence is possible.

How are scriptural sentences verified ?

It follows from this that whenever one hears a sentence, and when the situation in which it could be verified is not present, the truth of it cannot be verified directly, but by a subsequent inference.<sup>14</sup> Now, how can we verify scriptural sentences ? It is generally recognized that most of the sentences in religious books were written in a situation which no longer exists (unless 'existentially' reproduced). Some Christian Protestant thinkers (e.g.) say that the excellence of the Bible provides its own inward evidence, meaning thereby that since it produces an 'impact' on the reader, which is unique, it must be true. But this is a dangerous argument, because many tales (e.g., the stories of King Arthur), dramas (e.g., *Hamlet*), and novels (e.g., *The Brothers Karamazov*) have exerted a tremendous influence on the emotions and actions of men ; and yet, they are false. Again, others argue that since the ethical insights of the prophets and sages, whose teachings are contained in religious scriptures are recognized to be true, what they say about God must also be true. This apology for religious scriptures cannot escape the fatal criticism of the type which Prakāśātman and Kumārila have made (*supra* pp. 32-3, 213-4).

A scripture cannot be proved true :

The utmost that could be proved about a religious scripture is that its author or authors were not impostors ; but it can never be *proved* that its teaching is true, in the sense in which a scientific proposition is proved true. If we have reasons for believing that a religious book was written by an *āpta* (*supra* pp. 228-9) [i.e. one who has direct experience of what he speaks about, who desires to communicate what he experiences only, and who is able to do so (*supra* pp. 23-4)] then it can only lead us to conclude that what he says was absolute truth for himself, and not that it is a verifiable universal truth for all men. Since every scripture (even if it is not spurious) is just a pattern of words,—first orally handed down, then written and then printed—meant to be a vehicle of revelation, to regard it as a collection of infallible oracles dropped down from heaven (as the Cabbalists, the Muslims, the Hindus and some Christians believe) is to develop a religion of the Book and not a religion of the Spirit.



A scripture is valid within a tradition only :

Every special revelation was originally given (if given) to an individual within a historic community. So a scripture which contains such a revelation (if it does) is not intelligible apart from the tradition of that community ; it derives its authority from the disclosure which was made to that community and is valid only within that community. In order to assimilate that revelation, one has to grow in that community and appropriate its religious tradition ; and tradition is constituted by the memory of a special revelation given to the forefathers of a community ; and for him who cannot evoke such a memory there never was a special revelation : ' And it shall come to pass, when your children shall say unto you, what mean ye by this service ? that ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's passover, who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt.' (*Exodus* xii. 26.)

Reply to Hobbes :

To conclude : When anyone raises an objection similar to that of Hobbes, there seems to be no way of *proving* that a religious scripture does contain God's revelation. But if a man puts himself in 'the situation of contemporaneity' with the person to whom a special revelation was given, he can appropriate it as absolute truth ; and for him there is no loss if it is logically unproven. 'For nothing worthy proving can be proven, Nor yet disproven.' (Tennyson, *The Ancient Sage*.) Others, if they are charitable, can only conclude that they are blind to those aspects of Reality which are disclosed to the man of Faith, just as (to take the example of Prof. Broad) people born blind are unaware of the aspects of Reality visible to us.<sup>15</sup>

It is for this reason that Hindu tradition maintains that it is useless to impart profound religious truths to the unfaithful, for they will only cavil at the teaching. Says the Gītā : 'Do not tell this to anyone, who is without *tapas* and faith, or to one who does not want to hear it, or to one who hates Me.'<sup>16</sup> Without Faith a religious tradition could be of no use, for, as the Cambridge Platonist, John Smith, so wisely said, 'Systems and models furnish but a poor wan light.' 'To seek our divinity merely in books and writings is to seek the living among the dead' ; in these 'truth is often not so much enshrined as entombed'.<sup>17</sup>

A *Mumukṣu* should select what is relevant :

For the truly religious man, the seeker of liberation (*mumukṣu*), scripture is valuable only in so far as it is able to provide him with a soteriology ; and so when he takes up the study of a scripture, he does not aim to find therein history or science. For him only those passages are important which are in some way creative of spiritual reality. In eliminating irrelevancies and evolving a coherent pattern, the concept of *tātparyā* (*supra* pp. 75-80) developed by the *Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta* schools is of great value ; and in determining the *tātparyā* the six-fold criteria seem to be indispensable (*supra* pp. 81f.). Without the guidance of this concept of *tātparyā*, a centuries old religious scripture is bound to be a morass of empty words ; but this concept itself seems to be dictated by one's *notion of importance*, as will be evident from the following examples.

Scriptural interpretation is *a parte subjecti* :

Assiduous studies of the Veda have been made by some modern scholars, but they have not gained thereby any knowledge of spiritual reality, though they have made enormous contributions to our knowledge of Vedic Aryans, their culture and history, because they have not steeped themselves in the Vedic tradition and selected what is spiritually relevant. M. Bloomfield, a very sound scholar, pronounced the *Rg Veda* to be 'a collection of priestly hymns', and the 'engrossing theme of *Rg Vedic* thought' as the 'worship of the personified powers of nature'.<sup>18</sup> As against this, Sri Aurobindo (who was himself a brilliant product of Cambridge, and no Fundamentalist) said that the 'first and central teaching' of the Veda is that 'There is a Truth higher and deeper than the truth of outward existence, a Light greater and higher than the light of human understanding which comes by revelation and inspiration, an immortality towards which the soul has to rise . . . . As the summit of the teaching of the Vedic mystic comes the secret of the One Reality, *ekam sat, tad ekam* which became the central word of the Upaniṣads.'<sup>19</sup> My purpose is not to judge which of these two interpretations is correct, but to show that without exercising a selective judgment one cannot interpret religious scriptures ; and that such a judgment depends upon one's *notion of importance*.



Even prior to 500 B.C., there were Vedic students of the type of Bloomfield, and also of the type of Aurobindo; for Yāska mentions several kinds of interpreters : etymologists, ritualists, polytheists, *ātmavādins* (those who sought spiritual truths), and lastly those who said that the Veda is nonsense useful in magic (the school of Kautsa). Yāska himself admits that there are all kinds of 'mantra-seeings' in the Veda, some expressing 'high' ideas and some 'low',<sup>20</sup> and he thus implies that different interpreters may take anyone of these ideas as the 'engrossing theme of the Veda', and then interpret the whole of the Veda in that light. He, for instance, mentions various views regarding the Vedic gods—whether there are many or one, whether they have any shape or not—and states his own view that they are all aspects or manifestations of the one Ātman.<sup>21</sup> We know too well the opinion of modern critical scholars regarding the Vedic deities.

So we may conclude that there can be no scriptural interpretation *a parte objecti*; all interpretation is more or less *a parte subjecti*, because selective judgment based on the concept of importance is unavoidable in interpretation. 'The notion of importance,' writes Whitehead, 'is like nature itself: Expel it with a pitch-fork, and it ever returns. The most ardent upholders of objectivity in scientific thought insist upon its insistence. In truth "to uphold a doctrine" is itself such an insistence. Apart from a feeling of interest, you would merely notice the doctrine and not uphold it. The zeal for truth presupposes interest. Also sustained observation presupposes the notion. For concentrated attention means disregard of irrelevancies; and such disregard can only be sustained by some sense of importance.'<sup>22</sup> From this it follows that a *mumukṣu*'s interpretation is not likely to be less 'objective' than that of a 'higher critic'.

The Principle of demythologisation :

In this context the principle accepted by the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta schools, namely, that a religious scripture is not meant for giving us knowledge of perceptible, or inferable things (*supra* pp. 121-8), is to be borne in mind. This would mean that in a religious scripture it is in vain to seek science or history, and that (as Śaṅkara says clearly) where a scriptural passage contradicts an evident truth of perception, or inference, it is not really a

scriptural passage but an *arthavāda* to be discarded (*supra* pp. 26-7, 68f.). Had European theologians followed this principle, much of the conflict between science and religion could have been avoided. Centuries ago Pseudo-Dionysius said that scriptures are intelligible only to those who can free themselves from 'puerile myths'.<sup>23</sup> Kumārila and Śāṅkara recognized this (*supra* pp. 70f., 216-7), and put it into practice. This, again, does not mean there can be no history, or science at all in a scripture; but that it is not what is *important* in a scripture; though, it may, for instance, tell how at a particular time in the past certain people reacted to certain historical events, and saw in them a more direct disclosure of God's activity than in other events; or, in other words, a scripture may provide us with an evaluation of history, based on faith (*Heilsgeschichte*), but not objective history (for that cannot be *saving* history).

It is a great tribute to the ancient Hindu thinkers that principles of scriptural exegesis somewhat similar to theirs are now being advocated by some of the foremost Christian theologians; to wit, the powerful movement of *Entmythologisierung* inaugurated by Prof. Bultmann. According to Bultmann the entire history of salvation as presented by the Bible is only a myth, i.e. a representation according to which the transcendent and the divine appears as the immanent and the human, and the invisible as the visible. He thinks that the entire Biblical history of salvation is not history, but is susceptible to be interpreted as a myth, by virtue of its 'profound intention'; because (he says) when Christ died on the Cross nothing happened for the salvation of humanity on the ontological plane. This story is a mythical expression of our 'authentic existence'. When man finds that the world gives him a false security, and that real 'values' (things that matter) are escaping him, he is overwhelmed with cares, and develops 'anguish'. The message of the New Testament liberates us from this situation by making us develop an 'attitude of detachment' towards 'available realities', and an 'attitude of confiding abandonment' towards 'non-available realities'. To sum up: For Bultmann the objective facts of Christ's life in themselves are of no significance; by our *faith* they lead us to the 'comprehension of existence'.<sup>24</sup>



It seems to me that unless we employ Dr. Bultmann's principle of scriptural exegesis (which is endorsed by the Vedānta also) we are not likely to derive the full benefit from religious scriptures, whether they are the Vedas, the Bible, or the *Purāṇas*. A sacred scripture (if not spurious) contains revelation much as a musical score contains music; and we should know how to use it. Its value for us consists in so far as its 'profound intention', or *tātparya* (and not the apparent and the literal meaning), enables us to realize that we are in living relation to God, and that we are saved when we appropriate this truth by faith—a total response of our personality. If a scripture fails to help us towards this realization, this experience, either we have been unable to use it, or it has not the spark in it to set us aflame.

## CHAPTER VII

### REASON AND REVELATION

'*Buddham śaraṇam anvīṣha.*' 'Seek thou refuge in Reason.'

—Gītā, II. 43.

'Authority is derived from reason, and not reason from authority. An authority which is not acknowledged by reason seems valueless. Reason, on the contrary, invincibly resting on its own strength, has no need of confirmation of any authority.'

—John Scotus Erigena, *De Divisione Naturae*.

'A truth can never be contrary to reason, and once a dogma has been disputed and refuted by reason, instead of its being incomprehensible, one may say that nothing is easier to understand, nor more obvious, than its absurdity.'

—G. W. Leibniz, *Theodicy*, p. 88.

'No proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge, because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever.'

—John Locke, *Essay*, Bk. IV, Ch. 18.5.

'Scripture ceases to be authoritative when it conflicts with experience.' (*Na ca anubhava virodhe āgamasya prāmāṇyam.*)

—Madhvācārya, *Viṣṇu Tattva Vinirṇaya*.

#### I

#### *Religion is Neither Mere Feeling Nor Right Conduct*

In a paper read before the Cambridge Theological Society,<sup>1</sup> Prof. Braithwaite maintained that religious statements are non-cognitive, and that they are only: (i) 'expressions of feeling', (ii) 'proclamations of some policy of behaviour', and (iii) 'propositions which are considered without being believed' (myths), to 'psychologically assist one in carrying through his policy for living'. Now if these contentions are justified, there will be no problem of revelation and reason. But on the



contrary, if religion does give us knowledge, and knowledge of a distinctive kind, it will raise an important problem. In India no thinker seems to have maintained a view similar to that which has been put forward by Prof. Braithwaite; but in contemporary Europe some philosophers apparently uphold such a view.<sup>2</sup> After giving a brief account of the circumstances which have brought such views into vogue, I will try to show that they are not based on a proper understanding of the phenomenon called 'religion'.

### Growth of the Conception of Religion as Mere Feeling :

In Europe, when, at the dawn of the scientific era, Biblical statements were found to be irreconcilable with the world-view which emerged from the astronomical discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo, doubts were raised against tenets which were regarded fundamental dogmas. In the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Spinoza, with his profound knowledge of Hebrew and Rabbinical traditions, attempted to show that portions of the Old Testament are false, and maintained that the prophets often gave out their own ideas as inspirations. Rationalists rejected all that was irrational in religion; the Empiricists refused to believe in anything miraculous or supernatural; and the Romanticists refused to worship anything other than natural beauty, art and poetry. The Deists, the French Revolution and the German Enlightenment swept away all the old landmarks. Then there came Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason*. Holding that the cognitive faculties are incompetent to explore any other world beyond this, Kant granted that practical needs demand the postulation of God. This in a way amounted to Voltaire's famous saying that if there is no God, he has to be invented. God thus became a mere word, a heuristic fiction, a symbol of an unknowable something, which must be postulated in answer to the moral demands. Goethe popularised these views further. In his many works, he urged that values are to be sought within and not without, because 'Feeling is all, Name is sound and smoke'. (*Gefühl ist alles, Name ist Schall and Rausch.*)

Schleiermacher gave a full and classical expression to this subjectivistic tendency. While Kant made religion an appendix

to ethics, and Hegel regarded it as undeveloped philosophy. Schleiermacher sought to make it independent of both metaphysics and morality, and to justify it to both the Romanticists and the Rationalists. To the Romanticists, who apotheosised feeling, he pointed out that religion is the highest phase of spiritual life—the sense of the infinite, as vital and dynamic as the sense of beauty. To the Rationalists, who objected to every irrational dogma, he said, 'I cannot hold religion for knowledge at all.'<sup>3</sup> As against the moralists who reduced religion to morality, he maintained that religion is 'immediate feeling',<sup>4</sup> 'fleeting and pellucid',<sup>5</sup> which 'does not urge men to activity at all'.<sup>6</sup> Thus at a stroke, he wanted to make religion *sui generis*, and take it beyond the attacks of science and philosophy.

Since Schleiermacher's time rationalistic natural theology has gone out of fashion; for if feeling is the bedrock of religion, doctrines and dogmas are only petrified feelings; and since a man believes what he feels, his belief is his exclusive concern. This sort of conception of religion justifies the Logical Positivist's critique of religion. The Logical Positivists say that since God-sentences are not propositions, but symbolical expressions of certain feelings and attitudes, they cannot have any point of contact with philosophy, which is concerned with the analysis of propositions.<sup>7</sup>

Criticism of the above view :

The thesis that distinctions of truth and falsehood are irrelevant in religion is a natural corollary to the presupposition that religion is pure feeling. We have already expressed the doubt whether there could be any pure feeling, absolutely devoid of at least some element of cognition (*supra* pp. 280-1). All the mystics and saints attest to the fact that religious faith is cognitive. In a revelation, as Juliana of Norwich said, 'Our Lord willeth that this be *known*'.<sup>8</sup> The seer of the Upaniṣad says, 'I *know* (*vedāham*) this great Person.'<sup>9</sup> St. Augustine wrote, 'I entered and *beheld* . . . the Light unchangeable . . . That Light is God Himself.'<sup>10</sup> Feeling occupies an important place in religion, for it helps man to see things in a new way by opening to him hitherto unnoticed aspects; and indeed (following Alexander) we may go further and say that in religious experience cognition occurs



through feeling;<sup>11</sup> but just because the disclosure of God is non-inferential, it cannot be devoid of intellectual content. In fact in the vision of God the intellectual aspect is primary; in other words, *amor Dei* is *amor Dei intellectualis*. The feeling of dependence (as Schleiermacher says), or the act of worship (as Prof. Farmer says)<sup>12</sup> may be the essence of religion; but the feeling of dependence presupposes that there is an 'Other', an independent Reality, which can be depended upon, just as the feeling of gratitude presupposes our knowledge of someone, to whom we ought to be grateful;<sup>13</sup> and the knowledge of a person worthy of adoration must be antecedent to the act of worship, though worship may confirm and deepen that knowledge. We must therefore conclude that in religious experience, man is aware of a presence that compels recognition, though it can only be imperfectly expressed in words.

#### Religion is Not Morality :

There are some thinkers such as Bradley who maintain that religion is essentially practical.<sup>14</sup> Prof. Braithwaite's view that religion is meant to sustain a 'policy for living' amounts to the same. This confusion of religion with morality is based upon the notion generally prevalent in the West that to be highly religious and to be highly moral are one and the same thing. To entertain such a notion would be to conceive God as bound within what the Puritans have called 'the filthy rags of righteousness'. As St. Paul suggested, God transcends the moral law. Sometimes, intense and genuine religious faith may be found in persons of low moral conduct (e.g. some of the saints in the *Bhakti* religions),<sup>15</sup> for, as A. E. Taylor pointed out, 'to adore is not the same thing as to cultivate moral betterment'.<sup>16</sup> 'The founders of the great historical religions *never* regarded themselves, nor were regarded by their followers as moral reformers.'<sup>17</sup> Śāṅkara very rightly insisted (and in this Rāmānuja and Madhva would support him) that the supreme aim of religion is to obtain *samyakdarśana* (right vision) of Brahman, and not to discharge one's moral obligations properly; moral behaviour can at best be only a means of preparing us for the *samyakdarśana*. An important difference between dharma (moral duty) and Brahman is that, while the former is ideal, the latter is real. The moral ideal belongs to the

realm of what yet is not, while Brahman is already (in Śankara's words) an 'accomplished reality,' *siddha vastu* (*supra* pp. 9ff.). 'No amount of Ought-ness can be made to take the place of Is-ness', said von Hugel.<sup>18</sup> As Rudolf Otto has correctly pointed out, the genuinely religious experience does not spring from the soil of morality, because the apprehension of God as sanctity (*Tu solus sanctus*) is of a unique kind; it is the apprehension of God as the most *numinous* ('*ananta mahāvibhūti*', says Yāmuna, the teacher of Rāmānuja), and of man as the least *numinous* (*akīṇana* and *ananyagati*, says Yāmuna).<sup>19</sup> Again, the distinctly religious modes of conduct (e.g. worship, prayer) do not fall within the realm of morality; and many men of exceptional moral integrity have never engaged themselves in them (e.g. Diogenes and Jeremy Bentham). It would appear that these considerations justify us in rejecting the view that religion is in essence moral conduct.

Knowledge leads to the End of Religion :

The above contention is supported by the fact that all the great religions seem to agree that religion is pre-eminently theory, and not practice. At least as far as Hinduism is concerned there is no doubt that all the six schools of philosophy (including the Mīmāṃsā, *supra* pp. 190-1) unanimously declare that only knowledge can lead us to liberation. Among the Vedāntins, even the pluralistic schools such as that of Madhva say that it is knowledge of God that leads to God's grace, and they quote in support the Gītā text that the wise (*jñānis*) are the beloved of God.<sup>20</sup> According to the Buddha, it is 'Knowledge, which causeth Calm, Insight, Enlightenment, and *Nirvāṇa*'.<sup>21</sup> In Islām, the *Ulul-Ilm* (the man of knowledge) occupies the foremost place among the *Mo'minin* (the believers); and the Qurān says that it is knowledge that 'lights the way to heaven', and that it is the angels and the 'men of learning with mental equipoise' (cf. the *sthita-prajna*, the *sama-darśī* of Gītā) that bear witness to God.<sup>22</sup> From the side of Christianity St. Thomas says that 'the ultimate end of rational creatures is the vision of God';<sup>23</sup> and he adds, 'These three run together: vision, the perfect knowledge of an intelligible end; comprehension, the presence of the end; delight or enjoyment, the ease of lover with beloved'.<sup>24</sup> (Cf. the *brahmānanda* in *Taittirīya Up.*) He is also emphatic that man's final happiness does not consist



in moral activity, for the former 'is ultimate and not subservient to a higher end, whereas moral activity is directed to something above itself'.<sup>25</sup> Luther's doctrine that it is the knowledge of God which is reconciling and *saving* knowledge is too well-known to need mention. It seems to me, therefore, that we will not be wrong in concluding that all the great religions are pre-eminently (not entirely) *theoria*, and not *praxia*, and that the ultimate goal of all religion is the Vision of God.<sup>26</sup>

But when we say that religion is pre-eminently 'knowledge', it is not knowledge of the kind found in some of the sciences. It is cognition of the sort generated by personal encounter with one's fellowmen or by the hearing of music: Music, for instance, arouses experience of a specific kind, and gives rise to ideas, which are vague and shadowy. They are what Kant calls *unausgewickelte Begriffe* (unexplicated concepts). (Cp. *supra* p. 56, Vācaspati's example of tasting sugar and honey.) As Leibniz has said, we may have a notion of a thing, but it may not be 'adequate'; i.e. in other words, one can *know* a thing, but may not *comprehend* it. Leibniz gives the following example to illustrate this. We have some ideas regarding light-rays, we may demonstrate these ideas to some extent, but in the end there remains something, which compels us to confess that we do not comprehend the nature of light.<sup>27</sup> Rudolf Otto has said: 'To know and to understand conceptually are two different things, are often even mutually exclusive and contrasted'.<sup>28</sup>

But a man cannot rest content with just having an experience, for, as we suggested earlier (*supra* p. 284), the intrinsic movement of his intellect obliges him to seek clarification of his beliefs, elicit the implications of his experience, and thereby find out how far this knowledge is in conformity with the knowledge of reality disclosed to (say) the 'metaphysical consciousness', or the 'scientific consciousness' of mankind. '*Credo ut intelligam*'. In this process is encountered a great difficulty, because no concrete experience, and much less religious experience, can find perfect expression in propositions; while, on the other hand, unless it is clothed in language it cannot be clarified, appreciated and brought to self-consciousness. Long ago St. Augustine anticipated questions of the sort Dr. Johnson asked, 'If Jacob (Boehme) saw the unutterable, why then did he

attempt to utter it?', and gave his reply, '*Non ut diceretur, sed ne taceretur*'.<sup>29</sup> ('Not because one wants to talk, but because one can't keep silence.')

The irreducible datum of so concrete an experience, such as the religious, can never be defined, but only discussed; it cannot be described, but only shown how it resembles and yet differs from other experiences. This is the reason for the oddness of theological language (*supra* pp. 53f., 56f.). At least a dim consciousness of it can be evoked or aroused by various means, provided one is ready to respond with a penetrative sympathy to what passes in another man's mind. Unless something in the hearer stirs and goes out to receive a revelation it fails to make an impact, just as the finest melody is lost when one is musically deaf. 'We have heard him ourselves and *know*'. (*St. John* iv. 42.) 'The R̥ṣis have acclaimed Thee (as the Supreme Brahman), and now Thou Thyself tellest it to me. I believe all this that Thou tellest to me to be true.' (*Gītā*, X. 13-14.)

## 11

### *All Knowledge of God is His Disclosure*

Some theologians have attempted to make a sharp distinction between the human discovery of God and God's disclosure of himself to man. It seems to me that this is an extremely difficult thing to do; as no hard and fast line could be drawn between the two.

In one sense we may say that all knowledge is revelation, for historians and scientists have to patiently wait for facts and find them; they cannot make facts. As Śāṅkara said, one can (so to say) acquire merit, but one cannot acquire truth (*supra* pp. 73-4); that which is produced cannot be truth. To quote Bradley: 'The laws of the planets and stars, we believe, in part revealed themselves truly to Newton, but the revelation, if so, was something more than a mere personal event. It is only in poetry that America rose from the waves at the will of Columbus, and even in poetry the America which appeared was a thing found as well as done. There is for us no truth, we may say, save that which discovers itself to us.'<sup>30</sup> At another place he says: 'Unless the Reality itself enters into the process of events, unless it itself is what it becomes there, unless it itself discovers itself to itself



and us, and takes on a change from that discovery—the Reality remains outside of knowledge, and itself is unreal.<sup>31</sup>

If this is the case about scientific facts and historical events, much more should it be so about God for the following reasons :

Firstly, he is not a sensible thing, which we can come across in perceptual experience, but is a self-conscious being, about whom we can know only by coming into personal encounter. We do not know much about the life and purpose of even a human person merely by seeing him from outside, for though we may guess something about his nature from his acts, these guesses are not certain to be right. So the best way to know a person fully is through his self-disclosure to us. On the other hand, we cannot have certain knowledge about God from his acts, because unless we know him, we cannot know with certainty which are his acts.

Secondly, God is not like any other person about whom we can know something in spite of himself, for he is present both in us as well as apart from us ; and whatever we do or know is willed by him. '*Ēṣa hi eva sādhu karma kārayati*' (*Kau. Up.*) ; '*mattah smṛtiḥ jñānam apohanam ṇa*' (*Gītā*). So if at all we have knowledge of God, it is because he has revealed himself. A knowledge of God, in whatever way we may think we have arrived at, comes ultimately from God.

It follows from this that revelation is not something wholly different from the cognitive and conative processes that occur in the case of creative thinkers and artists. After laborious days spent in disciplining natural inclinations, and following a search which claims his devotion, a man may suddenly find that he has come to possess a new idea, which is not a deduction from his previous knowledge, but is (so to say) a 'leap' to a new level of apprehension, which is recognized by him as that which he has been groping after. To quote Buber, 'Whatever science may say about it as subconscious or some such thing, the one who experiences it receives something he did not have before and receives it in such a way that he knows it has been given to him'.<sup>31a</sup> The difference between a religious revelation and creative inspiration is that in religious revelation, man receives the impact of a Presence, and a 'sense of fullness of mutual relation' between

himself and this Presence, by virtue of which his whole way of living is reintegrated.

### III

#### *Religious Faith Cannot be of 'the Absurd'*<sup>3</sup>

So far as instincts and emotions are concerned, there is no difference between man and the higher animals.<sup>32</sup> But we find that even primitive man is capable of exercising reason;<sup>33</sup> so we will not be wrong if we conclude that the evolution of man is synonymous with the development of a living being capable of using reason. Aristotle's definition of man as a rational being appears to be by far the best definition even now. Here and in the following paragraphs by 'reason' I mean that which Kant called 'understanding' (*verstand*), i.e. the faculty of making mediate inferences;<sup>34</sup> in other words, it is (as Leibniz said) the linking together of truths.<sup>35</sup> *Qua* rational being, nothing irrational can be assimilated by man, for though he may accept the irrational unawares, knowingly he cannot; and '*credo quia impossibile*' is an impossibility. This very Tertullian paradox recognizes the standard of reason, for a thing is known as an impossibility only after a careful rational scrutiny. Those who urge that an irrational doctrine can be held by faith, because faith is different from reason, should remember that man is a whole who cannot be torn asunder.

Kierkegaard has maintained a doctrine directly opposed to this. According to him, 'The absurd is the object of faith, and the only object that can be believed'.<sup>36</sup> Now, it seems to me that this doctrine itself is absurd, for no one can believe something to be the case, in spite of *known* evidence to the contrary; for however much one may hold fast to the absurd 'in the passion of inwardness',<sup>37</sup> one cannot coerce himself to believe. A man can ignore evidence, which is unsettling or dangerous to his settled way of life or thought; and he may come to form a habit of disregarding contrary evidence. Nevertheless this does not prove that one can believe X to be Y, when he clearly knows X is not Y. He may presume a mistake on his part, or he may bring in the plea that all human reason and perception is fallible; but he can never make himself believe that what he knows for certain (say) as a horse is a cat. Men may come to hasty



conclusions, they may be credulous and believe what they are told ; but it is impossible for them to ignore what they take to be established evidence (whether it is perceptual or logical). To sum up, belief is not a voluntary action.

For these reasons we have to reject the teaching of some Advaitins that a man can believe in Non-Duality in spite of the fact that he knows it to be impossible ('*durghaṭa*', says Vimuktātman ; '*dr̥ṣṭaviparīta*', says Vācaspati);<sup>38</sup> and precisely for the same reason Kierkegaard's teaching that 'the absurd' (which for him means that God has come into being in time, has been born, has grown up and died) can be believed<sup>39</sup> stands condemned. Any truth can be believed only when one knows that it is not opposed to reason ; and not when he knows that it is opposed.

It is a pity that Indian philosophers fail to distinguish between 'contradictory to' and 'above' reason. For both of these they have a single term '*viruddha*'. Nor do Kierkegaard or Barth distinguish between propositions (i) which are above reason, (ii) which are in accordance with reason, and (iii) which are contradictory to reason. It is this failure that has led them into a hopeless confusion. All that need be said on this point was said by Leibniz long ago. That which we cannot comprehend and which we cannot account for (says Leibniz) is *above* reason, while that which is opposed by invincible reasons or the contrary of which can be proved in a precise and sound manner is *against* reason.<sup>40</sup> As the reason we possess is a gift of God, and as it differs from God's reason only as a drop of water differs from the ocean, 'mysteries' (says Leibniz) may transcend but cannot be contrary to it'.<sup>41</sup>

It should be clearly noted that when it is said that knowledge of God, or Incarnation (if there had been one) is not contradicted by reason, it does not mean that they can be comprehended, or that they can be proved. Even the most concentrated exercise of reason cannot completely elucidate the mystery of God. The scriptures declare : 'O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out !' (*Romans* xi. 33.) 'Infinite Lord of infinite form, I see Thee everywhere ; but I find not the beginning, middle, or end of Thee.' (*Gītā*, XI. 16.)

Here the position of Advaita Vedānta is fundamentally sound, for it holds that Brahman cannot be proved, but at the same time it maintains (i) that what is said about Brahman is not meaningless, or as Leibniz says the terms employed must not be *sine mente soni*, words signifying nothing;<sup>42</sup> and (ii) that the objections of opponents must be capable of being answered. The knowledge of God, theists maintain, is based on the consciousness that God has revealed himself. It is for the opponent to prove that this belief is unjustified. Unless the believer in God desires to make the opponent comprehend God (which no genuinely religious man will seek to do), it is enough if he is able to refute the objections by either denying the premises on which the objection is based, or by showing the faults in the arguments of the opponent.<sup>43</sup> The *onus probandi* lies with the objector, who has to find a premise acceptable to both the parties, from which he can start an objection;<sup>44</sup> and, the objection should be contradictory to (and not just alternate to) the beliefs entertained by the theist. Now if it so happens that such an objection is unanswerable, then the belief of the theist is proved to be unjustified. However, if objections are based on instances of the most frequent occurrences, or superficial observations, what seems improbable from that standpoint need not be absurd, for it might have happened, or may happen.<sup>45</sup> The unusual and the incomprehensible need not be the absurd. In such cases we must remember that theology has its own logic, and in examining theological statements we ought only to see how far they are self-consistent in accordance with their own logic. In all this the method of the Advaita Vedānta is the same as that advocated by Leibniz.

The great Muslim thinker, al-Ghazali, endorses this position. He says that reason can only dialectically destroy the possibility of an opposing metaphysical system, and establish the authority of an immediate awareness of reality.<sup>46</sup> Von Hugel is also of the opinion that the right method to be followed in the sphere of theology is not to attempt to prove the validity of religious experience by argument, but to rebut the arguments of those who say it is false.<sup>47</sup> If there are no good reasons for regarding the evidence of religious consciousness as fallacious, then, as Prof. Stout said, it is unchallenged.<sup>48</sup>



We may sum up by saying that no truth about God is or can be absurd, though it may be suprarational. We cannot hope to comprehend God, and, as Tersteegen said, 'a comprehended God is no God',<sup>49</sup> but, nevertheless, no 'mystery' of God admits of irrefutable objections against it; for if that were the case, then the falsity of the propositions about God is proved.<sup>50</sup> Adapting Wittgenstein's words, we may say that if any doubts can be raised at all about God, then they can be resolved, for a doubt can only exist where there is an answer. But if even after all questions are answered, we do not understand what God is, it only *shows* that he is *inexpressible*,<sup>51</sup> 'dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto'. (*I Timothy* vi. 16.)

In this connection we should not go to the other extreme and maintain, as the Barthians do, that reason has only a purely negative role to play in theology, in refuting the objections of opponents, since no positive statements at all can be made about God. Harṣa to a pre-eminent degree, and Śāṅkara, subscribe to this sort of theory (*supra* pp. 145-6; 167-9), for they aver that reason cannot establish any one proposition as the final truth, because there is scarcely any proposition against which a clever logician cannot raise insuperable difficulties.

As against this position of Barthians and Śāṅkarites, it seems to me that, firstly, a thing can be said to be not something definite only if we have some positive knowledge of it. Plato has demonstrated in the *Sophist* the impossibility of making absolute negative judgments. *Omnis negatio est determinatio*. Even if reason cannot by itself demonstrate the truth about God, it has a positive role in clarifying the content of revelation. Secondly, whenever reason refutes a thesis, it builds up an opposing thesis; and when it seems to overthrow both the thesis and antithesis, then it will lead to a profound truth by opening up new vistas of thought, provided we are determined to be led wherever it leads us in all humility and impartiality and with the sole desire to find truth. 'Man is obviously made to think. It is his whole dignity and his whole merit; and his whole duty is to think as he ought.'<sup>52</sup> So Pascal; and a man who casts off his 'dignity' does not (as Locke said) pay 'the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him to keep him out of mistake and error'.<sup>53</sup>

It is relevant to point out that this conclusion would have the support of not only Śāṅkara, but of Kant, for along with them, I maintain that reason by itself cannot prove that God exists, but if there should be another source of *knowledge* regarding God, reason can clarify and explicate the content of such knowledge. Kant wrote, 'Although reason, in its merely speculative employment, is very far from being equal to so great an undertaking, namely, to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being, it is yet of great utility in *correcting* any knowledge of this being which may be derived from other sources, in making it consistent with itself and with every point of view from which intelligible objects may be regarded, and in freeing it from everything incompatible with the concept of an original being and from all admixture of empirical limitations.'<sup>54</sup> Kant avers that knowledge of God is provided by moral theology, while Śāṅkara asserts that an eternal Scripture supplies us with such knowledge; but I in all humility differ from these great thinkers and maintain that it is the normal characteristic of human mind to have a sense of being in the presence of 'something' or 'someone' at once 'ultimate', 'holy', and 'intimate'. From the *Opus Postumum*, however, we find that Kant himself came to recognise that God is directly present to us in moral experience.<sup>55</sup>

#### IV

#### *God is Postulated by 'Reason'*

From what we have said in the previous section, it would follow that the so-called theistic proofs cannot prove the existence of God; but at the same time it is hard to agree with Prof. Laird that the 'failure of a demonstration is a failure'.<sup>56</sup> The Vedāntins are right when they say that these proofs (i) support theism, provided we have a knowledge of God from other sources, inasmuch as they serve as meditations on God (as Udayana said, *supra* p. 208); and (ii) even independently, they serve as *yuktis* (q. v. pp. 142-3), which are no worse than other *yuktis*, and may in a sense be preambles to faith; and (iii) they may help even a man who thinks himself to be an atheist to examine the grounds of his atheism, and find out whether it is at all impossible that he should have repressed his belief in God. When reflected upon with



understanding, the traditional theistic proofs may come to be a necessary dialectic moment in the process of knowing God, for, after all, they embody the 'metaphysical experience' of some of the greatest thinkers that history has known and have in turn impressed some of the best minds. If Cook Wilson was right when he said that 'the true business of philosophy is to bring the belief to a consciousness of itself',<sup>57</sup> theistic proofs may rank as philosophy.

As was said in the beginning itself, in the previous section we used 'reason' in the sense of Kant's '*verstand*' ('*anumiti jñāna*'), and Locke's 'illation' or 'inference';<sup>58</sup> and we maintained that any revelation cannot be contradictory to reason in that sense, though *all* genuine revelation is above it. But there is another sense in which 'reason' is sometimes used. For example, Plotinus said: 'He who tries to rise above reason, falls outside of it'; '*Nous* is King'. Here obviously Plotinus refers to the consciousness, which, according to Plato, can apprehend the world of Ideas. It is 'Transcendental Feeling', which, says Stewart, is the 'beginning and end of metaphysics', 'manifested normally as Faith in the Value of Life'.<sup>59</sup> In this sense 'reason' is what Kant has called '*Vernunft*', which according to him is ineradicably metaphysical.<sup>60</sup>

Now, Kant says that the systematic unity of all knowledge of nature is a *naturale desiderium* of 'reason' in this sense, and that this cannot be achieved unless God is postulated.

Kant says: 'Purposive unity is, however, so important a condition of the application of reason to nature that I cannot ignore it, especially as experience supplies me so richly with examples of it. But I know no other condition under which this unity can supply me with guidance in the investigation of nature, save only the postulate that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things in accordance with the wisest ends. Consequently, as a condition of what is indeed a contingent, but still not unimportant purpose, namely, to have guidance in the investigation of nature, we must postulate a wise Author of the world. Moreover, the outcome of my attempts (in explanation of nature) so frequently confirms the usefulness of this postulate, while nothing decisive can be cited against it, that I am saying much too little if I proceed to declare that I hold it merely as an opinion.'<sup>61</sup> He adds: 'This belief is not, therefore, strictly speaking, practical; it must be entitled a doctrinal belief, to which the theology of nature (physico-theology) must always necessarily give rise.'<sup>62</sup>

From another side eminent thinkers have argued that the experience of the finite leads us to posit the infinite; both the ontological argument and the argument *a contingentia mundi* are based on this need to postulate the Infinite. In his Gifford lectures Prof. Stout said: 'The demand for a psychical life beyond our own is founded on the essential incompleteness of the finite individual as such. It cannot therefore be met by positing the existence of any finite individual, or group of individuals.'<sup>63</sup> Thought, as Hegel said, has to make the passage from the finite to the infinite, and he who says that there must be no such passage says that there must be no thinking.<sup>64</sup> It would appear that Hegel here uses 'thought' in the sense of Kant's '*Vernunft*'. Now Kant himself admits that the ideas of Reason 'are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding'.<sup>65</sup>

It would seem from this that two such formidable authorities as Kant and Hegel maintain that God is a necessary *postulate* of reason; and both of them apparently agree that we have no direct experience of God, and that God cannot be established by a logically necessary theoretic inference. Yet it seemed to them that to acknowledge the finiteness of the world, and not to affirm God as its ground or sufficient reason is a species of unreason, almost a self-contradiction. The only thing to do was to speak of a process of 'postulation', 'presumption', or 'positing'; and I suggest that this 'postulation', is similar to the *arthāpatti* of Advaita Vedānta. (*supra* pp. 155f.) It is neither inference, nor perception, but another way of cognition, a *pramāṇa*, and is the function of mind in its '*vernunft*' aspect. In a suggestive passage in *Theodicy*, Leibniz has distinguished between 'conjecture' and 'presumption'. 'Presumption', he says, is that 'which must provisionally pass for truth in case the contrary is not proved'.<sup>66</sup> This method is, as Prof. Kemp Smith showed, 'identical in general character with the hypothetical method of the natural sciences. It proceeds by enquiring what conditions must be postulated in order that the admittedly given may be explained and accounted for'.<sup>67</sup>

The existence of the external world and other selves are postulates of all experience, while the belief in the rational order



of nature is a postulate of science. Neither logical demonstration nor inductive generalization can justify these postulates ; but the method of *arthāpatti* 'demonstrates' that these beliefs are implicit in experience. Now I wish to suggest that since some of the greatest thinkers have *demonstrated* the existence of God to be a 'necessary belief' (Kant<sup>67a</sup>) involved in all experience, we have every reason to take it as a valid belief on a par with other beliefs such as the existence of other selves, an order in nature etc. If Collingwood is right when he says that 'philosophic reason leads to no conclusions which we did not in some sense know already', 'but brings us to know in a different way things which we already know in some way', then we may not be wrong in saying that philosophy vindicates theism.<sup>68</sup>

It is strange that though the Advaita Vedānta recognised *arthāpatti* as a method of proof distinct from inferential reasoning, it could not conceive it as an independent source of knowledge of God ; but Advaitins recognised that *arthāpatti* could be a method of proof based on scripture. Now I maintain that just as all inference, though ultimately based on the premises supplied by perception, is a source of knowledge, even so *arthāpatti* based on our experience is a source of knowledge regarding God, for it shows that belief in God is the ultimate presupposition of all experience ; and since *arthāpatti* is only a non-discursive functioning of reason, we may say that in one sense 'reason' leads us to God.

To this Kant would object that God cannot be a phenomenal object, i.e., that though he may be a necessary postulate of reason, he cannot be an object within the limits of 'experience', as Kant conceived it (viz. empirical knowledge within space and time).<sup>69</sup> In reply to such an objection, our reaction (as Prof. Emmett said)<sup>70</sup> would be to ask, what serious religious thinker has ever thought that God is a phenomenal object ?

V

*In Conclusion*

The conclusions which we have reached in this Part may be summarised and brought together under the following heads :

(a) Eternal Scripture : The Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta conception

of an eternal scripture is absurd, because we can accept that truth has been disclosed to man only if there is someone who can do so.

(b) *Advaitavāda*: The Advaita Vedānta metaphysic cannot be true, because it is contradictory to perception, and is logically refutable. Further, if Brahman is the one and *sole* reality, to speak of any revelation of Brahman is nonsense.

(c) Existence of God: Since the concept of revelation requires a Revealer, we inquired whether there could be any Revealer, and found that man has an immediate awareness of God.

(d) Revelation not one-sided: If there is God, it is intelligible that he should have revealed himself, but it is highly unlikely that any body of infallible propositions were (as the Nyāya says) handed down by him. The way for revelation has to be prepared for by man; and he is active both in the reception and interpretation of it.

(e) Revelation not *Einmalige*: Revelation is not a phenomenon *sui generis*. Firstly, unless there is a general revelation of God there can be no special revelation such as is claimed by the several religions. Secondly, creative inspiration which thinkers, poets and artists have is not wholly different from religious revelation.

(f) Revelation is of Truth: It is intellectual obscurantism to say that revelation is always of a person and that its channel is a historical event, and that truth is never revealed. Revelation can never fail to include an element of cognition, for even the most elementary faith and feeling have an intellectual core.

(g) Revealed Truth is 'Absolute': The problem posed by the existence of many religions, each claiming to be in possession of final truth, can be solved, if we remember that the truth given in revelation is 'absolute' and not scientific and 'universal'.

(h) The Theological task: Dissenting from what Prof. Laird has called the 'modish body of opinion', which insists that 'the greater part of traditional philosophy, and the whole of philosophical theology, should be regarded as a kind of poetry',<sup>71</sup> we have maintained that theology may give us 'knowledge'. But a theologian who claims that this 'knowledge' is a revelation of God should remember that while the apprehension of supreme reality can never be fully adequate to its object, the formulation of the intellectual conviction given in such an



experience also can never be perfect. Since these 'given' insights are always expressed through the ideas and language of a bygone age, the task of a theologian, who has soaked himself in the tradition, must be to study critically these linguistic expressions and to see whether they can be more adequately formulated in terms of current forms of thought and language; but this explication of the religious insights found in a tradition is a progressive task, which can never be taken to be complete.

(i) Religious 'knowledge': While revelation does give us knowledge, which helps us towards the supreme goal of religion 'the Vision of God', this 'knowledge' is not similar to that which can be found in the sciences, but is (e.g.) more like the *aperçu* which is opened up through an appreciation of music; and not all of it may be adequately expressible in a propositional form.

(j) Language and God: What the Advaitins have said about the relationship between language and Brahman is fundamentally correct. Theology is one sort of language, while science and poetry are different sorts of language, all employed in talking about reality. Theology has its own 'logic', and it is enough if it consistently adheres to it.

(k) No 'Proof' of Revelation: There can be no objective authoritative standard of religious truth, for postulation of any such standard assumes a subjective belief in it. So there is no 'external' way of judging: (i) whether there has been a revelation or not, and (ii) whether a particular scripture contains a revelation or not. A man has to judge for himself whether he can realize the truth, which is claimed to be revealed and embodied in a religious tradition, by living in tune with that tradition, and by an exercise of 'productive empathy'; and a truth not so realized and a revelation not so validated is neither truth, nor revelation for that man.

(l) Scriptural Interpretation: The principles of interpretation of sacred scriptures which have been laid down by the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta seem to be beyond any cavil. The allegation of some European authors that Śāṅkara has no consistent principles of interpretation is unfounded; what was wrong with him was his notion of what was *important* in the Scripture. Since he started with the presumption that the Veda is meant for teaching Advaita, and that only passages inculcating it are important, he

found Advaita in the Veda. There can be no objective interpretation of religious scriptures. He who cannot read a sacred scripture 'in the spirit' derives little religious profit from it. In the understanding of a sacred scripture, it is well to bear in mind that scriptural language is neither perceptual, nor objectively historical.

(m) All knowledge is Revelation : In one sense, all knowledge of facts is a revelation ; but knowledge of God is revelation in every way, because God is not only a transcendent God, but an indwelling Deity and no knowledge of him is possible without his disclosing himself.

(n) Religious truth is not absurd : Religious truths are not fully comprehensible, but this does not mean that they are irrational. The depths of the Divine are unfathomable, but not irrational. We can accept Locke's maxim that 'reason must be our last judge and guide in everything',<sup>72</sup> only in the sense that nothing expressly contradicted by inferential reasoning based on sound premises can be revelation ; but we cannot accept it in the Spinozistic sense that whatever cannot be established by reason is a phantom and a dream.<sup>73</sup> *Pace* Spinoza and Locke, neither the existence of God nor moral maxims are self-evident *ex vi terminorum*. Here again the Advaita position is in general sound.

(o) 'Reason' postulates God : There is another sense in which the word 'reason' is used, e.g. in Plotinus and Kant. Then it would be almost the same as Plato's 'transcendental feeling' and Eckhart's '*intellectus*' as opposed to '*ratio*'. So understood, reason can show that the existence of God is a necessary postulate, an implicit belief, involved in all experience. This is not an inferential demonstration, but is nevertheless a valid exercise of mind, a meditation on existence, which shows (in Luther's words) that 'the knowledge of God is impressed on the mind of every man by God', 'for all men, as soon as they hear it treated of, find this belief written in their hearts, and acknowledge it as proved'.<sup>74</sup> Only, this 'proof' is not an inference, but an *arthāpatti*; and it is a philosophical task. 'Our enduring task in philosophical endeavour,' writes Prof. Jaspers, 'is to become authentic men by becoming aware of being ; or, and this is the same thing : to become ourselves by achieving certainty of God.'<sup>75</sup>



## BIBLIOGRAPHY OF IMPORTANT SANSKRIT WORKS

(The abbreviations used in the references are also shown below)

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 U.B. .. „ *Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*.  
 G.B. .. „ *Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya*.  
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 B. .. Vācaspati, *Bhāmātī*.  
 K. .. Amalānanda, *Kalpataru*.  
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Ta. V. .. Vācaspati, *Tattva Vaiśāradi*.

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### INTRODUCTION

1. *Naiṣadha*, IXX. 88. Cp. *Amara Kośa*, I. 14. Śāṅkara himself accepts Buddhism to be very close to Vedānta. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā Bhāṣya*, IV. 99.
2. *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* (Suzuki's Translation), p. 127.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 171.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 43-44.
5. *Mādhyamika Vṛtti* (Calcutta), pp. 134, 219.

The only difference between Buddhist and Vedānta theories is (says Śānta Raksita) that while Buddhism says that there are a number of cognitions, Vedānta says there is only *one* eternal consciousness. (*Tattva Sangraha*, 330-1) Śrī Harṣa says that while according to Buddhism everything is indescribable and nothing is permanent, Vedānta maintains that except Brahman, which is eternal, everything else is indescribable.

6. Baladeva Upādhyāya, *Śrī Śāṅkarācārya*, pp. 35, 40.

## BOOK ONE

### PART ONE

#### CHAPTER I

##### Section I (pp. 3-5)

1. V.C., 110-11. S.B., I. 4.3; *Śvetāśvetara Up. B.*, IV. 9.10.
2. V.C., 244.
3. V.C., 246.
4. V.C., 247.
5. G.B., XIII. 2; *Taittirīya Up. B.*, II. 7; S.B., I. 1.12.
- 5A. S.B., II. 1.14. '*Brahmadāṛṣanopāyatoena viniyojyate*'.
- Also, S.B., I. 4.11.
6. G.B., VII. 13; VII. 18; VII. 19; X. 14-16.
7. G.B., Introduction; S.B., I. 1.16-17; II. 1.22.
- 7A. *Māyā* is *aṁśara* and *nitya*. See G.B., XIII.19; XV.16.
8. *Brahma Sūtra*, I. 1.2. *Taittirīya Up.* III. 2.
9. *Taittirīya Up.*, II. 1.
10. S.B., II. 3.41; III. 2.5.
11. S.B., II. 3.41.
12. S.B., II. 3.42.
13. *Kaṭha Up. B.*, II. 2.25; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, II. 1.20.
14. Prof. Laird has some acute remarks on *Karma* and moral freedom. He concludes that the theory of *Karma* is not morally defective in any way. See *On Human Freedom*, pp. 143-4.
15. S.B., II. 3.42.
16. G.B., XVIII. 45. S.B., III. 2.5.
17. S.B., IV. 4.7-14 & IV. 4.22.
18. S.B., IV. 4.17.
19. S.B., IV. 4.21.
20. S.B., *Ibid.*, IV. 2.13; I. 1.4.

CHAPTER I

Section II (pp. 6-10)

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, II. 5.19 'yadi hi nāmarūpe na vyākriyete tadā aśya ātmano nirupādṛhikam rūpam na pratikhyāyeta.'

*Ibid.*, IV. 4.2. 'sa prāṇam asrujata, tatra ṣa ātmaçaitanya jyotih sarvadā abhivyaktatarām'.

S.B., I. 3.30 'Ekasyāpi kūṣastharya citta-tāratamyāt jñānaishvaryaṇām abhivyaktih pareṇa pareṇa bhūyasi bhavati'.

*Itareya Up. B.*, II.3. 'Sthāvarādārābhya uttarottaram avistaratoam ātmanah'.

Also, G.B., X. 41; *Chāndogya Up. B.*, I. 9.2.

2. G.B., VII. 18.

3. V.P.S., pp. 225-31. B., 1.1.2. V.C., 219.

4. S.S., pp. 57-58.

5. A.S., p. 27.

6. G.B., Introduction.

7. *Ibid.*, IV. 4.

8. *Ibid.*, IV. 5.

9. S.B., III. 2.9; II. 3.46.

10. G.B., IV. 6.

11. *Loc. cit.*

12. G.B., VII. 25-6.

13. *Ibid.*, IV. 6.

14. *Ibid.*, VII. 24-5.

15. *Ibid.*, VII. 26.

16. *Ibid.*, IV. 6.

17. S.B., I. 1.20.

18. G.B., Introduction.

CHAPTER II

(pp. 11-24)

1. For above V.P., Chap. IV.

2. V., p. 229.

3. V.P.S., pp. 280-1.

4. *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* II; S.V., 184, 185.

5. V.U., p. 131, V.P.S., p. 295.

6. K.K.K., p. 81.

7. T.P., p. 15.

8. K.K.K., p. 90f.

9. T.P., p. 11.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

11. S.P., p. 43.

12. S.V., pp. 26-35. S.D., pp. 53-60. V.P., chap. VII.

13. N.S., II. 9.

14. V., p. 220.

15. The referent is that which is referred to or signified by a word. See Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 13. cf. 'jātimātrābhidhāyino vā sarvadeśeṣu abhidhānatayā sampratipannāḥ . . . tāni ṣa abhidhānāni, naivam sāmketikā śabdāḥ'.

16. V.U., p. 131.

17. V.P.S., p. 296. V.U., p. 131.

18. V.U., p. 123.

19. S.B., I. 3.28.

20. V.P., chap. IV.

21. S.B., and R.P., I. 3.28.



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22. *loc. cit.*
23. V.U., p. 124. V.P.S., pp. 281-2.
24. B., p. 8 *et seq.*
25. N.D., II. 2.27-9.
26. B., I. 1.3; p. 98.
27. S.B., I. 3.28. The conclusion, '*tatas̥ca nityebhyaḥ śābdebhyaḥ . . .*'  
etc. On this R.P. & V.P.S., pp. 280-1.
28. The Nyāya also is of the same view, N.V.T., p. 470.
- 28A. B., p. 320ff.
29. S.P., p. 93.
30. M.D., *Sūtras* 25 & 32. S.P., p. 92.
31. S.B., and B., on it, I. 1.4. V.P.S., pp. 287-8.
- 31A. B., p. 105.
32. V.U., p. 130.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-1. V.P.S., 293-5. Also, B., pp. 105-6.
34. *loc. cit.*

## CHAPTER III

### Sections I & II (pp. 25-33)

1. R.B.B., p. 3.
2. *Yajña Paribhāṣā Sūtra*, I. 33. (S.B.E., Vol. XXX, p. 324.)
3. M.D., II. 1.32-3.
4. Br., II. 1.32-3.
5. R.B.B., pp. 16-17.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
7. T.B., *Upodghāta*, p. 2.
8. *loc. cit.*
9. R.B.B., p. 24. '*Dharmabrahmani vedaikavedye.*'
10. *loc. cit.*
11. P.B., p. 3.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
13. S.B., III. 1.25.
14. S.V., p. 83f.
15. S.B., *loc. cit.*
16. K., pp. 106-7, where arguments from *Nyāya Kaṇikā* are given.
17. *loc. cit.*
18. B., p. 99.
19. S.B., I. 1.2. '*Dharmajñānāsāyām śrītyādaya eva pramāṇam . . .*  
*puruṣādhiṇātmalābhatvācca kartavyasya*', etc.
20. Cf. *Mahābhārata*: '*Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhāyām, naiko muniryasya matam pramāṇam.*'
21. R.B.B., p. 3.
22. S.B., I. 1.4. '*Na ṣa anumānagamyam lāstrapramāṇam.*'
23. S.B., II. 1.1.
24. R.B.B., pp. 3-4.
25. V.P.S., p. 325.
26. V.U., p. 123. S.V. (on *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* II), 184-5. S.D., pp. 53-60.  
V.P., chap. VII.
27. V.P.S., p. 80.
28. B., p. 108.
29. V.P.S., p. 296.
30. N.S., *vākya* 92.
31. *Ibid.*, II. *śloka* 35f.
32. S.B., I. 1.3.
33. B., p. 96.
34. B., p. 99.
35. N.V.T., pp. 431-3. cp. N.M., Part I, p. 243.
36. V., pp. 226-7.
37. *loc. cit.*

1. B., p. 99. V.U., p. 123.
2. V., p. 228. V.P.S., p. 279.
3. S.B., I. 3.29.
4. V., p. 227.
- 4A. V.P.S., p. 278f.
5. S.P., p. 99.
6. *Rg Veda*, VIII. 75.6.
7. *Mahābhārata*, *Sāntiparva*, 232, 24.
8. S.B., 1.3.28.
9. B., p. 331.
10. S.B., 1. 3.28.
11. B., p. 322. 'avāpakena teṣām (vastūnām) buddhāvanālekhanāt.' 'Alekhana' also means painting, writing etc. Here we may take it in the sense of not being vivid.
12. S.B., I. 3.28.
13. *loc. cit.*
14. B., p. 321.
15. K.P., p. 322.
16. *Śvetāśvetara Up.*, VI. 18.
17. K.P., p. 322.
18. S.B., I. 3.29.
19. K.P., p. 332.
20. M.D., I. 1.31.
21. Indra lived with Prajāpati as a *brahmaçāri* for a hundred years to obtain Brahman-knowledge. *Chāndogya Up.*, VIII. 11.3.
22. S.B., I. 3.26-7.
23. *Ibid.*, I. 3.28 and B., on it. Also, S.B., I. 3.30.
24. *Smṛti*, cited in S.B., I. 3.30.
25. *Mahābhārata*, *Sāntiparva*, 12, 85. cited by Śankara, *loc. cit.*
26. S.B., 2. 1.36.
27. *Smṛti* 'Rṣiṇām nāmadheyāni' etc., cited in S.B., I. 3.30.
28. S.B., I. 3.30.
29. V.P.S., pp. 280-1.
30. V., p. 230. V.U., p. 124.
31. B., p. 336.
32. *loc. cit.*, & p. 99.
33. S.B., IV. 1.3.
- 33A. B., p. 99. 'Nityasya vedānām yonerapi na teṣu svātantryam.'
34. *Rg Veda*, X. 190.3.
- 34A. K., p. 331. Regarding occasional and final dissolutions, see V.P., chap. VIII.
35. T.B., p. 3.
36. R.B.B., p. 16. 'Naitāvatā pauraṣeyatvam bhavati manuṣyanirmittatvābhāvāt.'
37. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, II. 3.3.
38. *Ibid.*, II. 3.4f.
39. S.B., II. 3.7.
40. V.P., chap. VIII.
41. Appayya says that while the non-eternity of the Veda should be most appropriately proved in the chapter in which the non-eternity of ether is established; since here Brahman's omniscience is proved from its being the author of the Veda, the objection that Brahman cannot be the cause of all things, as at least one thing, the Veda, is eternal had to be answered here. See K.P. p. 96.
42. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, II. 4.10.



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43. S. B., I. 1.3. & B., on it.
44. *Ibid.*, II. 2.38.
45. B., on above, p. 569.
46. K., p. 569.
47. B., & K., pp. 106-7.
48. V.P.S., p. 277.
49. B., pp. 99, 321-2.
50. V., p. 224.
51. V.U., p. 122.
52. V., *loc. cit.*
53. *loc. cit.*
54. V., p. 225.
55. V., p. 231.
56. *loc. cit.*
57. V., p. 225. V.U., pp. 122-3. 'Vedastu . . . na rāgārthakah, adhyayanavidhinā vidhau tātparyāt.'
58. V., p. 231.
59. V., p. 225. 'Raṇaiva sāpekṣatve nimittam samadhiḡatam.'
60. V.U., p. 123. 'Abhinavāmpūrvyā itvareṇāpi akaraṇāt.'
61. V.U., p. 122.
62. V., p. 228.
63. V.P.S., p. 279.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 280-1.
65. S.B., I. 1.3.
66. V., p. 231.
67. V.U., p. 124.
68. V., p. 231.
69. V.P.S., p. 282.
70. Plato, *The Republic* (Everyman's Library), p. 202.
71. R.B.B., p. 16.
72. V.P., chap. IV.
73. *Rg Veda*, X. 71-3, quoted in S.B., I. 3.29.
74. S.B., I. 3.30.
75. Amalananda and Appayya Dīkṣita quote *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* to the effect that a mispronounced, misspelt, or wrongly used *mantra* will kill the sacrificer, 'the very words becoming like a *vajra*' (*sa vāg vajro yajamānam hinastī*). Appayya Dīkṣita also narrates a story illustrating this. K., & K.P., p. 99.
76. S.B., I. 3.28.
77. *Ibid.*, II. 1.1.
78. *Ibid.*, II. 2.42.
79. *Ibid.*, I. 2.25.
80. *Ibid.*, II. 1.1.
81. *Ibid.*, II. 1.3.
82. B., & K., pp. 106-7.
83. V., p. 227.
84. *Vedāntakalpāṭikā*, p. 7 (last para).
85. P.B., p. 19.
86. *loc. cit.*, pp. 1-2.
87. *loc. cit.* p. 2. 'Vedabāhyatvāt teṣāṃ paramparayāpi puruṣārthānupayogitvāt.'

## CHAPTER IV

(pp. 53-67)

1. For above account, V.P.S., pp. 225-31. Introductory sentences of B., on S.B., I. 1.2.
2. B., I. 1.1. 'jñānam esitavyam, taṇṇa na kevalebhyo vedāntebhyah api tu brahmamimāṃsopakarāṇebhyah', etc.

3. *loc. cit.*
4. S.B., I. 1.4.
5. B., on above; 'adūraviprakaṣeṣa kathamcit ihāpi samānam'.
6. *loc. cit.*
7. *Ibid.*, 'Mānāntara agoṣaratvena agraḥītasangatitayā apadārthatayā brahmanah', ff.
8. *Ibid.*, 'Prāptam tu adhitavedāntasya viditapadārthasambandhasya', etc.
9. The distinction between 'describing' and 'showing' was made by Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 187.
10. J. Wisdom, *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis*, p. 112.
11. XIII. 12.
12. *Kena Up.*, I. 3.
13. *Taittiriya Up.*, II. 4.9.
14. *Gītā*, XIII. 13.
15. For the entire above account, G.B., XIII. 12-14.
16. *Gītā*, XIII. 13-14.
17. *Isa Upaniṣad*, V.
18. *Svetāśvetara Up.*, III. 19.
19. *Taittiriya Aranyaka*, I. 11.
20. *Vākyapadiya*, 'upāyāḥ śikṣamānānām bālānām upalālanāḥ', etc.
21. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, V. 9.10.
22. *Taittiriya Up.*, II. 1.
23. *Chāndogya Up.* VI. 1.4.
24. *Ibid.*, VIII. 24.1.
25. *Taittiriya Up. B.*, II. 1.
26. *Taittiriya Up.* II. 4.1.
27. *Ibid.*, II. 7.1. For the whole of above account see *Taittiriya Up. B.*, II. 1.
28. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, I. 4.7.
29. *Ibid.*, II. 3.6.
30. V.P.S., pp. 289-93.
31. N.S., III. 1-3.
32. *Ibid.*, III. 104.
33. *Ibid.*, III. 96 et seq.
34. *Ibid.*, III. 106f. 'Śayānāḥ prāyaśo loke', etc.

## CHAPTER V

(pp. 68-87)

1. P.B., pp. 3, 6. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), p. 35.
2. S.B., II. 1.27. 'śabdenāpi na śakyate viruddho arthah pratyāyayitum'.
3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, II. 1. 'Na ṣa pramāṇam pramāṇāntareṇa viruddhyate.'
4. G.B., XVIII. 66. 'Śyteh prāmāṇyam na pratyakṣādi viṣaye.'
5. S.B., I. 3.33. B., p. 343.
6. *Taittiriya Samhitā*, II. 1. 1.1.
7. *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā* (Rāmākṛṣṇa Maṭh), pp. 69f.
8. B., p. 341.
9. S.B., I. 3.33. B., pp. 341-2.
10. P.B., p. 5.
11. S.B., V. 3.33. 'Etena mantrō vyākhyātah.'
12. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, II. 4.13.
13. S.B., I. 1.4.
14. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, IV. 4.5.
15. *Chāndogya Up.*, VIII. 7.1.
16. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, I. 4.7.
17. *Chāndogya Up.*, VIII. 12.1.



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18. *Muṇḍaka Up.*, II. 1.2.
19. *Kaṭha Up.*, I. 2.14.
20. *Muṇḍaka Up.*, III. 2.9.
21. *Kena Up.*, I. 3.
22. *Ibid.*, I. 4.
23. S.B., I. 1.4. 'jnānam pramāṇajanyam; pramāṇam ca yathābhūta-  
vijayam.'
24. *loc. cit.* 'jnānam na cōdanā tantram', etc.
25. For the whole of the above account of Śāṅkara's views, S.B., I. 1.4.
26. P.B., pp. 3-5. Also, A.S., p. 35.
27. S.B., I. 3.25.
28. S.B., I. 1.4.
29. B., p. 102.
30. K., p. 102. 'Tātparyam samyaktvam.'
31. For the above account of Vācaspati's views, B., pp. 343-6.
32. V.P.S., pp. 287-8.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 228-30.
34. V., pp. 181-2.
35. V.P.S., pp. 228-30.
36. V., p. 181.
37. V.P.S., p. 227.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 289.
39. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), pp. 34-5.
40. *loc. cit.*
41. B., p. 567. 'Āgamāt īśvara siddhau na dṛṣṭam anusartatyam.'
42. B.A., (Bombay), pp. 381-2. 'Tātparyagrāhakapramāṇāni hi upa-  
kramopasamhārādini eva, na tu pramāṇāntara avirodhah. Pratyakṣādi pramāṇān-  
taraviruddhepi advaita īrti tātparya nirṇaya sambhavāt'.
43. B., p. 103.
44. *Taittiriya Samhitā*, II. 6.6. 4.
45. M.D., pp. 218-22.
46. K., pp. 103-4.
47. M.D., pp. 223-5.
48. B., p. 103.
49. *Chāndogya Up.*, VI. 2.1. & VI. 16.3.
50. *Itareya Up.*, I. 1.1. & I. 3.13; III. 1.3.
51. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, I. 4.10 & IV. 4.5.
52. *Muṇḍaka Up.*, I. 1.3. & II. 2.11.
53. S.S., 2.321f.
54. Appayya Dikṣita has written a book of that name.
55. S.B., IV. 3.14.
56. S.S., *loc. cit.*
57. M.D., VI. 5.54.
58. S.S., *loc. cit.*
59. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), pp. 36-7.

## CHAPTER VI

(pp. 88-98)

1. *Īśa Upaniṣad*, 7.
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* B., I. 4.7.
3. B., I. 3.33. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), p. 34.
4. *Chāndogya Up.*, VI. 2.1—VI. 8.7.
5. For the whole of above account, *Chāndogya Up.* B., VI. 16.3.
6. N.S., II. 5; III. 44-5.
7. For the whole of above account, V.P.S., pp. 289-93.
8. N.S., III. vākya 200-4.
9. *Ibid.*, III. śloka 81 et seq. & 89 et seq.

10. *Ibid.*, III. 80.
11. *Chāndogya Up.* B., III. 14.1.
12. A.S. (Kumbakonam), pp. 34-6. Also, B., p. 343.
13. S.S., pp. 54-5.
14. V.P., chap. IV., pp. 206-7.
15. *loc. cit.*
16. V.C., 244-51. 'Aikyam tayor lakṣitayoh na vācayayoh.'
17. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri, V.P. *Prakāśikā* (Calcutta), pp. 206-7.
18. V.C. 245, 247. 'Tayorvirodhoyamupādāhikalpito.'

## CHAPTER VII

(pp. 99-111)

1. S.B., IV. 1.3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV. 3.22. 'Yatra vedāh avedāh.'
2. G.B., XIII. 2. 'Bandhāvasthāyām eva śāstrādyarthavattvam, na muktāvasthāyām.'
3. V.P.S., pp. 281-2.
4. *loc. cit.* Also, V.U., p. 124.
5. S.B., II. 1.14; & R.P. on it, S.S., p. 74.
6. N.S., III. śloka 109.
7. *Ibid.*, II. vākya 247.
8. *Ibid.*, IV. śloka 36-7.
9. S.B., II. 1.14.
10. B., p. 8 *et seq.*
11. V.U., p. 124.
12. For the above account of Vācaspati's views, B., pp. 154-5.
13. B., p. 150.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 155. 'Sākṣātkāro bhāvīkah, nāśau kāryah.'
15. K.K.K., Vol. I, para 157.
16. *Ibid.*, chap. I, see 1 *et seq.* para 86.
17. See note 2 above.
18. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* B., I. 4.7.
19. *Ibid.*, II. 4.1., *Upodghāta*.
20. *loc. cit.*
21. S.S., p. 96.
22. *Brahma Siddhi* (Madras), p. 35.
- 22A. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
23. N.S., III. śloka 284-5.
24. *Ibid.*, III. 89 *et seq.*
25. *Ibid.*, III. vākya 265 & śloka 118.
26. *Ibid.*, II. 12-14.
27. *Ibid.*, III. 125.
28. *Ibid.*, II.6.9 & IV. 71-3.
29. *Taittiriya Up.*, III. 1.1.
30. *Ibid.*, II. 1.
31. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV. 3.18.
32. *Ibid.*, IV. 3.7.
33. Si.B., *Upodghāta*.
34. V.P.S., p. 128. 'vedāntaśabdasya brahmāparokṣavagati hetutvam.'
- S.S., p. 97.
35. V.U., p. 59.
36. V., p. 103.
37. V.U., p. 59.
38. V., p. 103, 'viparyaya samskāradopālṣa, pratibaddham bhrāntyā parokṣavad avabhāṣate.'
39. V., p. 105. V.P.S., pp. 128-9.
40. B., pp. 55ff.
41. K., on above.



## REFERENCES

42. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, IV. 4.20. 'Manasāivānudraṣṭavyam.'
43. K.P., pp. 55ff.
44. *loc. cit.*

## CHAPTER VIII

(pp. 112-20)

1. S.B., I. 1.1. 'anubhavōdayasā yathā sambhavam iha pramāṇam.'
2. *Ibid.*, I. 1.4. 'Brahmātmabhāvasya śāstram antareṇa anavagamya-mānatvāt.'
3. *loc. cit.* 'īrūṭayo brahmacidyānantarameva mokṣam darśayanto madhye kāryāntaram vārayanti'.
4. *Ibid.*, III. 4.15 & II. 3.32. 'Anubhavārūḍham eva vidyā phalam.'
5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya Vārtika*, pp. 970-2.
6. S.B., IV. 2.13.
7. *Ibid.*, IV. 1.13.
8. *Ibid.*, IV. 1.14.
9. *Ibid.*, IV. 1.15. 'śva hṛdaya pratyayam brahma vedanam.'
10. S.B., I. 1.4. 'Na avagata brahmātmabhāvasya yathāpūrvam samsāritvam śakyam darśayitum.'
11. *loc. cit.*
12. *loc. cit.*
13. S.B., III. 2.24 ; & R.P., on this.
14. *Ibid.*, III. 2.25-6.
15. *Ibid.*, I. 1.4. 'Na hi unmadhitasya dvaita vijñānasya punah sambhavosti.'
16. *Ibid.*, I. 1.4. 'Vedapramāṇajamīta brahmāvagama.'
17. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, IV. 4.7.
18. *Gītā*, II. 54 *et seq.*
19. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* B., IV. 4-6.
20. W.R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism* (1899), pp. 175, 220.
21. V.P., chap. I.
22. Views of Śaṅkara and Sureśvara as explained by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Bhakti Rasāyana*, I. 21-23.
23. V.P.S., p. 270.
- 23A. For the above objections and replies, S.S., chap. III, sect. 7f.
24. S.B., I. 1.4. 'ahampratyayaṣṭayakartṛvyatirehena tatsākṣisarevabhūtastah.'
25. S.B., I. 3.7.
26. V., p. 240.
27. *Ibid.*, & V.P.S., pp. 293-4.
28. N.S., IV. 12-13.
29. N.S., II. 219.

## PART TWO

### CHAPTER I

(pp. 121-34)

1. S.B., I. 1.2.
2. *Ibid.*, II. 1.6.
3. N.S., III. 120 ; II. 1 ; II. vākya 213.
4. *Ibid.*, II. 8 ; II. 213 ; I. 12.
5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* B., II. 1.20.
6. N.S., III. vākya 206, *lōka* 84.
- 6A. *Ibid.*, III. vākya 207.
7. *Ibid.*, III. 86 ; III. 232.

8. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, II. 1.20. 'Na hi śāstram padārthān anyathā-kartum prayittam.' Also, *Praśna Up. B.*, VI. 2.
9. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, loc. cit., & I. 4.10.
10. G.B., XVIII. 66. 'Śṛteḥ prāmāṇyam na pratyakṣādi viśaye.'
11. S.B., I. 3.33; II. 1.13.
12. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam) p. 34.
13. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, I. 3.1.
14. *Kaṭha Up.*, v. 11.
15. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, III. 8.11.
16. *Ibid.*, I. 4.7.
17. N.S., III. vākya 204.
18. *Ibid.* III. śloka 44-5.
19. *Ibid.*, III. śloka 87 et seq.
20. *Ibid.*, III. 231-32.
21. loc. cit.
22. *Ibid.*, III. vākya 200.
23. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), pp. 20, 65-7.
24. B., pp. 8ff.; 343.
25. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), p. 27.
26. V.P.S., pp. 296-7. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), p. 34.
27. A.S. (Kumbakoṇam), p. 30.
28. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, II. 1.20. The quotations are from *Kaṭha Up.*, II. 21; I. 21.
- 28A. Mādhava, *Śrī Śaṅkara Vijaya*, VIII. 92-101 & Commentary *Vijaya Dinidima* on it.
29. B., I. 1.1. 'Vyavahāra pratyayān mitheti manyamāno vidvān na braddhate, pittopahatendriya iva guḍam dhūṭkṛtya tyajannapi tasya tiktatvam.'
30. For above views, S.S., pp. 50-8.
31. loc. cit.
32. K.K.K., Vol. I, para 131.
33. *Ibid.*, para 153.
34. *Ibid.*, para 155.
35. For the whole of above account, chap. I, secs. 1-11.

## CHAPTER II

(pp. 135-9)

1. Y.V., I. 40.
2. *Ibid.* & Y.B., I. 47-99.
3. Y.B., I. 1. 'yastu ekāgra cetanī sadbhūtamārtham pradyotayati kṣīnoti ca kleśān.'
4. Viśvanātha, *Siddhānta Muktvāḥi*, 65-6. V.S., p. 212.
5. V.D., pp. 128-9.
6. S.B., II. 1.1. 'Na ca atindriyānārthān īrtimantareṇa haścīt upalabhata.'
- Also, S.B., II. 3.1.
7. S.B., II. 1.3. 'Na . . . vedanirapekṣeṇa yogamārgeṇa vā nīreayasam adhigamyata.'
8. *Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*, III. 12.9.7. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, III. 9.2.6.
9. S.B., I. 3.33.
10. *Ibid.*, II. 1.3.
11. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, I. 4.7.
12. G.B., V. 27. 'Dhyānayogam samyakhārīṇasya antarangam.'
13. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā Bhāṣya*, III. 39-40.
14. G.D. (Ānandāśram), p. 216. 'Bhagavatpūjyapāddh kutrāpi brahma-vidān yogāpekṣām na vyutpādayām babhūvuh.'
15. loc. cit.



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16. K., pp. 106-7.
17. V., p. 226.
18. S.B., II. 1.1.
19. R.P., on above.
20. B., II. 1.1.
21. S.B., II. 1.1.
22. S.B., & R.P., I. 1.30.

## CHAPTER III

(pp. 140-57)

1. V.P., chap. II.
2. V., p. 218. '*Anumānam—artham niṣāpayati*', etc.
3. K.P., pp. 88-9.
4. V.P.S., p. 268.
5. V.U., p. 118.
6. N.S., III. vākya 90 ; śloka 34.
7. *Ibid.*, III. 99.
8. S.B., I. 1.2.
9. *Ibid.*, II. 2.37.
10. *Ibid.*, II. 2.38.
11. *Ibid.*, II. 2.39-40.
12. *Ibid.*, II. 2.41.
13. *Ibid.*, II. 2.38. Also B., on it.  
'*Anumānam tu dṛṣṭānusāri naivam vidhe pravartitum arhati.*'
14. R.P., II. 2.37.
15. B., II. 2.37.
16. *loc. cit.*, & R.P., II. 2.37.
17. N.D., pp. 6, 34-35.
18. S.B., II. 1.11 ; G.B., XIII. 12.
19. K.P., pp. 88-9.
20. S.B., I. 1.1. '*Vedāntavākyamimāṃsā tadavirodhi tarkopakaraṇā.*'
- S.B., p. 7. '*Kim viçārena iti çet ? . . . samāya nirākaraṇārtham.*'
21. V.U., p. 18.
22. *loc. cit.*, & V., p. 101 ; V.P.S., pp. 124, 127.
23. B., I. 1.1. '*vedāntamimāṃsā tāvaṣ tarka eva.*'
24. S.B., & R.P., I. 1.2.
25. B., on II. 1.6. '*Āgamapramāṇāśrayah, tad viçayaviveçakah, tadavirodhi.*'
26. R.P., II. 1.6.
27. *Chāndogya Up.*, VI. 8.1.
28. S.B., & R.P., II. 1.6.
29. B., II. 2. 1.
30. V.P.S., p. 268.
31. S.B., II. 2. 1.
32. N.S., III. 99.
33. V.P.S., pp. 271-2.
34. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, II. 4.5 ; IV. 5.6.
35. *Bhāṣya* on the above.
36. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* B., III. 1.1.
37. Śi. B., p. 70.
38. Quoted in N.S., IV. 18.
39. N.S., chap. III, *passim*.
40. *Ibid.*, IV, śloka 3-10.
41. *Ibid.*, chap. III *passim*.
42. *Ibid.*, III. 6.
- 42A. *Ibid.*, III. vākya 90, III. 99ff.
43. *Chāndogya Up.*, IV. 15.1.

44. *Kena Up.*, I. 2.
45. *Chāndogya Up.*, VIII. 12.4-5.
46. *Ibid.*, VIII. 3.4 and *bhāṣya* on it.
47. *Ibid.*, VI. 8.7.
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51. Si. B., & commentary on it, pp. 70-3.
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57. *Chāndogya Up.*, VII. 1.3.
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## CHAPTER IV

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6. III. 26.
7. III. 27-9.
8. III. 48.
9. III. 32.
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27. *Ibid.*, II. 3.7.
28. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, I. 1.1.
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44. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā Bhāṣya*, III. 23.
45. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. B.*, II. 1.
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47. *Ibid.*, II. 2.38. 'Brahmavādi(nā) na avaiyam . . . yathā dṛṣṭameva sarvam abhyupagantavyam.'
48. B., II. 2.37-38. 'Tena(āgmena) adṛṣṭāni dṛṣṭaviparitāni rubahūnyapi kalpyamānāni na lohagandhitām āvahanti.'
49. K.P., II. 1.6.
50. R.P., I. 4.27 ; II. 2.37.

## CHAPTER V

(pp. 166-70)

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2. K.K.K., Vol. I, paras 86-7.
3. N.D., I. 58.
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5. *loc. cit.*

## CHAPTER VI

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2. R.P., II. 1.9.
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16. B., I. 4.14.
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## BOOK TWO

### PART ONE

#### CHAPTER I

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22. *Ibid.*, V. 10-12.
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3. *Rg Veda*, X. 90.9. 'Yajñāt ṛcah sāmāni jajñire.'
4. Cf. *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparva*, 232.24.
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27. *loc. cit.*
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30. *Ibid.*, V. 37-51.
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34. *Ibid.*, I. 1.3. In this *sūtra* 'tadvačanāt āmnīyarya prāmāṇyam', the word *tad* can refer only to *dharma* defined in the immediately preceding *sūtra*. It cannot mean God in that context. Śāṅkara Miśra recognizes this when he says 'taditi sannihitam dharman eva parāṅśati'. *Tad* in the very last *sūtra* of Kapāda can and does mean God or sages.
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7. Cf. Kālidāsa, *Raghuvamśa*, I. 1.
8. J. G. Herder, *Origin of Language*.
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


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